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Abstract
Climate change threatens food production systems and the livelihoods of agriculture-
dependent populations, particularly in developing countries. Farm household's ex-
posure to weather changes such as prolonged drought, late start of rains, and shifting
rainfall patterns causes greater loss of incomes and threatens food security. Partic-
ularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, farm households mostly have limited access to formal
risk management instruments to deal with the myriad of production-related risks
that they face. Therefore, they mostly rely on a range of traditional risk manage-
ment strategies to avoid or minimize these production-related losses. However, these
traditional or informal risk management strategies are mostly incomplete, subopti-
mal, and mitigate only a small part of overall risk. Additionally, each of these risk
management strategies is associated with dierent cost and resource use or alloca-
tion implications. This PhD research, therefore, sought to explore the impact of
various risk management strategies employed by Senegalese farm households across
multiple outcomes including, agriculture incomes and dispersions around income,
technical eciency, and food security. In doing so, the study sought to provide
context-specic information to guide farmers and policymakers to better manage
production-related risks by selecting the right portfolio or mix or risk management
strategies. The PhD research which is a collection of 5 papers employed several
econometric analyses using a nationally representative farm household survey data
collected in 2017.
The rst paper examined the impact of climate change in the form of rainfall vari-
ability on inter-household income inequality, daily food calorie availability, and agri-
cultural labour productivity in Senegal, and the role of adaptation strategies. It em-
ployed the recently developed model-averaging techniques (Weighted Average Least
Squares) to address model uncertainty and the Gini decomposition approach. The
result showed that rainfall variability negatively aects income equality by increasing
the Gini elasticity of agriculture incomes. Particularly for agriculture incomes, the
study found that the Gini elasticity increases for every deviation in rainfall. Because
agriculture income sources constitute the largest share and contributor to household
income inequality, any shocks to the sector will largely be responsible for any ob-
served increases in income inequality. The study also nds that rainfall variability
decreases household daily food calorie availability and agricultural labour produc-
tivity. The study also nds varying impacts of adaptation strategies on household
outcomes, however, insurance (risk transfer) use appeared to be more eective in
addressing rainfall variability impacts.
The second paper evaluated the adoption eect of dierent risk management strate-
gies employed by farm households on agriculture income and dispersions around
incomes. To achieve this, the study employed a Multinomial Endogenous Switching
Regression model to control for potential selectivity bias problems and a Moment-
Based Approach. The empirical results showed that the use of ex-ante risk man-
agement strategies signicantly reduces agriculture incomes while the use of ex-post
strategies either in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strate-
iii
gies signicantly increases agriculture incomes. All the risk management strategies
employed by households signicantly reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes,
however, ex-post strategies produce the largest dispersion reduction eect.
The third study analysed the technical eciency implications of the risk manage-
ment strategies employed by farm households. The study employed a sample selec-
tion stochastic production frontier to control for potential self-selectivity biases in
adoption together with a meta-frontier model to evaluate the impact of risk man-
agement strategies on technical eciency. The empirical results showed that risk
management has implications on farm household's technical eciency. The results
also revealed that farm households adopting ex-post risk management strategies ap-
pear to have a relatively higher technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier
compared to the other risk management strategies. Households, adopting ex-ante
risk management strategies were observed to be the least technically ecient com-
pared to households not managing risks or those employing ex-post risk management
strategies in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strategies.
The results also suggested that managing risks using multiple strategies does not
necessarily result in the highest technical eciency gain compared to the use of
single or isolated strategies.
The fourth study assessed the complementary impact of productivity-enhancing
technologies (mineral fertilizer and improved seeds) with insurance adoption on
technical eciency by comparing two distinct farm households  one adopting fertil-
izer and improved seeds with insurance and the other fertilizer and improved seeds
without insurance. The study employed a sample selection stochastic production
frontier with a meta-frontier model, propensity score matching (PSM) approach,
and an endogenous switching regression model to control for potential biases. The
results showed that households that adopted productivity-enhancing technologies
without insurance tend to be more technically ecient on average compared to those
that adopted productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance. Nonetheless, the
technology gap ratios of productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance adopt-
ing households were signicantly higher than households adopting productivity-
enhancing technologies without insurance, suggesting that productivity-enhancing
technologies with insurance adopters appear to be slightly more ecient in adopting
the best available technology. The study also nds that adopting productivity-
enhancing technologies with insurance appears to decrease the technical eciency
of productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance adopters by about 50.17%
at the meta-frontier. Conversely, adopting insurance with productivity-enhancing
technologies could potentially increase the mean technical eciency of productivity-
enhancing technologies only adopters by about 37.44%. The results suggest that
lower observed technical eciencies for productivity-enhancing technologies with in-
surance adopters may be driven by unobserved eort or behavioural biases of farmers
which can be an important source of heterogeneity in the observed treatment eects.
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The last paper assessed the joint welfare impacts of managing climatic risk through
the adoption of risk-reducing technologies and insurance by comparing three distinct
farm households: 1) non-adopters of mineral fertilizer, improved seeds and insurance,
2) mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adopters without insurance and 3) mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds adopters with insurance. To achieve the objective of
the study, a Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression model was employed to
control for potential selectivity bias problems. The results showed that the adoption
of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or without insurance is associated with
signicant increases in household food calorie availability and crop income per capita.
However, complementing the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with
insurance leads to higher household welfare outcomes compared to adopting mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance. The ndings of this study are
important not only in helping farm households to rene their risk management
decisions but also in selecting the optimum set of strategies when faced with risky
situations. Additionally, the identied optimal risk management strategies provide
useful information to policymakers to better design, target, and scale up intervention
programs and appropriate risk management policies.
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Zusammenfassung
Der Klimawandel bedroht die Lebensmittelproduktionssysteme und die Lebensgrund-
lagen der von der Landwirtschaft abhängigen Bevölkerung, insbesondere in den
Entwicklungsländern. Die Gefährdung der landwirtschaftlichen Haushalte durch
Wetterveränderungen wie anhaltende Dürre, verspäteten Regenbeginn und verän-
derte Niederschlagsmuster führt zu gröÿeren Einkommensverlusten und bedroht die
Ernährungssicherheit. Vor allem in den afrikanischen Ländern südlich der Sahara
haben die landwirtschaftlichen Haushalte nur begrenzten Zugang zu formellen Risi-
komanagementinstrumenten, um mit den unzähligen produktionsbezogenen Risiken
umzugehen, denen sie ausgesetzt sind. Daher verlassen sie sich meist auf eine Reihe
traditioneller Risikomanagementstrategien, um diese produktionsbedingten Verluste
zu vermeiden oder zu minimieren. Diese traditionellen oder informellen Risikoma-
nagementstrategien sind jedoch meist unvollständig, suboptimal und mindern nur
einen kleinen Teil des Gesamtrisikos. Darüber hinaus ist jede dieser Risikomanage-
mentstrategien mit unterschiedlichen Kosten und Auswirkungen auf die Ressourcen-
nutzung oder -zuweisung verbunden. Im Rahmen dieser Doktorarbeit wurde daher
versucht, die Auswirkungen verschiedener Risikomanagementstrategien, die von se-
negalesischen landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten eingesetzt werden, auf verschiedene
Ergebnisse zu untersuchen, darunter landwirtschaftliche Einkommen und Einkom-
mensstreuungen, technische Ezienz und Ernährungssicherheit. Auf diese Weise
sollte die Studie kontextspezische Informationen liefern, die Landwirten und poli-
tischen Entscheidungsträgern dabei helfen, produktionsbezogene Risiken durch die
Auswahl des richtigen Portfolios oder Mixes von Risikomanagementstrategien besser
zu bewältigen. Die Doktorarbeit, die aus fünf Beiträgen besteht, verwendet mehrere
ökonometrische Analysen unter Verwendung von Daten einer national repräsentati-
ven landwirtschaftlichen Haushaltserhebung aus dem Jahr 2017.
Die erste Arbeit untersuchte die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels in Form von Nie-
derschlagsvariabilität auf die Einkommensungleichheit zwischen Haushalten, die täg-
liche Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungskalorien und die landwirtschaftliche Arbeitspro-
duktivität im Senegal sowie die Rolle von Anpassungsstrategien. Dabei wurden die
kürzlich entwickelten Modellmittelungstechniken (Weighted Average Least Squares)
zur Berücksichtigung von Modellunsicherheiten und der Ansatz der Gini-Zerlegung
verwendet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Niederschlagsvariabilität die Einkom-
mensgleichheit negativ beeinusst, indem sie die Gini-Elastizität der landwirtschaft-
lichen Einkommen erhöht. Insbesondere für die landwirtschaftlichen Einkommen
ergab die Studie, dass die Gini-Elastizität bei jeder Abweichung der Niederschlags-
menge zunimmt. Da die landwirtschaftlichen Einkommensquellen den gröÿten Anteil
an der Einkommensungleichheit der Haushalte haben, sind Schocks in diesem Sektor
weitgehend für den beobachteten Anstieg der Einkommensungleichheit verantwort-
lich. Die Studie zeigt auch, dass die Variabilität der Niederschläge die tägliche Ver-
fügbarkeit von Nahrungsmittelkalorien und die landwirtschaftliche Arbeitsprodukti-
vität der Haushalte verringert. Die Studie zeigt auch unterschiedliche Auswirkungen
der Anpassungsstrategien auf die Ergebnisse der Haushalte, wobei die Nutzung von
Versicherungen (Risikotransfer) bei der Bewältigung der Auswirkungen von Nieder-
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schlagsschwankungen eektiver zu sein scheint.
In der zweiten Studie wurde die Auswirkung verschiedener Risikomanagementstra-
tegien, die von landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten eingesetzt werden, auf das landwirt-
schaftliche Einkommen und die Einkommensstreuung untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck
wurden in der Studie ein multinomiales endogenes Switching-Regressionsmodell zur
Kontrolle möglicher Selektivitätsverzerrungen und ein augenblicksbasierter Ansatz
verwendet. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Einsatz von
Ex-ante-Risikomanagementstrategien die landwirtschaftlichen Einkommen signi-
kant reduziert, während der Einsatz von Ex-post-Strategien entweder isoliert oder
in Kombination mit Ex-ante-Risikomanagementstrategien die landwirtschaftlichen
Einkommen signikant erhöht. Alle von den Haushalten angewandten
Risikomanagement-Strategien verringern die Streuung der landwirtschaftlichen Ein-
kommen erheblich, wobei die Ex-post-Strategien die gröÿte Streuungsreduzierung
bewirken.
In der dritten Studie wurden die Auswirkungen der von den landwirtschaftlichen
Haushalten angewandten Risikomanagementstrategien auf die technische Ezienz
analysiert. In der Studie wurde eine stochastische Produktionsgrenze für die Stich-
probenauswahl verwendet, um potenzielle Verzerrungen durch Selbstselektion bei
der Annahme zu kontrollieren, sowie ein Meta-Frontier-Modell, um die Auswirkun-
gen der Risikomanagementstrategien auf die technische Ezienz zu bewerten. Die
empirischen Ergebnisse zeigten, dass das Risikomanagement Auswirkungen auf die
technische Ezienz der landwirtschaftlichen Haushalte hat. Die Ergebnisse zeigten
auch, dass landwirtschaftliche Haushalte, die Ex-post-Risikomanagementstrategien
anwenden, im Vergleich zu den anderen Risikomanagementstrategien eine relativ
höhere technische Ezienz in Bezug auf die Meta-Grenze zu haben scheinen. Haus-
halte, die Ex-ante-Risikomanagementstrategien anwenden, waren im Vergleich zu
Haushalten, die kein Risikomanagement betreiben, oder zu Haushalten, die Ex-
post-Risikomanagementstrategien isoliert oder in Kombination mit Ex-ante-
Risikomanagementstrategien anwenden, am wenigsten technisch ezient. Die Er-
gebnisse deuten auch darauf hin, dass ein Risikomanagement mit mehreren Strate-
gien nicht unbedingt zu den höchsten technischen Ezienzgewinnen im Vergleich
zur Anwendung einzelner oder isolierter Strategien führt.
Die vierte Studie untersuchte die komplementären Auswirkungen produktivitäts-
steigernder Technologien (Mineraldünger und verbessertes Saatgut) in Verbindung
mit der Einführung von Versicherungen auf die technische Ezienz, indem sie zwei
verschiedene landwirtschaftliche Haushalte miteinander verglich - einen, der Dünger
und verbessertes Saatgut mit Versicherungen einsetzt, und einen, der Dünger und
verbessertes Saatgut ohne Versicherungen einsetzt. In der Studie wurde eine sto-
chastische Produktionsgrenze mit einem Meta-Frontier-Modell, einem Propensity-
Score-Matching-Ansatz (PSM) und einem endogenen Switching-Regressionsmodell
verwendet, um mögliche Verzerrungen zu kontrollieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass
Haushalte, die produktivitätssteigernde Technologien ohne Versicherung einsetzen,
im Durchschnitt technisch ezienter sind als Haushalte, die produktivitätssteigernde
Technologien mit Versicherung einsetzen. Dennoch waren die Technologieabstände
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der Haushalte, die produktivitätssteigernde Technologien mit Versicherung anwand-
ten, signikant höher als die der Haushalte, die produktivitätssteigernde Techno-
logien ohne Versicherung anwandten, was darauf hindeutet, dass Haushalte, die
produktivitätssteigernde Technologien mit Versicherung anwandten, oenbar etwas
ezienter bei der Anwendung der besten verfügbaren Technologie sind. Die Studie
zeigt auch, dass die Einführung produktivitätssteigernder Technologien mit Versiche-
rung die technische Ezienz der Anwender produktivitätssteigernder Technologien
mit Versicherung an der Metagrenze um etwa 50,17% verringert. Umgekehrt könn-
te die Einführung von Versicherungen in Verbindung mit produktivitätssteigernden
Technologien die durchschnittliche technische Ezienz derjenigen, die nur produk-
tivitätssteigernde Technologien einsetzen, um etwa 37,44% erhöhen. Die Ergebnisse
deuten darauf hin, dass die beobachteten niedrigeren technischen Ezienzen für pro-
duktivitätssteigernde Technologien mit Versicherungsabschluss auf unbeobachteten
Aufwand oder Verhaltensverzerrungen der Landwirte zurückzuführen sein könnten,
die eine wichtige Quelle für Heterogenität bei den beobachteten Behandlungseekten
sein können.
Im letzten Beitrag wurden die gemeinsamen Wohlfahrtseekte des Managements von
Klimarisiken durch den Einsatz von risikomindernden Technologien und Versiche-
rungen bewertet, indem drei verschiedene landwirtschaftliche Haushalte verglichen
wurden: 1) Haushalte, die Mineraldünger, verbessertes Saatgut und Versicherun-
gen nicht einsetzen, 2) Haushalte, die Mineraldünger und verbessertes Saatgut ohne
Versicherung einsetzen und 3) Haushalte, die Mineraldünger und verbessertes Saat-
gut mit Versicherung einsetzen. Um das Ziel der Studie zu erreichen, wurde ein
multinomiales endogenes Switching-Regressionsmodell verwendet, um mögliche Se-
lektivitätsverzerrungen zu kontrollieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Einführung
von Mineraldünger und verbessertem Saatgut mit oder ohne Versicherung mit einer
signikanten Steigerung der Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungsmittelkalorien und des Pro-
Kopf-Einkommens verbunden ist. Die Ergänzung des Einsatzes von Mineraldünger
und verbessertem Saatgut durch eine Versicherung führt jedoch zu höheren Wohl-
fahrtsergebnissen für die Haushalte im Vergleich zum Einsatz von Mineraldünger und
verbessertem Saatgut ohne Versicherung. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie sind nicht nur
wichtig, um den landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten dabei zu helfen, ihre Risikomana-
gemententscheidungen zu verfeinern, sondern auch, um in Risikosituationen die op-
timalen Strategien auszuwählen. Darüber hinaus liefern die ermittelten optimalen
Risikomanagement-Strategien nützliche Informationen für politische Entscheidungs-
träger, um Interventionsprogramme und geeignete Risikomanagement-Maÿnahmen
besser zu konzipieren, auszurichten und auszuweiten.
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The agricultural sector is one of the most important sectors experiencing the ef-
fect of climate change. Several studies (e.g., Parry et al., 2009; Hertel et al., 2010;
IPCC, 2014; FAO et al., 2018; Homan et al., 2018) have shown that Sub-Saharan
Africa will be the region largely impacted by climate change due to its heavy re-
liance on agriculture for livelihoods. In Senegal, climate-sensitive sectors such as
agriculture, livestock, and sheries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters and
the eects of climate change (USAID, 2017). With agriculture being predominantly
rain-fed, more than 95% of the total cropped area in Senegal depends on rain-fed
systems, and most farmers practise subsistence agriculture (Khouma et al., 2013).
Simultaneously, growing evidence suggests that climate change is already aecting
agriculture and food security in Senegal. The country in recent years is experiencing
erratic rainfall patterns and rising sea levels which are increasing the rates of soil
erosion, salinization in agricultural soils, and destruction of critical infrastructure
(ANACIM et al., 2013; IFAD, 2019).
The subject of farm household adaptation to climate change in developing countries
are well known and studied. Most empirical studies (e.g., Di Falco and Veronesi,
2013; Kassie et al., 2015; Roco et al., 2017; Teklewold et al., 2017; Gorst et al., 2018;
Khanal et al., 2018; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019; Torres et al., 2019) have been devoted
to understanding the impact of mostly agronomic adaptation strategies on house-
hold welfare outcomes. Some other studies have also provided important insights
into the channels of climate change impacts and weaknesses of several adaptation or
risk management approaches. The empirical literature for instance identies four im-
portant channels through which climate shocks impact farm households. First, they
inuence households' decisions to adopt productivity-enhancing inputs and impose
ex-ante barriers to their use (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Dercon and Christiaensen,
2011; Amare et al., 2018). Secondly, they reinforce changes in production and invest-
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ment portfolio towards farm enterprises that are less vulnerable to shocks, but at the
same time may also be less remunerative compared to others (Birthal and Hazrana,
2019). Thirdly, they cause potential deviation between expected and real outcomes
(Schanit-Chatterjee, 2010; Obiri and Driver, 2017). Fourthly, climate shocks drive
household poverty through the destruction of livelihood assets, increases in food
prices and reductions in consumption (Hallegatte et al., 2016; Hertel et al., 2010).
The impact of farm household adaptation to climate change is highly contentious be-
cause the continuum nature of risks in agriculture implies that dierent instruments
are best suited to address dierent risks. Simultaneously, because it is virtually
impossible to address all climate change-related risks at once, it is necessary to pri-
oritize interventions based on evaluating trade-os between changes in risk, expected
returns, and other variables. Building farm household's resilience to climate-related
shocks thus requires an understanding of the eectiveness and impact of risk manage-
ment measures (adaptation) across several outcomes. Although a signicant body
of research in existence have assessed the impact of climate change on agriculture,
further research is needed to identify the impact of adaptation or risk management
strategies on multiple outcomes. Particularly for the study country Senegal, large
empirical research gaps exist on the subject of adaptation and its impact on farm
households. The available literature on Senegal only provides anecdotal evidence at
best. Motivated by these research gaps, this PhD research sought to explore the
impact of climate change and various adaptation strategies herein risk management
strategies across multiple outcomes including, agriculture incomes and dispersions
around income, technical eciency, and food security of Senegalese farm households.
Globally, cognizance of the impacts of climate-related shocks has led to an increased
focus on reducing smallholder farmers' exposure and increasing the resilience of
production systems and livelihoods to adverse impacts (World Bank, 2016). Because
risks faced by farmers are both numerous, complex, and interconnected, they vary
in their levels of frequency and severity and have profound short-term and long-term
impacts on both income and livelihoods. This means that a singular blueprint for
risk management is not feasible. Farmers especially in developing countries when
facing climate-related shocks have heavily relied on several traditional or informal
risk management tools to deal with such shocks largely due to limited access to
formal risk management instruments such as insurance or credit. Farm households
use these risk management tools simultaneously or in combinations to deal with
agricultural risks (Harwood et al., 1999; Makki et al., 2001; Flaten et al., 2005;
Velandia et al., 2009; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Ullah et al., 2015; World Bank,
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2016). In most cases, they are assumed to select a combination of risk management
strategies that, for example, maximize expected net returns subject to the degree of
risk they are willing to accept (Harwood et al., 1999; Tomek and Peterson, 2001).
Traditional or informal strategies employed by households usually include agronomic
adaptation practices such as conservation farming practices, mulching, sustainable
land management (World Bank, 2016; Baiyeri and Aba, 2017; Obiri and Driver,
2017), diversifying income sources through multiple farm enterprises or o-farm
activities (Kijima et al., 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Di
Falco and Chavas, 2009; Di Falco et al., 2010; Tangermann, 2011; Bezabih and Di
Falco, 2012; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019), household cop-
ing strategies such as labour market participation, reduced consumption, and sales
of assets (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Fafchamps, 1999; Dixon et al., 2001; Belay
et al., 2005; Demeke et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016). Other strategies include pro-
ducing lower risk outputs (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Carter and Barrett,
2006; Barnett et al., 2008), informal risk-sharing arrangements such as share ten-
ancy contracts, traditional money-lending, and risk-sharing within extended families
and other community networks (Zeuli, 1999; Anderson, 2001; Barnett et al., 2008),
informal insurance such as dependence on relatives and neighbours for material and
moral support (World Bank, 2005a,b, 2016), and employing risk-reducing inputs or
technologies (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001; World Bank, 2005b; Barnett et al.,
2008). Beyond these, recent innovations in formal insurance in the form of index-
based risk transfer products (Deng et al., 2007b,a; Huirne et al., 2007; Barnett et al.,
2008; Velandia et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016)and production and
market or sales contracts (Makus et al., 1990; Harwood et al., 1999; World Bank,
2005b) are increasingly playing an important role in helping households better man-
age climate-related risks.
However, the reliance on these largely traditional risk management strategies to
avoid or minimize losses are mostly incomplete, suboptimal and mitigate only a small
part of the overall risk (Siegel and Alwang, 1999; Dercon, 2002; Alderman, 2008; Bar-
nett et al., 2008; Deressa et al., 2010; Kouamé, 2010). For example, covariate agri-
culture shocks often aect entire regions, thus, local mutual insurance schemes can
break down (Hazell, 1992; Dercon, 1996, 2002; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993;
Townsend, 1994; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Traditional or household-level risk-
management strategies are mostly ineective (Skees et al., 2002; World Bank, 2005a)
because they only achieve partial risk coverage at a very high cost and are in some
cases localized and limited in scope. In addition, informal risk transfer measures
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such as socially constructed reciprocity obligations within various social networks,
semi-formal micronance, rotating savings, and credit marginalize the most vulnera-
ble and have high hidden costs (World Bank, 2001a,b, 2005a,b). Empirical evidence
(see Platteau, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Santos and Barrett, 2006) also sug-
gest that access to these informal risk transfer measures are positively related to
social factors such as existing wealth, meaning this can prevent reciprocity obliga-
tions and hence the poorest of the poor have little to gain from such arrangements.
At the same time, such arrangements are fragile, inequitable, and untimely and can
leave individuals exposed to risk while at the same time creating a dependency that
has dire consequences (Carter, 1997; World Bank, 2005a).
Furthermore, there is an implied risk premium or cost for all of these risk manage-
ment strategies which can be very high (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Mor-
duch, 1995; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Deressa et al., 2010; World Bank, 2016).
For instance, the implied risk premium for self-insurance strategies employed by
farm households such as diversication, producing lower risk outputs, or employing
risk-reducing inputs or technologies is either the direct or the opportunity cost of
undertaking the strategy. According to Kahan (2008), the cost could be expressed
by the amount of resources tied up in order for a farm household to manage their
risks more eectively. Such implied costs are easy to identify in some instances,
while in others, the cost is less recognisable. At the same time, some of these risk
management strategies can potentially generate adverse external eects. Dercon
(1996), Skees et al. (2002), and Barrett and Swallow (2006) for instance observed
pecuniary externalities in the case of distress asset sales following covariate shocks.
For example, mass selling of livestock during a major shock such as drought can drive
livestock prices down in situations where covariate risks have impacts across large re-
gions, hence bringing no increased income gains for households. Furthermore, some
authors (see Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003) also
tend to suggest the occurrence of such impacts even in the case of localized adverse
shocks if markets for the asset are not spatially integrated.
Some empirical studies (see Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995;
Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002) have found considerable eciency losses associated
with risk mitigation, typically due to lack of specialization and the need for farm-
ers to make trade-os between income variability and protability. Skees et al.
(2002) also observed that ex-post risk management strategies involving coping mea-
sures such as reduced consumption and sales of assets are costly. Some studies (see
Bhandari et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2008; Amare et al., 2018) suggest that farm
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households that use risk coping mechanisms are unable to recover the loss of assets
ex-post the shock. Hence, liquidating productive assets may also not be a viable risk
management option for the poorest of the poor (Barnett et al., 2008) with empirical
evidence (see Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Kazianga and Udry, 2006) suggesting
that extremely poor households recognize the danger of such sales of assets and thus
choose to waive consumption (e.g. reduced expenditures on school fees, health care,
and food consumption) rather than further liquidating assets. Waiving household
consumption also has severe implications mostly through reductions in the value
of human assets, further presenting not only a barrier to poverty alleviation but
also reinforcing poverty (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Dercon and Hoddinott, 2003;
Thomas et al., 2004; Hoddinott, 2006; Kouamé, 2010). The need of households
to smooth consumption against idiosyncratic and correlated shocks which they do
through coping strategies, also comes at a serious cost in terms of production e-
ciency and reduced prots, thus lowering the overall level of household consumption
(World Bank, 2005b).
Diversication, as a risk management strategy, can hinder development since gains
are possible when households specialize (Skees et al., 2002). Furthermore, diversica-
tion may not actually spread certain types of risk, in particular, weather events that
cause widespread losses. Implying that when covariate risks occur, it may impact a
variety of sources of income such as own farm, agricultural labour, and non-farm in-
come hence diversication may not necessarily be an eective strategy (Skees et al.,
2002). Furthermore, diversication could imply farmers shift the share of land use
under high-value crops such as cash and permanent crops and this reallocation can
have a detrimental eect not only on agriculture income but also allocative and
technical eciency. Furthermore, diversication can reduce the yields of cash crops
relative to staple crops, and potentially increase the level of staple crops planted
(Mullins et al., 2018). This is because farmers devote a larger share of land to
safer, traditional varieties or staple crops than to riskier high-yielding varieties or
high-value crops (Morduch, 1995; Salazar-Espinoza et al., 2015). In the nutshell,
farmers tend to use resources sub-optimally leading to less productivity on average
than other strategies that farmers could have followed if the risk could be ignored
for instance (Anderson, 2001). Other studies (see Purdy et al., 1997; Barry et al.,
2001; Poon and Weersink, 2011) have also shown that farm enterprise diversity does
not always lower farm income volatility, suggesting that encouraging a wider mix of
enterprises is not always an eective strategy to reduce uctuations in farm income.
For instance, Schoney et al. (1994) found that despite several crops typically having
a risk-reducing eect, these benets were typically oset by the lower gross incomes
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linked with such levels of diversication.
Index-based insurance products in agriculture serve two main purposes, reducing vul-
nerability by compensating producers for the economic losses suered from insured
events and increasing productivity through increased investment by securing credit
in case of loan default due to insurable events (Barnett et al., 2008; Kouamé, 2010;
D'Alessandro et al., 2015). However, despite index-based insurance products being
a powerful ex-ante instrument to address risk before it materializes, one signicant
limitation is the existence of basis risk (Miranda and Vedenov, 2001; World Bank,
2005b; Barnett et al., 2008; Hazell et al., 2010; Jensen and Barrett, 2017; Jensen
et al., 2018). As suggested by the World Bank (2005b) and Schanit-Chatterjee
(2010), the presence of basis risks implies that a farm household can experience a
loss and yet receive no payment. Conversely, it is also possible that the household
will not experience a loss and yet receive a payment. Basis risk occurs because
the index upon which the insurance is developed is not perfectly correlated with
farm-level losses (Barnett et al., 2008).
The eectiveness of index-based insurance as a risk management tool is therefore de-
pendent on how positively farm-level losses are correlated with the underlying index
(World Bank, 2005b). Barnett et al. (2008) argue that index-based insurance prod-
ucts can be a highly eective risk management tool if basis risk is relatively small and
ineective if basis risk is large. Some studies have also found contradictory impacts
of insurance. For example, Giné and Yang (2009) nd index insurance contracts to
signicantly reduce investment in a new agricultural opportunity. de Nicola (2015)
nds that in cases where single, low-technology options are available, insurance tends
to reduce total input investments, and it weakens farmers' precautionary motives to
overinvest. Farrin and Murray (2014) report a negative eect of insurance on wealth,
as in good years farmers pay a premium but do not receive an indemnity payment.
Giné et al. (2010) also observed that index-insurance products could only improve
welfare if other risk-sharing mechanisms employed by households are insucient.
Dercon et al. (2014) argue that index insurance is particularly benecial to groups
that are able to hedge idiosyncratic risks in an informal manner.
Some insurance schemes have also been observed to reduce the use of production
diversication or, reduce and even eliminate the demand for other formal risk hedg-
ing/transfer products (Schanit-Chatterjee, 2010; Nigus et al., 2018; Matsuda et al.,
2019). Supplementary to risk management strategies employed by farm households,
public risk-management strategies targeting farm households also have limitation in
terms of coverage, weak institutional linkages among stakeholders who deal with risk
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management, poor early warning mechanisms, and dependence on foreign sources
(World Bank, 2005a; Devereux and Guenther, 2007).
1.2 Research objectives
The general objective of this PhD research is to assess farm household adaptation to
climate shocks in Senegal and its impact on several welfare indicators. Specically,
the PhD research:
1. Examined the impact of climate change in the form of rainfall variability on
inter-household inequality, food security, and labour productivity
2. Evaluated the impact and eectiveness of risk management strategies on house-
hold agricultural incomes and dispersions around agriculture incomes
3. Analysed the implication of risk management under climate change on farm
household technical eciency
4. Assessed the complementary impact of productivity-enhancing technologies
(PET) with insurance adoption on technical eciency.
5. Assessed the welfare impacts of managing climate risk through the joint adop-
tion of risk-reducing technologies and insurance
1.3 Relevance of the study
The PhD research study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First,
the study empirically contributes to our understanding of how current moisture
stress-related climatic events, shape Senegalese farm household outcomes today. The
study contributed to the current understanding of how climate change in the form of
rainfall variability can drive income inequality and agricultural labour productivity.
Secondly, this study contributed to the current understanding of the eectiveness
of various risk management strategies employed by households in terms of reduc-
ing dispersion around agriculture incomes. This helps farm households to not only
rene their decisions but also select the optimum set of strategies when faced with
risky situations. Besides farm households, the identied optimal risk management
strategies provide useful information to policymakers to better design, target, and
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scale up intervention programs and appropriate risk management policies. At the
same time, the holistic analysis of this study conrmed the results of existing studies
that have emphasized the importance of insurance in risk management in terms of
unlocking demand and increasing investments in productivity-enhancing technolo-
gies, and also improving general household welfare outcomes. However, the present
study also identied a new form of moral hazard problems with insurance that has
not yet been emphasised in the existing literature. Understanding the impact of
risk management strategies employed by households on technical eciency is also
important for designing performance-improvement programs that can help farmers
better optimize the returns on the use of these risk management strategies.
1.4 Data
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the
larger Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricul-
tural Policy Support Project which was funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) under the "Feed The Future" initiative. The
survey was conducted between April and May 2017. The survey covered all the 14
administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments except for the departments
of Dakar, Pikine, and Guédiawaye due to a lack of agricultural activities. In total,
42 agricultural departments were included in the survey. A general census of popu-
lation and housing, agriculture and livestock conducted in 2013 showed that about
755,532 agricultural households practised agriculture, with about 61% (458,797) of
the farming households practising rainfed agriculture. The survey design, therefore,
included a global sample of 6,340 farm households in 1260 rural census districts and
the 42 agricultural departments. The sample represented a survey rate of 1.4%, i.e.,
about 1 household out of every 72. The sample distribution considered the overall
survey rates and the agricultural weight of the stratum.
The survey was focused on cereals, horticultural, and fruit and vegetables value
chains. The survey design was a two-stage, nationally based random survey that
included rural census districts as the primary units and farm households as the sec-
ondary units. The method consisted of rst dividing the statistical population (i.e.,
agricultural households) into the primary units so that each of them is unambigu-
ously related to a well-dened primary unit. Then samples were drawn in two stages.
In the rst stage, a sample of rural census districts was drawn and in the second
stage, a sample of agricultural households was selected at the level of each primary
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unit. In rural census districts where rainfed agriculture was practised and localized
crops were grown such as Senegal River Valley and Niayes Market Gardening Zone,
stratication of the rural census districts was done before agricultural households
were selected.
The agricultural survey was geared towards estimating the level of the main agricul-
tural production of family farms. The survey provided information on the physical
characteristics of cultivated plots (geolocation and area) and major investments
made at their level (agricultural inputs, cultural operations, soil management, and
restoration), level of agricultural equipment, agricultural income, agricultural risks,
and adaptation strategies1. Specically, the data collected in the survey included
information on household demographic characteristics, plot and land holdings, agri-
cultural equipment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017 growing season,
credit and extension access, membership of farmer-based organizations, inputs use
and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes, and processing of agricultural pro-
duce. Others included household consumption, access to amenities, non-farm and
livestock revenue, remittance, agricultural insurance, risks, and production-related
constraints and risk adaptation strategies, input subsidies access, and their percep-
tions.
1.5 Thesis structure
This PhD study is a collection of ve papers. The rst paper which is presented in
Chapter 2 was a general opening to the subject of my PhD research. In this paper,
I examined the impact of climate change in the form of rainfall variability on inter-
household income inequality, daily food calorie availability, and agricultural labour
productivity in Senegal and the role of adaptation strategies. The study employed
the recently developed model-averaging techniques that address issues related to
model uncertainty and controlled for household vulnerability factors. The empirical
results revealed that rainfall variability negatively aects income inequality, and de-
creases household daily food calorie availability and agriculture labour productivity.
Adaptation strategies produced varying eects across the three household welfare
1The survey specically asked farm households about the adaptation strategies they employ
when faced with risk. These strategies are in the nutshell meant to manage production and
climate-related risks. Thus, these are risk management strategies, hence throughout this thesis,
risk management strategies is used. Readers are however to note that in this context, adaptation
strategies and risk management strategies are one and the same since they are meant to reduce
risk exposure or mitigate the adverse impacts of risks.
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outcomes, but risk transfer (insurance) use was found to better help households deal
with rainfall variability related shocks.
In Chapter 3, the study evaluated the eect of dierent risk management strategies
employed by farm households on agriculture income and dispersions around incomes.
The study employed a Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression model to con-
trol for potential selectivity bias problems and a Moment-Based Approach. The
study found that the use of ex-ante risk management strategies signicantly reduces
agriculture incomes while the use of ex-post strategies either in isolation or in com-
bination with ex-ante risk management strategies signicantly increases agriculture
incomes. In general, all the risk management strategies signicantly reduced dis-
persions around agriculture incomes with ex-post strategies however producing the
largest eect.
Chapter 4 of the study broadly analysed the technical eciency implications of risk
management strategies employed by farm households. Because the adoption and
use of risk management strategies are non-random and farm households self-select
into adopting or not adopting, the study addressed potential biases by employing a
sample selection stochastic production frontier together with a meta-frontier model
to evaluate the impact of risk management strategies on technical eciency. The
study nds that risk management has implications on farm household's technical ef-
ciency. The result also showed a relatively higher technical eciency for households
adopting ex-post risk management strategies compared to the other risk manage-
ment strategies. At the same time, farm households employing only ex-ante risk
management strategies were observed to be the least technically ecient compared
to households not managing risks or employing ex-post risk management strategies
either in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strategies.
Complementary to Chapter 4, the more specic study of Chapter 5 assessed the com-
plementary impact of productivity-enhancing technologies (fertilizer and improved
seeds) with insurance adoption on technical eciency by comparing two distinct
farm households: one adopting fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance and the
other fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance. The study employed a sample
selection stochastic production frontier with a meta-frontier model and an endoge-
nous switching regression model to control for potential biases. The study nds that
households that adopted productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance tend
to have higher levels of investment in inputs, however, households that adopted
productivity-enhancing technologies without insurance tend to be more technically
ecient on average. At the meta-frontier, the study nds that complementing the
10
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adoption of fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance reduces the technical e-
ciency of fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance adopting households. On the
contrary, the study nds that if households adopting fertilizer and improved seeds
without insurance were to have adopted with insurance, their technical eciency
would signicantly increase. The nding suggests that behavioural biases might be
the underlying reason for the heterogeneous treatment eects observed.
To better evaluate the inuence of insurance on household welfare, Chapter 6, as-
sessed the joint welfare impacts of managing climatic risk through the adoption of
risk-reducing technologies and insurance by comparing three distinct farm house-
holds; non-adopters of mineral fertilizer, improved seeds, and insurance, mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds adopters without insurance and mineral fertilizer and
improved seeds adopters with insurance. The study employed a multinomial en-
dogenous switching regression model to control for selection bias stemming from
both unobserved and observed factors. The study nds that complementing the
adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance leads to higher
household welfare outcomes in terms of food calorie availability and crop income
per capita compared to households adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds
without insurance.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the PhD research, oers relevant
policy implications of the study, discusses some caveats related to the study, and
oers recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2
The impact of climate change on
inter-household inequality, food
security and labour productivity:
Evidence from Senegal
Peron A. Collins-Sowah, Christian H.C.A. Henning.
Abstract
Changing precipitation patterns caused by climate change are expected to have ma-
jor impacts on economic inequality, food security and labour productivity in the
agriculture sector of developing countries. This study examines the impact of cli-
mate change in the form of rainfall variability on inter-household income inequality,
daily food calorie availability and agricultural labour productivity in Senegal using
a nationally representative household survey data. Using the recently developed
model-averaging techniques that address issues related to model uncertainty and
controlling for household vulnerability factors, we show that the inequality impacts
of climate-induced shocks will be highly dependent on the income source composi-
tion of households. We nd that the Gini elasticity of agriculture income increases
for every deviation in rainfall whiles in the case of nonfarm income it decreases for
every deviation in rainfall. Because agriculture income sources constitute the largest
share and contributor to household income inequality, any shocks to the sector will
largely be responsible for any observed increases in income inequality. Additionally,
we nd that rainfall variability decreases household daily food calorie availability
and agricultural labour productivity. Lastly, we nd that risk transfer, irrigation
use, subsidies access and the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies (fer-
tilizer and improved seeds) are important instruments to help households deal with
rainfall variability related shocks.
Keywords: Climate change, rainfall variability, weighted-average least squares,
income inequality, food security, labour productivity
JEL Codes: D63, Q18, Q54, Q12
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2.1 Introduction
As one of the most dominant economic sectors in many poor Sub-Saharan African
countries, agriculture is the mainstay of rural economies and the livelihoods of its
rural residents. The sector plays a multi-dimensional role in the development pro-
cess through direct and indirect linkages such as stimulating growth in other parts of
the economy, creating employment opportunities, reducing poverty, lowering income
disparities, ensuring food security, delivering environmental services and providing
foreign exchange earnings (World Bank, 2007; Odusola, 2017). Particularly in the
context of poverty reduction and inequality some studies (Bourguignon and Mor-
risson, 2002; Thirtle et al., 2003; Christiaensen et al., 2006; Ravallion and Chen,
2007; World Bank, 2007; Imai and Gaiha, 2014; Odusola et al., 2017) strongly show
that agriculture growth is the most ecient and powerful tool to accelerate a re-
duction in poverty and income inequalities in developing countries. At the same
time, accumulating evidence suggests that due to the dependence of agriculture on
climate, it is one of the sectors where climate change impacts are expected to hit
hardest (Dixon et al., 2001; InterAcademy Council, 2004; Hertel et al., 2010; Halle-
gatte et al., 2016). Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the inuence of climate on
production and livelihoods is both strongest and most complex, primarily due to a
heavy reliance on rainfed agriculture which makes rural populations more vulnera-
ble to the eects of climate change (Neely et al., 2009; Molnar, 2010; FAO et al.,
2018). These vulnerabilities are due to several interlinking factors such as low level
of technological progress (e.g. irrigation, improved and high yielding varieties of
crops and improved breeds of livestock adoption), and lack of resources to mitigate
the adverse eect of climate change on agriculture (UNDESA, 2020).
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the eects of climatic variability
on agriculture. Although accumulating evidence suggests that agricultural produc-
tion is aected by climate change in Senegal, there remains little quantitative un-
derstanding of how these agricultural impacts would aect livelihoods and welfare.
At the same time, a growing consensus exists within the literature that dierential
ability to cope with extreme weather events exacerbates existing inequalities and
power disparities within societies (IPCC, 2014). While some few studies have pro-
vided empirical evidence that climate-related risks increase inequality (Bui et al.,
2014; Thiede, 2014; Silva et al., 2015; Narloch and Bangalore, 2018; Warr and Aung,
2019), food insecurity (Codjoe and Owusu, 2011; Murali and A, 2014; Weldeare-
gay and Tedla, 2018; Kinda and Badolo, 2019) within countries, a large part of the
literature only provide anecdotal evidence at best. Furthermore, empirical work on
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the eects of such climate-related risk events on within-country inequality at the
subnational level in less developed countries remains relatively limited (Leichenko
and Silva, 2014; Islam and Winkel, 2017). Although model-based studies such as
those by Parry et al. (2009), Hertel et al. (2010), Biewald et al. (2015), Havlík et al.
(2015), IFPRI (2017), Popp et al. (2017), Hasegawa et al. (2018) and Dienbaugh
and Burke (2019) provides important insights into climate change impacts on in-
equality and food security, they obscure or fail to capture other important factors
and spatial variations that drive these observed social and economic impacts. Fur-
thermore, the impacts of climate change are a function of the three dimensions (ex-
posure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity) of vulnerability. Such existing studies fail
to account for these dimensions of vulnerability and therefore gives little guidance
to decision-makers on groups in particular that gain or lose the most from climate
change. Additionally, the physical, social and economic landscape of climate risk is
uneven across countries. This makes subnational level analysis particularly relevant
because of heterogeneous vulnerability, thus the eects of climate change is not ex-
perienced by everyone in the same way due to dierences in exposure, susceptibility
to the damage caused by climate change, and the ability to cope with the eects
and recover. The implication is that such heterogeneous vulnerabilities will change
the relative status, or distribution of aected households with respect to social and
economic outcome. Furthermore, while prior studies have largely focused on the
likely direct climate impacts on crop yields and agricultural output, they neglected
a vast majority of potential economic impacts of climate change on agriculture such
as agricultural labour productivity (Hertel and De Lima, 2020).
The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the impact of climate change in
the form of rainfall variability on inter household income inequality, food calories
availability and agricultural labour productivity using a nationally representative
survey data from Senegal. Studying the eect of climate change on the agricultural
sector of Senegal is of particular interest for several reasons. First, the country
is a food-decit country with coverage rates of its cereal needs through domestic
production being varied between 30% and 65% over the past 10 years (Hathie, 2019).
Some estimates suggest that the country imports approximately 60% of its cereal
requirements, mostly rice (USAID, 2017). This leads the country to rely on imports
to meet domestic demand which exposes the country to global food price shocks.
Food insecurity at the national level is estimated to be about 7.2% while malnutrition
is about 8.2% (WFP, 2020). However, over 15% of rural households and over 8%
of urban households are considered food insecure (WFP, 2012; IMF, 2013; USAID,
2017). Under climate change, per capita, food consumption (kg per capita per year)
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is projected to decrease by 4.4% and 9% in 2030 and 2050 respectively (IFPRI,
2019). Secondly, the agriculture sector is a key policy target of the government
in its poverty reduction strategies eort (IMF, 2013). Poverty in Senegal remains
essentially a rural phenomenon, with about 57.3% of the population being poor and
about 70% of the rural population depending on rainfed subsistence farming (IFAD,
2019). Thus, excessive and recurrent climatic shocks will aect most of these rural
households through losses in assets and food insecurity. This will reverse any gains
made and further deepen poverty and inequality.
Our study is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, the study provides a better under-
standing of how current moisture stress-related climatic events, shape household out-
comes today. Secondly, investigating the inequality implications of climate-related
risks among farm households in Senegal is important because inequality is expected
to aect progress toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), thus quantifying the impacts of climate will help direct where, when, and
how adaptation should proceed. Thirdly, because labour productivity is directly
linked to improved standards of living for farm households, knowledge of the impacts
of rainfall variability on agricultural labour productivity indirectly oers important
cues relating to the climate-poverty nexus within households. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of climate change
impacts in Senegal. Section 2.3 provides a review of the literature on the channels
and pathways by which climate change aects inequality, food security and labour
productivity. Using the information from Section 2.3, we present the conceptual
framework and empirical strategy in Section 2.4. We discuss the data used and
variables measurement in Section 2.5 and the empirical specication in Section 2.6.
In Section 2.7, we present the empirical results and discussions and nally, Section
2.8, concludes and oers some policy recommendations.
2.2 Climate-related shocks in Senegal
In Senegal, climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, livestock and sheries are
highly vulnerable to natural disasters and the eects of climate change (USAID,
2017). With agriculture being predominantly rain-fed, more than 95% of the total
cropped area in Senegal depends on rain-fed systems, and most farmers practise
subsistence agriculture (Khouma et al., 2013). Like most countries in the Sahel
region, Senegal's agricultural sector faces highly variable rainfall and is highly vul-
nerable to the eects of climate change. Simultaneously, growing evidence shows
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that climate change is already aecting agriculture and food security in Senegal.
The country in recent years is experiencing erratic rainfall patterns and rising sea
levels which are increasing the rates of soil erosion, salinization in agricultural soils,
and destruction of critical infrastructure (ANACIM et al., 2013; IFAD, 2019). His-
torically, climate change in Senegal is linked to persistent drought in the 1970s and
the 1980s (ANACIM et al., 2013). Since the 1960s, average temperatures have been
observed to increase by 0.9°C, with higher rates of warming in the northern part of
the country and more pronounced between October and December (USAID, 2017).
Average annual rainfall has diminished since 1970 and is predicted to continue to
diminish across Senegal (Ministère de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Na-
ture, 2010; Jalloh et al., 2013; Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement
Durable, 2015). Rainfall declines of about 15% below the long-term average have
also been observed and with the most signicant rainfall declines in the southern
region of Senegal during the wet season between June and September. Between 1970
and 2000, the country suered prolonged droughts that contributed to a rural exo-
dus (USAID, 2017). Similarly, documented accounts of these droughts and ooding
events in Senegal over the past several decades have been reported in several studies
(Braman et al., 2013; Lo, 2013; WFP, 2014).
Persistent drought in the 1970s and 1980s severely aected the natural and managed
ecosystems of the climatologically drier northern regions of the country (Gonzalez
et al., 2012). In the period 1986 to 2003, the average annual rainfall in many dé-
partments1 in Senegal was observed to be considerably lower than the long term
average (World Bank, 2009). Major droughts in 2002 and 2007 led to signicant
losses in total crop production values by 35% and 25% respectively (World Bank,
2009). The drought in 2002 was projected to have aected about 284,000 people
(ANACIM et al., 2013). The causes of loss as identied during an annual crop yield
surveys indicated that drought was the primary cause of crop loss for almost 30% of
rain-fed farmers, followed by locust infestation which was reported by 16% of farm-
ers (EMAP, 2004). A major drought event in the 2011/2012 cropping season led to
drought-induced food insecurity followed by subsequent oods in 2012 (ANACIM
et al., 2013). This was projected to have aected about 850,000 people (GIIF, 2017).
In the year 2007, the World Bank (2009) reported a general decrease in agricultural
production compared to the previous season, mainly due to drought. The drought
event decreased cereal and groundnut production by 12% and 7% respectively com-
pared to the previous year. More recently, a low and delayed rainfall was observed
in 2013 and 2014 raining season aecting agriculture productivity (GIIF, 2017).
1These are administrative subdivisions in Senegal
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Based on an analysis of available quantitative and qualitative data, D'Alessandro
et al. (2015) identied drought, locusts, price volatility, crop pest and diseases as the
most important climatic related risks facing Senegal's agricultural sector. Speci-
cally, weather-related factors that relate to moisture stress caused either by erratic
rainfall, early cessation of rains, delayed onset of rains, or extended drought are
particularly prominent. Despite these identied risk events occurring in isolation,
multiple and overlapping shocks are observed to have far greater impacts and higher
associated losses (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). Furthermore, more than 40% of the
variation in crop yields in Senegal can be ascribed to the variation in annual rainfall
amounts (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). In the case of the country's most important
cash crop, groundnut, rainfall levels are estimated to explain about 39% of the
variability of yields (IMF, 2007). Empirical data provide strong evidence that en-
vironmental and climatic shocks related to oods and droughts have been highly
correlated to production losses in the agricultural sector of Senegal (EMAP, 2004;
World Bank, 2009; Régent et al., 2011; D'Alessandro et al., 2015). For instance, a
macro-level analysis and estimates of the indicative value of losses, due to agricul-
tural risks for 11 major crops between the period of 1980 to 2012 by D'Alessandro
et al. (2015) shows that total losses from production risks in Senegal amounted to
4.82 million MT. In monetary equivalent, this is about US$1.38 billion, or about
US$41.7 million per year, corresponding to about 3.9% of agricultural GDP on an
average annual basis.
The analysis further showed that the highest crop losses coincided with major shocks
to agricultural production. D'Alessandro et al. (2015) further observed that al-
though the average annual impact of shocks on GDP is relatively modest, actual
impacts when they occur potentially results in losses of the order of 10 to 20% of the
agricultural sector GDP. Further analysis also shows that Senegalese agriculture is
subjected to losses exceeding 10% of gross production value in one out of every ve
or six years on average due to unmanaged risks. The most signicant cause of loss in
Senegal is due to drought/erratic rainfall, and this accounts for approximately 50%
of crop yield reductions, followed by pests and diseases, especially locusts, which
accounts for about 25% of crop yield losses. Besides, maize production exhibits
the highest level of vulnerability in terms of frequency of risk, whereas groundnuts
production incurs the highest losses, accounting for nearly 45% of aggregate losses
(D'Alessandro et al., 2015). At the individual farm level, Régent et al. (2011) have
estimated the cost of natural disasters damage to crop and livestock farmers in Sene-
gal to average between US$474.55 to 596.48. In the long-term, climate change in
Senegal is predicted to manifest as further declines in the amount of rainfall how-
22
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal
ever with increased intensity, increased temperatures, and sea-level rise (Ministère
de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature, 2010; Braman et al., 2013;
Jalloh et al., 2013; USAID, 2017).
2.3 Literature Review
A growing body of evidence has linked climate change to the extent and the per-
sistence of rural poverty (Reardon and Taylor, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2009; Hertel
et al., 2010; Olsson et al., 2014; Abeygunawardena et al., 2016; Hallegatte et al.,
2016; Tschakert, 2016; World Bank, 2016; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; Hansen
et al., 2019; WFP, 2020), inequality (Valentine, 1993; Bui et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014;
Thiede, 2014; Silva et al., 2015; Hallegatte et al., 2016; Narloch and Bangalore, 2018;
Dienbaugh and Burke, 2019; Warr and Aung, 2019; Sedova et al., 2020; UNDESA,
2020) and food insecurity and malnutrition (FAO, 2008, 2010; Parry et al., 2009;
Ringler et al., 2010; St.Clair and Lynch, 2010; Codjoe and Owusu, 2011; Havlík
et al., 2015; Popp et al., 2017; FAO et al., 2018; FSIN, 2018; Hasegawa et al., 2018;
Kinda and Badolo, 2019; WFP, 2020) in developing regions of the world. Thus,
climate change will pose enormous threats to the achievement of key SDGs such as
poverty reduction, zero hunger, good health and well-being, and reduced inequality.
Recent research has identied pathways or channels through which climate change
will impact these key SDGs.
For instance, pertaining to poverty, Hallegatte et al. (2016) argues that the impacts
of climate change on agriculture aect poverty in two ways, rst through prices
and consumption, and secondly through farmers' incomes. They argue that higher
food prices will reduce households' available income especially for those that spend
a large share of household income on food products. At the same time, food price
changes also aect farmers' incomes positively. A 15 country study by Hertel et al.
(2010), shows that a climate-induced price rise increases extreme poverty by 1.8
percentage points. These price shocks are also directly linked to household food
security and malnutrition. In Uganda, Hill and Mejia-Mantilla (2016) observed
that a 10% reduction in water availability due to a lack of rainfall reduced crop
income of farm households by an average of 14.5% and almost 20% for the poorest
households. Similarly, they observed that a decrease in rainfall of about 10% results
in a decline of about 4.8% in per capita consumption for the average household.
Similarly, Charles et al. (2019) argue that the impacts of climate change on poverty
occur through two channels. The rst channel is directly through changes in the
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biophysical environment and any associated market responses. In the second channel
which is indirect, biophysical changes can alter other factors (economic, political,
cultural, and institutional) that are also linked to poverty and development.
Climate change is also expected to aect not only asset accumulation and invest-
ments in new assets but also the destruction of assets (Carter et al., 2007; Dercon
and Christiaensen, 2011; Verner, 2011; Abeygunawardena et al., 2016; Hallegatte
et al., 2016; FAO et al., 2018; Weldearegay and Tedla, 2018; Charles et al., 2019;
Steiner et al., 2020; UNDESA, 2020) and trigger new vulnerabilities that can exacer-
bate poverty (Tschakert, 2016). Climate change thus directly impacts on assets and
resources needed to earn a living and thereby harms climate-sensitive livelihoods
(UNDESA, 2020), making it more dicult for poor people to increase their income
leading to poverty traps (Hallegatte et al., 2016). By disrupting livelihoods, climate
change undermines access to income-earning opportunities. Similarly, related health
shocks of climate change can result in loss of labour capacity and lost labour income
(Hallegatte et al., 2016; FAO et al., 2018). Furthermore, climate change is expected
to contribute to a decoupling of economic growth which will directly impact poverty
through reduced income opportunities, thereby making it even harder to eradicate
poverty (Abeygunawardena et al., 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2016). According to Hal-
legatte et al. (2016), the net eect of climate change on poverty, is a culmination of
its impacts on productivity, consumer prices, and incomes.
The relationship between climate change, poverty, and income inequality is theoret-
ically ambiguous (Reardon and Taylor, 1996; Beteille, 2003) however poverty and
inequality aect each other directly and indirectly through their link with economic
growth (Naschold, 2002). Nevertheless, climate change is expected to inuence intra-
household resource allocation and sectoral sources of income, hence the intensity of
the shock can increase income inequality (Valentine, 1993; Reardon and Taylor,
1996). As shown by Thiede (2014), the inuence of climate change on inequality
may be reected by changes in both asset loss and wealth or income accumulation.
Furthermore, because households or individuals dier in their exposure, susceptibil-
ity and adaptive capacity to shocks, climate change could reduce income inequal-
ity by reducing income at the top of the distribution (Reardon and Taylor, 1996;
Thiede, 2014) or exacerbate existing wealth inequalities (Abdullah et al., 2016). For
instance, in Ethiopia, Little et al. (2006) found evidence that households with rela-
tively high levels of assets were more likely to experience shock-related decreases in
assets than those with few assets. Therefore by aecting both the prevalence and
depth of poverty, climate change contributes to inequality (UNDESA, 2020). Other
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studies in Africa (Mendelsohn, 2009; Nhemachena, 2014; Shumetie and Alemayehu,
2017) show that rainfall variability and higher average temperatures negatively aect
households' income that comes from crops and livestock in Africa.
Climate change is projected to inuence food insecurity and malnutrition via many
channels. Because climatic factors such as rainfall and temperature are direct inputs
for production, any change and variability in these variables are inevitably going to
have signicant eects on production, causing yield losses hence leading to food in-
security and escalating famine (Gregory et al., 1999; Amthor, 2001; Fuhrer, 2003;
Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Porter et al., 2014; FAO, 2018; FAO et al., 2018;
FSIN, 2018; Weldearegay and Tedla, 2018; UNDESA, 2020). Modelling studies by
Nelson et al. (2014), Biewald et al. (2015), and Havlík et al. (2015) all suggest that
climate change could result in global crop yield losses as large as 5% in 2030, 17%
in 2050 and 30% in 2080, even after accounting for adaptive behaviours. Estimates
by Thornton et al. (2011) shows that climate change has already reduced agricul-
tural production by 1-5% per decade compared to production levels expected with
no climate change. Particularly, in sub-Saharan Africa, a region with the lowest
global crop yields, increasing temperatures reduced yields for principal crops such
as maize, sorghum and groundnuts (Homan et al., 2018). Parry et al. (2009) also
project that global cereal production will decrease by between 1-7%, depending on
the General Circulation Model scenario adopted by 2060. Additionally, the largest
negative changes, which is estimated to average between 9-11% will occur in de-
veloping countries. At the same time, Vogel et al. (2019) observed that growing
season climate factors including mean climate as well as climate extremes explains
between 20-49% of the variance of yield anomalies. Climate extremes, in particular,
explain between 18-43% of this variance depending on the crop type. Among the
climate extremes, droughts are known to cause more than 80% of the total damage
and losses in agriculture, especially for the livestock and crop production subsectors
(FAO et al., 2018).
Climate change will not only reduce agricultural production but also increase food
prices due to lower agricultural production which will intensify the risk of hunger and
malnutrition, poverty and reduce food access (Parry et al., 2009; Hertel et al., 2010;
Abeygunawardena et al., 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2016; FAO, 2018; FAO et al., 2018;
Kinda and Badolo, 2019; UNDESA, 2020). For example, Hertel et al. (2010) suggests
that climate-induced crop yield changes will increase prices for major staples between
10-60% by 2030. Similarly, Nelson et al. (2014) estimate that yield shocks due to
future climate change will increases market prices of agricultural commodities by
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20% and reduces related consumption by 3% by 2050. Parry et al. (2009) observed
that decreases in production by 2060 will lead to about 25-150% increases in prices
and 10-60% increases in hunger involving 350 million people. The number of people
at risk of hunger most of which will be in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase
by 10-20% by 2050 as a consequence of climate change (Parry et al., 2009). In fact,
FAO et al. (2018) projects that 59 million people in 24 countries in Africa will require
urgent humanitarian action due to climate shocks and stressors. At the same time a
modelling framework by Hertel et al. (2010) shows that climate-induced rise in food
prices could increase poverty rates of non-agricultural households by 20-50% in parts
of Africa and Asia. Furthermore, climate change will increase the risks of hunger by
aecting all four components of food security: food availability, food accessibility,
food utilization and food stability (FAO, 2018; FAO et al., 2018; Charles et al.,
2019).
Through production losses, climate change is expected to reduce food calorie avail-
ability. For instance, Havlík et al. (2015) estimate that global average calorie losses
will be about 6% and 14% by 2050 and 2080 respectively. Hasegawa et al. (2018) also
project average global food calorie availability to be lower by 45-110 kcal per person
per day by 2050. Similarly, IFPRI (2017) shows that global per capita food con-
sumption (kcal per capita per day) will decrease by 2% in 2030 and 4% in 2050 with
climate change. Climate change will also lead to malnutrition and lower nutritional
levels in crops. Parry et al. (2009) estimate a 26% increase in the number of mal-
nourished children in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 due to climate change. Studies by
Yamano et al. (2005), Alderman et al. (2006), Ringler et al. (2010) and Dercon and
Porter (2014) shows that asset-poor households in Sub-Saharan Africa typically pro-
vide children with lower-quality nutrition following weather shocks. Climate changes
also impact heavily on nutrition by impairing nutrient quality and dietary diversity
of foods produced and consumed (FAO, 2018; FAO et al., 2018).
Recent studies by Myers et al. (2014), Medek et al. (2017) and Smith and Myers
(2018) show that higher CO2 concentrations reduce the protein, zinc, and iron con-
tent of crops. Smith and Myers (2018) observe that elevated CO2 could cause an
additional 175 million people to be zinc decient and an additional 122 million peo-
ple to be protein decient by 2050. Poor households that are dependent on plant
sources for their nutrition will be largely impacted. Climate variability via erratic
rainfall and higher temperatures also aects the quality and safety of food (Shelby
et al., 1994b,a; Magan et al., 1997). Climate change in terms of higher rainfall inten-
sity can lead to the occurrence of some strains of toxins producing microbes, such as
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aatoxins on eld crops (Cotty and Jaime-Garcia, 2007; Unnevehr and Grace, 2013;
Benkerroum, 2020), that can lead to stunting among children (Lombard, 2014).
Beyond poverty, inequality and food security, climate change is projected to impose
health and disease risks (WHO and WMO, 2012; Smith et al., 2014; Hallegatte et al.,
2016; FAO et al., 2018; Steiner et al., 2020; UNDESA, 2020). Indirectly through
health, climate change is expected to not only aect poverty as previously discussed
but also labour productivity. There is mounting evidence that global warming will
sharply reduce labour capacity particularly with outdoor workers exposed to solar
radiation. According to Heal and Park (2016) temperature stress may aect workers
in at least two immediate ways; through direct physical or psychological discomfort
and reduction of task productivity. These two immediate channels may in turn
aect labour productivity, labour supply (hours worked), and labour eort. Climate-
related impacts via occupational heat exposure can undermine workers performance
in both physical and mental tasks but also slowing down work and other activities
(Ramsey, 1995; Kjellstrom et al., 2009b,a; UNDESA, 2020). Loss of labour capacity
particularly due to extreme heat and other related health risks such as malaria can
have important implications for agricultural wage labour and thus reduce labour
productivity (FAO et al., 2018).
Evidence from the empirical literature suggests that increasing temperatures or heat
stress will negatively aect labour productivity. For instance, in accounting for the
impact of heat stress on outdoor labour productivity, Watts et al. (2018) estimated
global labour capacity diminished by 5.3% between 2000 and 2016, with a dramatic
decrease of more than 2% between 2015 and 2016. In a recent review of the rapidly
evolving literature on heat stress and labour productivity, Dell et al. (2014) suggest
that estimates of labour productivity impacts of heat stress appear to converge to
around 1% to 3% normalized decline per degrees Celsius above room temperature.
Existing literature has also demonstrated that labour productivity losses due to heat
stress have stronger impacts in regions that are already hot today than in cooler
regions (Kjellstrom et al., 2009b,a). However, in many developing regions such as
Sub-Saharan Africa, beyond heat stress, rainfall variability will perhaps have the
single most important eect on agriculture labour productivity. As rightly argued
by Hertel and De Lima (2020), ignoring the impacts of combined heat and humidity
on labour capacity paints a very distorted picture of how climate change aects
agriculture.
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In summary multiple and interreacting factors inuence income inequality, food se-
curity and labour productivity and the impact of climate change on these household
welfare outcomes are partly dependent on the vulnerability of households in terms
of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climatic shocks.
2.4 Empirical Framework
2.4.1 Conceptual Framework
From the literature review in section 2.3, we developed a conceptual framework that
guides our empirical analysis (Figure 2.1). In this framework, we assume that the
vulnerability of households to the eects of rainfall variability on welfare outcomes
is not homogeneous due to inter-households dierences in exposure, susceptibility
(sensitivity) to the damage caused by climate change, and the ability to cope with
the eects and recover. The interactions between these dimensions explain the level
or degree of vulnerability of a household to rainfall variability and the magnitude
of impacts. Thus, to estimate the impact of rainfall variability on inter-household
income inequality, food security and labour productivity, we account for these dimen-
sions  exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity by using pseudo-vulnerability2
indicators.
In the literature (see for example Moss et al., 2001; Tubiello and Rosenzweig, 2008)
exposure has been used to characterize the biophysical impacts of climate change
on agroecological systems. It also includes the spatial and temporal dimensions of
climate variability, such as droughts and oods, and also the magnitude and duration
of weather events. While we do not have data on all these aspects of exposure, we
rely on the deviations of rainfall from 30 years mean rainfall to capture any spatial
dimensions of exposure to rainfall variability. Additionally, we use reported data of
farm households relating to the most recurring rainfall variability related climatic
events in the past 5 years as an indicator for the magnitude of rainfall variability.
As dened in the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007), sensitivity is
the degree to which a system is either adversely or benecially aected by climate
variability or change. Sensitivity is rather a complex concept to measure because
2Vulnerability as a concept is complex and empirically dicult to measure, so we rely on some
indicators of the three dimensions reported in the literature to control for vulnerability in our
modelling framework. Because these are not widely universally acknowledged indicators, we choose
to call them pseudo-vulnerability indicators.
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the responsiveness of a system can be inuenced by both intrinsic characteristics
and degrees of external manipulation (ADB and IFPRI, 2009). Nevertheless, some
indicators exist to identify the sensitivity of a system. In the case of agriculture,
Tubiello and Rosenzweig (2008) suggest that the characteristics of the agricultural
system such as rural population density, irrigated land, and agricultural employment
can provide useful insights about sensitivity. For example, water-stressed areas that
have no irrigation infrastructure will be most sensitive to rainfall variability in terms
of drought. Additionally, farm households practising solely rainfed agriculture with-
out access to irrigation will be more sensitive to rainfall variability compared to
those who have access to or practice solely irrigated farming. We, therefore, use the
information on irrigation use and the type of farming system to control for house-
hold's sensitivity to rainfall variability. The adaptive capacity of a system, which is
the last dimension of vulnerability according to Tubiello and Rosenzweig (2008) can
be viewed as the full set of system skills i.e., technical solutions available to farm-
ers to respond to climate stresses as determined by the socio-economic and cultural
settings, plus institutional and policy contexts, prevalent in the region of interest.
As argued by Tubiello and Rosenzweig (2008), adaptive capacity as a concept is
a theoretical one, and it is not easily measurable. However, actual adaptation re-
sponses can be measured and evaluated to make inferences about adaptive capacity.
In layman's term, adaptive capacity can be seen as actions taken by individuals or
household to avoid potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope
with the consequences of change. In this regards, we use the information on adap-
tation strategies (mitigation, transfer and coping) used by farm households when
faced with rainfall variability shocks to control for dierences in adaptive capacities.
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of the impact of climate change on household welfare
The eect of rainfall variability on economic inequality and food security occurs
through interrelated pathways. These pathways are related to asset destruction or
accumulation, reduced yields or losses, income losses and price shocks. Although
the biophysical impact of higher temperatures and declining labour productivity is
well documented, less well understood are the eects of rainfall variability particu-
larly on agricultural labour productivity. In the context of farming households in
tropical regions, rainfall variability can aect agricultural labour productivity in at
least two ways (See gure 2.1). Firstly, rainfall variability can impose health and
disease-related impediments mostly through vector-borne diseases, such as malaria
and dengue fever which can directly aect labour productivity. Secondly, through
food production losses, rainfall variability will reduce food calorie availability to
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farm households and thus the physiological function of food in terms of providing
energy for growth, development, and work will be impeded. Our study investigates
the latter channel.
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
As argued by De Luca and Magnus (2011) economic theory provides some infor-
mation about empirical model specications but oers little guidance about how to
specify the exact data-generating process for the outcome of interest. At the same
time, the lack of a one-to-one link between theory and empirical model specication
generates uncertainty regarding, for example, which explanatory variables must be
included in the model, which functional forms are appropriate, or which lag length
captures dynamic responses. In econometrics, these problems are known as problems
of model uncertainty (De Luca and Magnus, 2011). The key feature behind model
uncertainty is the existence of a wide range of functional forms and explanatory
variables without much consensus concerning which canonical model is appropriate.
The implication of this is that empirical researchers need to choose among a set
of possible model specications. In such cases, empirical results will typically be
inuenced by the inclusion or omission of specic variables.
Depending on the model selection procedure, dierent researchers may arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions even when using the same data (De Luca and Magnus, 2011). As
shown by Magnus and Durbin (1999), Wang (2003), Danilov and Magnus (2004)
and Liu and Myers (2009), estimation results may be sensitive to dierent model
specications. Model averaging alleviates such inconsistencies by comparing the ro-
bustness of regression coecients over the entire model space. Model uncertainty
is particularly relevant when examining the drivers of income inequality and labour
productivity, where theory is even less settled (Furceri and Ostry, 2019). At the
same time, examining drivers of food security involves uncertainties regarding which
explanatory variables to include. While economic theory suggests a wide range of
potential drivers, there is little consensus regarding the most relevant ones. Further-
more, when estimating the drivers of income inequality there are a potentially large
number of endogenous variables that have to be controlled for. One approach to
address the endogeneity of variables is the control function approach (Wooldridge,
2015) but this generates further auxiliary variables in the model. With several
possible explanatory drivers for our outcomes on interest, identifying their relative
importance and robustness is tenuous. A common practice will be to focus on a
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handful of variables selected based on their priors. But as previously argued, dier-
ent results may be obtained.
In this paper, we attempt to advance our understanding of the impact of rainfall
variability on the drivers of income inequality, food security and labour productivity
by employing the recently developed model-averaging techniques. The basic idea
of model-averaging estimators is that one rst estimates the parameters of interest
conditional on each model in the model space and then compute the unconditional
estimate as a weighted average of these conditional estimates (De Luca and Magnus,
2011). This approach has been employed recently by Furceri and Ostry (2019) and
a spatial variant has also been used by Hortas-rico and Rios (2019) to investigate
the drivers of income inequality. Specically, we adopt the weighted-average least
squares (WALS). As discussed by Magnus et al. (2010) and De Luca and Magnus
(2011), WALS is theoretically and practically superior to the standard Bayesian
model averaging (BMA). It is theoretically superior because the prior is `neutral' and
the risk properties of the estimator are close to those of the minimax regret estimator
(Magnus et al., 2010). Additionally, it is also practically superior because the space
over which model selection is performed increases linearly rather than exponentially
with size. WALS unlike BMA relies on preliminary orthogonal transformations of the
auxiliary regressors and the parameters. Thus the computational burden required to
obtain an exact WALS estimate is lower compared to BMA (De Luca and Magnus,
2011). Also, the choice of the prior distribution on parameters is independent on
prior information availability as in the case of BMA. Although WALS addresses
model uncertainty and endogeneity concerns related to omitted variable bias, it
does not solve reverse causality issues (Furceri and Ostry, 2019).
Our model framework to assess the drivers of income inequality, food security and
labour productivity is a linear regression model of the reduced form:
yi = α + β
′Xi + εi (2.1)
where X is a vector of k covariates reecting rainfall variability, pseudo-vulnerability
indicators, access to institutional elements and characteristics of household i, and y
is a measure of the outcomes of interest (income inequality, food security and labour
productivity). As previously mentioned, the estimation of this model is plagued
with two important econometric challenges. Firstly, a large number of potential
explanatory factors and the correlation among them and secondly the lack of a priori
`true' statistical model to test these potential drivers. The weighted-average least
32
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal
squares (WALS) approach addresses these challenges by (i) running the maximum
combination of possible models and (ii) providing estimates and inference results
that take into account the performance of the variable not only in the nal `reported'
model but over the full set of possible specications. In practice, these two steps
consist of estimating a parameter of interest conditional on each model in the model
space and computing the unconditional estimate as a weighted average of conditional
estimates. Formally, assuming that we are faced with M dierent models and that





i where the weights Wi denote a measure of goodness of
t of each model.
We apply the WALS techniques developed by Magnus et al. (2010). Compared to the
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) which uses a Gaussian distribution prior for the
auxiliary parameters, the WALS uses a Laplace distribution which reduces the risk
of the prior inuencing heavily the nal estimates (Magnus et al., 2010). Besides, the
WALS relies on the preliminary orthogonal transformation of the auxiliary regressors
and their parameters. This consists of computing an orthogonal k × k matrix P
and a diagonal k × k matrix ∆ such that P⊤X⊤MXP = ∆, for each model M. The
key advantage of this transformation is that the space over which model selection is
performed increases linearly rather than exponentially in size as in the case of BMA.
Denoting t̄ the Laplace estimator of the vector of theoretical t-ratios of the auxiliary
regressors (t = [ t1, t2, ..tk2] ), the WALS estimators of the coecients β in equation
2.1 is given by:
β = sP∆
− 1/2t̄ (2.2)
In determining whether a given auxiliary regressor is a robust determinant of the
outcome of interest, Magnus et al. (2010) suggest an absolute value of the t-ratio
greater than 1 for a variable to qualify as robust. This choice is motivated by the fact
that including a given auxiliary regressor variable increases the model t as measured
by the adjusted R2 and the precision of the estimators of focus regressors which is
measured by a lower mean squared error (MSE) is met if and only if the t-ratio
of the additional auxiliary regressor is in absolute value greater than 1. Finally, it
should be noted that while the WALS addresses model uncertainty and endogeneity
concerns related to omitted bias, it does not address reverse-causality issues. In this
regards, Furceri and Ostry (2019) suggest that such reverse-causality issues are best
taken up through event-study type of analysis. In our study, however, we address the
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issue of reverse-causality using the control function approach by Wooldridge (2015).
In estimating the impact of rainfall variability on inter-household income inequal-
ity in equation 2.1, some of the control explanatory variables such as education,
landholding, extension access, credit access, membership of farmer organizations,
market information access and subsidy access are potentially endogenous. As shown
in several empirical studies, access to assets such as land and institutional factors
such as credit, extension, credit etc. are highly correlated to income inequality. Fur-
thermore, despite rainfall variability potentially aecting agricultural labour pro-
ductivity through food calorie availability, it might also be that households with
high labour productivity have generally high food calories available, thus making
food calories availability potentially endogenous. Addressing issues related to en-
dogeneity is particularly important because the presence of reverse causality and
endogeneity in models can make the identication of causal eects dicult due to
biased estimates. To address the potential endogeneity of these variables we used the
control function approach proposed by Wooldridge (2015). The approach involves
the specication of the potential endogenous variable as a function of explanatory
variables inuencing the outcome variable (in our case income inequality and labour
productivity), together with a set of instruments in a rst stage probit regression3.
The employed instruments here should strongly inuence the given potential endoge-
nous variables but not the outcome of interest (income inequality and agriculture
labour productivity).
Finding true instruments in empirical work is very challenging and sometimes im-
possible. The diculty arises with nding an instrument that is strongly correlated
with the endogenous variable of interest and that satises the exclusion restriction
i.e., having no direct eect on the outcome of interest. For our study, gender ratio,
the share of household labour, support needs, the main occupation of the household
head, occupation with known unions or memberships, sale of raw farm produce,
rural population per region of household residence and the adoption of traditional
granaries were used as identifying instruments for education, landholding, extension
access, credit access, membership of farmer organizations, market information ac-
cess, subsidy access and food calorie availability respectively. Following Di Falco
and Veronesi (2013), we establish the admissibility of the selected instruments by
performing a simple falsication test: the selected or valid instruments are required
3The probit regression specication (see Wooldridge, 2015, Pp. 427  428), was for the binary
variables  education, extension access, credit access, membership of farmer organizations, market
information access and subsidy access. On the other hand, an OLS regression (see Wooldridge,
2015, Pp. 424) was used for the continuous variables land holding and food calorie availability.
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to signicantly inuence the potentially endogenous variable but have no signi-
cant eect on the outcome variable. The generalized residuals predicted from a
rst-stage regression are included as covariates in the outcome model. As suggested
by Wooldridge (2015), the approach leads to a robust, regression-based Hausman
test for the endogeneity of the suspected variables. If the coecient of the residual
term is statistically signicant, it shows that endogeneity was indeed present and
also well controlled for in the model (Gibson et al., 2010; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011;
Amankwah et al., 2016; Harris and Kessler, 2019; Katengeza et al., 2019; Ogutu
et al., 2019). Furthermore, Wooldridge (2015) observed that if the coecient on the
estimated generalized residual is statistically signicant, there is a need to adjust
the standard errors for the two-step estimation by bootstrapping.
2.5 Data and variable measurement
2.5.1 Farm household survey
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the larger
Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricultural Pol-
icy Support Project funded by USAID under the "Feed the Future" project. The
implemented project focused on several value chains such as dry cereals, irrigated
rice, horticulture, and inputs value chains such as seeds and fertilizers. The Sene-
galese National Agricultural Research Institute (ISRA) conducted the survey, with
the support of the International Food Research Institute (IFPRI) between April and
May 2017 across all the 14 administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments
except the departments of Dakar, Pikine and Guédiawaye. A total of 42 agricultural
departments were included in the survey. The survey design was a two-stage, na-
tionally based random survey that included rural census districts as the primary
units and farm households as the secondary units. The method consisted of rst
dividing the statistical population (i.e. agricultural households) into primary units
so that each of them is unambiguously related to a well-dened primary unit. Then
samples were drawn in two stages. In the rst stage, a sample of rural census dis-
tricts was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricultural households was
selected at the level of each primary unit. In rural census districts where rain-fed
agriculture was practice and localized crops were grown such as Senegal River Valley
and Niayes Market Gardening Zone, stratication of the rural census districts was
done before agricultural households were selected. The collected data covered the
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main agricultural season of 2016-2017 and include information on household demo-
graphic characteristics, plot and land holdings, agricultural equipment ownership,
crop production for the 2016/2017 growing season, credit, inputs use and cost, fam-
ily and hired labour, sales volumes, and food processing. Others included household
consumption, access to amenities, non-farm and livestock revenue, remittance, agri-
cultural insurance, risks and adaptation strategies, perception of subsidized inputs,
and membership of farmer-based organizations.
2.5.2 Measuring rainfall variability
A high-resolution (0.5 x 0.5 degree) gridded time-series data (version 4.04) which
covers month-by-month variations in climate over the period 1901-2019 and pro-
duced by Harris et al. (2020) at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU), University of
East Anglia was obtained to estimate rainfall variability for farm households. The
data covers several climatic variables including cloud cover, diurnal temperature
range, frost day frequency, wet day frequency, potential evapotranspiration (PET),
precipitation, daily mean temperature, monthly average daily maximum and min-
imum temperature, and vapour pressure for the period January 1901 - December
2019. The data were produced using angular-distance weighting (ADW) interpola-
tion based on monthly observational data calculated from daily or sub-daily data by
National Meteorological Services and other external agents. Using farm households'
geographical coordinates data and QGIS, we extracted monthly rainfall data from
1988 to 2017 for each household. We used 30 years preceding the farm household
survey because climate change takes place over decades or centuries. This helps us to
capture both long term and shorter-term rainfall variations in the form of extremes
drought and oods. Rainfall variability was measured for each household as the
standard deviation from the long term mean for the period 1988 to 2017. We also
included a self-reported experience of recurring rainfall related shocks in the last 5
years preceding the survey as an additional control for rainfall variability shocks.
2.5.3 Measuring income inequality
We use the Gini index as the baseline measure of income inequality in this study,
mainly because it is the ubiquitous standard in the inequality literature. Also known
as the Gini coecient or Gini ratio, it is a measure of statistical dispersion that is
used to represent the income or wealth distribution of a population. It does so by
36
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal
comparing the cumulative proportions of the population against cumulative propor-
tions of income they receive. The coecient ranges between 0 in the case of perfect
equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality. In our study, we estimated an income
Gini from three main household income sources: agriculture income which consists
of crops and livestock incomes, nonfarm income and remittances. We calculate the
Gini coecient at the regional level as our income inequality measure. This index
is dened as:




where the Lorenz curve of income L(p; y) at such p-values of ranked relative cumulated-
population (so that, p ∈ (0, 1)) can be dened mathematically by the expression:







where p is a percentile function; F(q) is the distribution function measuring the
proportion of individuals of the population having incomes below or equal to q, and
µy denotes the average total household income. G(y) takes values between 0 (perfect
equality) and 1 (complete inequality).
Gini decompositions
Beyond, identifying the impact of rainfall variability on income inequality, we were
interested in exploring the impact of rainfall variability on the Gini elasticity of
agriculture income and nonfarm income. This is particularly important because the
impact of rainfall variability on inequality may depend on where a household earns
most of its income. For example, a household that earns most of its income from
nonfarm sources that are not climate-sensitive will be less aected by rainfall vari-
ability compared to a household that solely depends on agriculture for income. On
the contrary, if the nonfarm income source is somehow indirectly climate dependent
(e.g. sale of production inputs such as fertilizer, seeds and agrochemicals), the im-
pact of rainfall variability on income can be substantial through either increase or
decrease demand. Hence the impact of climate change will be uneven across income
sources, thus examining the income-source specic changes eects on Gini elasticity
provides an important step in identifying how rainfall variability drives income in-
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equality. Investigating the Gini decompositions by source also provides important
cues as to how changes in particular income sources will also aect overall income
inequality. To estimate the Gini decompositions by income source we follow the
approach introduced by Shorrocks (1982) and extended by Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1985) and Stark et al. (1986) for a static decomposition of the Gini index. Because
the decomposed income inequality by dierent income sources is observed at a par-
ticular moment in time, the approach is a static one. Nevertheless, by taking the
derivative for a small percentage change in income from a particular income source,
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark et al. (1986) analysed the eect of a marginal
change in an income source on the overall Gini index at that point in time, holding
all other income sources constant. Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark




Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk (2.5)
where Sk and Gk are the share and the Gini index of income component k, respec-
tively. The Gini index of income component k is estimated using equation 2.3. Rk
represents the Gini correlation of component k with total household income. It
shows similar characteristics to Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coecients.
According to Hundenborn et al. (2018) Equation 2.5 allows the examination of three
important concepts. First, the share of the respective income source in overall house-
hold income, Sk. Secondly, the inequality within the dierent income sources, Gk
and lastly the Gini correlation Rk between income component k and total household
income. The share of an income source in overall household income Sk and the Gini
index of any income source Gk are always positive and ranges between 0 and 1. Sim-
ilarly, Hundenborn et al. (2018) suggest that the Gini correlation Rk, on the other
hand, will be positive when an income source contributes positively to the overall
Gini index, i.e. when yk is an increasing function of total income y0. Similarly, Rk
will be negative when income source yk is a decreasing function of total income y0.
Thus, Rk is bounded by -1 ≤ Rk ≥ 1 and will be equal to zero when yk and y0
are uncorrelated. Additionally, we are interested in assessing how a small change
in any one of the income components k aects the overall Gini index. We want to
get a better understanding of the impact of rainfall variability on the Gini elasticity
of agriculture and nonfarm income. If we assume that an exogenous change in any
income source j by a factor e occurs, then the income from j is assumed to change
according to yj(e) = (1 + e)yj and
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∂G0
∂e
= Sj(Rj ∗Gj −G0) (2.6)
The partial derivative4 which simulates a marginal change in a particular income
source while holding income from other sources constant is shown in equation 2.6.







Accordingly, the change in overall inequality due to a small change in income source
j is equal to the initial share of j in total inequality less the share of source j in
total household income (Stark et al., 1986). Given the characteristics of Rj, this
produces two possible outcomes for the overall Gini index. If income source j has
a negative or zero correlation between j and total household income y0, an increase
in income from source j will have an equalizing eect, thereby lowering inequality.
This is because the share of income from source j (Sj), as well as the Gini index for
j and total income, Gj and G0, are always positive. The other possible outcome is
when Rj represents a positive Gini correlation. Assuming that Gj > G0, then
Rk∗Gk
G
which leads to an increase in inequality associated with component j. Gj > G0 is a
necessary condition for an inequality-increasing eect of income component j, given
that Rj is always smaller or equal to 1. The sum of relative marginal eects across
all income sources is zero. At the same time, multiplying all income sources by e
leaves the overall Gini index unchanged.
2.5.4 Measuring food calorie availability
In measuring household food security, the study focused on only the rst dimension
of food security which is related to food availability, i.e. the supply of foodstus in a
household from production. Thus, the focus here was on household food production
only. We used the daily per adult-equivalent food availability as an indicator of a
household's food security because it helps determine the capacity of each household
to provide proper food energy to its members during a whole calendar year. The
total quantity of food calories produced per equivalent adult per day or a house-
hold daily food calories availability was estimated using staple food crops grown by
4The prove that the derivative of the overall Gini with respect to a uniform percentage change
in income source j is equation 2.6 is provided in the Appendix
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households. A total of 9 staple crops were used in estimating household food calorie
availability. This includes 5 cereal staples (maize, rice, millet, sorghum, and fonio),
2 legumes (groundnut5 and cowpeas), 1 oilseed crop (sesame) and 1 root tuber crop
(cassava). According to Hathie (2019), Senegal has food traditions, both in urban
and rural, based on the consumption of cereals (rice, millet, maize, and sorghum) as
staple foods, and these constitute about 40% of households' food budget. Further-
more, rice, millet/sorghum, wheat, and maize are the foundations of the Senegalese
diet with Senegalese deriving about 60% of their calories from grain consumption.
Household food calorie availability was computed using the gross household produc-
tion of these 9 crops. We rst, estimated available food crop by multiplying the
farm-gate production of each crop by the appropriate post-harvest losses ratios6.
Subsequently, the derived available food crops were converted into calories (kcal)
available using the crop-specic energy ratios and edible portions conversion factors
from the West African Food Composition7 table by Stadlmayr et al. (2012).
For each household, we estimated the total adult equivalent following Claro et al.
(2010)8 by considering the gender and age composition of family members. House-
hold adult equivalents (AE) for each household member is obtained by dividing the
Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) for the energy of each household member,
according to the specic age and gender, by the average energy RDA reference value
of 2,550 kcal (Claro et al., 2010). The sum of all of the individual adult equivalents
within a household was further computed to obtain the household adult equivalent
(AE) value. This approach is particularly important because some family members
such as children might have distinct energy needs which dier from adults. We sub-
sequently divided the calories available at the household level by the households'
total adult equivalents (AE) to make the values comparable. Finally, the obtained
values were divided by 365 to have the daily food available per adult equivalent.
5As reported in D'Alessandro et al. (2015) despite considered as an important cash crop, ground-
nut is also grown for household consumption
6The postharvest losses ratios used were obtained from the African Postharvest Losses Infor-
mation System (APHLIS), Aognon et al. (2015) and Tomlins et al. (2016) are provided in Table
2.5 in the Appendix
7Conversion ratios for edible fractions and energy equivalence (kilo calories) are presented in
Table 2.6 in the Appendix
8The Adult-equivalent conversion factors for estimated calorie requirements according to age
and gender are presented in Table 2.7 in the Appendix
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2.5.5 Measuring labour productivity
Household agricultural labour productivity was measured as the total value of crop
output of households measured in CFA divided by the number of household labour.
The estimation of agricultural labour productivity was restricted to crop production
because we only have household labour use for this sector. Because some household
employ labour (hired) we only considered the part of labour productivity attributed
to household labour only. As shown in the study of Taylor and Adelman (2003) in
developing countries, family and hired labour may not be perfect substitutes. Since
the observed crop output for each household is from a combination of household
labour and hired labour, we tried to disentangle the part of labour productivity
associated with household labour only. We achieved this by accounting for the share
of household labour in total labour used for crop production. Finally, this share was
multiplied by the total agricultural labour productivity to obtain the part of labour
productivity associated with household agriculture labour.
2.6 Empirical specication
The specication of our empirical models was based on economic theory and other
empirical studies that have similarly investigated the topics of concern. Although
economic theory suggests a wide range of potential determinants of income inequal-
ity, there is little consensus regarding the most relevant ones (Furceri and Ostry,
2019). Similarly, Odusola et al. (2017) argue that the drivers of inequality are neither
homogeneous nor universal. Nonetheless, the literature identies a myriad of factors
aecting income inequality some of these include education (Odusola et al., 2017;
Hortas-rico and Rios, 2019), access to capital and markets (Odusola et al., 2017),
household size or the age-dependency ratio (Guvenen et al., 2015; Ouedraogo and
Ouedraogo, 2015; Odusola, 2017; Odusola et al., 2017; Furceri and Ostry, 2019), ac-
cess to institutions (Ostry et al., 2018), technological change (Jaumotte and Buitron,
2015; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; UNDP, 2013), type of income distribution (UNDP,
2013; Odusola, 2017) and farm size (Odusola, 2017). Particularly in Senegal spatial
pattern of poverty is explained by factors such as market access and transporta-
tion connectivity (ANSD, 2016). Other factors including tax systems, distribution
of public investments and expenditures, globalisation and structural transformation
etc. could aect inequality but are not suited for our study. This is because the local
dimension of income inequality based on cross-sectional data is likely to be dierent
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from national-level income inequality. After all, they may not respond to the same
factors.
A wide range of factors has been found in the empirical literature to drive household
food security or insecurity. These factors operate on both the demand and sup-
ply side. Some of these include sociodemographic factors such as age of household
head, household size and composition, education, gender of household head, migra-
tion, asset ownership, income (Garrett and Ruel, 1999; Iram and Butt, 2004; Idrisa
et al., 2008; Maxwell et al., 2008; Gbetibouo, 2009; Pankomera et al., 2009; Davis
et al., 2010; Fekadu and Muche, 2010; Mallick and Ra, 2010; Kassie et al., 2012;
Aidoo et al., 2013; Frimpong and Asuming-Brempong, 2013; Abata and Kim, 2014;
Kakota et al., 2015; Agidew and Singh, 2018; Alpízar et al., 2020), farm characteris-
tics such as improved technologies adoption, farming system, agro-ecological zones,
farm size, and land quality (Feleke et al., 2005; Kidane et al., 2005; Fekadu and
Muche, 2010; Van der Veen and Tagel, 2011), climatic shocks such drought, short-
age of rainfall, crop diseases (Feleke et al., 2005; Abata and Kim, 2014; Agidew
and Singh, 2018), access to market and credit (Feleke et al., 2005; Pankomera et al.,
2009; Kassie et al., 2012; Aidoo et al., 2013; Frimpong and Asuming-Brempong,
2013), and access to government intervention programs such as food assistance or
food-for-work program, subsidies (Sharkey et al., 2011; Van der Veen and Tagel,
2011).
Similarly, sociodemographic factors such as age, education, household size, savings,
land ownership (Okoye et al., 2008; Anyaegbunam et al., 2010; Shittu et al., 2010;
Obike et al., 2017; Nuttee et al., 2019), farm characteristic such as farm size, im-
proved technologies adoption such as fertilizer, improved planting materials, tractor,
irrigation etc. (Okoye et al., 2008; Anyaegbunam et al., 2010; Shittu et al., 2010;
Obike et al., 2017; Shanmugan and Baria, 2019), and access to credit (Okoye et al.,
2008) have been identied to inuenced agriculture labour productivity.
In Table 2.1, we present the denition and summary statistics of all variables used
in the analysis.
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Table 2.1: Variables denition and summary statistics
Name Variable description Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
Gini index Income inequality 0.556 0.088
Daily calorie Log of food calorie per adult equivalent per day 6.266 2.147




Age Age of household head in years 53.013 13.272
Gender =1 if household head is male 0.923 0.267
Education =1 if the household head has formal education 0.382 0.486
Household size Total number of people in the household 9.766 5.262
Dependency Dependency ratio of household (%) 87.132 73.659
Agriculture Share of agriculture income (%) 85.116 27.243
Storage =1 adoption of advanced storage technology 0.170 0.376
Market integration =1 if household is integrated into markets 0.559 0.497
AIIa Agriculture implement index -0.014 1.274
Institutional factors
Extension =1 if accessed extension service 0.152 0.359
Membership =1 if member of farmer-based organization 0.131 0.338
Credit =1 if access to credit 0.044 0.206
Subsidy =1 if access to subsidized inputs 0.506 0.500
Road Log of distance to the nearest all-weather road in km 3.597 0.875
Market Log of distance to the nearest market in km 3.962 0.455
Market info =1 if access to market information 0.503 0.500
Farm-related characteristics
Land Total land holding of household in hectares 5.425 8.203
Staple crop Share of land under staple crops 0.489 0.351
PET =1 if household adopts productivity enhancing technologies 0.230 0.421
Mixed =1 if household practices mixed farming 0.315 0.465
Pseudo-vulnerability indicators
Std Rainfall The standard deviation of annual rainfall in mm (1988  2017) 120.153 28.556
Rainfall shock =1 if household experienced rainfall shock in past 5 years 0.759 0.428
Farming system =1 if household practices rainfed subsistence agriculture 0.857 0.350
Irrigation use =1 if household uses irrigation 0.191 0.393
Mitigationb =1 if household adopts risk mitigation strategies 0.739 0.439
Transferc =1 if household adopts formal insurance 0.034 0.180
Copingd =1 if household adopts risk coping strategies 0.334 0.472
a This is an index computed using principal component analysis (PCA) based on the number of
agricultural equipment owned by a household.
b These are ex-ante measures taken by households before the occurrence of a shock. These include
diversifying agricultural activities, reducing cultivation areas, shifting to non-agricultural activities,
and renting land
c Refers to the use of formal insurance products such as livestock, crop or index-based insurance.
d These are ex-post measures taken after the occurrence of a shock. They include selling grain stocks,
livestock, properties and exchanging or swapping clothes or jewels for food
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Table 2.1: Variables denition and summary statistics(continued)
Name Variable description Mean Std. Dev.
Agro-ecological factors
Rainfall Log of mean annual rainfall in mm (1988  2017) 6.507 0.480
BasinAra =1 if agro-ecological zone is Bassin Arachide 0.425 0.494
RiverVall =1 if agro-ecological zone is River Valley 0.136 0.343
SylvFerlo =1 if agro-ecological zone is Ferlo Sylvo-pastoral 0.073 0.260
Casamance =1 if agro-ecological zone is Casamance 0.212 0.408
CentEast =1 if agro-ecological zone is Center East 0.091 0.287
VallAnambe =1 if agro-ecological zone is Valley Anambe 0.048 0.213
Instruments for endogeneity control
Gender ratio The ratio of men to women in the household 1.376 1.070
Household labour Share of household labour in total labour use 0.144 0.866
Support needs =1 if the household has support needs 0.755 0.430
Main occupation =1 if the main occupation of the household head is agri-
culture
0.854 0.353
Union =1 if household head is in occupations with known unions 0.083 0.276
Sale =1 if household sells raw farm produce 0.548 0.498
Rural population Rural population per region of household residence 6,393,600 2,659,060
Granaries =1 if traditional granaries are adopted 0.291 0.454
Observations 5,232
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Composition of income inequality
We rst present the results of the Gini decomposition method by Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark et al. (1986) in Table 2.2. As mentioned previously,
households have several income sources, and the eects of the rainfall variability
will be uneven across these income sources. Examining the income-source specic
changes eects on Gini elasticity provides an important step in identifying how rain-
fall variability might drive income inequality. The results show that income from
agriculture (crop and livestock) sources is the biggest contributor to household in-
come inequality. Agriculture income contributes to about 93% of overall inequality.
Furthermore, it is also the most strongly correlated (coecient of 0.971) of all in-
come sources with total household income. We also nd that the second-largest
contributor to inequality is nonfarm income, accounting for about 4.72% of overall
inequality, and remittances having the least contribution, about 2.62% to overall
inequality. At the same time, the nding reported in Table 2.2 shows that income
from agriculture sources has a strongly dis-equalizing eect. This is shown by the
elasticity reported in the last column of Table 2.2. Following equation 2.7, a 1%
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change in income from agriculture leads to an absolute increase in the Gini index by
0.076. Nevertheless, the static decomposition suggests that the equalizing eects of
nonfarm income and remittances can oset to some degree the dis-equalizing eect
of agriculture income sources.
The marginal change analysis shows that nonfarm income and remittances have the
potential to lower the Gini index. A 1% increase in nonfarm income and remittances
would lead to a 0.060 and 0.016 decrease in inequality, respectively. The results
here suggest that the inequality impacts of climate-induced shocks will be highly
dependent on where a household earns its income from. The nding is congruent to
that of Reardon and Taylor (1996) who suggested that weather shocks have greater
unequalizing eects on income distributions in households with less diverse income
sources. Our results strongly suggest that because agriculture in Senegal is highly
dependent on climate, especially through rainfed production, and accounts for a large
part of household incomes, any variability in climate can aggravate farm household
income inequality. Nonetheless, we nd evidence of the existence of a Kuznets curve
relationship between Gini elasticity and the share of agriculture incomes. As the
share of agriculture income in total household income increases, Gini elasticity may
rise until a threshold is reached, after which inequality declines.
This can be seen in the inverted U-shape relationship in Figure 2.2a. Beyond what
we observed in Figure 2.2a, the model results in Table 2.4 also support this nding.
The results suggest that the share of agriculture income in total household income
is robust and negatively associated with income inequality. This means that an
increasing share of agriculture income in total household income will reduce the Gini
index. From Figure 2.2b and 2.2c, we nd an opposite relationship between Gini
elasticity and the share of nonfarm and remittance income which exhibits a U-shape,
suggesting an increasing share of these income sources in total household income
may decrease Gini elasticity until a threshold is reached after which Gini elasticity
increases. Thus, the nding here corroborates the general view and econometric
evidence (see Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002; Thirtle et al., 2003; Christiaensen
et al., 2006; World Bank, 2007; Byerlee et al., 2009; Imai and Gaiha, 2014; Odusola
et al., 2017) that agriculture remains a powerful tool to accelerate reductions in


























































































Income source Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Agriculture 0.851 0.004 0.971 0.003 0.565 0.001 0.466 0.002 0.927 0.002 0.076 0.002
Nonfarm 0.107 0.003 0.153 0.026 0.547 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.047 0.002 -0.06 0.002
Remittances 0.042 0.002 0.271 0.042 0.579 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.026 0.002 -0.016 0.001
Total 1.000 1.000 0.481 0.481 1.000 -
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With the rst results indicating that agriculture and nonfarm income accounts for a
larger part of overall inequality, we also explored whether rainfall variability drives
the observed Gini elasticities concerning these two income sources9. This is particu-
larly important because the Gini elasticities we estimated earlier, on their own oer
few immediate insights in identifying possible pathways by which climate change
aects income inequality. As previously stated, dierences in household income
composition imply that households whose income sources are from non-climate de-
pendent sectors, for instance, may be aected dierently from those whose income
sources are climate dependent. To address this, we use the estimated elasticities of
agriculture and nonfarm income reported in the last column of Table 2.2 for each
household and regress them on rainfall variability and a set of control variables.
The WALS results which are presented in Table 2.3 show that rainfall variability is
a robust driver of Gini elasticity concerning the two income sources. In the case of
agriculture income, we nd that rainfall variability is positively associated with the
Gini elasticity while in the case of nonfarm income it is negatively associated. This
suggests that the Gini elasticity of agriculture income increases for every deviation in
rainfall while that of nonfarm income decreases for every deviation in rainfall. This
is rather not surprising because agriculture income sources are highly dependent on
climate, thus any shocks related to the climate might reduce agriculture incomes
and this will increase the Gini elasticity with respect income.
Nonfarm incomes on the other hand might not be directly dependent on the cli-
mate and hence, climate shocks will not increase the Gini elasticity. It is however
worth noting that mean rainfall decreases the Gini elasticity for agriculture income
and increases the Gini elasticity for nonfarm income. The result strongly suggests
that climate change is more likely going to increase Gini elasticity with respect to
agriculture income, thereby plunging vulnerable households more into poverty.
9We ignored remittances in the analysis because unlike the agriculture and nonfarm income
sources, it is not highly correlated or dependent on the weather.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between Gini elasticity with respect to the share of income by
source
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2.7.2 Impact of rainfall variability on inequality, food secu-
rity, and labour productivity
Table 2.4 reports the WALS estimates of the most robust drivers of the outcomes of
interest, estimated using equation 2.2. As pointed earlier, a regressor is considered
to be robust if the value of the associated t-statistic in absolute terms is larger than
1. This choice is motivated by the fact that including a given auxiliary regressor
variable increases the model t as measured by the adjusted-R2 and the precision of
the estimators of focus regressors which is measured by a lower MSE is met if and
only if the t-ratio of the additional auxiliary regressor is in absolute value greater
than 1. The robustness of the ve variables representing the residuals derived from
the rst-stage regressions for the potential endogenous variables (extension access 
Resid ext, credit access  Resid cred, market information access  Resid mar, subsidy
access  Resid sub and daily calorie availability  Resid food) indicates the presence
of simultaneity bias, and hence a consistent estimation of these variables. The results
of the control function approach are provided in Table 2.8 for the inequality model
and Table 2.9 for the labour productivity model in the appendix. A falsication
test (Table 2.12 and 2.13) and correlation test (Table 2.10 and 2.11) between the
used instruments and the outcome variables also showed that all the instruments
used were appropriate. In the spirit of brevity, we limit our discussions to the main
variables of interest  mean rainfall, rainfall variability, experienced shocks, and the
pseudo-vulnerability indicators of households.
Regarding income inequality, we nd that several factors robustly drive dierences
in the level of income inequality at the inter-household level. We nd that mean
annual rainfall is negatively associated with income inequality, suggesting that a
unit increase in mean rainfall reduces income inequality. On the contrary deviations
from the mean annual rainfall and household experience with rainfall related shocks
in the past 5 years are positively associated with income inequality. The result here
supports our earlier nding that deviation in rainfall increases the Gini elasticity
of agriculture income. With agriculture incomes accounting for about 85% of total
household incomes, the net impact of rainfall variability on income inequality is
clearly through agriculture incomes. Our ndings here are congruent with previous
studies such as Sedova et al. (2020) who show that adverse weather aggravates
inequality by reducing consumption of poor rural farming households in India. In
Mozambique, Silva et al. (2015) nd that weather shocks exacerbate existing income
and power disparities, although in some cases inequality and polarization declines
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Table 2.3: Robust drivers of Gini elasticity with respect to income sources
Gini elasticity of agriculture income Gini elasticity of nonfarm income
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t
Constant 0.262 0.059 4.42 -1.490 0.110 -13.54
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.000 3.14
Gender -0.020 0.007 -3.01 -0.009 0.012 -0.82
Education 0.010 0.004 2.85 0.010 0.007 1.47
Dependency 0.000 0.000 1.51 0.000 0.000 -0.93
Land -0.001 0.000 -4.53 0.003 0.001 5.27
Extension 0.013 0.005 2.35 0.008 0.009 0.92
Credit -0.001 0.009 -0.07 -0.020 0.017 -1.20
Membership 0.007 0.006 1.14 -0.016 0.010 -1.56
Subsidy 0.012 0.004 3.20 -0.002 0.007 -0.32
Market info -0.002 0.003 -0.73 0.000 0.005 -0.02
PET -0.019 0.005 -3.77 0.026 0.010 2.62
Rainfall -0.060 0.012 -4.78 0.259 0.023 11.26
Std Rainfall 0.001 0.000 6.17 -0.004 0.000 -9.51
Rainfall shock 0.004 0.005 0.88 -0.007 0.011 -0.65
Farming system 0.023 0.009 2.65 -0.019 0.018 -1.04
Irrigation use 0.050 0.006 7.86 -0.008 0.010 -0.79
Mitigation 0.026 0.005 5.28 -0.016 0.008 -1.89
Transfer -0.041 0.011 -3.67 0.062 0.026 2.38
Coping 0.023 0.005 5.00 0.004 0.007 0.56
N 5190 1401
Note: A regressor is considered to be a robust driver of Gini elasticity if the associated t-statistic
is in an absolute value larger than 1. In bold are those regressors that can be considered robust.
in the aftermath of an extreme event, or increase even in cases where the weather is
relatively good. Similarly, Thiede (2014) show that rainfall decits do not only have
an equalizing eect on within-community livestock inequality in parts of Ethiopia
but also at the regional level.
The distributional impacts of rainfall shocks depend critically on household vulner-
ability in terms of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. We nd varying
eects of these pseudo-vulnerability indicators on income equality. Mitigation and
risk transfer adaptive strategies are positively associated with inequality while cop-
ing strategies and farming system is negatively associated with income inequality.
Mitigation strategies (reducing land areas, renting land, and moving to nonfarm ac-
tivities) particularly aect resource allocations negatively. These negative resource
allocations might have implications for income generation, and this might explain the
positive association with inequality. The nding of Odusola (2017) provides a good
insight into this. The author nds that a 1% shift of labour away from agriculture to
other sectors leads to a 0.282% reduction in the rural poverty gap, but a 0.071% rise
in rural poverty. Similarly, Silva et al. (2015) argue that low-return or low-skilled
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activities undertaken by households to oset poor agricultural productivity through
shocks, for instance, maybe inequality-decreasing, while participation in high-return
activities may increase inequality as wealthier households tend to have better access
to these types of jobs. Risk transfer in the form of index-based insurance is also not
accessible to poor households and it also requires substantial nancial investments
in the form of premia. The nding here is in line with the consensus that some adap-
tation measures are likely to increase inequality when they prioritize higher-income
groups and economically valuable areas over low-income or marginalized neighbour-
hoods (Anguelovski et al., 2016). Rainfed subsistence agriculture is generally a low
input alternative and generates lower income opportunities compared to commer-
cial farming the requires massive inputs in the form of fertilizers, seeds, pesticides,
machinery, and irrigation, and generates higher incomes. The implication is that
rainfed subsistence farming will be associated with lower levels of income inequality
compared to commercial farming.
Just as expected, we nd that mean annual rainfall is positively associated with
household daily calorie availability. Deviations from the mean annual rainfall and
experience with rainfall related shocks in the past 5 years are however negatively
associated with household daily calorie availability. The nding here is congruent
to the study of Kinda and Badolo (2019). In their study, they analysed the eect of
rainfall variability on food security for 71 developing countries from 1960 to 2016 and
they found that rainfall variability reduces food availability per capita and increases
the percentage of total undernourished population in developing countries. In Ghana
and Bangladesh, Cooper et al. (2019) found an association between precipitation
shocks and household hunger. Other studies (Codjoe and Owusu, 2011; Abata and
Kim, 2014; Murali and A, 2014; Abegaz, 2017; Agidew and Singh, 2018) have
also found that weather-related shocks aect household food security. We nd that
risk transfer as an adaptive strategy is positively associated with daily food calorie
availability. Risk transfer products are known to increase investments in productive
inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides (see Goodwin et al., 2004; Mobarak
and Rosenzweig, 2012; Berhane et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015;
Elabed and Carter, 2015; Delavallade et al., 2015; Cole et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2019)
and this can translate to higher household food production and thus daily food
calorie availability.
Although not a robust driver of household daily food calorie availability, mitigation
as an adaptive strategy is negatively associated with daily food calorie availabil-
ity. As pointed out earlier, these strategies aect agriculture resource allocations,
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particularly land and labour and this can negatively aect household food produc-
tion. Similarly, household coping strategies were found to be a robust driver and
negatively associated with household daily food calorie availability. These strategies
which involve sales of grain stocks and livestock assets can potentially reduce house-
hold food availability. As argued by Abeygunawardena et al. (2016), traditional
coping mechanisms are backwards-looking and in the face of changing patterns of
climate variability, their eectiveness may be signicantly reduced.
52
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal
Table 2.4: Robust drivers of inequality, food security, and labour productivity
Gini index Daily calorie Labour productivity
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t
Constant 1.404 0.066 21.28 4.402 0.716 6.15 1.354 0.574 2.36
Age 0.000 0.000 2.14 0.001 0.001 0.70 -0.002 0.001 -2.17
Gender 0.004 0.006 0.76 0.356 0.058 6.18 0.311 0.052 5.97
Education 0.013 0.018 0.70 0.054 0.032 1.69 0.023 0.028 0.82
Dependency 0.000 0.000 -1.71
Household size -0.061 0.003 -20.17 -0.011 0.005 -2.43
Land 0.001 0.001 0.59 0.038 0.002 21.21 0.023 0.003 6.99
Extension 0.051 0.009 5.63 0.181 0.048 3.76 0.014 0.043 0.32
Credit -0.043 0.019 -2.25 0.055 0.075 0.74 -0.062 0.067 -0.92
Membership 0.039 0.016 2.50 -0.015 0.053 -0.27 0.054 0.044 1.22
Agriculture 0.000 0.000 -5.74
Subsidy -0.223 0.014 -15.47 0.173 0.032 5.39 0.101 0.028 3.65
Road 0.001 0.001 0.95 -0.056 0.016 -3.48
Market -0.011 0.002 -4.72 0.169 0.031 5.36
Market info -0.002 0.002 -0.82 -0.011 0.025 -0.42
Market integration 0.008 0.030 0.27
Rainfall -0.112 0.013 -8.73 0.561 0.137 4.09 1.346 0.109 12.31
Std Rainfall 0.000 0.000 1.01 -0.011 0.002 -5.10 -0.02 0.003 -6.05
Rainfall shock 0.005 0.003 1.59 -0.266 0.048 -5.53 0.064 0.042 1.53
Mitigation 0.007 0.002 3.29 -0.041 0.044 -0.92 -0.007 0.038 -0.18
Transfer 0.024 0.004 5.58 0.803 0.089 8.99 0.406 0.090 4.51
Coping -0.004 0.002 -1.52 -0.048 0.044 -1.10 0.061 0.034 1.81
PET 0.076 0.005 14.08 0.411 0.047 8.74 0.231 0.047 4.89
Farming system -0.044 0.007 -6.45 -1.20 0.126 -9.51 0.274 0.080 3.42
Irrigation use 0.001 0.004 0.31 0.162 0.059 2.76 0.266 0.053 5.06
AII -0.203 0.014 -14.08
Storage 0.13 0.042 3.09
Daily calorie 0.408 0.068 5.96
Daily calorie × Std Rainfall -0.001 0.000 -1.28
Staple crop 0.859 0.067 12.79
Mixed 0.153 0.035 4.41
BasinAra 0.489 0.211 2.31
RiverVall 0.339 0.229 1.48
SylvFerlo 0.277 0.220 1.26
Casamance 0.450 0.224 2.01
CentEast 0.507 0.225 2.25
VallAnambe 0.599 0.259 2.31
Resid edu -0.002 0.011 -0.21
Resid land 0.000 0.001 0.21
Resid ext -0.011 0.005 -2.40
Resid cred 0.027 0.009 3.09
Resid mem 0.001 0.008 0.07
Resid mar 0.004 0.002 1.76
Resid sub 0.133 0.009 15.00
Resid food 0.399 0.061 6.52
N 5232 4862 4862
Note: A regressor is considered to be a robust driver of Gini elasticity if the associated t-statistic
is in an absolute value larger than 1. In bold are those regressors that can be considered robust.
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We nd that rainfed subsistence agriculture is negatively associated with household
daily food calorie availability. This is expected because of its high dependence on
rainfall and low input use. These two factors might largely explain the observed
eect. Supplementing rainfed agriculture with irrigation use is positively associated
with household daily food calorie availability. Intuitively, irrigation use will help a
household to deal with rainfall related shocks such as droughts and allow households
to produce crops all year round.
Lastly, we examined the robust drivers of agriculture labour productivity. Mean
annual rainfall is positively associated with agricultural labour productivity. The
implication is that sucient rainfall can reduce production risk and entice farm
households to increase cultivated land and use of more productivity-enhancing tech-
nologies. Such resource allocations might increase agriculture productivity. Our
results suggest that land and the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies
 fertilizer and improved/high yielding varieties are positively associated with agri-
cultural labour productivity. A key argument we made in this paper is that beyond,
high temperatures, rainfall variability will aect agricultural labour productivity,
through food production losses and reductions in food calorie availability. Reduc-
tions in food calories will impede on the important physiological function of food
in terms of providing energy for growth, development, and work. We nd that de-
viations from the mean annual rainfall are negatively associated with agricultural
labour productivity. At the same time, food calorie availability is positively asso-
ciated with agricultural labour productivity. We nd that the correlation between
daily food calorie availability and agricultural labour productivity is relatively high
(R = 0.638, p < 0.05).
As shown by the coecient of the interaction term between food calorie availability
and rainfall variability, the eect of food calorie availability on agricultural labour
productivity decreases for every deviation in rainfall. Rather surprisingly, we nd
that household experience with rainfall related shocks in the past 5 years is positively
associated with agricultural labour productivity. Exposure to such shocks may in the
short term shift some household labour to high-return o-farm activities. This de-
crease in household labour force might push them to be more ecient. As suggested
by Chavas et al. (2005) most farm households operate under decreasing returns to
scale because household resources particularly the number of adults and land are
`too large' for the prevailing technology. A shift to o-farm employment opportuni-
ties can therefore elevate production into either a constant or increasing returns to
scale. Although not a robust driver of agricultural labour productivity, mitigation as
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an adaptive strategy is negatively associated with agricultural labour productivity.
Just as we argued in the case of income inequality and daily food calorie availability,
mitigation potentially pulls resources or shifts them out of production, and this can
ultimately lower labour productivity. We nd that risk transfer and coping strate-
gies are positively associated with agricultural labour productivity. As mentioned
previously, risk transfer has an input use eect that may complement agriculture
labour, hence potential increases in agricultural labour productivity. Similarly, cop-
ing strategies involving the sale of assets might have two eects  a food availability
eect and/or an input use eect. Household supplementary foods obtained from
purchases or exchange may provide physiological needs of food related to work.
Furthermore, the sale of productive assets might not be entirely used for household
consumption, but part might be re-invested into production in terms of inputs which
can help increase agricultural labour productivity. We nd that the farming system
and irrigation use are positively associated with agricultural labour productivity.
The study also assessed the robustness of the above estimates to various empirical
model specications. For income inequality, we specied a tobit model due to the
censored nature of the variable (i.e. ranges between 0 and 1) and an OLS model was
specied for both daily food calorie availability and agricultural labour productivity.
The result which is presented in Table 2.14 in the appendix is in line with param-
eter estimates of interest in Table 2.4. The tobit model to determine the drivers
of inequality shows that our results remain essentially unchanged both in terms of
direction and robustness of the coecients, except for risk transfer, which turned
out insignicant though with a positive sign. Similarly, the OLS model results for
the drivers of both daily food calorie availability and agricultural labour produc-
tivity also remain essentially unchanged both in terms of direction and robustness
of the coecients. However, coping strategies, turned out insignicant though it
maintained the correct signs throughout both models. We also found that the sign,
on experience with rainfall related shocks in the past 5 years and the interaction
term between food calorie availability and rainfall variability were maintained in the
OLS model but did not turn out signicant.
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2.8 Conclusion
This study investigated the impact of climate change in the form of rainfall vari-
ability on inter-household income inequality, food security, and agricultural labour
productivity of Senegalese farm households. We employed the recently developed
model-averaging techniques which address issues related to model uncertainty and
controlled for potentially endogenous variables and household pseudo-vulnerability
factors. Besides, we employed the Gini decomposition approach to identify key
household income sources and the contribution of each source to overall inequal-
ity. The empirical results revealed that the inequality impacts of climate-induced
shocks will be highly dependent on the income source composition of households.
Our results suggest that the Gini elasticity of agriculture income increases for every
deviation in rainfall while in the case of nonfarm income it decreases for every devia-
tion in rainfall. Since agriculture income constitutes the largest source of income and
contributor to household income inequality, any shocks to the sector will largely be
responsible for any observed increases in income inequality. Nonetheless, we found
evidence of the existence of a Kuznets curve relationship between Gini elasticity
and the share of agriculture incomes. This suggests that even though incomes from
agriculture is the biggest contributor to household income inequality, as the share
of agriculture income in total household income increases, Gini elasticity may rise
initially, after which inequality will decline.
Consistently we nd that rainfall variability decreases household daily food calorie
availability and agricultural labour productivity. Beyond the eect of temperature
increases on labour productivity which has been well studied, we show that food
calorie availability is positively associated with agricultural labour productivity. Fur-
thermore, the eect of food calorie availability on agricultural labour productivity
decreases for every deviation in rainfall. This suggests that climate change in the
form of rainfall variability can aect labour productivity through changes in food
availability. We also nd that the pseudo-vulnerability indicators have varying ef-
fects on the three outcomes. However, risk transfer and irrigation use are positively
associated with food calorie availability and agricultural labour productivity. Al-
though both increase income inequality, they appear to be the best instruments in
addition to subsidies and the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies (fer-
tilizer and improved seeds) to help households deal with rainfall variability related
shocks.
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The ndings from the study have some policy implications. First, policymakers
should scale up and oer subsidized index-based insurance products since they help
the farm household better adapt to rainfall related shocks. Secondly, to achieve
substantial reductions in inequality, improved food security and labour productivity,
accelerated improvements in agricultural yields, through functioning markets for
inputs such as fertilizers, seedlings, and tractors, as well as access to credit, irrigation,
and post-harvest facilities, are key to limit future impacts of climate change. There
are some important caveats to be considered for this study. Because our analysis is
rather static, it obscures or fails to capture important spatial and temporal shifts
in outcomes, that can provide critical thresholds to identify the impact of rainfall
related shocks. Future research can therefore focus on using long-term data such
as panel or longitudinal data on incomes, food production, and household labour
to provide answers on the eect of these temporal and spatial shifts on household
welfare.
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Appendix
Derivation of Equation 2.6
Following Stark et al. (1986), let G0 be the Gini index before multiplying each
household's income from source j by (I + e), and let G(e) be the Gini after the




Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk (2.8)
The multiplication of income source j by (I + e) does not aect Gk (k = I, ..., K ).
However, Rk is a function of the ranks of total income. The rank function is not well
dened for incomes that are equal. In order to avoid the problem created in this
case, we assume that incomes vary slightly across households (aside from households









k ̸=j µk + (1 + e)µj
=
µk∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
for k ̸= j (2.10)
while for source j,
Sk(e) =
(1 + e)µj∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
. (2.11)
Let us now evaluate:
G = G(e)−G0 =
K∑
k=1
Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk(e) − G0 =
K∑
k=1
Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk
K∑
k=1
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Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk +Rj ∗Gj ∗ Sj
∂G0
∂ej
= Sj(Rj ∗Gj − G0)
(2.16)
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Table 2.5: Post-harvest loss ratios per crop and region (%)
Region MaizeaRiceaSorghumaMilletaFonioaGroundnutbSesamecCowpeabCassavab
Dakar 17.19 0.00 11.09 8.02 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Diourbel 20.52 0.00 12.29 20.80 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Fatick 20.45 11.09 12.29 8.69 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Karine 28.85 10.85 22.19 20.67 18.76 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kaolack 20.34 10.85 11.31 8.54 11.48 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kédougou 26.57 11.79 11.40 10.63 23.70 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kolda 26.57 22.69 12.49 22.60 23.55 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Louga 17.19 10.85 11.31 8.34 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Matam 17.19 11.25 11.20 8.12 18.76 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Saint-Louis 17.19 11.37 11.31 8.46 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Sédhiou 26.54 22.76 22.39 10.76 23.58 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Tambacounda 17.19 11.05 22.23 8.34 11.48 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Thiès 25.94 10.85 22.13 20.67 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Ziguinchor 17.91 23.07 11.40 10.63 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
a Source: African Postharvest Losses Information System (APHLIS). https://www.aphlis.net/en
b Source: Aognon et al. (2015)
c Source: Tomlins et al. (2016)
Table 2.6: Conversion ratios for edible fractions and food energy equivalence










Source: Stadlmayr et al. (2012)
71
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal
Table 2.7: Adult-equivalent conversion factors according to age and gender



























































































Table 2.8: Control function approach for potentially endogenous variables for income inequality model
Education Land Extension Credit Membership Market info Subsidy
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 5.508∗∗∗ 0.625 -30.346∗∗∗ 3.739 -0.621 0.826 -5.060∗∗∗ 1.273 -2.762∗∗∗ 0.869 -0.664 1.185 -5.673∗∗∗ 0.750
Age -0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 0.044∗∗∗ 0.008 0.004∗ 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
Gender 0.676∗∗∗ 0.076 1.266∗∗∗ 0.420 0.036 0.093 -0.125 0.132 -0.096 0.095 0.050 0.136 0.154∗∗ 0.071
Education 1.037∗∗∗ 0.235 0.123∗∗ 0.051 0.122∗ 0.072 0.134∗∗ 0.053 0.043 0.075 0.031 0.039
Dependency -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.003∗ 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Land 0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.007∗∗ 0.004 0.020∗∗∗ 0.003
Extension 0.129∗∗ 0.056 -0.631∗ 0.339 -0.119 0.092 0.679∗∗∗ 0.062 -0.192∗ 0.108 0.345∗∗∗ 0.058
Credit 0.098 0.090 1.555∗∗∗ 0.555 -0.182∗ 0.107 0.563∗∗∗ 0.095 0.199 0.227 0.080 0.096
Membership 0.139∗∗ 0.060 -0.230 0.364 0.679∗∗∗ 0.064 0.492∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.035 0.123 0.338∗∗∗ 0.063
Subsidy 0.029 0.039 1.853∗∗∗ 0.233 0.179∗∗∗ 0.053 0.166∗∗ 0.075 0.289∗∗∗ 0.055 0.104 0.074
Road -0.110∗∗∗ 0.022 0.359∗∗∗ 0.134 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.032 0.044 0.020 0.032 0.010 0.042 0.003 0.023
Market 0.019 0.042 -0.386 0.252 0.233∗∗∗ 0.060 0.040 0.081 0.043 0.059 0.12 0.077 -0.148∗∗∗ 0.043
Market info 0.057 0.036 -0.557∗∗ 0.218 -0.054 0.048 -0.037 0.069 0.006 0.051 0.016 0.037
Mitigation -0.306∗∗∗ 0.083 0.301 0.506 0.015 0.107 0.238 0.160 -0.563∗∗∗ 0.094 -0.118 0.173 -0.052 0.085
Transfer -0.137 0.142 0.292 0.876 0.399∗∗ 0.159 0.847∗∗∗ 0.195 -0.059 0.149 0.002 0.367 0.101 0.157
Coping -0.278∗∗∗ 0.086 0.701 0.523 0.119 0.111 0.359∗∗ 0.165 -0.626∗∗∗ 0.099 -0.062 0.178 0.043 0.088
PET 0.140∗∗∗ 0.054 0.516 0.325 0.428∗∗∗ 0.062 0.368∗∗∗ 0.086 0.633∗∗∗ 0.061 0.152 0.109 0.851∗∗∗ 0.056
Agriculture -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.022∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
Rainfall -1.231∗∗∗ 0.127 5.890∗∗∗ 0.757 -0.283∗ 0.168 0.615∗∗ 0.264 0.236 0.176 -0.612∗∗∗ 0.236 1.205∗∗∗ 0.141
Std Rainfall 0.027∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.108∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.003 0.003 -0.010∗∗ 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.019∗∗∗ 0.002
Rainfall shock 0.081 0.054 0.844∗∗∗ 0.324 -0.153∗∗ 0.071 0.136 0.100 -0.416∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.022 0.105 -0.029 0.055
Farming system -0.147∗ 0.089 3.673∗∗∗ 0.532 -0.083 0.104 -0.701∗∗∗ 0.140 -0.089 0.102 -0.827∗∗∗ 0.207 -0.116 0.093
Irrigation use 0.079 0.065 0.477 0.391 0.362∗∗∗ 0.079 0.012 0.114 0.079 0.080 -0.246∗ 0.126 -0.224∗∗∗ 0.069
Gender ratio -0.060∗∗∗ 0.017
Household labour 0.652∗∗∗ 0.127
Support needs 1.074∗∗∗ 0.09
Main occupation 0.280∗∗ 0.123
Union 0.168∗ 0.09
Sale 4.969∗∗∗ 0.294
Rural population 0.000∗∗∗ 0
N 5232
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Control function approach for potentially endogenous variables for labour
productivity model
Daily calorie













Market info 0.000 0.031
PET 0.419∗∗∗ 0.046
Rainfall 0.745∗∗∗ 0.107
Std Rainfall -0.011∗∗∗ 0.002
Rainfall shock -0.334∗∗∗ 0.046
Farming system -0.721∗∗∗ 0.076
















































































Table 2.10: Correlation test of instrumental variables used for income inequality model
Variable Gini index Gender ratio Household labour Support needs Main occupation Union Sale Rural population
Gini index 1.000
Gender ratio -0.005 1.000
Household labour 0.022 -0.021 1.000
Support needs 0.021 -0.019 0.063 1.000
Main occupation 0.009 -0.001 0.010 0.048 1.000
Union -0.002 0.010 0.006 -0.022 -0.293 1.000
Sale 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.018 0.130 1.000
Rural population -0.013 0.013 -0.040 -0.040 -0.149 0.035 0.015 1.000
Table 2.11: Correlation test of instrumental variables used for labour productivity model
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Table 2.12: Test of the validity of instruments on inequality model
Gini index
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t
Constant 0.556 0.003 172.83
Gender ratio 0.000 0.001 -0.35
Household labour 0.001 0.001 0.98
Support needs 0.002 0.002 0.96
Main occupation 0.001 0.002 0.24
Union 0.001 0.003 0.18
Sale 0.000 0.002 0.29
Rural population 0.000 0.000 -0.65
N 5232
Note: A regressor is considered to be a robust driver
of Gini elasticity if the associated t-statistic is in an
absolute value larger than 1. In bold are those re-
gressors that can be considered robust.
Table 2.13: Test of the validity of instruments on labour productivity model
Labour productivity
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t
Constant 11.207 0.022 519.49
Granaries 0.002 0.029 0.08
N 4862
Note: A regressor is considered to be a ro-
bust driver of Gini elasticity if the associ-
ated t-statistic is in an absolute value larger
than 1. In bold are those regressors that
can be considered robust.
76
Chapter 2. The impact of climate change on inter-household inequality, food security and labour
productivity: Evidence from Senegal







Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 1.555∗∗∗ 0.086 4.339∗∗∗ 0.700 1.103∗ 0.600
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002∗∗ 0.001
Gender 0.017∗∗ 0.007 0.398∗∗∗ 0.061 0.296∗∗∗ 0.055
Education -0.048∗ 0.027 0.073∗∗ 0.034 0.021 0.028
Dependency -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Household size -0.061∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.009 0.006
Land 0.001 0.001 0.040∗∗∗ 0.002 0.022∗∗∗ 0.004
Extension 0.071∗∗∗ 0.011 0.200∗∗∗ 0.049 0.004 0.045
Credit -0.013 0.022 0.019 0.078 -0.06 0.068
Membership 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.053 0.052 0.044
Agriculture -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Subsidy -0.233∗∗∗ 0.014 0.163∗∗∗ 0.034 0.098∗∗∗ 0.029
Road -0.001 0.002 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.016
Market -0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 0.158∗∗∗ 0.034
Market info -0.001 0.002 -0.011 0.025
Market integration -0.012 0.031
Rainfall -0.134∗∗∗ 0.016 0.560∗∗∗ 0.134 1.333∗∗∗ 0.118
Std Rainfall 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.019∗∗∗ 0.003
Rainfall shock 0.005∗ 0.003 -0.296∗∗∗ 0.047 0.067 0.046
Mitigation -0.020∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.018 0.073 -0.014 0.037
Transfer 0.010 0.007 0.776∗∗∗ 0.124 0.415∗∗∗ 0.100
Coping -0.027∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.005 0.076 0.053 0.032
PET 0.087∗∗∗ 0.006 0.408∗∗∗ 0.047 0.223∗∗∗ 0.052
Farming system -0.045∗∗∗ 0.007 -1.235∗∗∗ 0.125 0.340∗∗∗ 0.088
Irrigation use 0.002 0.004 0.173∗∗∗ 0.058 0.263∗∗∗ 0.053
AII -0.198∗∗∗ 0.016
Storage 0.146∗∗∗ 0.044
Daily calorie 0.454∗∗∗ 0.093
Daily calorie×Std Rainfall -0.001 0.000








Resid edu 0.035∗∗ 0.016
Resid land 0.000 0.001
Resid ext -0.016∗∗∗ 0.005
Resid cred 0.017∗ 0.010
Resid mem 0.020∗∗ 0.009
Resid mar 0.006∗∗ 0.002
Resid sub 0.140∗∗∗ 0.009
Resid food 0.370∗∗∗ 0.082
N 5232 4862 4862
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. The standard errors
reported for the inequality and labour productivity model are the bootstrapped errors.
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How Eective are Risk Management
Strategies? Empirical Evidence from
Farm Households in Senegal
1
Peron A.Collins-Sowah, Christian H. C. A. Henning
Abstract
Using empirical data from a nationally representative farm household survey in
Senegal, this study evaluated the eect of dierent risk management strategies em-
ployed by farm households on agriculture income and dispersions around incomes.
To achieve this, the study employed a Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regres-
sion model and a Moment-Based Approach. We nd that the use of ex-ante risk
management strategies signicantly reduces agriculture incomes while ex-post risk
management strategies adoption either in isolation or in combination with ex-ante
signicantly increases agriculture incomes. Ex-ante risk management strategies were
observed to be associated with opportunity costs relating to income loss and likely
inecient resource allocations. Ex-post strategies on the contrary involve the sale
of assets, hence it grants households the ability to smoothen household income ex-
post shocks. The study also nds that all risk management strategies signicantly
reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes with ex-post risk management strate-
gies producing the largest eect. The results suggest that ex-post risk management
strategies appear to be the most eective in terms of helping households to maxi-
mize their objectives in terms of expected income and reductions in the variability
of incomes. For wealthy households, ex-post risk management might be an eective
strategy while for poor households it might not be optimal since it can plunge them
deeper into poverty.
Keywords: Risk management, strategies, dispersion, multinomial, ex-ante, ex-post
JEL Codes: D13, G32, Q12
1Part of this chapter has been published as a working paper: An earlier version of this paper was
published as the working paper title: Risk management and its implications on household incomes.
Working Papers of Agricultural Policy, No. WP2019-05, Kiel University, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics, Chair of Agricultural Policy, Kiel. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/
10419/213603/1/1689255315.pdf. In this working paper a less aggregated risk management ty-
pology (risk mitigation, transfer and coping) was used.
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3.1 Introduction
As pervasive and permanent xtures of agricultural landscapes, risks are costly and
if unchecked breeds uncertainty, stie agricultural investments (D'Alessandro et al.,
2015), and impose ex-ante barriers to the use of technologies, which in turn aect
agricultural productivity and economic growth (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Bar-
nett et al., 2008; Miller, 2008; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Kouamé, 2010; Dercon
and Christiaensen, 2011; Demeke et al., 2016; Poole, 2017; Amare et al., 2018).
The incidence of risks also has important spill-over eects on other rural households
and businesses (Anderson, 2001). For instance, by lowering farm outputs, risks can
also reduce turnover for agricultural merchants and agro-processors (Pannell and
Nordblom, 1998). Additionally, agricultural risks potentially limit access to nance,
increases the likelihood of farmers defaulting on loans and this restrains agriculture
productivity (Yaron et al., 1997; Demeke et al., 2016). Particularly in developing
regions of the world, smallholder producers are often exposed to a variety of climate
risks that does not only adversely aect output and input prices but also household
income and wealth.
Several empirical studies (see Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Harwood et al., 1999;
Fafchamps, 2000; Poole, 2017) suggests that farm households are not particularly
concerned with uncertainty relating to agricultural output and prices, but rather to
the variability of their incomes. Thus one of the most fundamental and complex de-
cisions that farm households have to make, is the choice among probability functions
of income stemming from dierent risk management strategies. In most cases, they
are assumed to select a combination of risk management strategies that, for instance,
maximize expected net returns subject to the degree of risk they are willing to accept
(Harwood et al., 1999; Tomek and Peterson, 2001). An optimal risk management
decisions of farm households often rely on sound analysis of the entire portfolio of
policies available to them. At the same time, empirical evidence also suggests that
risk management approaches in which multiple approaches are considered simulta-
neously appear to be more ecient than single approaches (Huirne et al., 2007). An
important question that arises in the context of household risk management is how
eective2 these risk management strategies farm households employ are, and how
2The overall eectiveness of a risk management strategy typically requires the evaluation of
trade-os between expected returns and the associated costs (actual or opportunity costs). Eec-
tiveness of a risk management strategy therefore calls for a balanced of costs against the achieved
reduction or returns (dispersion around incomes). In this paper we only evaluate the eectiveness
of risk management strategies from the returns perspective. Cost eectiveness is beyond the scope
of this study. We use the associated standard deviation of households' agriculture incomes as proxy
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large are the benets? The available empirical evidence (see Howard and D'Antonio,
1984; Li and Vukina, 1996; Dhuyvetter and Kastens, 1997; Heifner and Coble, 1997;
Berg, 2002; Kimura et al., 2010; Vigani and Kathage, 2019) is largely concentrated
on formal risk management instruments such as insurance and future contracts. A
limited number of studies (see Kimura et al., 2010; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019; Vi-
gani and Kathage, 2019) have been focused on informal strategies such as crop and
income diversication either in isolation or in combinations with formal instruments.
For most of the informal risk management strategies employed by farm households
in developing countries, the available empirical evidence is inadequate to provide
denitive answers on their eectiveness.
Concurrently, agricultural risk management aims to nd the risk-ecient combina-
tion of tools and instruments that maximizes household farm incomes and at the
same time reducing the variability of incomes. Particularly in the study country
Senegal, the use of traditional risk management strategies by households to deal
with climate-related risk is well known and documented (see Evans, 2007; Tacoli,
2011; ANACIM et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2014). However, to date, no empirical
study has been carried out to investigate the impact of these strategies on house-
hold incomes or their eect on dispersions around incomes. The purpose of this
paper is to identify the optimal risk management strategies that allow households to
maximize their income and reduce the variability of income. The study there seeks
to investigate the eectiveness of the various risk management strategies employed
by farm households to deal with climate shocks. By employing a multinomial en-
dogenous switching regression that accounts for selectivity bias and a moment-based
approach, the study examined the impact of two main risk management typology on
agriculture incomes and its dispersions in a multinomial framework. This approach
permits the evaluation and comparison of aggregate eects across these dierent risk
management typologies and their simultaneous use.
Evaluating the eectiveness of risk management strategies on Senegalese farm house-
holds' agricultural incomes and dispersions around incomes is important for several
reasons. First, because of limited access to formal risk management instruments,
farm households most often have challenges managing the myriad risks they face.
They therefore heavily rely on a range of traditional risk management strategies to
avoid or minimize losses but these are mostly incomplete, suboptimal and mitigate
only a small part of the overall risk (Siegel and Alwang, 1999; Dercon, 2002; Al-
derman, 2008; Barnett et al., 2008; Deressa et al., 2010; Kouamé, 2010). Secondly,
indicators for the return's eectiveness of a risk management strategies.
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these traditional risk management strategies are not always widely available or prove
ineective for poor farm households and also come with associated costs (see Zim-
merman and Carter, 2003; Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 2008; Deressa et al., 2010;
World Bank, 2016) which can either be direct costs or the opportunity cost of un-
dertaking a specic strategy. Thirdly, ineective risk management strategies could
potentially result in a vicious sequence of shockpartial recoveryshocks, which can
undermine natural and capital resources and threaten the transition from subsis-
tence to commercial agriculture (Cusmano, 2013; Demeke et al., 2016; World Bank,
2016).
This study is important for several reasons. First, it highlights the need for a more
targeted and systematic approach to agricultural risk management. Because good
risk management decisions depend on accurate information, evaluating the eec-
tiveness of dierent strategies and tools will help farm households to rene their
decisions and select the optimum set of strategies when faced with risky situations.
This is particularly important because uctuations in farm incomes, due to risks
may present dicult welfare problems for farmers. Optimal risk management tools
also have implications for rural growth and poverty reduction. Furthermore, identi-
fying optimal risk management strategies provides useful information for the design
of appropriate risk management policies by policymakers. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 3.2 and 3.3 presents the conceptual framework and
empirical strategy, respectively. In Section 3.4, the survey data and variable mea-
surements are presented. In Section 3.5, the empirical results and discussions are
presented and nally, Section 3.6 oers conclusion and policy implications.
3.2 Conceptual framework
At the farm household level, one can assume that risk management strategies are
aimed at enhancing expected returns while reducing volatility. Concurrently, farm
households' when faced with production-related shocks must decide to adopt among
a possible set of risk management strategies (Table 3.6) that can help them to oset
the adverse eects of risk and income shortfalls. Following Kim and Chavas (2003),
Koundouri et al. (2006), and Mukasa (2018) we model farm households' choice of risk
management strategies in an expected utility framework. Just like farm households
having to make production decisions before climatic and other risks are realized, the
adoption of risk management strategies follows a situation where farm households
are uncertain about the outcome of their decisions. Therefore, the adoption of risk
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management strategies is related to uncertain prospects, which one can reduce to a
probability distribution over a domain of possible payos. Hence, decision-making
by farm households, therefore, boils down to a choice between dierent possible prob-
ability distributions of returns, herein agricultural incomes and dispersions around
incomes.
Households select from a nite set of risk management strategies (ex-ante, ex-post,
or both) to maximize agriculture incomes but minimize dispersions around incomes.
More importantly, as shown in gure 3.1, adoption of these risk management strate-
gies is associated with dierent eects, herein dispersions around the means of agri-
culture income. From gure 3.1a, if we assume that agriculture incomes follow a
normal distribution and π is the mean or average household agriculture income,
then an adopted risk management strategy can; a) reduce the dispersion or varia-
tion around π  i.e., the areas between τ1 and τ2 or b) increase the dispersion or
variation around π  i.e., the areas between ϕ1 and ϕ2. In the same fashion, risk
management strategies could have dierent eects on the skewness distribution of
household incomes (gure 3.1b). It could lead to a) negative skewness distribution
 i.e., ϕ1 or b) positive skewness distribution  i.e., ϕ2.
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Figure 3.1: Dispersion eect of risk management strategies on incomes
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Furthermore, adoption decisions on these risk management strategies are made with-
out knowing which outcomes may result from such decisions, hence farm household
decision making occurs under uncertainty. The risk management strategies in this
nite set are also mutually exclusive, therefore the choice of one implies the rejection
of the others. We assume that a farm household's decisions are based on whether
or not to adopt any, some, or all of the risk management strategies, j available to
them (j = 1,...., M ). In light of this, it is assumed that farm households will choose
risk management strategies that will result in the highest expected utility.
3.3 Empirical strategy
In a multiple risk management strategies adoption setting, farm households' simul-
taneous use of strategies leads to 4 possible combinations that farm households could
choose from (Table 3.1). Because of the simultaneous use of these strategies, failing
to account for the fact that farm households can adopt several risk management
strategies simultaneously, can lead to biased estimates as the overall eect of adop-
tion is not necessarily equal to the sum of the eects of adopting each strategy
separately (Wu and Babcock, 1998). Farm households' decisions to adopt these
strategies may not also be random and they may endogenously self-select into adop-
tion or non-adoption. Therefore, the adoption decisions are likely to be inuenced
systematically by both observed and unobservable characteristics that may be cor-
related with the outcomes of interest (agriculture income and standard deviation of
agriculture income). Such unobservable characteristics may include for example the
innate managerial and technical abilities of the farmers in understanding and using
risk management strategies or the types of social networks formed by farmers that
are not captured, such as the kind of neighbours the farmer communicates with and
whether such neighbours have adopted risk management strategies. The inability to
therefore capture these unobservable characteristics may lead to selection bias.
Table 3.1: Risk management portfolios available to farm households
Risk Management Portfolio Portfolio ID Frequency Percent (%)
No risk management RMP0 279 5.38
Ex-ante risk strategy only RMP1 3,172 61.18
Ex-post risk strategy only RMP2 1,004 19.36
Ex-ante and Ex-post strategy RMP3 730 14.08
Total 5,185 100
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Hence, to disentangle the pure eects of adoption, we model the farm households'
choice of risk management strategies and the impact of adoption in a multinomial
endogenous switching regression framework. This approach is a selection-bias cor-
rection methodology based on the multinomial logit selection model developed by
Bourguignon et al. (2007). The approach allows us to rstly, obtain both consistent
and ecient estimates of the selection process and a reasonable correction for the
outcome equations. Secondly, it allows us to evaluate both individual risk manage-
ment strategies and combined strategies while capturing the interactions between
the choices of alternative strategies. Estimation of the multinomial endogenous
switching regression occurs simultaneously in two steps. In the rst stage, farm
households' choice of risk management strategy is modelled using a multinomial
logit selection model, while recognizing the inter-relationships among the portfo-
lios. The estimated parameters from the rst stage and then used to calculate the
selection-bias correction (or selectivity) terms.
In the second stage, the selection-bias correction terms together are incorporated
as covariates into the outcome model to estimate the impacts of risk management
strategies on agriculture income and the standard deviation of agriculture incomes
using ordinary least squares (OLS). Following the studies of Di Falco and Veronesi
(2013), Kassie et al. (2015), Teklewold et al. (2017), and Vigani and Kathage (2019),
we describe the empirical econometric approach used in the study below.
3.3.1 Stage I: Multinomial Adoption Selection Model
Farm households are assumed to maximize their expected revenues by using a port-
folio of risk management strategies. Let Y ∗ij be the latent variable that captures
the expected net revenues from the use of a risk management strategy j (j=1. . .M )
concerning implementing any other strategy k. We specify the latent variable as
Y ∗ij = Xiϖ + εij (3.1)
Equation 3.1 includes a deterministic component, Xiϖ, and an idiosyncratic unob-
served stochastic component εij. The deterministic component is a latent variable
determined by observed household characteristics such as age, gender, and education
of the household head, household size, asset ownership, farm size, soil fertility, etc.
While the unobserved stochastic component captures all the variables that are rel-
evant to the household's decision-maker but are unknown to the researcher such as
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skills or motivation. The utility obtained by farm households from choosing among
the risk management strategies is not directly observable, but the adoption decision
is observable. A farm household i will choose a risk management strategy j if it
provides expected returns greater than any other portfolio if:
Yi

1 i Y ∗i1 > max
k ̸=1
(Y ∗ik) or εi1 < 0
...
...
... for all k ̸= j
M i Y ∗iM > max
k ̸=M
(Y ∗ik) or εiM < 0
(3.2)
The formulation in equation 3.2 implies that the ith farm household will adopt a
risk management strategy j to maximize their expected benet if it provides greater
expected utility than any other risk management strategy k ̸= j, i.e., if εij =max
k ̸=1
(Y ∗ik)
< 0. It is assumed that the covariate vector Xi in equation 3.1 is uncorrelated
with the idiosyncratic unobserved stochastic component εij, i.e., E(εij | Xi) = 0.
Under the assumption that εij is identically and independently Gumbel distributed,
the probability of the ith farm household with characteristics X choosing the j th
risk management strategy can therefore be specied by a multinomial logit model
(McFadden, 1974) as:




The parameter estimates of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation. In our specication, the base category, non-adoption of any
risk management portfolio (see Table 3.1), is denoted as j = 1. In the remaining
portfolios (j = 2,. . ., 4), at least one portfolio is used by a farm household.
3.3.2 Stage II: Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regres-
sion Model
In the second stage, we estimate a multinomial endogenous switching regression
model to investigate the impact of each risk management strategy on agriculture
income and the standard deviation of agriculture incomes by applying the Bour-
guignon et al. (2007) selection bias correction model. Our model implies that farm
households face a total of M regimes (one regime per risk management strategy,
where j = 1 is the reference category (no risk management). We assume that the
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vector of outcome variables is a linear function of explanatory variables. Hence,
the stochastic function to evaluate agriculture income and the standard deviation of
agriculture incomes implication of each risk management strategy for each regime j
is given as:
Regime 1 : Qi1 = Ziβ1 + αi1Zi1 + µi1 if Ai = 1
...
... ,
Regime M : QiM = ZiβM + αiMZiM + µiM if Ai = M
(3.4)
where Qij is the outcome variable of farm household i in regime j, (j = 1,. . ., M ),
and Zi represents a vector of inputs, and household's characteristics, such as the age
of household head, household size, asset ownership, etc., included in Xi. β and α
represent the corresponding vector of coecients to be estimated. µij represents the
unobserved stochastic component, which veries E(µij | Zi, Xi) = 0 and V(µij | Zi,
Xi) = σ
2
j . In addition, to overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity with observed covariates, we employed the approach of Mundlak
(1978) and Wooldridge (2018) which has also been used by Di Falco (2014), Kassie
et al. (2015), Teklewold et al. (2017) and Vigani and Kathage (2019)3. Control-
ling for unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important to help address farm or
plot-specic unobservables as they may contain useful missing information regarding
land quality (Kassie et al., 2015) for instance.
Concurrently, if farm households obtain private information about unobservable ef-
fects such as how good the soil is on the plot or some shocks, they will adjust their
factor input decisions accordingly (Fafchamps, 1993; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003;
Assunção and Braido, 2007). Hence, this approach allows us to exploit crop-level
information to deal with the issue of the farm household's unobservable character-
istics. Furthermore, crop-level information can potentially control for farm-specic
eects. We exploit crop-level information and include the mean of crop varying Z
explanatory variables, which include land holding, labour, fertilizer, and seed quan-
tity to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. According to Teklewold et al.
(2013), a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the vectors α are jointly equal to zero
is required to indicate the relevance of crop-specic heterogeneity.
3In most of these studies, plot-variant variables were used to control for unobserved heterogene-
ity but due to the lack of plot-level data we use an alternative approach by using crop and farm
household-variant variables since household produce multiple crops and we have crop-level data.
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For each sample observation, Qij is observed if and only if one among the M depen-
dent regimes is observed. When estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) model,
the outcomes of interest, agriculture income, and the standard deviation of agricul-
ture income equations 3.4 are estimated separately. However, if the error terms of
equation 3.1, εij are correlated with the error terms µij of the outcome model 3.4,
then the expected values of µij conditional on the sample selection are nonzero i.e.,
corr(εij, µij) ̸= 0, and the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To correct
for the potential inconsistency, we employ the multinomial endogenous switching
regression model by Bourguignon et al. (2007), which takes into account the correla-
tion between the error terms εij from the multinomial logit model estimated in the
rst stage and the error terms from each outcome equation µij. Bourguignon et al.
(2007) show that consistent estimates of β and α in the outcome equations 3.4 can
be obtained by estimating the following selection bias-corrected agriculture income
and the standard deviation of agriculture income equations:
Regime 1 : Qi1 = Ziβ1 + αi1Zi1 + σ1τi1 + vi1 if Ai = 1
...
... ,
Regime M : QiM = ZiβM + αiMZiM + σMτiM + viM if Ai = M
(3.5)
where v is the error term with an expected value of zero, σ is the covariance between
εij and µij, τ is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the estimated probabilities in














where P̂ represents the probability that farm household i chooses risk management
strategy j as dened in equation 3.3, ρj is the correlation between εij and µij. The
specication in equation 3.5 implies that the number of selection correction (bias)
terms in each equation are equal to the number of multinomial logit choices M.
The specied model allows us to identify not only the direction of the bias related to
the allocation of farm households in a specic strategy but also which choice among
any two alternative strategies this bias stems from. For example, a positive bias
correction coecient related to alternative j selection equation in the alternative k
outcome equation highlights higher outcomes of farm households who chose alterna-
tive k compared to farm households taken at random, due to the allocation of farm
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households with worse unobserved skills out of alternative k into the alternative j.
In the nutshell, for each strategy-based outcome estimation, a negative (positive)
selectivity coecient related to any of the alternative strategies, indicates lower out-
comes than those of randomly chosen farm households on account of the allocation
of farm households with better (worse) unobserved characteristics out of the given
strategy and into the respective alternative risk management strategy.
3.3.3 Estimating the standard deviation of agriculture in-
comes
Ideally in estimating dispersions around agriculture income, panel or longitudinal
data will be the most appropriate to observe risk management strategies and disper-
sions around agriculture incomes over time. But since we only have cross-sectional
data for this study, an alternative approach to observe dispersions around agricul-
ture incomes was employed. In line with previous studies (Kim and Chavas, 2003;
Koundouri et al., 2006; Di Falco et al., 2007; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Kassie
et al., 2015; Mukasa, 2018), the estimation strategy for the standard deviation of
agriculture income consisted of computing moments of the income function. The
moment-based approach has been widely used in the literature as an indicator of
risk exposure. Furthermore, the central moment moments around the mean are
widely considered as a proxy for downside risk or the probability of losses. Accord-
ing to Antle (1983), maximization of the expected utility of prot E[U(π)] is equal
to the maximization of the relevant moments of the risk exposure (e) distribution
conditional on inputs use. The estimation procedure involved rst estimating each
regime's net agriculture income function and then using the residuals to compute
the simple moments for each farm household. The mean equation of agriculture
income is estimated as follows:
RV ij = ϕi1Hij + γi1H ij +Ψij (3.6)
where RV ij is the mean agriculture income of farm household i in regime j, Hi is
a vector of variables assumed to inuence the mean agriculture income functions;
H i is a vector of inputs used that may shift the farm production, these include
fertilizer, seed and labour use, land size, soil fertility, etc.; and Ψ denotes error
terms distributed with mean zero E(Ψij) = 0. ϕ and γ are vectors of parameters
to be estimated and associated with H and H, respectively. If we assume that
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the independent variables in equation 3.6 are exogenous, then equation 3.6 can be
consistently estimated by using OLS4. The rst moment of agriculture income is
then estimated as follows:
f(H i, ϕi, γi, H i) ≡ E
[
RV ij(H i, H i, e)
]
(3.7)
The higher moments of agriculture income can be written as follows:
E
[




fk(H i, ϕi, γi, H ik) where k = 1, 2, 3
(3.8)
where k = 1 is the mean agriculture income functions, k = 2 and k = 3 are the sec-
ond (variance) and third (skewness) central moments of agriculture income functions
under each risk management strategy, respectively. The standard deviation5 of agri-
culture incomes is then estimated as the squared root of the second central moment
(variance) of agriculture incomes. The estimated standard deviation of agriculture
income functions was then used as dependent variables in equations 3.5 to estimate
the impact of the adoption of each risk management portfolio on dispersions around
agriculture income.
While the variables Xi in equation 3.1 and Zi in equation 3.5 are allowed to overlap,
proper model identication requires at least one variable (instrument) in Xi that
does not appear in Zi. However, nding true instruments in empirical work is
sometimes challenging, or even impossible (Kassie et al., 2015). Therefore, the
selection equation 3.1 is estimated based on all explanatory variables specied in
the outcome equations plus at least one or more instruments. Following Di Falco
and Veronesi (2013), we establish the admissibility of the selected instruments by
performing a simple falsication test: the selected or valid instrument (s) is required
to signicantly inuence a farm household's choice of risk management strategy but
have no signicant eect on the outcome of interest (i.e. agriculture income and
4We employed two dierent specication: linear and log-linear for the mean agriculture income
equation. By observing the AIC and BIC with each specication, we settled for the log-linear
specication because it produced the smallest values for AIC and BIC.
5It must be noted that the standard deviation estimated here are nothing other than the residual
standard deviation. Most of the literature have used variance, skewness and kurtosis extensively,
however this does not meet the interest of this paper, hence the second central moment (variance)
was transformed into standard deviations. This is more advantageous because standard deviation is
expressed in the same units as agriculture income, hence making it more intuitive and informative.
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standard deviation of agriculture incomes). We also followed Stock et al. (2002) and
examined the strength of the instruments based on the F-statistic. In this study,
we employ distance to a major city and insurance needs as identifying instruments.
Distance to a major city is expected to signicantly inuence the adoption of risk
management strategies but not agriculture income or dispersions around income.
At the same time, the insurance need of a household is expected to signicantly
inuence the choice of a risk management strategy but not agriculture income or
dispersions around income. As shown by Antle (1983) the error terms in equations
3.5 are likely to exhibit heteroscedasticity, hence following Bourguignon et al. (2007),
we bootstrapped the standard errors to deal with heteroscedasticity in the second
stage.
3.3.4 Estimation of the treatment and counterfactual eects
The adoption of risk management strategies by farm households could result in
positive welfare outcomes for households. However, estimating such outcomes in
observational studies such as this one is important because of the diculty of ob-
serving the counterfactual outcomes. In cases where experimental data are involved
or available through randomized control trials, for instance, information on the coun-
terfactual situation would normally be provided, and as such, the problem of causal
inference can easily be resolved (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). The challenge of eval-
uating impacts using observational data is to estimate the counterfactual outcome,
which is the outcome of interest when farm households that adopted a particular
risk management strategy could have gained had they not adopted that strategy.
Di Falco (2014), argues that in the absence of a self-selection problem, it would be
appropriate to assign to farm households that adopted a counterfactual outcome
of interest equal to the average outcome of interest of non-adopters with the same
observable characteristics. However, unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to
choose a risk management strategy also aects the outcome of interest and cre-
ates a selection bias in the outcome of interest equation that cannot be ignored.
The Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression framework however can be used
to examine average treatment eects (ATT) by comparing expected outcomes of
adopters with and without adoption. Following Bourguignon et al. (2007), we rst
derive the conditional expected outcome of interest (agriculture income and stan-
dard deviation of agriculture income) of farm households that adopted, which in our
study means j = 2 . . .M from equation 3.5, as
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E (Qi2|Ai = 2) = Zi2β2 + αi2Zi2 + σ2τi2
...
... ,
E (QiM |Ai = M) = ZiMβM + αiMZiM + σMτiM
(3.9)
Then, we obtain the expected outcome of interest of farm households that adopted
risk management strategy j in the counterfactual hypothetical case that they did
not adopt (j = 1) as
E (Qi1|Ai = 2) = Zi2β1 + α1Zi2 + σi1τi2
...
... ,
E (Qi1|Ai = M) = ZiMβM + αiMZiM + σiMτi1
(3.10)
Equations 3.9 represent the actual expected outcomes of interest (agriculture income
and standard deviation of agriculture income) observed in the sample for adopting
farm households, while equations 3.10 are their respective counterfactual expected
outcomes of interest. The use of these conditional expectations allows us to calculate
the average treatment eects (ATT)  i.e., the treatment eect for treated farm
households, which is the dierence between equations 3.9 and 3.10.
3.3.5 Method for addressing potential endogeneity
An issue that needs to be addressed in estimating equation 3.1 is the potential
endogeneity problem that may arise. This is particularly important because the
presence of reverse causality and endogeneity in models can make the identication
of causal eects dicult due to biased estimates, hence the need to account for
any potential reverse causality between the adoption decision of risk management
strategies and the outcomes of interest. A potential source of endogeneity identied
in the empirical literature comes from the risk attitude of a farmer. The risk prole
or risk perception of a farmer may inuence the choice of risk management strategy.
Risk management strategies employed by a farmer can potentially correlate to his or
her risk prole or risk perception. Studies by Pennings and Leuthold (2000), Miyata
(2003), Sherrick et al. (2004), Wik et al. (2004), Pennings et al. (2008), Kouamé
(2010), Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), Theuvsen (2013), Ullah and Shivakoti
(2014), Ullah et al. (2015), Meraner and Finger (2017), and Asravor (2019) all
show that farmers' risk attitudes are positively correlated with the choice of risk
management strategy. Since some of the risk management strategies employed by
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farmers are technologies and management practices based, farm households having
access to agricultural extension agents might be encouraged to adopt these strategies.
Furthermore, being a member of a farmer-based organization might inuence access
to formal risk management instruments such as index-based insurance or informal
risk management instruments such as self-help groups.
Thus, risk attitude, extension, and membership of farmer-based organizations vari-
ables may be jointly determined with the decision of farm households choosing to
adopt risk management strategies. Hence, the study followed previous studies (see
Abdulai and Human, 2014; Ma and Abdulai, 2016), and controlled for the poten-
tial endogeneity of these variables using the control function approach developed
by Wooldridge (2015). Due to the dichotomous nature of the three variables, we
employed a probit regression specication of the potential endogenous variable (i.e.,
risk attitude, extension, and membership of farmer-based organization) as a function
of all other variables used in the selection equation (i.e., equation 3.1) in addition
to instrumental variables in the rst-stage estimation, such as:
Si = Xijτ +Gijγ + ϵij (3.11)
where Si is a vector of the observed potential endogenous variables, X is as de-
scribed previously in equation 3.1, Gij is a vector of instrumental variables. The
vectors τ and γ are the parameters to be estimated and ϵij is the random error
term. To ensure identication in the estimation of the adoption specication, some
of the variables included in the rst-stage estimation in equation 3.11 are excluded
from the adoption equation in 3.1. For this study, the three variables included as
instruments in equation 3.11 are storage technology used by farm household which
is expected to inuence risk attitude, the need for support which is expected to in-
uence extension access and lastly access to production contract which is expected
to aect membership in farmer-based organizations. In addition, it is also worth
noting here that the instrumental variable(s) used here is expected to not correlate
with the other instrumental variables (distance to a major city and insurance needs)
used for the multinomial endogenous switching regression model identication6. We
incorporated both potential endogenous variables and the estimated residuals7 pre-
6Results of the control function and the correlation of instruments and our outcomes of interest
are presented in Table 3.8 and 3.9 in the appendix.
7Wooldridge (2015, Pp. 427  428) proposes estimating a generalized residuals which uses
the inverse Mills ratio (the ratio of the standard normal density, ϕ, divided by the standard normal
cumulative distribution function, Φ) to compute the generalized residuals.
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dicted from equation 3.11 in the selection equation 3.1 to account for endogeneity
as follows:
Y ∗ij = Xijβ + Siϑ+Rijα + ωij (3.12)
whereXij is as dened previously, Si is a vector of the observed potential endogenous
variables, and Rij is a vector of the generalized residuals terms from the rst-stage
regressions of the endogenous variables in equation 3.11. The vectors β, ϑ, and α are
the parameters to be estimated and ωij is the random error term. The endogenous
variables become appropriately exogenous in a second-stage estimation equation by
adding appropriate generalized residuals since they serve as the control function.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2015), the approach leads to a robust, regression-based
Hausman test for the endogeneity of the suspected variables. If the coecient of
the residual term is statistically signicant, it shows that endogeneity was indeed
present and also well controlled for in the model (Gibson et al., 2010; Ricker-Gilbert
et al., 2011; Amankwah et al., 2016; Harris and Kessler, 2019; Katengeza et al., 2019;
Ogutu et al., 2019). Furthermore, Wooldridge (2015) observed that if the coecient
on the estimated generalized residual is statistically signicant, there is a need to
adjust the standard errors for the two-step estimation by bootstrapping.
3.4 Data and variable measurement
3.4.1 Farm household survey
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the larger
Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricultural Pol-
icy Support Project. The farm household survey was conducted between April and
May 2017 across all the 14 administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments
except for the departments of Dakar, Pikine, and Guédiawaye. A total of 42 agri-
cultural departments were included in the survey. The survey was targeted towards
cereals, horticultural crops, and fruit and vegetable producers. The survey design
was a two-stage, nationally based random survey that included rural census districts
as the primary units and farm households as the secondary units. The method con-
sisted of rst dividing the statistical population (i.e., agricultural households) into
the primary units so that each of them is unambiguously related to a well-dened
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primary unit. Then samples were drawn in two stages. In the rst stage, a sample
of rural census districts was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricultural
households was selected at the level of each primary unit. In rural census districts
where rainfed agriculture is practised and localized crops were grown such as Senegal
River Valley and Niayes Market Gardening Zone, stratication of the rural census
districts was done before agricultural households were selected. Data collected in-
clude information on household demographic characteristics, plot and land holdings,
agricultural equipment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017 growing sea-
son, credit, inputs use and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes, and food
processing activities. Others included household consumption, access to amenities,
non-farm and livestock revenue, remittance, agricultural insurance, risks and adap-
tation strategies, perception on input subsidies, and membership of farmer-based
organizations.
3.4.2 Risk management typologies
During the survey, farm households were asked to identify the most recurring risks
they faced in the previous 5 years preceding the survey. Additionally, they were
asked to list the various adaptation strategies used in dealing with these recurrent
risks. Nine main strategies were outlined by households and this is provided in
Table 3.6 in the appendix. In the presence of production shocks, diversication of
agricultural activities was the largest (39%) strategy employed by farm households
to deal with risk. This is subsequently followed by an orientation to non-agricultural
activities, which is employed by about 30% of households. Reduction of land areas
under cultivation as a risk management strategy is employed by about 20% of the
surveyed households. After risks have occurred, measures related to the sale of
livestock are employed by about 20% of the surveyed households. Both sales of
grain stock and property are used by 9% of farm households. Based on the empirical
literature (see World Bank, 2001, 2005; Lilleor et al., 2005; Chetaille et al., 2011), we
aggregated these risk management strategies employed by farm households based on
the point at which the reaction to risk takes place into two broad typologies; ex-ante
and ex-post risk management strategies as shown in Table 3.6.
Ex-ante strategies refer to those actions taken before the realization of a risky event
to lower the probability of a risky event. On the other hand, ex-post strategies are
those actions taken after a risk event has occurred and are also synonymous to risk
coping strategies. They are mostly used in response to the variation of farm income.
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Since evidence from the empirical literature (Harwood et al., 1999; Makki et al.,
2001; Flaten et al., 2005; Velandia et al., 2009; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Ullah
et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016) suggest these risk management approaches are used
simultaneously or in combinations, we assume that in a multiple risk management
strategies adoption setting, farm households' simultaneous use of these two strategies
leads to four possible combinations or portfolio of strategies that farm households
could choose from (see Table 3.1). Based on these risk management portfolios, about
61% of farm households are observed to employ ex-ante risk management strategies.
This is followed by ex-post risk management strategies which are employed by about
19% of farm households while about 14% of farm households employ both ex-ante
and ex-post measures. About 5% of farm households employ no risk management
strategy.
3.4.3 The empirical specication
The specication of our empirical model is based on economic theory, empirical
studies on risk management strategies adoption (Goodwin et al., 2004; McNamara
and Weiss, 2005; Finocchio and Esposti, 2008; Tavernier and Onyango, 2008; Ash-
faq et al., 2008; Velandia et al., 2009; Deressa et al., 2010; Poon and Weersink,
2011; Dadzie and de Graft Acquah, 2012; Enjolras et al., 2012a; Amanor-Boadu,
2013; Bowman and Zilberman, 2013; Bryan et al., 2013; Nienaber and Slavi£, 2013;
Bartolini et al., 2014; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Ullah et al.,
2015; Meraner and Finger, 2017; Asravor, 2019; Vigani and Kathage, 2019) and fac-
tors aecting the variability of farm incomes (Pope and Prescott, 1980; Dunn and
Williams, 2000; Schurle and Tholstrup, 1987, 1989; Purdy et al., 1997; Barry et al.,
2001; Poon and Weersink, 2011; Enjolras et al., 2012b). Following this literature,
we summarized variables that are hypothesized to aect risk management strate-
gies adoption decisions, agriculture income, and standard deviation of agriculture
income.
The rst outcome variable, agriculture income is composed of income from both
crops and livestock. Livestock income was directly provided by households dur-
ing the survey; however, crop income was estimated as the value of all household
crop production in CFA. In our data, farm households produced about 33 dierent
crops but on average, households produce 2 crops. Using the reported farm gate
price, we estimated the monetary value of each crop commodity produced by farm
households. A sum of the monetary value across all crops grown by households and
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livestock incomes represented a household's total agriculture income. The second
outcome, deviations of agriculture income was estimated as previously described in
equation 3.6 to 3.8. Table 3.2 presents the denition of the variables used in the
analysis. The summary statistics of variables across the various risk management
strategies and the pooled data are presented in Table 3.7 in the appendix. House-
holds employing both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies appear to
have the highest agriculture incomes followed by those who use ex-post strategies
only. Ex-ante risk management adopting households have the least agricultural in-
comes. Similarly, households adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management
strategies have the lowest deviations of agriculture incomes followed by ex-post risk
management strategies adopting households. Households, not managing risk have
the highest deviations of agriculture incomes. Table 3.7 also shows that households
adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies experience the high-
est risk and loss counts while households not managing risks have the lowest risk
and loss counts.
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Table 3.2: Variables denition
Name Variable description
Outcome variables
Agriculture income Log of agriculture income in CFA
Std. agriculture income Standard deviation of agriculture income in CFA
Household characteristics
Age Age of household head in years
Gender =1 if the household is male-headed
Education =1 if the household head has formal education
HH size Number of people residing in the household
Risk attitude =1 if the household is risk-taking
Remittance =1 if the household receives remittances
Lighting fuela =1 if the source of lighting fuel is electricity
Share Agricultural income share (%) in total household income
Insurance knowledge =1 if farmer has ever heard of agricultural insurance
Farm characteristics
Land Total land area cultivated by household (ha)
Diversicationb Crop diversication index
Cash crop Share of land under cash crops (%)
Soil qualityc Soil quality index
AIId Agriculture implement index
Irrigation =1 if the household uses irrigation
Farming system =1 if household practices rainfed subsistence agriculture
Fertilizer Total fertilizer quantity used in kg
Seed Total seed quantity used in kg
Labour Total quantity of labour used
Risk indicators
Std. Rainfall Standard deviation of rainfall (2000  2015)
Rainfall Log of mean annual rainfall in mm (2000  2015)
Risk count Number of production risks faced by the household
Loss count Number of risk-related losses experienced by household
a Source of lighting fuel is used as a proxy variable for household wealth.
b The diversication index estimated here is simply the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
which is calculated by squaring the land area share of each crop grown by a household and
then summing the resulting numbers. It can range from close to zero to 1. A value of 1 means
that the household produces only one crop, while a value close to zero suggests a high crop
diversication. This index is not meant to measure risk management by rather identify
the crop portfolio of households.
c For soil quality, we computed a soil quality index using publicly available data from the
International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC  World Soil Information).
We describe the computation of this index in the appendix.
d The agricultural implement index was computed using a principal component analysis
(PCA) based on the number of agricultural equipment owned by a household.
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Table 3.2: Variables denition(continued)
Name Variable description
Access to institutions
Extension access =1 if accessed extension service
Membership =1 if a member of a farmer-based organization
Credit access =1 if access to credit
Subsidy =1 if access to subsidies
Mundlak Fixed Eects
Mean land Mean land (ha) allocation across all crops grown
Mean fertilizer Mean fertilizer (kg) use across all crops grown
Mean seed Mean seed (kg) use across all crops grown
Mean labour Mean labour used across all crops grown
Instrumental variables
Distance Log of distance to a major city in km
Insurance needs =1 if farmer has specic insurance needs
Contract =1 if access to production contracts
Storage =1 if household use metal silos
Support =1 if farmer has support needs
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we rst investigate factors driving the adoption of the various risk
management strategies in isolation or combination. Secondly, we present the eco-
nomic implications associated with each risk management portfolio on household
agriculture incomes and the standard deviation of agriculture. We do not however
discuss results of the econometric estimation of agriculture income, agriculture in-
come function, and the standard deviation of agriculture income models. Related
results are however provided in Table 3.11 to Table 3.13 in the appendix. The se-
lectivity correction terms (m0 to m3) in Table 3.12 and 3.13 are signicant in some
of the risk management portfolio equations. This indicates the presence of sample
selectivity eects and using OLS would have produced biased and inconsistent es-
timates. Thus, accounting for selectivity eects using the Multinomial Endogenous
Switching Regression model was appropriate.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the multinomial logit model for the dierent risk
management portfolios. We nd that the multinomial logit model ts the data well,
the Wald test is highly signicant, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that all the
regression coecients are jointly equal to zero. The test for the joint signicance
of instruments across the dierent risk management portfolios is highly signicant.
The results from the control-function specication indicate that the correction for
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endogeneity in the model was necessary. We nd the coecient of the extension
access and membership of farmer-based organization residual term to be statisti-
cally signicant in two of the risk management strategies, implying the presence
of endogeneity of extension access and membership of farmer-based organization.
The results from the control-function approach are presented in Table 3.8. Our re-
sults also suggest that selected instruments used in the control function approached
satised the necessary conditions. Not only do the instruments (storage technology,
support needs, and contracts) have a signicant eect on the potentially endogenous
variables but they are also not correlated to the two instrumental variables (distance
to a major city and insurance needs) used in the multinomial endogenous switching
regression model identication. A correlation test between instrumental variables
used (Table 3.9) in model identication and the control function also shows weak
correlations, suggesting that the condition is met.
3.5.1 Drivers of Risk Management Strategies
From Table 3.3, the relative probability of adopting ex-ante risk management strate-
gies (RMP1) is strongly negative and statistically signicant for the education level
of household head, membership of farmer-based organizations, remittance, the share
of agriculture income in total household income, and distance to a major city. This
suggests that household heads with formal education and households that are mem-
bers of farmer-based organizations are less likely to adopt ex-ante risk management
strategies. Receiving remittances, increasing share of agriculture income in total
household income and an increasing distance of a household to a major city are
associated with a less likelihood of ex-ante risk management strategies adoption.
Conversely, we nd that the number of risk and losses experienced, extension and
credit access and insurance needs are strongly positive and statistically signicant
for the adoption of ex-ante risk mitigation strategies.
Concerning ex-post risk management strategies (RMP2), we nd that the probabil-
ity of adoption is positive and statistically signicant for the gender of the household
head, the number of risks and losses experienced, insurance knowledge, and needs.
On the contrary, we nd that the education level of household head, lighting fuel
which is a proxy for household wealth, risk attitude, and distance to a major city is
strongly negative and statistically signicant for the adoption of ex-post strategies.
We nd that the age and education level of the household head, the proxy variable
for household wealth  lighting fuel, membership of farmer-based organizations, and
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share of agriculture income in total household income are negatively associated with
the adoption of both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies (RMP3). How-
ever, the number of risk and losses experienced, extension and credit access, subsidy
access, and insurance needs and knowledge are positive and statistically signicant
for the adoption of both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies. The adop-
tion of risk management strategies appears to be largely driven by the educational
level of the household head, the number of risks and losses experienced, and insur-
ance needs.
Table 3.3: Parameter estimates of risk management portfolios adoption, Multinomial
Logit Selection Model
RMP1 RMP2 RMP3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 3.235∗∗∗ 0.754 1.285 0.812 -0.170 0.834
Age -0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.006 -0.012∗ 0.006
Gender 0.023 0.238 0.602∗∗ 0.273 0.289 0.298
Education -0.324∗∗ 0.158 -0.350∗∗ 0.171 -0.368∗∗ 0.181
HH size 0.021 0.022 0.031 0.023 0.036 0.024
Lighting fuel 0.013 0.141 -0.440∗∗∗ 0.155 -0.374∗∗ 0.175
Risk attitude -2.250 1.775 -3.236∗ 1.892 -2.888 1.970
Risk count 0.238∗∗ 0.099 0.309∗∗∗ 0.104 0.564∗∗∗ 0.105
Loss count 0.432∗∗∗ 0.122 0.330∗∗ 0.129 0.772∗∗∗ 0.133
Std. Rainfall 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
Extension 1.941∗∗ 0.786 0.366 0.881 1.874∗ 0.961
Membership -1.835∗ 1.004 -0.063 1.137 -3.914∗∗∗ 1.195
Credit 0.946∗∗ 0.440 0.732 0.499 1.280∗∗ 0.511
Land 0.017 0.024 0.033 0.026 0.016 0.025
Irrigation 0.258 0.236 0.001 0.276 0.265 0.305
Cash crop 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.004
Total labour 0.021 0.021 0.034 0.024 0.035 0.025
Subsidy 0.115 0.460 0.084 0.492 1.026∗∗ 0.506
Remittance -0.413∗ 0.245 -0.284 0.271 -0.046 0.283
Share -1.136∗ 0.610 -0.133 0.647 -1.126∗ 0.662
Insurance knowledge 0.090 0.200 0.410∗ 0.215 0.947∗∗∗ 0.229
Distance -0.005∗∗ 0.002 -0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Insurance needs 0.731∗∗∗ 0.183 1.032∗∗∗ 0.199 0.865∗∗∗ 0.202
Resid risk 0.826 1.052 1.591 1.124 1.313 1.176
Resid extension -1.072∗∗∗ 0.399 -0.459 0.449 -0.800 0.502
Resid membership 0.477 0.481 -0.536 0.557 1.615∗∗∗ 0.570
Joint sig. of instruments (χ2) 27.020∗∗∗ 54.640∗∗∗ 21.280∗∗∗
Wald test, χ2 (75) 1151.100∗∗∗
N 5,185
Notes: The base category is farm households that did not adopt any of the risk management
portfolios (i.e., RMP0). RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management, RMP2  denotes ex-post risk
management, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post risk management. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent
1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped
standard errors.
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3.5.2 Economic Implications of Risk Management Strategies
The objective of this paper is to identify which optimal risk management strategies
allow households to maximize their objectives in terms of expected income and min-
imize variability of income. In this section, the study attempts to identify the best
tools, in terms of maximizing and stabilizing farm households' agriculture incomes.
The economic implications of adopting each risk management portfolio on farm
households' agricultural incomes and the standard deviation of income measured in
terms of the average treatment eects (ATT) for the treated farm households are
presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. After controlling for the eects of
several covariates and the selection bias stemming from both unobserved and ob-
served factors on household agriculture incomes, the adoption of the ex-post risk
management strategies either in isolation or in combination with ex-ante strategies
is signicantly associated with positive agriculture incomes. In the case of ex-ante
risk management strategies, the observed eect was negative.
The adoption of ex-post risk management strategies provides higher agriculture in-
comes compared to a counterfactual case where farm households do not adopt it as a
risk management measure. This is not surprising because ex-post risk management
strategies rely largely on the sale of assets. By using ex-post risk management as a
strategy, farm households obtain about 2.43% more agriculture income and this ef-
fect is statistically signicant at 1%. Ex-post risk management might be an eective
strategy to smooth household consumption in the short run. For wealthy or resource
endowed households, this might be benecial in terms of smoothing household in-
comes and consumption shortfalls. However, for poorer households, this might be a
costly strategy, especially in the long run since they will be unable to recover the loss
of productive assets ex-post the shock (Bhandari et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2008;
Amare et al., 2018), which might partly be due to the cost in terms of production
































































income - If households did not
manage risk
ATT Change (%)
Ex-ante 5.362(0.007) 5.385(0.011) -0.023∗(0.013) -0.43
Ex-post 5.567(0.011) 5.432(0.020) 0.135∗∗∗(0.023) 2.43
Ex-ante and ex-post 5.591(0.010) 5.500(0.023) 0.091∗∗(0.025) 1.63
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
Table 3.5: Dispersions impact on agriculture income by risk management strategy
Strategy
Actual std of agriculture
income
Counterfactual std of agriculture
income - If households did not
manage
ATT Change (%)
Ex-ante 0.337(0.002) 0.368(0.003) -0.030∗∗∗(0.004) -8.83
Ex-post 0.281(0.003) 0.343(0.007) -0.062∗∗∗(0.008) -22.02
Ex-ante and ex-post 0.279(0.003) 0.301(0.007) -0.021∗∗∗(0.008) -7.66
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
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The adoption of both ex-ante and ex-post also leads to higher agriculture income
compared to the counterfactual case of non-adoption. The adoption of this risk
management strategy increases household agriculture incomes by about 1.63% com-
pared to the counterfactual case of not adopting this strategy. By virtue of the
treatment eects, adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies
does not appear to help households maximize their expected agriculture income
incomes compare to adopting just adopting ex-post risk management strategies in
isolation. Surprisingly managing risk ex-ante reduces household agriculture incomes
by about 0.43%. The eect is also statistically signicant at 10%. Table 3.6 sheds
important insights as to why the use of ex-ante risk management strategies might
have negative eects on household's agriculture incomes. We see from Table 3.6
that the ex-ante risk management strategies such as reduction of cultivated areas
and orientation to non-agricultural activities account for about 20.4% and 30.2% of
the ex-ante risk management strategies employed by households. Intuitively, there is
an opportunity cost related eect to the use of these strategies. For example, Soullier
(2017), estimates the opportunity cost of labour in Senegalese rice value chain to be
about FCFA 500 (US$ 0.93) per day during the production season. Particularly for
rice harvest, the opportunity cost for labour can be as high as FCFA 1,500 (about
US$ 2.79) per day.
The use of these strategies causes losses in agricultural income. Furthermore, produc-
tion or agricultural diversication, in particular, could lead to shifts or reallocation
of resources (land) for high-value crops and staple crops and this can have a negative
eect on agriculture income when a household income is largely dependent on the
sale of high-value crops and yields for high-value crops are lower relative to staple
crops (Morduch, 1995; Salazar-Espinoza et al., 2015). Evidently, we nd that farm
households using ex-ante risk management strategies allocate about 48.8% of their
cultivated lands towards staple crop production and only about 25.9% towards cash
crops. As argued by Skees et al. (2002) and Larochelle and Alwang (2013) diversi-
cation can also hinder important gains that can be obtained from specialization.
Other results also suggest that diversication is benecial up to a certain threshold
only (Schoney et al., 1994). Although a less important ex-ante risk management
strategy used by households, renting out land is associated with an opportunity cost
in the form of lost or foregone revenues or opportunities for protable agriculture en-
terprises. For instance, Soullier (2017) observed the opportunity cost of land rental
in Senegalese rice value chain to be about CFA 40,000 (about US$ 75) per hectare.
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Perhaps the most eective ex-ante risk management strategy, insurance adoption,
usually permits farm households to use more productive inputs such as organic fertil-
izer, improved or high yielding varieties of crops. However, the empirical literature
suggests some adverse eects related to insurance use. Most of these are related
to moral hazard problems. For instance, in the US, Smith and Goodwin (1996)
found that fertilizer and chemical use among Kansas wheat producers tended to be
negatively correlated with insurance purchases. They found that producers who pur-
chased insurance use fewer inputs than those producers that did not buy insurance.
Similarly, Giné and Yang (2009) and de Nicola (2015) nds insurance contracts to
signicantly reduce total input and investments in new agricultural opportunities.
In Hungary, Spörri et al. (2012) also found a negative impact of insurance on farm
prot, labour, and land productivity in arable farms. Similarly in France and Hun-
gary, Vigani and Kathage (2019) also nd that insurance negatively aects farm
eciency.
Furthermore, some risk transfer products have been found to reduce the use of com-
plementary risk management strategies such as diversication (Schanit-Chatterjee,
2010; Nigus et al., 2018; Matsuda et al., 2019). This crowding-out eect could po-
tentially have cascading eects which might be reected in income shortfalls. At
the same time, other behavioural biases related to less eort devoted towards farm-
ing activities by insurance policyholders might explain the ndings. As shown in
previous studies (see Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 1996;
Goodwin, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2004) insurance use leads to moral hazard problems
and farmers with insurance are likely not going to take care in their production
activities compared to a situation without insurance.
Results of the eect of risk management on dispersions around agriculture incomes
are presented in Table 3.5. Managing production risks either through single strate-
gies or in combination in eect helps to reduce dispersions around agriculture in-
comes. By using ex-ante risk management strategies, farm households reduce dis-
persions around agriculture incomes by about 9% and this eect is statistically
signicant at 1%. Not surprisingly, ex-post risk management strategies which are
heavily skewed towards to sale of assets allow farm households to reduce dispersions
around agriculture by about 22% compared to the counterfactual case of not employ-
ing ex-post risk management strategies. Employing a combination of ex-ante and
ex-post risk management strategies signicantly reduces dispersions around agricul-
ture incomes by about 8% compared to the counterfactual case of not employing
this combination. Additionally, the results suggest that adopting both ex-ante and
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ex-post risk management strategies does not provide the largest benets in terms of
reducing dispersions around agriculture income incomes compare to adopting just
ex-ante or ex-post risk management strategies in isolation.
106
Chapter 3. How Eective are Risk Management Strategies? Empirical Evidence from Farm
Households in Senegal
3.6 Conclusion
This study sought to investigate how eective the various risk management strate-
gies employed by farm households to deal with risk are and to identify which optimal
risk management strategies allow households to maximize their objectives in terms
of expected income and reductions in the variability of income. We employed a
multinomial endogenous switching regression that accounts for selectivity bias and
a moment-based approach to determine the impacts of the various risk management
strategies on agriculture incomes and their dispersions around agriculture incomes
in a multinomial framework. Our results suggest that risk management strategies
employed by households are largely driven by the educational level of the household
head, the number of risks and losses experienced by the household, and insurance
needs. We nd a positive impact of ex-post risk management strategies adoption ei-
ther in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strategies on farm
household agriculture incomes. Risk management through ex-ante risk management
strategies appears to negatively aect agriculture incomes because these strategies
are primarily related to opportunity costs and suboptimal allocation of productive
resources. We nd that adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strate-
gies do not lead to a signicantly higher net impact in terms of agriculture incomes.
We nd that the adoption of all risk management strategies by farm households are
eective in reducing the dispersions around agriculture incomes. Ex-post risk man-
agement strategies have the highest observed eect on reducing dispersions around
agriculture income. The use of these strategies reduces dispersions around agricul-
ture incomes by about 22%. Although ex-ante risk management appears to have
a negative impact on agriculture incomes, we nd that it appears to have a larger
dispersion reduction eect on agriculture incomes compared to using it in combi-
nation with ex-post risk management strategies. Overall, ex-post risk management
strategies appear to be the most eective in terms of helping households to max-
imize their objectives in terms of expected income and reducing the variability of
incomes. However, the use of ex-post strategies can have very severe implications in
terms of deepening poverty through the reduction of assets and thus might not be
an eective strategy for very poor households.
Our ndings have some important policy implications. First, there is a need for a
more targeted and systematic approach to agricultural risk management. Of par-
ticular relevance is the need for several kinds of implementation instruments such
as agricultural investments and technical assistance that can amplify the benets
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of some of the risk management strategies employed by households. For example,
investments related to the provision of climate information, for example, can be
benecial for farmers adopting ex-ante risk management strategies through helping
them to select the right crop commodities to produce for a particular season and
at what time within the season to sow for instance. At the same time, empowering
farmer's management of climate risks will require the adoption of context-suitable
agricultural practices such as conservation agriculture, sustainable land manage-
ment practices, etc., and technologies that are important low-cost risk mitigation
strategies such as improved and drought-resistant varieties of crops. This will re-
quire the provision of information and technical assistance to farmers in the use
and implementation of these practices. Although the study nds that ex-post risk
management strategies appear to be more eective in terms of agriculture incomes
and reducing dispersions around income, farm households' long-term management
of risks should be encouraged and supplemented through the adoption of formal
risk transfer products such as index-based insurance. For especially poor house-
holds, overcoming some socioeconomic and institutional barriers will be particularly
important in improving access and use of these products.
In conclusion, there are some important caveats to be considered for this study.
Due to the lack of panel or longitudinal datasets, the study relied solely on cross-
sectional data. Hence the analysis used in this paper is a static one and also neglects
the dynamic behaviour of production systems. Also, the eectiveness of the various
risk management strategies might have both temporal and spatial dimensions which
are not evaluated in this study. Some of the studied risk management strategies
can be eective in the short run, while others might be eective in the long run.
Hence, having access to data with a long-time dimension on various production
systems, agriculture incomes, and risk management strategies employed by farm
households would allow for the investigation of all these dimensions and provide a
better comparison between the various risk management strategies. Such data would
be needed to provide more robust evidence on the implication of risk management on
important household welfare outcomes. Furthermore, since we clustered the various
risk management strategies into three broad typologies, we failed to evaluate the
impacts of their individual components. Because production conditions and the
scope of risk management strategies are heterogeneous across farms, focusing on
aggregate eects as we did in this study may obscure important individual strategy
specic eects for instance.
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Table 3.6: Risk management strategies employed by farm households
Risk management strategies Frequency Percent (%)
Ex-ante strategies
Diversify agricultural activities 2,040 39.34
Reduce the area under cultivation 1,055 20.35
Orientation to non-agricultural activities 1,565 30.18
Rent land to others 119 2.3
Subscribe to agricultural insurance 161 3.11
Ex-post strategies
Sell grain stocks 483 9.32
Sell property 452 8.72
Sale of animals 1,055 20.35
Exchange/swap clothes or jewels for food 71 1.37
Total number of households 5185 100
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Table 3.7: Means and standard deviation of variables by risk management strategy
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 Pooled data
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Agriculture income 5.474 0.639 5.358 0.585 5.564 0.516 5.581 0.439 5.436 0.566
Std. agriculture income 0.356 0.351 0.339 0.313 0.280 0.260 0.277 0.227 0.320 0.296
Age 52.781 13.547 53.434 13.401 51.985 12.769 52.515 13.163 52.989 13.265
Gender 0.910 0.286 0.909 0.287 0.950 0.218 0.948 0.222 0.923 0.267
Education 0.470 0.500 0.381 0.486 0.372 0.483 0.356 0.479 0.380 0.485
HH size 9.355 4.694 9.556 5.305 10.030 5.177 10.484 5.274 9.768 5.255
Lighting fuel 0.366 0.482 0.377 0.485 0.259 0.438 0.307 0.462 0.344 0.475
Risk attitude 0.599 0.491 0.338 0.473 0.407 0.492 0.385 0.487 0.372 0.483
Risk count 1.043 1.311 1.725 1.395 1.839 1.593 3.066 1.635 1.899 1.549
Loss count 1.215 1.041 1.623 0.985 1.588 0.972 2.419 1.256 1.706 1.071
Std. Rainfall 107.629 24.557 109.318 24.038 110.556 23.976 111.176 25.984 109.728 24.346
Rainfall 6.358 0.469 6.396 0.454 6.407 0.436 6.439 0.431 6.402 0.448
Extension 0.229 0.421 0.154 0.361 0.102 0.302 0.170 0.376 0.150 0.358
Membership 0.315 0.466 0.135 0.341 0.082 0.274 0.105 0.307 0.130 0.336
Credit 0.039 0.195 0.046 0.210 0.043 0.203 0.041 0.199 0.045 0.206
Land 4.801 8.943 5.077 8.337 6.222 8.878 6.207 6.202 5.443 8.232
Fertilizer 365.627 1294.696 219.305 1190.949 186.673 578.637 251.247 2773.626 225.357 1451.056
Seed 148.807 178.095 141.178 171.168 157.245 178.077 177.093 188.539 149.756 175.835
Labour 3.918 2.446 3.966 3.151 4.170 3.415 4.185 2.930 4.034 3.141
Irrigation 0.280 0.450 0.219 0.414 0.127 0.334 0.123 0.329 0.191 0.393
Cash crop 23.004 28.176 25.917 27.679 29.319 23.932 33.695 26.980 27.514 27.075
Subsidy 0.591 0.492 0.493 0.500 0.444 0.497 0.662 0.473 0.513 0.500
Remittance 0.111 0.315 0.095 0.293 0.090 0.286 0.125 0.331 0.099 0.299
Share 0.953 0.153 0.884 0.252 0.927 0.173 0.863 0.231 0.893 0.232
Diversication 41.600 35.072 51.156 32.482 46.778 26.215 52.524 24.998 49.987 30.655
Mean land 2.538 5.400 2.402 4.365 2.439 2.667 2.689 3.389 2.457 4.026
Mean fertilizer 321.090 1312.552 141.816 1138.028 85.213 251.226 172.839 2768.860 144.658 1407.403
Mean seed 87.848 124.938 69.208 91.845 63.053 71.357 73.117 80.530 69.548 88.949
Mean labour 2.438 1.923 2.339 2.240 2.011 1.810 1.997 1.616 2.232 2.073
Insurance knowledge 0.258 0.438 0.254 0.435 0.274 0.446 0.363 0.481 0.273 0.446
Distance 68.808 52.852 54.368 40.609 45.769 38.331 49.849 32.138 52.843 40.176
Insurance needs 0.287 0.453 0.373 0.484 0.447 0.497 0.433 0.496 0.391 0.488
Storage 0.093 0.291 0.156 0.363 0.201 0.401 0.227 0.419 0.172 0.377
Support 0.699 0.460 0.759 0.428 0.718 0.450 0.804 0.397 0.754 0.431
Contract 0.018 0.133 0.026 0.160 0.021 0.143 0.018 0.132 0.024 0.152
AII 0.048 1.269 0.116 1.238 -0.272 1.305 -0.274 1.297 -0.018 1.274
Soil quality 0.349 0.118 0.384 0.100 0.402 0.086 0.380 0.088 0.385 0.098
Farming system 0.688 0.464 0.835 0.371 0.896 0.305 0.963 0.189 0.857 0.350
N 279 3,172 1,004 730 5,185
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management, RMP2 
denotes ex-post risk management, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post risk management.
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Table 3.8: Control function approach for potentially endogenous variables
Risk attitude Extension Membership
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -1.996*** 0.169 -3.087*** 0.226 -1.686*** 0.214
Age 0.000 0.001 0.003* 0.002 -0.004* 0.002
Gender 0.142* 0.076 0.066 0.092 -0.156* 0.093
Education 0.128*** 0.040 0.081 0.051 0.193*** 0.053
HH size 0.024*** 0.004 -0.019*** 0.006 0.021*** 0.006
Lighting fuel 0.012 0.041 0.111** 0.051 -0.050 0.054
Risk attitude 0.015 0.054 0.393*** 0.054
Risk count -0.026 0.016 0.075*** 0.019 -0.042** 0.020
Loss count 0.015 0.021 0.012 0.025 0.054** 0.027
Std. Rainfall -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Extension -0.011 0.057 0.652*** 0.061
Membership 0.443*** 0.060 0.701*** 0.063
Credit 0.310*** 0.092 -0.064 0.103 0.556*** 0.095
Land 0.019*** 0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004
Irrigation 0.255*** 0.057 0.508*** 0.063 0.164** 0.067
Cash crop 0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001
Total labour 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.009
Subsidy 0.710*** 0.04 0.263*** 0.053 0.264*** 0.055
Remittance -0.090 0.065 0.312*** 0.073 -0.068 0.085
Share 0.670*** 0.093 0.074 0.110 -0.142 0.115
Insurance knowledge 0.029 0.046 0.505*** 0.054 0.142** 0.058
Distance 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001




Log-likelihood -2958.131 -1696.226 -1557.932
LR chi2(22) 949.75*** 1041.04***
N 5,185
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level,
respectively.
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Table 3.9: Correlation test of instrumental variables
Variables Distance Insurance needs Storage Support Contracts
Distance 1.000
Insurance needs 0.098 1.000
Storage -0.166 -0.055 1.000
Support 0.081 0.219 0.021 1.000
Contracts 0.076 0.066 0.017 0.065 1.000
Table 3.10: Test of the validity of the instrument (falsication test) on non-adopters
Selection equation Agriculture income Std of agriculture income
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -3.235*** 0.758 4.564*** 0.316 0.518** 0.207
Age 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
Gender -0.023 0.235 0.371*** 0.121 -0.073 0.080
Education 0.324* 0.168 0.073 0.074 0.009 0.049
HH size -0.021 0.022 -0.008 0.009 0.005 0.006
Lighting fuel -0.013 0.148 0.002 0.074 -0.024 0.049
Risk attitude 2.250 1.829 0.169** 0.076 -0.032 0.050
Risk count -0.238** 0.109 -0.042 0.035 -0.008 0.023
Loss count -0.432*** 0.126 0.058 0.040 0.022 0.026
Std. Rainfall 0.000 0.003 -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Extension -1.941** 0.765 -0.128 0.097 -0.007 0.064
Membership 1.835* 1.014 0.018 0.091 0.109* 0.060
Credit -0.946** 0.446 -0.029 0.175 0.174 0.115
Land -0.017 0.024 0.016*** 0.004 0.001 0.003
Irrigation -0.258 0.237 0.525*** 0.101 0.040 0.066
Cash crop -0.001 0.004 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Labour -0.021 0.023 0.040** 0.016 -0.018* 0.011
Subsidy -0.115 0.495 0.194** 0.081 -0.134** 0.053
Remittance 0.413* 0.246 0.110 0.105 -0.015 0.069
Share 1.136* 0.637 0.435** 0.220 -0.049 0.144
Insurance knowledge -0.090 0.194 0.023 0.089 -0.034 0.058
Distance 0.005** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Insurance needs -0.731*** 0.174 0.103 0.088 -0.022 0.058
Resid risk -0.826 1.101
Resid extension 1.072*** 0.373
Resid membership -0.477 0.498
Note: In the reported selection equation, ex-ante risk management strategies (RMP1) was set
as the base category. Selection equation results are for households, not managing risks (i.e. RMP0).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors for
the selection equation are the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 3.11: Log-linear agriculture income function estimation
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Gender 0.346*** 0.118 0.179*** 0.030 0.302*** 0.057 0.173*** 0.062
Education 0.068 0.068 -0.032* 0.017 -0.006 0.026 0.000 0.029
HH size -0.009 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.013*** 0.004
Extension -0.134 0.096 0.144*** 0.025 0.164*** 0.046 0.080** 0.038
Credit -0.061 0.166 0.046 0.041 0.152** 0.064 0.086 0.073
Membership 0.033 0.089 0.071*** 0.027 0.001 0.050 0.077* 0.046
Subsidy 0.177** 0.076 0.032* 0.018 0.094*** 0.026 0.017 0.031
Remittance -0.019 0.103 -0.031 0.029 0.026 0.044 -0.017 0.042
Contract 0.040 0.254 0.059 0.055 0.056 0.090 0.061 0.108
AII -0.070** 0.033 -0.047*** 0.008 -0.041*** 0.011 -0.018 0.013
Rainfall -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Land 0.007* 0.004 0.005*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.003
Fertilizer 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Seed 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Labour 0.018 0.016 0.010*** 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.006
Soil quality 0.025 0.333 -0.439*** 0.086 -0.500*** 0.155 -0.025 0.161
Farming system -0.580*** 0.121 0.105*** 0.036 0.261*** 0.062 -0.150* 0.088
Cash crop 0.004*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.001* 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Diversication 0.000 0.001 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001
Constant 5.419*** 0.237 5.220*** 0.059 5.016*** 0.110 5.375*** 0.136
Adj R2 0.339 0.374 0.440 0.314
Root MSE 0.520 0.463 0.386 0.363
AIC 446.709 4137.159 958.711 614.242
N 279 3,172 1,004 730
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management, RMP2 
denotes ex-post risk management, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post risk management.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
120
Chapter 3. How Eective are Risk Management Strategies? Empirical Evidence from Farm
Households in Senegal
Table 3.12: Estimates of agriculture income equations
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 6.674*** 0.857 4.658*** 0.205 4.061*** 0.375 5.346*** 0.409
Age 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Gender 0.309** 0.128 0.136*** 0.041 0.274*** 0.089 0.097 0.072
Education -0.033 0.085 -0.037* 0.022 -0.011 0.027 -0.011 0.033
HH size -0.020** 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.006* 0.003 0.010** 0.004
Lighting fuel 0.002 0.093 0.019 0.032 -0.039 0.042 0.077* 0.042
Risk attitude 0.019 0.144 -0.024 0.036 0.051 0.043 0.040 0.053
Risk count -0.001 0.053 -0.014 0.016 0.050*** 0.018 -0.016 0.021
Loss count 0.003 0.061 -0.023 0.017 -0.002 0.023 -0.006 0.024
Rainfall -0.251*** 0.074 0.014 0.019 0.056* 0.031 -0.021 0.034
Extension -0.124 0.099 0.171*** 0.031 0.107** 0.046 0.120** 0.049
Membership 0.124 0.132 0.009 0.038 -0.053 0.060 0.126** 0.057
Credit -0.109 0.175 0.082* 0.045 0.171*** 0.066 0.098 0.089
Land 0.011 0.024 0.013** 0.006 -0.009* 0.005 0.019** 0.009
Fertilizer 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Seed 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Labour 0.088*** 0.027 0.059*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.008 0.005 0.012
Subsidy 0.187* 0.098 -0.004 0.032 0.065 0.043 0.016 0.056
Cash crop 0.005** 0.002 0.001* 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Irrigation 0.595*** 0.126 0.087** 0.038 0.009 0.067 0.152*** 0.057
Remittance -0.026 0.105 -0.080** 0.035 0.008 0.051 -0.025 0.049
Diversication 0.000 0.001 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Mean land -0.003 0.040 -0.017 0.012 0.070*** 0.017 -0.015 0.019
Mean fertilizer -0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean seed 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Mean labour -0.124*** 0.039 -0.088*** 0.009 -0.043** 0.017 -0.014 0.025
m0 -0.109 0.313 -1.115** 0.443 -1.322*** 0.474 -0.269 0.562
m1 0.456 0.925 -0.469** 0.192 -1.062** 0.533 0.134 0.294
m2 -0.027 1.047 -0.920** 0.389 -0.256* 0.151 -0.848** 0.420




23.930*** 143.570*** 30.730*** 2.840
N 269 3150 992 726
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management,
RMP2  denotes ex-post risk management, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post
risk management. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 3.13: Estimates of the standard deviation of agriculture income equations
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 0.139 0.571 0.185 0.112 0.482* 0.247 0.089 0.217
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Gender -0.089 0.078 0.019 0.023 -0.101* 0.058 0.001 0.037
Education 0.002 0.057 0.003 0.013 -0.046*** 0.018 0.014 0.019
HH size 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Lighting fuel -0.027 0.068 0.092*** 0.018 0.073** 0.029 0.049** 0.023
Risk attitude -0.066 0.102 -0.056*** 0.019 -0.015 0.029 0.014 0.027
Risk count 0.045 0.040 -0.018** 0.008 -0.004 0.011 -0.011 0.011
Loss count 0.047 0.039 -0.009 0.010 0.026* 0.013 0.013 0.012
Rainfall -0.004 0.054 -0.023* 0.013 -0.014 0.019 0.014 0.021
Extension -0.063 0.066 0.003 0.019 -0.037 0.029 -0.028 0.028
Membership 0.045 0.087 0.003 0.024 -0.042 0.034 0.021 0.032
Credit 0.147 0.148 0.015 0.027 0.046 0.041 0.032 0.056
Land -0.009 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.005
Fertilizer 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Seed 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
Labour -0.029 0.019 -0.006* 0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.009 0.007
Subsidy -0.165** 0.065 -0.026 0.017 -0.030 0.026 0.007 0.030
Cash crop -0.001 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000
Irrigation 0.008 0.088 0.053** 0.022 0.097** 0.045 -0.030 0.030
Remittance -0.014 0.072 -0.022 0.021 -0.055* 0.032 -0.013 0.026
Diversication 0.000 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mean land 0.021 0.027 -0.003 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.012
Mean fertilizer -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean seed 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Mean labour 0.012 0.033 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.014
m0 -0.216 0.221 -0.524*** 0.192 -0.578** 0.283 0.150 0.309
m1 -0.778 0.608 -0.122 0.096 0.333 0.332 -0.234 0.168
m2 -0.398 0.772 -0.289* 0.167 -0.032 0.088 -0.110 0.210




6.22 19.550*** 3.850 10.350**
N 269 3150 992 726
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management,
RMP2  denotes ex-post risk management, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post
risk management. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Appendix A2
Soil Quality Index (SQI) Calculations Soil Quality Index (SQI) Calculations
In computing the soil quality index for the study, we used the Soil nutrient maps
of Sub-Saharan Africa8 raster le at 250 m resolution provided by the Interna-
tional Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC). Nutrients covered in this
data include total nitrogen (N), total phosphorus (P), extractable phosphorus (P),
potassium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg), sodium (Na), aluminium (Al), boron
(B), copper (Cu), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn) and zinc (Zn) in (ppm). For the es-
timation approaches for the nutrients data, curious readers are referred to Hengl
et al. (2017). Additionally, we used soil physical and biochemical properties data
provided by ISRIC for the computation of the index. We also used free spatial data
from DIVA-GIS9 provided by ISRIC for the computation of the index. We also
used free spatial data from DIVA-GIS10 in the form of shapeles for administrative
regions of our study country. Using the free and open-source geographic informa-
tion system, software called QGIS (previously known as Quantum GIS), and the
geographic coordinate data of farm households, we calculate the soil parameters for
each farm household. The Soil Quality Index (SQI) was calculated following the
approaches described in Zheng et al. (2005), Mukherjee and Lal (2014), and Zhang
et al. (2015). First, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to identify a mini-
mum data set (MDS) to reduce the indicator load in the estimation of the index and
avoid data redundancy. During the principal component analysis, only the `highly
weighted' variables were retained in the MDS. After the selection of parameters for
the MDS, all selected observations were transformed using linear scoring functions
(less is better, more is better, and optimum) based on the recommendations in the
empirical literature (Amacher et al., 2007; Mukherjee and Lal, 2014). Thereafter,
the weighted additive SQI was computed using the formula below:
SQI =
∑
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Abstract
Climate change imposes risk to food production, and this is projected to increase in the
coming decades, predominantly in low-income countries where adaptive capacity is weaker.
In the absence of well-functioning markets to manage climatic related risks, farm house-
holds in low-income countries mostly rely on informal traditional risk hedging mechanisms
to avoid, reduce exposure to risks and increase the resilience of production systems. The
use of such risk management tools or strategies has consequences for input use, levels of
investments, and allocation of scarce resources, and thus have implications for production
eciency. Using empirical data from a nationally representative farm household survey
in Senegal, this study evaluated the impact of dierent risk management strategies em-
ployed by farm households on technical eciency. The study employed a sample selection
stochastic production frontier approach and a meta-frontier model. The ndings of the
study suggest that managing production risks has implications on farm household's tech-
nical eciency. Furthermore, the result shows that the use of ex-post risk management
strategies is associated with higher technical eciencies with respect to the meta-frontier
compared to other risk management strategies. Households, employing only ex-ante risk
management strategies were observed to be the least technically ecient compared to
households not managing risks or employing ex-post risk management strategies either in
isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strategies. The ndings also sug-
gest that managing production risks using multiple strategies does not necessarily result in
the highest technical eciency gain compared to the use of single or isolated strategies. The
study, therefore, underscores the need to evaluate the trade-os and likely consequences of
risk management approaches used by farm households in order to provide context-specic
policy recommendations.
Keywords: Risk management, sample selection, meta-frontier, eciency, technol-
ogy gap
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4.1 Introduction
Agricultural production is particularly subjected to many risks, which cause distor-
tions in farm output and protability (Giné and Yang, 2009; Atozou et al., 2017).
Particularly in developing regions of the world, smallholder producers are often ex-
posed to a wide range of risk factors that negatively aect not just output and input
prices but also household income and wealth. At the same time, climate change
is impacting negatively on food production globally through rising temperatures,
oods and droughts, pests, and plant diseases. Model projections by the IPCC
(2014) show that climate change is expected to increase the inter-annual variability
of crop yields in many regions of the world. Furthermore, risks are widely acknowl-
edged as one of the factors that shape farmers' technology adoption decisions in the
empirical literature (Feder, 1980; Feder et al., 1981; Byerlee, 1993; Knight et al.,
2003; Gillespie et al., 2004; Baerenklau and Knapp, 2005; Yang et al., 2005; Liu,
2013).
Risk and uncertainty aect farm decision-making by signicantly changing invest-
ment patterns. For instance, risk and uncertainty can lead to signicant delays in
investments (Sandmo, 1971; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, 2004) and this can compound
risk-averse farmers' disincentives to invest in protable technologies and practices
(McCarthy et al., 2018). Risk presents an impediment to the adoption of more
protable agricultural production practices and technologies such as fertilizer, high-
yielding seed, and livestock (Cai et al., 2009; Clarke and Dercon, 2009; Mude et al.,
2012). Similarly, in anticipation of covariate shocks, such as droughts, for instance,
poor farm households are especially prone to selecting less risky technology portfo-
lios to evade lasting damage and these often also generate lower returns on average
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Fufa and Hassan, 2006; Yesuf and Blustone,
2009; Alem et al., 2010; Zerfu and Larson, 2010; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011;
Gebregziabher and Holden, 2011; Cavatassi et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2011; Berhane
et al., 2015).
Because risk exposure is an inherent feature of agricultural production systems, risk
management, therefore, plays a very important role in helping farm households deal
with risk. Risk reduction is particularly often much more important for smallholder
producers than productivity increases per se (Kraaijvanger and Veldkamp, 2015).
However, reducing the eect of risks leads to partial and suboptimal investments
due to the need to spread risk or uncertainty in order to generate less volatile re-
turns. Furthermore, the management of risks can also withdraw resources from the
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production activity, resulting in a likely negative impact on the overall farm produc-
tivity and eciency (Vigani and Kathage, 2019). Building on past work linking risk
management, productivity, and eciency, this study investigates the implication of
risk management under climate change on farm household technical eciency in
Senegal. Previous studies have found considerable eciency losses associated with
risk mitigation (see Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995; Kurosaki
and Fafchamps, 2002). For instance, crop diversication which is a well-known risk
management strategy could imply that farmers shift the share of land use under
high-value crops such as cash and permanent crops and this reallocation can have
a detrimental eect on productivity, production cost, income, and farm eciency
(Morduch, 1995; Anderson, 2001; Monchuk et al., 2010; Salazar-Espinoza et al.,
2015; Vigani and Kathage, 2019). Additionally, the use of formal risk management
instruments in the form of insurance has also been observed to lower investments
in inputs and productivity-enhancing technologies (Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Giné
and Yang, 2009; de Nicola, 2015), reduce labour and land productivity (Spörri et al.,
2012), and reduce the use of complementary risk management strategies such as di-
versication (Schanit-Chatterjee, 2010; Nigus et al., 2018; Matsuda et al., 2019).
While the literature has extensively investigated the use and drivers of these risk
management strategies (see Makus et al., 1990; Sherrick et al., 2004; Saqib et al.,
2016; Velandia et al., 2009; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Wang et al., 2016) and
their corresponding impacts on household welfare outcomes (Howard and D'Antonio,
1984; Li and Vukina, 1996; Dhuyvetter and Kastens, 1997; Kimura et al., 2010; Di
Falco and Veronesi, 2013; Kassie et al., 2014; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019) and input
use (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2004;
Mieno et al., 2018; Hill et al., 2019), it has not provided adequate denitive answers
on the link between risk management and productivity or technical eciency. Some
studies (Roco et al., 2017; Khanal et al., 2018; Imran et al., 2019; Torres et al., 2019;
Vigani and Kathage, 2019) have tried to address this link with a limited scope. At
the same time, the results have been contentious. For example, studies by Larochelle
and Alwang (2013) and Vigani and Kathage (2019) have found that in the case of
diversication, the cost of employing this risk management is reected by an in-
crease in technical ineciency. Other studies (Bojnec and Ferto, 2013; Roco et al.,
2017; Ahmed and Melesse, 2018; Khanal et al., 2018; Imran et al., 2019; Vigani and
Kathage, 2019) have largely found a positive eect of risk management on technical
eciency. Since farm households use risk management strategies simultaneously,
a major limitation of the literature exploring the link between risk management
and technical eciency is the failure to account for the simultaneous adoption of
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several risk management instruments and also the potential selectivity biases asso-
ciated with adoption. This might likely lead to biased results and inadequate policy
recommendations.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of four dierent risk man-
agement strategies on Senegalese farm household's technical eciency. To achieve
this, the study uses empirical data from a nationally representative farm household
survey in Senegal, a sample selection stochastic production frontier, and a meta-
frontier approach. Although this paper is not the rst to investigate the impact
of risk management strategies on technical eciency, it is the rst to analyse the
impact of multiple risk management strategies using the sample selection stochastic
production and the meta-frontier approach. The methodological approach is rele-
vant for a number of reasons. First farm households' decisions to adopt the various
risk management strategies may not be random, implying that households endoge-
nously self-select adoption or non-adoption. The implication is that the decision to
adopt specic risk management strategies is likely inuenced by both observed and
unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with technical eciency. The
inability to capture these unobservable characteristics may lead to selection bias.
Secondly, because each risk management strategy may be related to a specic pro-
duction technology, farm households may operate under heterogeneous technologies.
This is also because the choice of a particular technology (risk management strategy)
may be driven by several factors such as production environments and resources, rel-
ative input prices, etc. The presence of these factors inhibits farm households from
choosing the best technology from the array of potential technology sets. Hence
comparing farm households' technical eciencies from their own frontier could bias
results because they are measured against dierent production frontiers. Using the
meta-frontier approach permits the estimation of the meta production frontier which
envelopes the risk management strategy-specic frontiers, hence allowing for the es-
timation technology gap ratios which is the dierence between the optimal or best
technology and the chosen sub-technology. Employing this approach oers us the
opportunity to compare the impact of the various risk management strategies em-
ployed by farm households on technical eciency by providing a common technol-
ogy of reference for both adopters and non-adopters of the various risk management
strategies. Thirdly, our approach permits us not to only evaluate the technical e-
ciency of single or isolated risk management strategies but also their combinations.
The paper contributes to the literature in twofold: First, quantifying the technical ef-
ciency implications of farm household risk management is critical for understanding
127
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
the costs and benets of climate change adaptation. Furthermore, quantifying the
technical eciency implications of risk management highlights the need for making
trade-os between various future adaptation strategies. Secondly, this study pro-
vides new knowledge to assist farmers and policymakers in Senegal identify more
eective adaptation strategies, and to minimize or remedy any negative eects of
adaptation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 and 4.4 for-
mally present the analytical framework and empirical strategy, respectively. Section
4.5 describes the survey data used and the risk management strategies evaluated for
the study. In Section 4.6, the empirical results and discussions are presented and
nally, in Section 4.7 the conclusion is presented.
4.2 Analytical framework
The main motivation of this study is to investigate the impact of dierent risk
management strategies (see Table 4.3) employed by Senegalese farm households on
farm technical eciency. In doing so, our study is underpinned by the empirical
work of Hayami (1969) and Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1971) who introduced the
meta-frontier production function. The meta-frontier production function is based
on the idea that all producers in the various production groups have dierential
access to an array of production technologies. The choice of a particular technology
may be driven by several factors such as regulation, production environments, and
resources, relative input prices, etc. The presence of these factors inhibits produc-
ers in some groups from choosing the best technology from the array of potential
technology sets. Estimation of the meta production frontier which envelopes the
group specic frontiers is assumed to be the most optimal, hence allowing for the
estimation of technology gap ratios which is the dierence between the optimal or
best technology and the chosen sub-technology. Employing this approach oers us
the opportunity to compare the impact of the various risk management strategies
employed by farm households on productivity and technical eciency by providing
a common technology of reference for both adopters and non-adopters of the various
risk management strategies.
At the same time, farm households' decisions to adopt the various risk manage-
ment strategies may not be random. As shown in previous studies (Bravo-Ureta
et al., 2012; Park, 2014; Villano et al., 2015; Rahman et al., 2018; Azumah et al.,
2019), selectivity eects exist in technology adoption. Farm households may there-
fore endogenously self-select adoption or non-adoption, making such decisions to be
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likely inuenced systematically by both observed and unobservable characteristics
that may be correlated with the outcomes of interest, herein technical eciency.
Hence the inability to capture these unobservable characteristics may lead to selec-
tion bias. In acknowledging the presence of selectivity biases, earlier studies (see
Bradford et al., 2001; Sipiläinen and Lansink, 2005; Solís et al., 2007) attempted
to address this issue by relying on the Heckman approach. However, as argued by
Greene (2010) the Heckman approach is unsuitable for nonlinear models such as the
stochastic production frontier. Notably alternative attempts to address the issue of
selectivity bias include the work of Kumbhakar et al. (2009) and Lai et al. (2009).
The former developed a model where the selection mechanism is assumed to operate
through the one-sided error in the frontier whiles the latter formulated a model in
which the selection mechanism is correlated through a copula function, with the
composed error in the frontier instead of being correlated specically with either
the two-sided or the one-sided terms. However as suggested by Greene (2010),
the log likelihood is substantially more computationally demanding in both cases.
Furthermore, Greene (2010) suggests that the dierence in the assumption of the
impact of the selection eect is substantive. Hence to control for selection bias, and
disentangle the pure eects of risk management, we model farm households' choice
of risk management strategies and their impacts on technical eciency by adopting
the framework developed by Greene (2010) that extends the Heckman's approach
to consider sample selection in a stochastic frontier framework assuming that the
unobserved characteristics in the selection equation are correlated with the noise
in the stochastic frontier. The sample selection SPF model by Greene (2010) is
specied as follows:
Sample selection1 : tj = 1 [β
′Xj + εj > 0] , εj ∼ N(0, 1) (4.1)
Stochastic frontier model : yj = γ




, ϵj = vj − uj, (4.2)
1The model of Greene (2010) is limited to dichotomous treatments and since the risk manage-
ment evaluated in this study is a polytomous choice and mutually exclusive, the choice of one risk
management strategy implies rejection of the others. Hence in the specication in equation 4.1,
each tj is a binary variable and, thus, Equation 4.1 is actually a system of m probit equations (m
= 4 in this case). In most cases regression estimates from a multinomial logit or probit regression
model could be replicated through a set of simple logit or probit models. As shown by Begg and
Gray (1984), the asymptotic relative eciencies of the individual parameter estimates are generally
high, as are the eciencies of predicted probability estimates and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
joint tests of parameters from dierent regressions.
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where yj and Wj are observed only when tj =1, vj = σvvj with vj ∼ N(0, 1), uj
= |σuuj| = σu|uj| with uj ∼ N(0, 1), and (ϵj, vj) ∼ N2[ (0, 1), (1, ρσv, σ2v)] .
Also, yj denotes the logarithmic crop income of farm household j, Wj is a vector
of logarithmic input quantities, tj is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 for
adopters of a particular risk management strategy (see Table 4.4) and 0 otherwise,
Xj is a vector of covariates in the sample selection equation. The coecients β and
γ are parameters to be estimated, ϵj is the composed error term of the stochastic
frontier model that includes the conventional error (vj) and ineciency term (uj),
and ϵj is the error term. The ineciency term uj is assumed to follow a half-normal
distribution with the dispersion parameter σu, whereas ϵj and vj follow a bivariate
normal distribution with variances of 1 and σ2v, respectively.
The correlation coecient, ρσv if statistically signicant, indicates evidence of selec-
tivity bias implying that estimates of the standard stochastic frontier model would
be inconsistent (Greene, 2010). The standard errors of the parameters are adjusted
using the approach by Murphy and Topel (2002) and estimated using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) approach, and asymptotic standard errors are
obtained by employing the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithm estima-
tor. The specication described earlier allows us to estimate, separate selectivity
corrected stochastic frontier models for each risk management strategy. From these
estimated stochastic frontier models, we derive the group-specic technical eciency
estimates, TEji = E[ e
−uji , i = 1, 2 . . . .4] .
The estimated technical eciency scores allow us to compare how adopters of specic
risk management strategies are closer to their respective group production frontiers.
However, as stated earlier in the paper, farm households have the potential access
to an array of production technologies, however specic barriers prevent households
in one group from choosing the best technology from the array of the potential
technology set. Hence the estimated group level technical eciencies do not account
for technology dierences (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Additionally, a direct comparison
of technical eciencies between adopters of the various risk management strategies is
not possible because these scores are relative to each group's own frontier (González-
ores et al., 2014). To address this issue, we estimate a meta-frontier that envelopes
the risk management specic frontiers and allows for the comparison among the risk
management strategies.
An issue that needs to be addressed in estimating equation 4.1 is the potential endo-
geneity problem that may arise. This is particularly important because the presence
of reverse causality and endogeneity in models can make the identication of causal
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eects dicult due to biased estimates, hence the need to account for any poten-
tial reverse causality between the adoption decision of risk management strategies.
A potential source of endogeneity identied in the empirical literature comes from
the risk attitude of a farmer, membership of farmer-based organizations, extension,
and credit access. The risk attitude of a farmer may inuence the choice of risk
management strategy, therefore, risk management strategies employed by a farmer
can potentially correlate to his or her risk attitude (see Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014;
Ullah et al., 2015; Meraner and Finger, 2017; Asravor, 2019). Since some of the
risk management strategies employed by farmers are technologies and management
practices oriented, farm household's membership of farmer-based organizations may
encourage the adoption of some risk management strategies such as index-based in-
surance and diversication. At the same time, access to extension and credit may
inuence the adoption of certain risk management strategies and not others. For ex-
ample, farmers with extension access may be encouraged to subscribe to agricultural
insurance or adopt crop diversication as a risk management strategy.
At the same time, farm households with credit access may subscribe to agricultural
insurance and avoid costly risk management strategies such as the sale of productive
assets. Following previous studies (see Abdulai and Human, 2014; Ma and Abdu-
lai, 2016), we control for the potential endogeneity of the variables using the control
function approach2 developed by Wooldridge (2015). Due to the dichotomous nature
of the four variables, we employed a probit regression specication of the potential
endogenous variable (i.e. risk attitude, membership of farmer-based organizations,
extension, and credit access) as a function of all other variables used in the selection
equation (i.e. equation 4.1). We incorporated both potential endogenous variables
and the estimated residuals3 predicted from the probit equation into the selection
equation 4.1 to account for endogeneity. One important consideration in the con-
trol function approach is the inclusion of instruments that are expected to inuence
the potentially endogenous variable but not the adoption decision of risk manage-
ment strategies in equation 4.1. We employed the storage technology used by farm
households as instruments to control for potential endogeneity of risk attitude and
the access to production contracts as an instrument to control for membership of
farmer-based organizations. Similarly, support needs and location were employed
as instruments to control for extension and credit access respectively. These in-
2This is also known as a two-stage residual inclusion model in the empirical literature (see
Gibson et al., 2010; Terza, 2017; Harris and Kessler, 2019)
3Wooldridge (2015, Pp. 427  428) proposes estimating a generalized residuals which uses
the inverse Mills ratio (the ratio of the standard normal density, ϕ, divided by the standard normal
cumulative distribution function, Φ) to compute the generalized residuals.
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struments are expected to inuence their respective endogenous variables but not
the choice of risk management strategy adoption. Furthermore, Wooldridge (2015)
observed that if the coecient on the estimated generalized residual is statistically
signicant, there is a need to adjust the standard errors for the two-step estimation
by bootstrapping.
4.3 Meta-frontier Analysis
Following the approach outlined by O'Donnell et al. (2008), we estimate a meta-
frontier4 that envelops the production frontiers of the risk management specic group
frontiers. The deterministic meta-frontier model for farm households adopting the
various risk management strategies can be expressed as follows:









where β∗ denotes the vector of parameters of the meta-frontier function such that
Xjβ
∗ ≥ Xiβk for all j observations. We estimate the parameters of the meta-frontier
function (β∗) in equation 4.3 by minimizing the sum of the absolute dierences be-
tween the meta-frontier and the respective group-specic frontier at all observations,






|(In f(Xj, β∗)− In f(Xj, β̂k)|
s.t. In f (Xj, β






Based on the parameters of the meta-frontier function (β∗), we can calculate the gaps
between the meta-frontier and the individual risk management specic group fron-
tiers, termed the meta-technology gap ratio (TGR). As suggested by Issahaku and
Abdulai (2019), a comparatively high average meta-technology gap ratio for a par-
ticular technology group indicates a lower technology gap between farm households
in that group compared with all available set of production technologies represented
4The meta-frontier was estimated in R using the lpSolve package
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in the all-encompassing production frontier. For any given level of inputs, the meta-
technology ratio is calculated as the ratio of the highest attainable group output to
the highest possible meta-frontier output and is, therefore, an index lying between





Subsequently, the technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier production
technology (MTE) is determined as:
MTEj = TGR× TEjk (4.6)
It is also necessary to identify whether all the group-level data were generated from
a single production frontier. As noted by Battese et al. (2004), there would be no
good reason for estimation of technical eciency of farmers relative to the meta-
frontier if all the data were generated from a single production frontier. Hence
following the aforementioned authors, we applied the likelihood-ratio test of the null
hypothesis that there is no dierence between the risk management group-specic
sample selection stochastic frontiers for all farm households. By pooling data from
adopters of the four risk management strategies the likelihood-ratio test of the null
hypothesis, that the group-specic stochastic frontiers are the same for all farm
households was tested. The likelihood-ratio test is dened by λ = -2[L(Hp) - (L(H0)
+ L(H1) + L(H2) + L(H3))] , where L(Hp) is the value of the log-likelihood function
for stochastic frontiers estimated by pooling data for all farm households, L(H0),
L(H1), L(H2) and L(H3) is the value of the sum for all the log-likelihood functions
for the no-risk management strategy adopters, ex-ante risk management strategy
adopters, ex-post risk management strategy adopters and both ex-ante and ex-post
risk management strategy adopters respectively.
4.4 Empirical strategy
Because estimation results may be sensitive to dierent model specications (Wang,
2003; Liu and Myers, 2009), the selection among alternative competing models was
based on careful examination both on a theoretical and an empirical level consider-
ing also the type of data available and the context of the study. Based on a review of
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traditional and popular literature, Grin et al. (1987) identied twenty functional
forms of production functions. However, the two most common functional forms
used for production frontiers in eciency studies are the Cobb-Douglas and tran-
scendental logarithmic, also known commonly as the translog (Bravo-Ureta et al.,
2007; Seymour, 2017). The Cobb-Douglas production function is a simpler functional
form and imposes certain restrictions such as unitary elasticity of substitution that
the more exible translog production function avoids. Bokusheva and Hockmann
(2006) argue that functional forms such as translog and linear-quadratic provided
poor estimates and do not full the axiom of monotonicity and quasi-concavity.
Additionally, other researchers (Laureti, 2008; Mayen et al., 2010; Larochelle and
Alwang, 2013) have observed the Cobb-Douglas functional form to be less suscepti-
ble to loss of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity issues especially between in-
puts and the interaction terms as in the case of the translog function. Furthermore,
the Cobb-Douglas production function involves the estimation of fewer parameters
than the translog functional form which facilitates the ease of results interpretation
(Benedetti et al., 2019). Others (see Felipe, 1998; Johnes and Johnes, 2009) have
also argued that the presence of quadratic and interaction terms as in the case of the
translog functional form complicates results interpretation. Furthermore, the choice
of the functional form is connected to the shape, values of the elasticities of factor
demand, and factor substitution, hence the Cobb-Douglas production function is
widely used because it has universally smooth and convex isoquants (Fried et al.,
2008). Hence for this study, the technology for crop production by farm households
is represented by a CobbDouglas production frontier that can be specied as:






δkDkj + vj − ui (4.7)
where ln is a natural logarithm, yj denotes total crop income of farm household j,
β0 denotes farm household-specic xed eects measuring heterogeneity, βj and δk
denote unknown parameters to be estimated, Wj is the quantity of the kth input of
the j th household, D represents dummy variable for input subsidy access, improved
seed use, irrigation, and fertilizer use. Following the approach of Battese (1997), the
inclusion of the dummy variable for fertilizer use helps to account for zero values of
fertilizer by including dummy in the model, such that the logarithm of the inputs
with zero values is taken only if it is positive, and zero otherwise. This ensures that
unbiased and ecient parameter estimates of the model are obtained. vj denotes
random error and uj the ineciency term. The inputs vectors include labour in
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man-days/ha, landholding in hectares, and fertilizer and seed quantities used in kg
per hectare.
A summary of the variables and their denitions used in the analysis are presented
in Table 4.1. The detailed summary statistics of variables across the various risk
management portfolios are presented in Table 4.9 in the Appendix. The summary
statistics show that households employing both ex-ante and ex-post risk manage-
ment strategies appear to have the highest crop incomes followed by those who do
not adopt any risk management strategy. Ex-ante risk management strategies adopt-
ing households have the least crop incomes. Similarly, households not adopting any
risk management strategy have the highest total quantity of labour used followed by
those adopting ex-ante risk management strategies. Households employing both ex-
ante and ex-post risk management strategies have the lowest total quantity of labour
used in production. Regarding land, the summary statistics show that households
employing both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies have the largest
landholdings, followed by households adopting ex-post risk management strategies.
Households, not managing risk appear to have the smallest landholdings. The high-
est fertilizer use quantities are from households not employing any risk management
strategies, followed by households employing ex-ante risk management strategies.
Seed quantities are relatively higher for households employing both ex-ante and
ex-post risk management strategies followed by those not employing any risk man-
agement. Table 4.9 also shows that households not adopting any risk management
strategies use more improved seeds and irrigation. At the same time, households
not managing risks experience the lowest risk and loss counts while households em-
ploying both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies experience the highest
risk and loss counts.
4.5 Study area and data
4.5.1 Farm household survey
Senegal is a country within the Sahel region of West African. The country has
six agro-ecological zones, based on biophysical and socioeconomic criteria and these
are; Niayes, Senegal River Valley, Sylvo-pastoral Zone, Groundnut Basin, Eastern
Senegal, and Casamance (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). These agroecological zones
have unimodal rainfall, hence they are characterized by varying levels of rainfall and
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Table 4.1: Variables denition
Name Variable description
Household characteristics
Age Age of household head in years
Gender =1 if household head is male
Education =1 if the household head has formal education
Household size Total number of people in the household
HWIa Household welfare index
Remittance =1 if the household receives remittances
Market =1 if the household is integrated into markets
Institution variables
Extension =1 if accessed extension service
Membership =1 if a member of a farmer-based organization
Credit =1 if access to credit
Subsidy =1 if access to both subsidized fertilizer and seeds
Farm-related characteristics
Cash crop Share of land under cash crops (%)
Improved seeds =1 if a household uses improved and high yielding seeds
Irrigation =1 if the household uses irrigation
Fertilizer use =1 if the household did not use fertilizer
Risk variables
Risk attitude =1 if the household is risk-taking
Risk count Number of risks experienced by household
Loss count Number of risk-related losses experienced by household
Location variable
Distance Distance to a major city in km
Input variables for stochastic frontier model
Labour Total quantity of labour used in man-days/ha
Land Total land holding of household in ha
Fertilizer Fertilizer quantity used in kg
Seeds Seed quantity used in kg
Output variables for stochastic frontier model
Crop income Crop production value in CFA
Instruments for endogeneity control
Storage =1 if household use metal silos for storage
Contracts =1 if access to production contracts
Support needs =1 if farmer has support needs
Location =1 if the household is located in a highly populous region
aWe computed a household welfare index which is proxy for household wealth using prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) based on farm household access to basic amenities such
as water, electricity, toilet, the type of roof, wall and oor material, and the number of
sleeping rooms in the household.
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temperature with conditions that gradually become increasingly dry moving north
from Senegal's high rainfall southern regions to its northern arid zones. The length
of the rainy season diers from one year to the next and from one region to the
other. With more than 95% of the total cropped area depending on rain-fed and
less than 1% of agricultural land under irrigation, the growing season in Senegal
strongly correlates to the rainy season. The strong dependence of crop production
on rainfall results in highly variable production, as both rainfall amounts and the
onset and cessation of the rains, are subject to marked space-time variability and
temporal changes (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). The main crops cultivated in Senegal
by smallholders are groundnuts and millet, which together account for almost 75%
of the planted area. Maize, rice sorghum, cowpeas, and cotton make up about 25%
and less than 1% is sown to other crops, including vegetables (D'Alessandro et al.,
2015).
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the larger
Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricultural Pol-
icy Support Project. The farm household survey was conducted between April and
May across all the 14 administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments
except for the departments of Dakar, Pikine, and Guédiawaye. A total of 42 agri-
cultural departments were included in the survey. The survey was targeted towards
cereals, horticultural crops, and fruit and vegetable producers. The survey design
was a two-stage, nationally based random survey that included rural census districts
as the primary units and farm households as the secondary units. The method con-
sisted of rst dividing the statistical population (i.e. agricultural households) into
the primary units so that each of them is unambiguously related to a well-dened
primary unit. Then samples were drawn in two stages. In the rst stage, a sample
of rural census districts was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricul-
tural households was selected at the level of each primary unit. In rural census
districts where rainfed agriculture was practice and localized crops were grown such
as the Senegal River Valley and Niayes Market Gardening Zone, stratication of the
rural census districts was done before agricultural households were selected. Data
collected include information on household demographic characteristics, plot and
land holdings, agricultural equipment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017
growing season, credit, inputs use and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes,
and food processing activities. Others included household consumption, access to
amenities, non-farm and livestock revenue, remittance, agricultural insurance, risks
and adaptation strategies, perceptions about subsidized input, and membership of
farmer-based organizations.
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4.5.2 Risks and risk management strategies
In the survey, farm households were asked three dierent questions related to risks
faced in production. These were related to risks often faced during the last ve years,
risks faced during the past campaign, and a general list of risks and constraints
experienced by farm households. Descriptive statistics showed that the order of
importance of the observed risks does not change across the three questions. For
this study, the focus was on risks often faced during the last ve years. In the survey,
17 production risks were evaluated and this is presented in Table 4.2. In the context
of this study, however, we only considered production risks related to the climatic
shocks  drought, erratic rainfall, ooding; and biological shocks  pest and disease
outbreaks experienced by farm households. This is because most of the adaptation
or risk management strategies (see Table 4.3) employed by farm households were
to address these related risks. Climatic related shocks were widely experienced by
many farm households compared to biological shocks. Furthermore, price-related
shocks, equipment breakdown, and hydrology related issues appear to have been
experienced in isolated cases (see Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Risks often faced by farm households in the past 5 years
Risk Frequency Percent (%)
Insucient rainsa 2481 48.61
Early rains stopb 1579 30.94
Pause rainfallc 1298 25.43
Damage by animals (livestock) 1047 20.51
Granivorous birds 567 11.11
Drought 543 10.64
Plant disease 469 9.19
Theft of draft animals 324 6.35
Other pests 304 5.96
Flood 271 5.31
Harvest theft 233 4.57
Bush re 203 3.98
Locust invasion 175 3.43
Late rainsd 160 3.13
Fluctuation of product prices 78 1.53
Motor pump failure 32 0.63
Weakness of river ow 20 0.39
Total household 5104
a Implies not enough rain for crops during the whole growing season.
b The rain stops before the plant completes its maturation process.
c The rain pauses one or multiple during the growing season. This
could also happen at any phase of the development cycle of plants
and therefore can hamper the normal growth of crops.
d The rain starts late, and this delays the sowing period.
Besides the shocks experienced by farm households, strategies employed to deal with
the risks in Table 4.2 were solicited (Table 4.3). In the presence of production shocks,
diversication of agricultural activities was the largest (39.7%) strategy employed
by farm households to deal with risk. This is subsequently followed by orientation to
non-agricultural activities, which is employed by 30.2% of the surveyed households.
Reduction of land areas under cultivation as a risk management strategy is employed
by 20.6% of the surveyed households. After risks have occurred, measures related
to the sale of livestock are employed by 20.4% of the surveyed households. The sale
of grain stocks and properties is used as a risk management strategy by 9.4 and
8.8% of farm households respectively. Based on the empirical literature (see World
Bank, 2001, 2005; Lilleor et al., 2005; Chetaille et al., 2011), we aggregated the risk
management strategies employed by farm households based on the point at which
the reaction to risk takes place into two broad typologies; ex-ante and ex-post risk
management strategies as shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Risk management strategies employed by farm households
Risk management strategies Frequency Percent (%)
Ex-ante strategies
Diversify agricultural activities 2026 39.7
Reduce the area under cultivation 1053 20.6
Orientation to non-agricultural activities 1539 30.2
Rent land to others 118 2.3
Subscribe to agricultural insurance 169 3.3
Ex-post strategies
Sell grain stocks 482 9.4
Sell property 450 8.8
Sale of animals 1041 20.4
Exchange/swap clothes or jewels for food 78 1.5
Total 5104 100
Ex-ante strategies refer to those actions taken before the realization of a risky event
to lower the probability of a risky event. On the other hand, ex-post strategies
are those actions taken after a risk event has occurred and are also synonymous to
risk coping strategies. They are used in response to the variation of farm income.
Since evidence from the empirical literature (Harwood et al., 1999; Makki et al.,
2001; Flaten et al., 2005; Velandia et al., 2009; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Ullah
et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016) suggest these risk management approaches are used
simultaneously or in combinations, we assume that in a multiple risk management
strategies adoption setting, farm households' simultaneous use of these two strategies
leads to four possible combinations or portfolio of strategies that farm households
could choose from (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Risk management portfolios available to farm households
Risk Management Portfolio Portfolio ID Frequency Percent (%)
No risk management RMP0 261 5
Ex-ante risk strategy only RMP1 3119 62
Ex-post risk strategy only RMP2 987 19
Ex-ante and Ex-post strategy RMP3 737 14
Total 5104 100
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Based on these risk management portfolios, about 62% of farm households are ob-
served to employ ex-ante risk management strategies. This is followed by ex-post
risk management strategies which are employed by about 19% of farm households
while about 14% of farm households employ both ex-ante and ex-post measures.
About 5% of farm households employ no risk management strategy.
4.6 Empirical results
This section presents the ndings from the empirical analysis by rst presenting the
rst stage probit results. This is then followed by the results of the risk management-
specic stochastic frontiers and the meta-frontier. Subsequently, we discuss esti-
mates of the technical eciency (TE) scores, technology gap ratios (TGR), and the
group-specic technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier (MTE). The re-
sults of the control function approach for potentially endogenous variables are also
presented in Table 4.10.
4.6.1 Drivers of use of risk management strategies
Table 4.5 shows the results of the probit model for the dierent risk management
portfolios. We nd that the individual probit models t the data well, the Wald test
is highly signicant across all models, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that all
the regression coecients are jointly equal to zero. Furthermore, the results from
the control-function specication indicate that the correction for endogeneity in the
model was necessary. We nd the coecient of the membership in a farmer-based
organization, extension access, and credit access residual terms to be statistically
signicant in three of the risk management portfolios, implying the presence of en-
dogeneity of membership of farmer-based organization, extension access, and credit
access.
The results show that household welfare status and membership of farmer-based
organizations are positive and signicantly related to the likelihood of not managing
risks (RMP0). This suggests that households that are wealthier and are members
of farmer-based organizations are more likely to adopt no-risk management strate-
gies. On the contrary, the number of risks and losses experienced by the household,
extension access, and credit access are negative and signicantly related to the like-
lihood of not managing risks. This suggests that as the number of risks and related
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losses experienced by a household increases, they are less likely to adopt no risk
management as a strategy.
Furthermore, as a household gains access to extension services and credit, they are
less likely to adopt no risk management as a strategy. The use of ex-ante risk
management strategies (RMP1) is strongly positive and statistically signicant for
the age of the household head. This suggests that older household heads are more
likely to adopt ex-ante risk management strategies. Conversely, the gender of the
household head, the number of risks experienced by the household, and remittance
are negative and signicantly related to the adoption of ex-ante risk management
strategies. This implies that male-headed households, an increase in the number of
risks experienced, and the receipt of remittances decrease the likelihood of ex-ante
risk management strategies adoption.
Table 4.5: Probit model estimates for the various risk management strategies
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant -1.528∗∗∗ 0.198 0.636∗∗∗ 0.110 -0.741∗∗∗ 0.134 -1.963∗∗∗ 0.149
Age 0.001 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.004∗∗ 0.002 -0.005∗∗ 0.002
Gender 0.019 0.144 -0.269∗∗∗ 0.083 0.327∗∗∗ 0.103 0.123 0.112
Education 0.114 0.098 0.063 0.044 -0.084 0.053 -0.048 0.063
HH size -0.015 0.017 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.012 0.009
HWI 0.088∗∗∗ 0.021 0.005 0.012 -0.028∗∗ 0.014 -0.032∗∗ 0.016
Risk attitude 0.755 1.402 -0.425 0.564 0.142 0.662 -0.029 0.694
Risk count -0.143∗∗∗ 0.043 -0.103∗∗∗ 0.018 0.004 0.023 0.184∗∗∗ 0.023
Loss count -0.166∗∗∗ 0.052 -0.036 0.024 -0.088∗∗∗ 0.027 0.200∗∗∗ 0.028
Extension -1.052∗∗∗ 0.361 0.343 0.272 -0.602∗∗ 0.292 0.731∗∗ 0.346
Membership 1.599∗∗∗ 0.587 -0.019 0.368 0.365 0.403 -1.605∗∗∗ 0.490
Credit -2.544∗∗ 1.179 -0.449 0.706 0.838 0.857 1.167 0.988
Land size -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002
Cash crop 0.085 0.204 -0.122 0.099 -0.003 0.116 0.270∗∗ 0.118
Remittance 0.130 0.122 -0.133∗∗ 0.067 0.020 0.076 0.157∗∗ 0.078
Distance 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Resid risk -0.206 0.853 0.113 0.341 -0.043 0.402 0.107 0.422
Resid mem -0.533∗∗ 0.222 0.040 0.164 -0.388∗∗ 0.177 0.812∗∗∗ 0.222
Resid ext 0.479∗∗ 0.185 -0.186 0.137 0.155 0.153 -0.166 0.177
Resid credit 0.958∗ 0.572 0.280 0.326 -0.458 0.403 -0.387 0.462
Log-likelihood -912.528 -3302.805 -2433.509 -1828.75
Wald chi2(19) 235.405∗∗∗ 215.971∗∗∗ 145.965∗∗∗ 557.026∗∗∗
N 5104
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management strategy, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management
strategy, RMP2  denotes ex-post risk management strategy, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante
and ex-post risk management strategy. Reported standard errors are bootstrapped errors.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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For ex-post risk management strategies (RMP2), the ndings suggest that the age
of the household head, household welfare status, the number of risk-related losses
experienced, extension access, and the distance to a major city are negative and sig-
nicantly related to the likelihood of ex-post risk management strategies adoption.
Hence, older household heads, wealthier households, an increase in the number of
risk-related losses, access to extension services, and an increase in the distance to
a major city decrease the likelihood of ex-post risk management strategies adop-
tion. Additionally, male-headed households are more likely to adopt ex-post risk
management strategies.
The adoption of both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies (RMP3) is
negatively inuenced by the age of the household head, household welfare status,
and membership of farmer-based organizations. This implies that older household
heads are less likely to adopt both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies.
At the same time, wealthier households and membership in farmer-based organiza-
tions reduce the likelihood of adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management
strategies. On the contrary, the number of risks and risk-related losses, extension
access, the share of land area under cash crops, and remittance are positively re-
lated to the adoption of both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies. Thus
an increase in the number of risks and risk-related losses experienced increases the
likelihood of adopting both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies. Fur-
thermore, access to extension services, an increase in the share of land area under
cash crops, and receipt of remittances increase the likelihood of both ex-ante and
ex-post risk management strategies adoption.
4.6.2 Production frontier estimates
We present the results of the risk management-specic stochastic frontiers and meta-
frontier in Table 4.6. For all risk management-specic stochastic frontiers models,
the results show that the ineciency dispersion parameters Sigma (u) are signi-
cant, suggesting that ineciency is an important contributor to total crop income
variability. Furthermore, the results show that Sigma (u) is much larger for farmers
not managing risks, followed by farmers adopting ex-ante risk management strate-
gies. This suggests that non-risk managing farmers and ex-ante risk management
strategy adopting farmers are more aected by ineciency than farmers adopting
ex-post risk management strategies in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk
management strategies. Additionally, we tested the null hypothesis that there is no
143
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
dierence between the pooled (meta) frontier model and the four-risk management-
specic stochastic frontiers. With a generalized likelihood ratio test statistic χ2(37)
= 52.192 (p < 0.01), the null hypothesis is rejected suggesting that signicant tech-
nology dierences between the frontiers for the various risk management strategies.
Thus, the estimation of separate frontiers for each group is justied. Results show
that the input vectors are positive and signicant, hence implying that these inputs
contribute to moving farm productivity to the frontier. However, for the no-risk
management strategy and ex-ante risk management strategy frontier, the results
suggest that labour has a negative eect. However, the eect is not signicant in
the case of no risk management strategy group frontier while for the ex-ante risk
management strategy group frontier it was observed to be signicant.
Because the Cobb-Douglas coecients have an elasticity interpretation, the value of
the parameters can be taken as a measure of elasticity i.e. a measure of the percent-
age contribution of each input vector to a percentage change in total crop income.
The production elasticity estimates indicate that land has the highest contribution in
moving farm productivity to the frontier in all the risk management-specic frontiers.
This is followed by fertilizer, seeds, and labour in the case of no risk management
strategy group frontier. For ex-ante, ex-post, and both ex-ante and ex-post risk
management strategy group frontier, this is followed by seed, fertilizer, and labour
respectively. The input subsidy access dummy variable was observed to have a neg-
ative eect across all the risk management specic frontiers. For the ex-ante risk
management and both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategy group frontier,
the eect is statistically signicant. This suggests that input subsidy access moves
farm productivity away from the frontier. Improved seed use dummy variable has
a positive across all risk management specic group frontiers. The eect is however
signicant for ex-ante and both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategy. Irri-
gation use has a signicant eect on the frontier of no risk management, suggesting
it moves farm productivity towards the frontier. Results from the sample selection
production frontiers models show that the estimated sample selectivity term, Rho
is negative and statistically signicant for ex-ante risk management strategies and
both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategies. This suggests the presence of
selectivity bias, thus unobserved factors that aect the adoption of risk management
strategies are correlated with the idiosyncratic error term of the stochastic frontier






























































Table 4.6: Parameter estimates for sample selection stochastic production function models and meta-frontier
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 Meta-frontier
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std.Err.
Constant 10.027∗∗∗ 2.157 10.116∗∗∗ 0.150 9.045∗∗∗ 0.317 10.458∗∗∗ 0.349 10.882∗∗∗ 1.147
Ln labour -0.052 0.108 -0.056∗∗∗ 0.018 0.029 0.032 0.091∗ 0.051 0.042 0.055
Ln land 0.721∗∗∗ 0.190 0.384∗∗∗ 0.033 0.462∗∗∗ 0.056 0.469∗∗∗ 0.067 0.663∗∗∗ 0.200
Ln fert 0.338∗∗∗ 0.085 0.271∗∗∗ 0.018 0.210∗∗∗ 0.038 0.140∗∗∗ 0.034 0.295∗∗∗ 0.091
Ln seed 0.174∗∗ 0.075 0.316∗∗∗ 0.014 0.383∗∗∗ 0.026 0.240∗∗∗ 0.032 0.218∗∗∗ 0.075
Subsidy -0.029 0.272 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.053 0.069 -0.185∗∗ 0.082 0.063 0.133
Improved seed 0.120 0.324 0.220∗∗∗ 0.040 0.054 0.063 0.142∗ 0.073 0.221∗ 0.172
Irrigation 1.175∗∗∗ 0.393 0.073 0.047 0.130 0.091 0.163 0.111 0.871∗∗ 0.522
Fertilizer use 1.148∗ 0.588 0.787∗∗∗ 0.097 0.614∗∗∗ 0.207 0.121 0.189 0.910∗∗ 0.518
Sigma(u) 0.965∗∗∗ 0.270 0.886∗∗∗ 0.075 0.665∗∗∗ 0.104 0.715∗∗∗ 0.141
Sigma(v) 0.822∗ 0.491 0.856∗∗∗ 0.051 0.671∗∗∗ 0.042 0.744∗∗∗ 0.054
Rho(w v) -0.541 0.831 -0.613∗∗∗ 0.074 0.249 0.210 -0.206∗ 0.120
RTS 1.18 0.92 1.08 0.94 1.22
Log likelihood -1033.05 -5670.984 -2701.221 -2099.903
N 261 3119 987 737 5104
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management strategy, RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management strategy, RMP2  denotes ex-post risk manage-
ment strategy, and RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strategy. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level,
respectively.
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In the stochastic meta-frontier estimates (Table 4.6), we observe that all the input
vectors except labour have a signicant and positive eect in moving farm produc-
tivity to the meta-frontier. Just like the group level frontier estimates, the result
suggests that land has the highest contribution to moving farm productivity to the
meta-frontier, followed by fertilizer, seeds, and labour respectively. All three dummy
variables, input subsidy access, improved seeds use and irrigation use is positive, sug-
gesting that they move farm productivity towards the meta-frontier. The eect of
improved seed use and irrigation use was found to be statistically signicant. At the
risk management-specic frontiers, returns to scale to was found to be 1.18 for no risk
management strategy, 0.92 for ex-ante risk management strategy, 1.08 for ex-post
risk management, and 0.94 for both ex-ante and ex-post risk management. This
implies that farm households not managing production risks and those managing
risks ex-post shocks are operating under increasing returns to scale. Meaning that
holding all else constant, a 1% joint increase in all inputs will bring about more than
a unit increase in crop income for non-risk managing households and ex-post risk
managing households. On the contrary, households employing ex-ante risk manage-
ment strategies in isolation and, also in combination with ex-post risk management
strategies are operating under decreasing returns to scale. This implies that if the
households jointly increase all productive inputs by 1%, crop income would increase
by less than 1%. As suggested by Chavas et al. (2005), the presence of such decreas-
ing returns to scale implies that household resources are too large for the prevailing
technology, thus households could benet by expanding their scale of operation.
4.6.3 Technical eciencies and technology gap ratios
Since the primary objective of this study was to investigate the nexus between
risk management and production eciency, the estimated technical eciency (TE)
scores, meta-technology gap ratios (TGR), and technical eciency with respect to
the meta-frontier (MTE) are presented in Table 4.7. At the risk management-specic
frontiers, the average technical eciency of farm households employing ex-post risk
management strategies was the highest (60.3%) followed by both ex-ante and ex-post
risk management strategies (58%) and ex-ante risk management strategies (51.8%).
Farm households employing no risk management strategies were the least ecient
(49.8%). As stated earlier, the results of the group level technical eciencies are not
directly comparable because of the assumption of dierential technology adoption.
To make a more reasonable comparison across the various risk management portfo-
lios, the derived gaps between the stochastic meta-frontier and the risk management-
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specic frontiers provide a better comparison. The result shows that farm households
not adopting any risk management are slightly more ecient in adopting the best
available technology. They can have a mean technology gap ratio of 0.934, followed
by households adopting ex-ante risk management strategies (0.894). Households em-
ploying ex-post risk management strategies were observed to have the lowest mean
technology gap ratio (0.857). It is worth noting that although dierent risk manage-
ment strategies have been assumed in this study, the actual technology driving the
production functions of these risk management strategies are the production inputs
 land, labour, fertilizer, and seeds. As reported earlier, households not managing
risks use the largest quantities of labour and fertilizers, use more improved seeds and
irrigation compared to households using the other risk management strategies. This
likely explains the relatively high technology gap ratios for households not managing
production risks.
Subsequently, the study also evaluated how technically ecient Senegalese farm
households employing the various risk management strategies are in terms of their
operations with respect to crop incomes as captured by the MTEs. The study nds
low meta technical eciencies across all the risk management strategies employed
by households. The results show that in general, farm households employing only
ex-post risk management strategies are more technically ecient in their operations
with respect to overall crop production (51.7%) followed by households employing
both ex-ante and ex-post risk (51.6%). Furthermore, households employing no risk
management strategy are 46.5% technically ecient, while those employing only ex-
ante risk management strategies are the least technically ecient (46.3%). The use
of multiple risk management strategies does not appear to necessarily result in the
highest technical eciency gain compared to the use of single or isolated strategies.
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Table 4.7: Summary statistics of eciency measures across risk management strategies
Risk management portfolio Mean SD Min Max
No risk management
TE 0.498 0.143 0.051 0.864
TGR 0.934 0.015 0.874 0.976
MTE 0.465 0.133 0.047 0.819
Ex-ante strategies
TE 0.518 0.135 0.073 0.900
TGR 0.894 0.021 0.821 0.931
MTE 0.463 0.121 0.064 0.782
Ex-post strategies
TE 0.603 0.112 0.095 0.849
TGR 0.857 0.020 0.787 0.890
MTE 0.517 0.097 0.078 0.741
Ex-ante and Ex-post strategies
TE 0.580 0.113 0.118 0.830
TGR 0.890 0.018 0.810 0.941
MTE 0.516 0.102 0.109 0.765
Pooled
TE 0.542 0.133 0.051 0.900
TGR 0.888 0.027 0.787 0.976
MTE 0.481 0.117 0.047 0.819
As discussed previously, risk management is related to changes or allocation in scarce
production resources and these allocations have implications for the technical e-
ciency of farm households. To get a better understanding of the technical eciency
results, we refer back to Table 4.3 to evaluate the consequences of the strategies. For
example, diversication of agricultural activities which is a very popular risk man-
agement strategy under ex-ante measures could lead to shifts or reallocation of land
for staple crops. This can particularly have a negative eect on crop income, when a
household income is largely dependent on the sale of high-value crops and yields for
high-value crops are lower relative to staple crops (Morduch, 1995; Salazar-Espinoza
et al., 2015). The survey data suggests that farm households using ex-ante risk man-
agement strategies allocate about 50% of their cultivated lands towards staple crop
production and only about 26% towards cash crops. As shown in previous studies,
diversication hinders important gains that could be obtained from specialization.
Renting out land, intuitively also has implied opportunity costs related to the loss
of farm income and hence production eciency.
Orientation to non-agricultural activities potentially presents two eects; an income
eect and a labour eect. Income earned by farm households from non-agricultural
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activities may be used to purchase inputs or invested in farm production which
has implications on incomes and technical eciency. Additionally, engaging in non-
agricultural activities might lead to a loss of farm labour for farm work related to
planting, weeding and harvesting and this can also aect production eciency. The
use of agriculture insurance in the form of index-based insurance also presents im-
plications for technical eciency. Recent ndings of the impact of insurance on farm
eciency (see Vigani and Kathage, 2019) suggests that insurance negatively aects
farm eciency. Intuitively, transferring risk to third parties in the form of insurance
should allow farm households to use and invest more in productivity-enhancing in-
puts, however as the empirical literature (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith
and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2004) shows, moral hazard
problems can rather inuence eort expended in production or reduce investment in
such productivity-enhancing inputs. Others (see Schanit-Chatterjee, 2010; Nigus
et al., 2018; Matsuda et al., 2019) suggest a crowding-out eect of insurance related
to the use of other risk management strategies such as diversication and this can
have implications on farm productivity.
Although ex-post risk management strategies (Table 4.3) do not have direct resource
use or allocations as in the case of ex-ante risk management strategies, the sale of
productive assets might not be entirely used for household consumption but part
might be re-invested into production in terms of inputs. Hence the use of ex-post
risk management strategies might also have input use eects which can aect
production eciency as observed from the results of this study. Additionally, for
a farm household to be able to continuously sell grain stocks or livestock ex-post
shocks, they must be able to produce enough to have a surplus to sell. This might
also likely have a positive eect on household technical eciency. However, it is
worth noting that the use of ex-post risk management strategies is costly especially
to very poor households. In the long-run and persistent risk situations, poorer
households might be unable to recover the loss of productive assets ex-post the
shock (Bhandari et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2008; Amare et al., 2018). Furthermore,
such strategies can reduce the value of human assets, hence presenting not only a
barrier to poverty alleviation but also reinforcing poverty (Hoddinott and Kinsey,
2001; Dercon and Hoddinott, 2003; Thomas et al., 2004; Hoddinott, 2006; Kouamé,
2010).
In the context of policy, it is useful to determine what inuences eciency or in-
eciency to guide the design of performance-improvement programs that can help
farmers better optimize the returns of input use or the various risk management
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strategies. Thus, the study explored the inuence of some institutional variables on
technical eciency by regressing the technical eciency scores with respect to the
meta-frontier on these variables, using a Tobit model (Table 4.8). The estimates
reveal that technical eciency is signicantly inuenced by extension access, credit
access, and membership in farmer-based organizations. The results show a positive
and signicant relationship between extension access and technical eciency, sug-
gesting that farmers with lower extension contacts tend to be less ecient compared
to those with extension access. The result agrees with previous studies that have
found extension access to have a positive and signicant eect on technical eciency.
For example studies by Solís et al. (2007), Abdulai and Abdulai (2016), Yang et al.
(2016), Yang et al. (2018), and Imran et al. (2019) found that extension access sig-
nicantly reduces technical ineciency. In addition, the results reveal a negative
and signicant relationship between membership in farmer-based organizations and
credit access, suggesting that farmers that are members of farmer-based organiza-
tions and with access to credit tend to be less ecient. In a related study, Azumah
et al. (2019) nd that Ghanaian rice farmers belonging to farmer associations were
less ecient compared to those not belonging to any farmer group. The eect of
credit on technical eciency in the literature is mixed. Some studies (Solís et al.,
2007; Abdulai and Abdulai, 2016; Yang et al., 2018; Imran et al., 2019) have found
a positive impact on technical eciency while others (Theriault and Serra, 2014;
Azumah et al., 2019) have found a negative eect.
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Table 4.8: Determinants of technical eciency
Eciency model














Notes: RMP1  denotes ex-ante risk management strat-
egy, RMP2  denotes ex-post risk management strategy, and
RMP3  denotes both ex-ante and ex-post risk management
strategy. ∗∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, and 10% signicance level, re-
spectively.
The results also suggest that input subsidy access might have an adverse eect on
technical eciency although the eect is not statistically signicant. The nding is
consistent with previous studies such as Latrue et al. (2017) who nd a negative
eect of subsidies on technical eciency for some European Dairy Farms. Similarly,
Alem et al. (2018) found subsidies to increase the level of ineciency among Nor-
wegian dairy farms. The study by Bojnec and Ferto (2013) also found government
subsidies negatively inuenced the technical eciency of Slovenian family farms.
The results also suggest that compared to households not adopting risk manage-
ment strategies, the adoption of ex-ante risk management strategies reduces tech-
nical eciency, although the eect is not statistically signicant. Adopting ex-post
risk management strategies or both ex-ante and ex-post risk management strate-
gies signicantly increases technical eciency. The results here conrm the results
discussed previously.
151
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
4.7 Conclusion
This study investigated the nexus between risk management and production e-
ciency, using empirical data from a nationally representative farm household survey
in Senegal, a sample selection stochastic production frontier approach that corrects
for selectivity biases, and a meta-frontier. The empirical results revealed signi-
cant variation in TE, MTE, and TGR values across the various risk management
strategies employed by farm households. The ndings suggest that managing pro-
duction risks has implications on farm household's technical eciency. The use of
ex-post risk management strategies is associated with higher technical eciencies
with respect to the meta-frontier compared to other risk management strategies.
At the same time, households employing both ex-ante and ex-post risk manage-
ment strategies appear to be more technically ecient compared to households not
managing risk or employing only ex-ante risk management strategies in isolation.
Households employing ex-ante risk management strategies were observed to be the
least technically ecient. The study also nds that households not managing risk to
be relatively more ecient in adopting the best available technology. The ndings
from this study underscore the need for context-specic studies to guide policies that
seeks to help farmers better manage production risks.
Most importantly it highlights some important trade-os that have to be made. For
example, ex-post risk management strategies appear to result in higher technical
eciencies relative to the other risk management strategies, however, using ex-post
risk management strategies might deepen the poverty status of resource-poor house-
holds. Since access to extension, appears to reduce technical ineciency, eective
extension services through the provision of information on inputs application can
be instrumental in enhancing the technical capacity of farm households. Further-
more, complementing the provision of technical information on input use should
be done in combination with soil testing services and fertilizer recommendations to
help farmers to use appropriate amounts of fertilizer, which can go a long way to
minimize input costs and help them better adapt to climate variability. There are
some important caveats to be considered for this study. Because the scope of risk
management strategies employed by farm households is multifarious, aggregating
the various risk management strategies into the two broad typologies, helped us to
capture only aggregate eects. This approach obscures or fails to evaluate indi-
vidual risk management specic eects on technical eciency. Future research can
therefore focus on more localized and isolated risk management strategies and their
impacts on technical eciency. Additionally, technical eciency across the evalu-
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ated risk management strategies might have both temporal and spatial eects which
our study fails to capture. Access to long term data such as a panel or longitudinal
data can provide answers to these temporal and spatial technical eciency eects
of risk management strategies.
References
Abdulai, A. and Human, W. (2014) The adoption and impact of soil and water conserva-
tion technology: An endogenous switching regression application, Land Economics, 90,
2643.
Abdulai, A. N. and Abdulai, A. (2016) Allocative and scale eciency among maize farmers
in Zambia: a zero eciency stochastic frontier approach, Applied Economics, 48, 5364
5378.
Ahmed, M. H. and Melesse, K. A. (2018) Impact of o-farm activities on technical e-
ciency: evidence from maize producers of eastern Ethiopia, Agricultural and Food Eco-
nomics, 6, 3.
Alem, H., Lien, G., Hardaker, J. B. and Guttormsen, A. (2018) Regional dierences in
technical eciency and technological gap of Norwegian dairy farms: a stochastic meta-
frontier model, Applied Economics, 51, 409421.
Alem, Y., Bezabih, M., Kassie, M. and Zikhali, P. (2010) Does fertilizer use respond to
rainfall variability? Panel data evidence from Ethiopia, Agricultural Economics, 41,
165175.
Amare, M., Jensen, N. D., Shiferaw, B. and Cissé, J. D. (2018) Rainfall shocks and agricul-
tural productivity: Implication for rural household consumption, Agricultural Systems,
166, 7989.
Anderson, J. R. (2001) Risk Management in Rural Development: A Review.
Asravor, R. K. (2019) Farmers' risk preference and the adoption of risk management strate-
gies in Northern Ghana, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 62, 881
900.
Atozou, B., Lawin, K. G. and Niang, D. (2017) Impact of Weather Index Insurance on
Groundnut Farmers' Technical Ecient in Senegal: A Propensity Score Matching Ap-
proach, Journal of Sustainable Development, 10, 131142.
Azumah, S. B., Donkoh, S. A. and Awuni, J. A. (2019) Correcting for sample selection in
stochastic frontier analysis: insights from rice farmers in Northern Ghana, Agricultural
and Food Economics, 7.
Babcock, B. A. and Hennessy, D. A. (1996) Input Demand under Yield and Revenue
Insurance, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 416427.
Baerenklau, K. A. and Knapp, K. C. (2005) A Stochastic-Dynamic Model of Costly Re-
versible Technology Adoption, in American Agricultural Economics Association Annual
Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, Providence, Rhode Island, pp. 131.
Barnett, B. J., Barrett, C. B. and Skees, J. R. (2008) Poverty Traps and Index-Based Risk
Transfer Products, World Development, 36, 17661785.
Battese, G. E. (1997) A note on the estimation of Cobb-Douglas production functions
when some explanatory variables have zero values, Journal of Agricultural Economics,
48, 250252.
Battese, G. E., Prasada Rao, D. S. and O'Donnell, C. J. (2004) A metafrontier production
153
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
function for estimation of technical eciencies and technology gaps for rms operating
under dierent technologies, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 21, 91103.
Begg, C. B. and Gray, R. (1984) Calculation of Polychotomous Logistic Regression Param-
eters Using Individualized Regressions, Biometrika, 71, 11.
Benedetti, I., Branca, G. and Zucaro, R. (2019) Evaluating input use eciency in agricul-
ture through a stochastic frontier production: An application on a case study in Apulia
(Italy), Journal of Cleaner Production, 236, 117609.
Berhane, G., Devereux, S., Hoddinott, J., Hoel, J., Roelen, K., Abay, K., Kimmel, M.,
Ledlie, N. and Woldu, T. (2015) Evaluation of the Social Cash Transfers Pilot Pro-
gramme Tigray Region, Ethiopia. Endline Report., Tech. rep.
Bhandari, H., Pandey, S., Sharan, R., Naik, D., Hirway, I., Taunk, S. and Sastri, A. (2007)
Economic costs of drought and rice farmers' drought-coping mechanisms in eastern India,
in Economic costs of drought and rice farmers' coping mechanisms: a cross-country
comparative analysis (Eds.) S. Pandey, H. Bhandari and B. Hardy, International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), Los Baños, Philippines, chap. Chapter 4, pp. 43111.
Birthal, P. S. and Hazrana, J. (2019) Crop diversication and resilience of agriculture to
climatic shocks: Evidence from India, Agricultural Systems, 173, 345354.
Bojnec, . and Ferto, I. (2013) Farm income sources, farm size and farm technical eciency
in Slovenia, Post-Communist Economies, 25, 343356.
Bokusheva, R. and Hockmann, H. (2006) Production risk and technical ineciency in
Russian agriculture, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 33, 93118.
Bradford, W. D., Kleit, A. N., Krousel-wood, M. A. and Re, R. N. (2001) Stochastic Fron-
tier Estimation of Cost Models within the Hospital, Review of Economics and Statistics,
83, 302309.
Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Greene, W. and Solís, D. (2012) Technical eciency analysis correcting
for biases from observed and unobserved variables: An application to a natural resource
management project, Empirical Economics, 43, 5572.
Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Solís, D., Moreira López, V. H., Maripani, J. F., Thiam, A. and
Rivas, T. (2007) Technical eciency in farming: A meta-regression analysis, Journal of
Productivity Analysis, 27, 5772.
Byerlee, D. (1993) Technology adaptation and adoption: The experience of seed-fertilizer
technology and beyond, Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, 61, 311326.
Part II.
Cai, H., Chen, Y., Fang, H. and Zhou, L.-A. (2009) Microinsurance, Trust and Economic
Development: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment.
Cavatassi, R., Lipper, L. and Narloch, U. (2011) Modern variety adoption and risk man-
agement in drought prone areas: Insights from the sorghum farmers of eastern Ethiopia,
Agricultural Economics, 42, 279292.
Chavas, J.-p., Petrie, R. and Roth, M. (2005) Farm Household Production Eciency:
Evidence from The Gambia, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87, 160179.
Chetaille, A., Duau, A., Horrard, G., Lagandre, D., Oggeri, B., Rozenkopf, I. and GRET
(2011) Gestion des risques agricoles par les petits producteurs Focus sur l'assurance
récolte indicielle et le warrantage.
Clarke, D. and Dercon, S. (2009) Insurance, Credit, and Safety Nets for the Poor in a
World of Risk.
D'Alessandro, S., Fall, A. A., Grey, G., Simpkin, S. and Wane, A. (2015) Senegal Agricul-
tural sector risk assessment, Tech. rep., World Bank, Washington DC.
de Nicola, F. (2015) The impact of weather insurance on consumption, investment, and
welfare, Quantitative Economics, 6, 637661.
154
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
Dercon, S. and Christiaensen, L. (2011) Consumption risk, technology adoption and
poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia, Journal of Development Economics, 96, 159
173.
Dercon, S. and Hoddinott, J. (2003) Health, Shocks, and Poverty Persistence.
Dhuyvetter, K. C. and Kastens, T. L. (1997) Crop Insurance and Forward Pricing Linkages:
Eects on Mean Income and Variance by, in Proceedings of the NCR-134 Conference on
Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management. Chicago,
IL., Chicago, IL.
Di Falco, S. and Veronesi, M. (2013) How can African agriculture adapt to climate change?
A counterfactual analysis from Ethiopia, Land Economics, 89, 743766.
Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, R. S. (1994) Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University
Press.
Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, R. S. (2004) The options approach to capital investment, in Real
options and investment under uncertainty: Classical readings and recent contributions
(Eds.) E. S. Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis, MIT Press, pp. 6177.
Feder, G. (1980) Farm Size, Risk Aversion and the Adoption of New Technology under
Uncertainty, Oxford Economic Papers, 32, 263283.
Feder, G., Just, R. and Silberman, D. (1981) Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in
Developing Countries: A Survey.
Felipe, J. (1998) On the interpretation of coecients in multiplicative-logarithmic func-
tions: A reconsideration, Applied Economics Letters, 5, 397400.
Flaten, O., Lien, G., Koesling, M., Valle, P. S. and Ebbesvik, M. (2005) Comparing risk
perceptions and risk management in organic and conventional dairy farming: Empirical
results from Norway, Livestock Production Science, 95, 1125.
Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. A. K. and Schmidt, S. S. (Eds.) (2008) The Measurement of
Productive Eciency and Productivity Growth, Oxford University Press, New York.
Fufa, B. and Hassan, R. M. (2006) Determinants of fertilizer use on maize in Eastern
Ethiopia: A weighted endogenous sampling analysis of the extent and intensity of adop-
tion, Agrekon, 45, 3849.
Gebregziabher, G. and Holden, S. T. (2011) Distress rentals and the land rental market
as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia, Agricultural Economics,
42, 4560.
Gibson, T. B., Song, X., Alemayehu, B., Wang, S. S., Waddell, J. L., Bouchard, J. R.
and Forma, F. (2010) Cost sharing, adherence, and health outcomes in patients with
diabetes, American Journal of Managed Care, 16, 589600.
Gillespie, J. M., Davis, C. G. and Rahelizatovo, N. C. (2004) Factors Inuencing the
Adoption of Breeding Technologies in U.S. Hog Production, Journal of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, 36, 3547.
Giné, X. and Yang, D. (2009) Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: Field experi-
mental evidence from Malawi, Journal of Development Economics, 89, 111.
González-ores, M., Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Solís, D. and Winters, P. (2014) The impact of
high value markets on smallholder productivity in the Ecuadorean Sierra: A Stochastic
Production Frontier approach correcting for selectivity bias, Food Policy, 44, 237247.
Goodwin, B. K. (2001) Problems with market insurance in agriculture, American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 83, 643649.
Goodwin, B. K., Vandeveer, M. L. and Deal, J. L. (2004) An Empirical Analysis of Acreage
Eects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 86, 10581077.
Greene, W. (2010) A stochastic frontier model with correction for sample selection, Journal
155
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
of Productivity Analysis, 34, 1524.
Grin, R. C., Montgomery, J. M. and Rister, E. (1987) Selecting Functional Form in
Production Function Analysis, Western Journal of Agricultural Economics,, 12, 216
227.
Harris, M. C. and Kessler, L. M. (2019) Habit formation and activity persistence: Evidence
from gym equipment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 688708.
Harwood, J., Heifner, R., Coble, K., Perry, J. and Somwaru, A. (1999) Managing Risk in
Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis, Tech. Rep. 774, Market and Trade Eco-
nomics Division and Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Hayami, Y. (1969) Sources of Agricultural Productivity Gap Among Selected Countries,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 51, 564575.
Hayami, Y. and Ruttan, V. W. (1970) Agricultural Productivity Dierences Among Coun-
tries, American Economic Review, 60, 895911.
Hayami, Y. and Ruttan, V. W. (1971) Agricultural development: an international perspec-
tive, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Hill, R. V., Kumar, N., Magnan, N., Makhija, S., de Nicola, F., Spielman, D. J. and Ward,
P. S. (2019) Ex ante and ex post eects of hybrid index insurance in Bangladesh, Journal
of Development Economics, 136, 117.
Hoddinott, J. (2006) Shocks and their consequences across and within households in rural
Zimbabwe, Journal of Development Studies, 42, 301321.
Hoddinott, J. and Kinsey, B. (2001) Child growth in the time of drought, Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 63, 409436.
Horowitz, J. K. and Lichtenberg, E. (1993) Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use
in Agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75, 926935.
Howard, C. T. and D'Antonio, L. J. (1984) A Risk-Return Measure of Hedging Eective-
ness, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 19, 101112.
Imran, M. A., Ali, A., Ashfaq, M., Hassan, S., Culas, R. and Ma, C. (2019) Impact of
climate smart agriculture (CSA) through sustainable irrigation management on Resource
use eciency: A sustainable production alternative for cotton, Land Use Policy, 88,
104113.
IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global
and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Issahaku, G. and Abdulai, A. (2019) Sustainable Land Management Practices and Tech-
nical and Environmental Eciency among Smallholder Farmers in Ghana, Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, pp. 121.
Johnes, G. and Johnes, J. (2009) Higher education institutions' costs and eciency: Taking
the decomposition a further step, Economics of Education Review, 28, 107113.
Kassie, M., Jaleta, M. and Mattei, A. (2014) Evaluating the impact of improved maize
varieties on food security in Rural Tanzania: Evidence from a continuous treatment
approach, Food Security, 6, 217230.
Khanal, U., Wilson, C., Lee, B. and Hoang, V. N. (2018) Do climate change adaptation
practices improve technical eciency of smallholder farmers? Evidence from Nepal,
Climatic Change, 147, 507521.
Kimura, S., Antón, J. and LeThi, C. (2010) Farm Level Analysis of Risk and Risk Man-
agement Strategies and Policies: Cross Country Analysis.
Knight, J., Weir, S. and Woldehanna, T. (2003) The role of education in facilitating risk-
156
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
taking and innovation in agriculture, Journal of Development Studies, 39, 122.
Kouamé, E. B.-h. E. (2010) Risk, risk aversion and choice of risk management strategies
by cocoa farmers in western Cote d'Ivoire.
Kraaijvanger, R. and Veldkamp, T. (2015) Grain Productivity, Fertilizer Response and
Nutrient Balance of Farming Systems in Tigray, Ethiopia: A Multi-Perspective View in
Relation to Soil Fertility Degradation, Land Degradation & Development, 26, 701710.
Kumbhakar, S. C., Tsionas, E. G. and Sipiläinen, T. (2009) Joint estimation of technology
choice and technical eciency: an application to organic and conventional dairy farming,
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 31, 151161.
Kurosaki, T. and Fafchamps, M. (2002) Insurance market eciency and crop choices in
Pakistan, Journal of Development Economics, 67, 419453.
Lai, H., Polachek, S. and Wang, H. (2009) Estimation of a stochastic frontier model with
a sample selection problem.
Larochelle, C. and Alwang, J. (2013) The role of risk mitigation in production eciency:
A case study of potato cultivation in the Bolivian Andes, Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 64, 363381.
Latrue, L., Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Carpentier, A., Desjeux, Y. and Moreira, V. H. (2017)
Subsidies and Technical Eciency in Agriculture: Evidence from European Dairy Farms,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 99, 783799.
Laureti, T. (2008) Modelling exogenous variables in Human Capital Formation through
a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier, International Advances in Economic Research, 14,
7689.
Li, D.-F. and Vukina, T. (1996) Crop Yield Futures and Optimal Hedging Strategy for
North Carolina Corn Producers, in Paper presented at the Chicago Board of Trade Spring
Research Seminar, Chicago IL, Chicago IL.
Lilleor, H. B., Giné, X., Townsend, R. M. and Vickery, J. (2005) Weather Insurance in
Semi-Arid India.
Liu, E. M. (2013) Time to ChangeWhat to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption
Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China, Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 1386
1403.
Liu, Y. and Myers, R. (2009) Model selection in stochastic frontier analysis with an appli-
cation to maize production in Kenya, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 31, 3346.
Ma, W. and Abdulai, A. (2016) Does cooperative membership improve household welfare?
Evidence from apple farmers in China, Food Policy, 58, 94102.
Makki, S. S., Somwaru, A. and Harwood, J. (2001) Biotechnology in agriculture: implica-
tions for farm-level risk management, Journal of Agribusiness, 19, 5167.
Makus, L. D., Lin, B. H., Carlson, J. and Krebill-Prather, R. (1990) Factors inuencing
farm level use of futures and options in commodity marketing, Agribusiness, 6, 621631.
Matsuda, A., Takahashi, K. and Ikegami, M. (2019) Direct and indirect impact of index-
based livestock insurance in Southern Ethiopia, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance:
Issues and Practice, 44, 481502.
Mayen, C. D., Balagtas, J. V. and Alexander, C. E. (2010) Technology adoption and tech-
nical eciency: Organic and conventional dairy farms in the United States, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92, 181195.
McCarthy, N., Lipper, L. and Zilberman, D. (2018) Economics of Climate Smart Agricul-
ture: An Overview, in Climate Smart Agriculture. Natural Resource Management and
Policy (Eds.) L. Lipper, N. McCarthy, D. Zilberman, S. Asfaw and G. Branca, Springer,
Cham, pp. 3147, volume 52 edn.
Meraner, M. and Finger, R. (2017) Risk perceptions, preferences and management strate-
157
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
gies: evidence from a case study using German livestock farmers, Journal of Risk Re-
search, 22, 110135.
Mieno, T., Walters, C. G. and Fulginiti, L. E. (2018) Input use under crop insurance: The
role of actual production history, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 100,
14691485.
Monchuk, D., Deininger, K. and Nagarajan, H. (2010) Does land fragmentation reduce ef-
ciency : Micro evidence from India, in AAEA, CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting,
Denver, Colorado, July, p. 17.
Morduch, J. (1995) Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9, 103114.
Mude, A. G., Chantarat, S., Barrett, C. B., Carter, M. R., Ikegami, M. and McPeak, J. G.
(2012) Insuring Against Drought-Related Livestock Mortality: Piloting Index Based
Livestock Insurance in Northern Kenya, SSRN Electronic Journal, pp. 175188.
Murphy, K. M. and Topel, R. H. (2002) Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric
Models, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20, 8897.
Nigus, H. Y., Nillesen, E. and Mohnen, P. (2018) The eect of weather index insurance on
social capital: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia.
O'Donnell, C. J., Rao, D. S. P. and Battese, G. E. (2008) Metafrontier frameworks for the
study of rm-level eciencies and technology ratios, Empirical Economics, 34, 231255.
Park, T. A. (2014) Assessing performance impacts in food retail distribution systems:
A stochastic frontier model correcting for sample selection, Agricultural and Resource
Economics Review, 43, 373389.
Rahman, S., Matin, M. A. and Hasan, M. K. (2018) Joint determination of improved variety
adoption, productivity and eciency of pulse production in Bangladesh: A sample-
selection stochastic frontier approach, Agriculture (Switzerland), 8.
Roco, L., Bravo-Ureta, B., Engler, A. and Jara-Rojas, R. (2017) The Impact of Climatic
Change Adaptation on Agricultural Productivity in Central Chile: A Stochastic Pro-
duction Frontier Approach, Sustainability (Switzerland), 9.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Binswanger, H. P. (1993) Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composi-
tion and Protability of Agricultural Investments, The Economic Journal, 103, 5678.
Salazar-Espinoza, C., Jones, S. and Tarp, F. (2015) Weather shocks and cropland decisions
in rural Mozambique, Food Policy, 53, 921.
Sandmo, A. (1971) On the Theory of the Competitive Firm Under Price Uncertainty, The
American Economic Review, 61, 6573.
Saqib, S. e., Ahmad, M. M., Panezai, S. and Ali, U. (2016) Factors inuencing farmers'
adoption of agricultural credit as a risk management strategy: The case of Pakistan,
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 17, 6776.
Schanit-Chatterjee, C. (2010) Risk management in agriculture: Towards market solutions
in the EU.
Seymour, G. (2017) Women's empowerment in agriculture: Implications for technical e-
ciency in rural Bangladesh, Agricultural Economics, 48, 513522.
Sherrick, B. J., Barry, P. J., Ellinger, P. N. and Schnitkey, G. D. (2004) Factors Inuencing
Farmers' Crop Insurance Decisions, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86,
103114.
Sipiläinen, T. and Lansink, A. O. (2005) Learning in switching to organic farming, in NJF
Report, Nordic Association of Agricultural Scientists (NJF), Alnarp, Sweden, vol. 1, pp.
169172.
Smith, V. H. and Goodwin, B. K. (1996) Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural
Chemical Use, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 428438.
158
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
Solís, D., Bravo-Ureta, B. E. and Quiroga, R. E. (2007) Soil conservation and technical
eciency among hillside farmers in Central America: A switching regression model,
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 51, 491510.
Spörri, M., Baráth, L., Bokusheva, R. and Fertö, I. (2012) The Impact of Crop Insurance
on the Economic Performance of Hungarian Cropping Farms, in Paper prepared for
the 123rd EAAE Seminar: Price Volatility and Farm Income Stabilisation Modelling
Outcomes and Assessing Market and Policy Based Responses, Dublin, p. 15.
Terza, J. V. (2017) Two-stage Residual Inclusion Estimation: A Practitioners Guide to
Stata Implementation, The Stata Journal, 17, 916938.
Theriault, V. and Serra, R. (2014) Institutional Environment and Technical Eciency: A
Stochastic Frontier Analysis of Cotton Producers in West Africa, Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 65, 383405.
Thomas, D., Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., Sikoki, B., Strauss, J. and Teruel, G. (2004)
Education in a crisis, Journal of Development Economics, 74, 5385.
Torres, M. A. O., Kallas, Z., Herrera, S. I. O. and Guesmi, B. (2019) Is technical eciency
aected by farmers' preference for mitigation and adaptation actions against climate
change? A case study in Northwest Mexico, Sustainability (Switzerland), 11.
Ullah, R., Jourdain, D., Shivakoti, G. P. and Dhakal, S. (2015) Managing catastrophic
risks in agriculture: Simultaneous adoption of diversication and precautionary savings,
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 12, 268277.
Ullah, R. and Shivakoti, G. P. (2014) Adoption of On-Farm and O-Farm Diversication
to Manage Agricultural Risks - Are these decisions correlated?, Outlook on Agriculture,
43, 265271.
Velandia, M., Rejesus, R. M., Knight, T. O. and Sherrick, B. J. (2009) Factors Aecting
Farmers' Utilization of Agricultural Risk Management Tools: The Case of Crop Insur-
ance, Forward Contracting, and Spreading Sales, Journal of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, 41, 107123.
Vigani, M. and Kathage, J. (2019) To Risk or Not to Risk? Risk Management and Farm
Productivity, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 101, 14321454.
Villano, R., Bravo-Ureta, B., Solís, D. and Fleming, E. (2015) Modern Rice Technologies
and Productivity in the Philippines: Disentangling Technology from Managerial Gaps,
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66, 129154.
Wang, H. J. (2003) A stochastic frontier analysis of nancing constraints on investment:
The case of nancial liberalization in Taiwan, Journal of Business and Economic Statis-
tics, 21, 406419.
Wang, M., Ye, T. and Shi, P. (2016) Factors Aecting Farmers' Crop Insurance Participa-
tion in China, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64, 479492.
Wooldridge, J. M. W. (2015) Control Function Methods in Applied Econometrics, Journal
of Human Resources, 50, 420445.
World Bank (2001) World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, Tech. rep.,
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.
World Bank (2005) Managing Agricultural Production Risk: Innovations in Developing
Countries Agriculture, Tech. rep., Agriculture & Rural Development Department, World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2016) Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment: Methodological Guidance for
Practitioners.
Yang, P., Iles, M., Yan, S. and Jollie, F. (2005) Farmers' knowledge, perceptions and
practices in transgenic Bt cotton in small producer systems in Northern China, Crop
159
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
Protection, 24, 229239.
Yang, Z., Mugera, A. W., Yin, N. and Wang, Y. (2018) Soil conservation practices and
production eciency of smallholder farms in Central China, Environment, Development
and Sustainability, 20, 15171533.
Yang, Z., Mugera, A. W. and Zhang, F. (2016) Investigating yield variability and ine-
ciency in rice production: A case study in Central China, Sustainability (Switzerland),
8, 111.
Yesuf, M. and Blustone, R. A. (2009) Poverty, risk aversion, and path dependence in
low-income countries: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia, American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, 91, 10221037.
Yu, B., Nin-Pratt, A., Funes, J. and Gemessa, S. A. (2011) Cereal production and tech-
nology adoption in Ethiopia.
Zerfu, D. and Larson, D. F. (2010) Incomplete markets and fertilizer use: evidence from
Ethiopia.
160
Chapter 4. Risk management under climate change and its implication on technical eciency:
Evidence from Senegal
Appendix
Table 4.9: Summary statistics across risk management portfolios
RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 Pooled data
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Crop income 12.501 1.433 12.252 1.343 12.482 1.230 12.583 1.137 12.357 1.305
Labour 3.232 1.313 3.049 1.246 2.835 1.122 2.775 0.973 2.977 1.197
Land 2.071 0.965 2.174 0.920 2.389 0.903 2.453 0.832 2.251 0.914
Fertilizer 3.469 2.790 2.386 2.790 2.230 2.770 2.256 2.782 2.392 2.796
Seed 4.451 1.210 4.253 1.369 4.437 1.299 4.588 1.240 4.347 1.335
Age 52.674 13.533 53.457 13.418 51.975 12.707 52.615 13.288 53.009 13.280
Gender 0.920 0.273 0.910 0.286 0.953 0.211 0.948 0.221 0.925 0.264
Education 0.464 0.500 0.378 0.485 0.368 0.482 0.360 0.480 0.378 0.485
HH size 9.421 4.679 9.578 5.312 10.059 5.192 10.463 5.279 9.791 5.263
HWI 0.471 1.660 -0.007 1.759 -0.155 1.620 -0.228 1.560 -0.043 1.706
Risk attitude 0.609 0.489 0.339 0.473 0.412 0.493 0.392 0.489 0.374 0.484
Risk count 1.034 1.245 1.743 1.394 1.856 1.596 3.099 1.634 1.924 1.551
Loss count 1.238 1.044 1.628 0.984 1.591 0.977 2.412 1.249 1.714 1.071
Extension 0.234 0.424 0.155 0.362 0.100 0.301 0.178 0.383 0.151 0.359
Membership 0.287 0.453 0.131 0.337 0.078 0.268 0.118 0.323 0.127 0.333
Market 0.586 0.493 0.556 0.497 0.554 0.497 0.562 0.497 0.558 0.497
Credit 0.038 0.192 0.046 0.208 0.042 0.200 0.039 0.195 0.043 0.204
Cash crop 0.246 0.285 0.263 0.277 0.296 0.237 0.334 0.269 0.279 0.270
Remittance 0.111 0.315 0.095 0.293 0.089 0.285 0.123 0.329 0.099 0.298
Distance 67.115 52.785 54.079 40.506 45.526 37.998 50.149 32.118 52.524 39.936
Storage 0.100 0.300 0.159 0.366 0.205 0.404 0.225 0.418 0.174 0.379
Contracts 0.019 0.137 0.026 0.159 0.021 0.144 0.019 0.137 0.024 0.152
Support needs 0.705 0.457 0.759 0.428 0.716 0.451 0.806 0.396 0.755 0.430
Location 0.149 0.357 0.162 0.368 0.128 0.334 0.138 0.346 0.151 0.358
Subsidy 0.264 0.442 0.214 0.411 0.195 0.396 0.360 0.480 0.234 0.423
Improved seeds 0.506 0.501 0.327 0.469 0.259 0.439 0.365 0.482 0.329 0.470
Irrigation 0.264 0.442 0.217 0.412 0.124 0.329 0.119 0.324 0.187 0.390
Fertilizer use 0.360 0.481 0.557 0.497 0.589 0.492 0.588 0.493 0.557 0.497
N 261 3119 987 737 5104
Notes: RMP0  denotes no risk management strategy, RMP1  denotes ex-ante strategy,






























































Table 4.10: Control function approach for potentially endogenous variables
Risk attitude Membership Extension access Credit access
Variable Coe. Std.Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant -1.253*** 0.115 -1.721*** 0.154 -2.599*** 0.166 -1.772*** 0.208
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.003
Gender 0.203*** 0.075 -0.147 0.096 0.098 0.092 -0.034 0.134
Education 0.136*** 0.039 0.197*** 0.053 0.087* 0.050 0.078 0.070
HH size 0.029*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.005 -0.015*** 0.005 0.010 0.006
HWI 0.000 0.011 -0.019 0.015 0.121*** 0.014 0.026 0.021
Risk attitude 0.512*** 0.053 0.129** 0.052 0.375*** 0.070
Risk count -0.043*** 0.015 -0.063*** 0.019 0.019 0.018 -0.031 0.025
Loss count 0.028 0.021 0.084*** 0.027 0.074*** 0.025 -0.010 0.037
Extension 0.176*** 0.055 0.790*** 0.061 0.101 0.088
Membership 0.615*** 0.060 0.824*** 0.063 0.642*** 0.081
Credit 0.447*** 0.091 0.682*** 0.095 0.096 0.103
Land size 0.011*** 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003** 0.001
Cash crop 0.315*** 0.075 -0.544*** 0.114 -0.557*** 0.102 -0.327** 0.150
Remittance -0.052 0.064 -0.040 0.086 0.291*** 0.073 -0.096 0.119
Distance 0.001*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Storage -0.161*** 0.051
Contracts 0.663*** 0.125
Support needs 1.047*** 0.088
Location -0.890*** 0.219
Log likelihood -3112.033 -1506.57 -1721.2114 -802.971
LR chi2(15) 526.099*** 867.812*** 898.180*** 220.245***
N 5104
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Abstract
Using empirical data from Senegal, we investigated the nexus between insurance
use and technical eciency by comparing two distinct farm households; one adopt-
ing fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance and the other fertilizer and im-
proved seeds only. We employed a sample selection stochastic production frontier,
a meta-frontier model together with the propensity score matching, and an endoge-
nous switching regression model to control for potential biases. The results show
that households who adopted productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance
tend to have higher levels of investment in production inputs, however, households
that adopted productivity-enhancing technologies without insurance tend to be more
technically ecient on average. Furthermore, households that adopted productivity-
enhancing technologies with insurance seem to be slightly more ecient in adopting
the best available technology set as measured by the technology gap ratio. At the
meta-frontier, the results of the endogenous switching regression model show that
adopting productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance decreases the technical
eciency of productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance adopters by about
50.17%. Conversely, for households adopting productivity-enhancing technologies
without insurance, adopting with insurance could potentially increase the mean
technical eciency by about 37.44%. The results suggest that lower observed tech-
nical eciencies for productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance adopters
may be driven by unobserved eort or behavioural biases of farmers which can be
an important source of heterogeneity in the observed treatment eects.
Keywords: Insurance, productivity, technology, technical eciency, stochastic fron-
tier
JEL Codes: Q12, Q16, G52
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5.1 Introduction
In Senegal, agriculture is predominantly rain-fed, with more than 95% of the total
cropped area depending on rain-fed systems, and most farmers practising subsistence
agriculture (Khouma et al., 2013). At the same time, agricultural productivity in
Senegal has been observed to be lower due to a myriad of factors. Some of these
include low levels of soil fertility, limited farmer use of improved seeds, fertilizers,
and agro-chemicals, poor access to extension and nancial services (World Bank,
2009; Aholder et al., 2013; D'Alessandro et al., 2015; USAID, 2017). These in
essence have led to the stagnation of agricultural productivity, hampered agricultural
growth, and caused a growing impoverishment of farmers in Senegal (World Bank,
2009).
In parallel, several studies (Heisey and Mwangi, 1996; Wopereis-Pura et al., 2002;
De Groote et al., 2005; Duo et al., 2008; Marenya and Barrett, 2007; Asfaw, 2010;
Cunguara and Darnhofer, 2011; Kassie et al., 2014; Graf et al., 2015; Khonje et al.,
2015; Koussoubé and Nauges, 2017; Mekonnen, 2017; Abdoulaye et al., 2018) have
observed that the returns on the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies
(PET) such as fertilizer, improved/high yielding varieties, improved livestock are
very high and generally improves household welfare outcomes. However, few farmers
invest in these technologies in Africa despite the high proven returns on investments.
Empirical studies that have tried to investigate this adoption conundrum have iden-
tied many factors such as knowledge gaps (Matuschke and Qaim, 2008; Kabunga
et al., 2012; Ekbom et al., 2013), risk and uncertainties (Knight et al., 2003; Gillespie
et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2005; Liu, 2013), liquidity and credit constraints (Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2010; Andersson and D'Souza, 2014; Lambrecht et al., 2014; Grabowski
et al., 2016), and behavioural biases (Choi et al., 2011; Duo et al., 2011; Kremer
et al., 2013).
Particularly in Senegal, D'Alessandro et al. (2015) observed that a major limiting
factor to the widespread adoption of improved seeds and fertilizer among smallholder
farmers is the reluctance to assume risks associated with increased productivity. Pre-
vious studies (see Lamb, 2003; Barnett et al., 2008; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011;
Hill and Viceisza, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014; You, 2014; Farrin and Miranda, 2015;
Cole et al., 2017) strongly suggests that uninsured risk or the lack of protection from
downside risk accounts for deciencies in technology uptake and inecient produc-
tion choices among low-income households. Recent innovations in formal insurance,
such as index-based risk transfer products, oer an opportunity for smallholder
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farmers to manage production risks. Nevertheless, the impact of insurance on pro-
ductivity and welfare in the empirical literature is contentious. Some studies nd a
positive impact on productivity mainly through reducing uncertainty, unlocking de-
mand, and inducing higher investments in inputs (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993;
Goodwin et al., 2004; Madajewicz et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015;
Cole et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2019; Sibiko and Qaim, 2020). Other studies on the
other hand have found that insurance use lowers investments in inputs (Babcock and
Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2004;
Giné and Yang, 2009; de Nicola, 2015). The use of insurance clearly has implications
for input use, levels of investments, and allocation of scarce resources. Hence insur-
ance use has repercussions for resource allocation and this can also aect technical
eciency. This paper examines the question of whether complementing the adoption
of fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance improves technical eciency.
While much attention has been devoted to investigating the impact of productivity-
enhancing technologies and insurance on household welfare, studies addressing the
link between composite technologies (such as productivity-enhancing technologies
and insurance) and technical eciency are still scarce. Few studies such as the re-
cent one by Vigani and Kathage (2019) have attempted to evaluate the impacts of
insurance and other risk management instruments under varying levels of risk on to-
tal factor productivity using a multinomial endogenous switching regression model
and survey data from French and Hungarian farms. They found insurance to nega-
tively aect farm eciency. Similarly, an earlier study in Senegal by Atozou et al.
(2017) employed a conventional stochastic frontier and propensity score matching to
evaluate the technical eciency impact of weather index insurance project piloted
with groundnut farmers. They found groundnut farmers who had subscribed to in-
surance were less technically ecient compared to those who had not subscribed to
insurance. Despite these previous studies providing important insights, they have
some limitations. For instance, they fail to justify why insurance use has a negative
eect on eciency. The study of Atozou et al. (2017) in particular fails to account
for unobservable variables that might be correlated with technical eciency. Fur-
thermore, it assumed a similar technology for adopters and non-adopters of weather
index insurance. However, the two groups of farmers might be operating under
two dierent frontiers making a direct comparison between their technical eciency
estimates inappropriate.
Our paper goes beyond these limitations and departs from the abovementioned
literature in several ways. First, the study evaluated the impact of a composite
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technology (mineral fertilizer, improved seeds, and insurance) adoption on technical
eciency and levels of investment in production inputs. Secondly, the analysis is
limited to two distinct farm households  farm household adopting two productivity-
enhancing technologies (fertilizer and improved seeds) without insurance and the
other adopting fertilizer, improved seeds with insurance. Thirdly, the study em-
ploys a sample selection stochastic production frontier to correct for biases from ob-
served and unobserved variables and a meta-frontier framework. In this framework,
the study assumes that households in the two distinct groups have the potential
access to an array of production technologies, but each may choose a particular
technology, depending on specic barriers, such as the production environments and
resources, relative input prices, access to information and existing institutional en-
vironment. These barriers prevent farmers in one group from choosing the best
technology from the array of potential technology sets. The resulting meta produc-
tion frontier is assumed to be the most optimal, hence we estimate the technology
gap ratios which is the dierence between the optimal or best technology and the
chosen sub-technology. Fourthly, the study also examined the impact of insurance
on technical eciency at the meta-frontier. This is particularly useful in helping to
determine whether any behavioural biases might be related to insurance use.
The paper contributes to the literature in twofold: First, because risk management in
agriculture is multifaceted, gaining a better understanding of the impact of agricul-
tural insurance products or programs is important for developing eective strategies
to counterbalance any negative unintended eects. Secondly, the ndings of this
study can also be used to design performance-improvement programs that can help
farmers better optimize their returns on productivity-enhancing technologies and in-
surance. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 formally presents
the conceptual framework and econometric specication. In Section 5.3, the survey
and data used are described. In Section 5.4, the empirical results and discussions
are presented and nally, Section 5.6 oers conclusion and policy implications.
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5.2 Conceptual and Econometric Framework
Agricultural production systems particularly in developing regions such as Africa
have been observed to be generally inecient due to a multitude of factors. Some
of these factors include lack of infrastructure, lack of input, credit and insurance
markets, low soil fertility and inecient methods of cultivation, and insucient use
of fertilizer, insecticides, and improved seeds. Furthermore, the presence of risk in
agricultural production systems imposes ex-ante barriers to the use of protable tech-
nologies, which in turn aect agricultural productivity and economic growth (Bin-
swanger and Sillers, 1983; Barnett et al., 2008; Miller, 2008; Di Falco and Chavas,
2009; Kouamé, 2010; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Demeke et al., 2016; Poole,
2017; Amare et al., 2018). Managing production risks is therefore seen as a poten-
tial to unlock demand for productivity-enhancing inputs (Liu, 2013; Mobarak and
Rosenzweig, 2012; Elabed and Carter, 2014; Cai et al., 2015). Concurrently, the
provision of formal insurance in the form of index-based insurance is considered to
be an eective risk management tool for smallholders to manage risk. However,
as pointed out earlier, the use of insurance has implications for input use, levels
of investments, and allocation of scarce resources, therefore, aecting smallholders'
production and technical eciency. At the same time, the use of insurance products
leads to likely moral hazard problems and behavioural biases that do not only aect
levels of investment in inputs but potentially, eort expended in production. These
channels might correlate positively or negatively with household technical eciency.
5.2.1 Sample selection stochastic frontiers approach
With the development of stochastic frontier analysis by Aigner et al. (1977), a large
number of studies have analyzed the productivity and technical eciencies among
rms in several industries (e.g., Park, 2014; Vidoli et al., 2016; Badunenko and
Kumbhakar, 2017) and smallholders in developing countries (e.g., Ali and Chaudhry,
1990; Ali and Byerlee, 1991; Battese and Coelli, 1992; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012).
At the same time, a substantial number of studies (Mal et al., 2011; Abedullah et al.,
2015; Khanal et al., 2018; Imran et al., 2019; Torres et al., 2019) have employed the
stochastic frontier approach to examine the impact of technology adoption versus
non-adoption on technical eciency. The limitation of most of these studies is the
failure to account for selectivity biases arising from both observable and unobservable
factors. Studies such as those by Bravo-Ureta et al. (2012), Park (2014), Villano
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et al. (2015), Rahman et al. (2018) and Azumah et al. (2019), have shown the
presence of selectivity eects hence failure to account for selectivity bias leads to
inconsistent and biased estimates of technical eciency.
In light of this, this study employed the sample selection approach proposed by
Greene (2010) to estimate the impact of PET adoption with or without insurance on
technical eciency among farm households. The model which is an extension of the
Heckman's approach considers sample selection in a stochastic frontier framework
and assumes that unobserved characteristics in the selection equation are correlated
with the noise in the stochastic frontier model. The sample selection stochastic
frontier production frontier model by Greene (2010) is specied as follows:
Sample selection : tj = 1 [β
′Xj + εj > 0] , εj ∼ N(0, 1) (5.1)
Stochastic frontier model : yj = γ




, ϵj = vj − uj, (5.2)
where yj and Wj are observed only when tj =1, vj = σvvj with vj ∼ N(0, 1), uj =
|σuuj| = σu|uj| with uj ∼ N(0, 1), and (ϵj, vj) ∼ N2 [ (0, 1), (1, ρσv, σ2v)] . Also,
yj denotes the logarithmic crop income of farm household j, Wj is a vector of log-
arithmic input quantities, tj is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 for adopters
of PET with insurance, and 0 otherwise, Xj is a vector of covariates in the sample
selection equation. The coecients β and γ are parameters to be estimated, ϵj is the
composed error term of the stochastic frontier model that includes the conventional
error (vj) and ineciency term (uj), and εj is the error term. The ineciency term
uj is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution with the dispersion parameter σv,
whereas εj and vj follow a bivariate normal distribution with variances of 1 and σ
2v,
respectively. The correlation coecient, ρσv if statistically signicant, indicates ev-
idence of selectivity bias implying that estimates of the standard stochastic frontier
model would be inconsistent (Greene, 2010). The specication described earlier per-
mits the estimation of two separate selectivity corrected stochastic frontier models.
From the two estimated stochastic frontier models, the group-specic technical ef-
ciency estimates, TEji = E[ e
−uji , i=1, 0] , for PET with insurance adopters and
PET only adopters are derived. The estimated technical eciency scores permit the
comparison of the closeness of PET with insurance adopters and PET only adopters
to their respective group production frontiers. However, as stated earlier in the pa-
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per, farm households in the two distinct groups have potential access to an array of
production technologies, however specic barriers prevent households in one group
from choosing the best technology from the array of the potential technology set.
Hence the estimated group level technical eciencies do not account for technology
dierences (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Additionally, a direct comparison of technical
eciencies between PET with insurance adopters and PET only adopters is not pos-
sible because these scores are relative to each group's own frontier (González-ores
et al., 2014). To address this issue, we estimate a meta-frontier for the preferred
model.
5.2.2 Meta-frontier Analysis
Following the approach outlined by O'Donnell et al. (2008), the meta-frontier1 that
envelops the production frontiers of the PET with insurance and PET without insur-
ance adopter group frontiers was estimated. The deterministic meta-frontier model
for farm households adopting PET with and without insurance can be expressed as
follows:









where β∗ denotes the vector of parameters of the meta-frontier function such that
Xjβ
∗ ≥ Xiβk for all j observations. The parameters of the meta-frontier function
(β∗) in equation 5.3 are estimated by minimizing the sum of the absolute dierences
between the meta-frontier and the respective group-specic frontier at all observa-






|(In f(Xj, β∗)− In f(Xj, β̂k)|
s.t. In f (Xj, β






Based on the parameters of the meta-frontier function (β∗), the gaps between the
meta-frontier and the individual group frontiers, termed the meta-technology gap
1The meta-frontier was estimated in R using the lpSolve package
169
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
ratio (TGR) are estimated. According to Issahaku and Abdulai (2019), a compar-
atively high average meta-technology gap ratio for a particular technology group
suggests a lower technology gap between farm households in that group compared
with all available set of production technologies represented in the all-encompassing
production frontier. For any given level of inputs, the meta-technology ratio is cal-
culated as the ratio of the highest attainable group output to the highest possible






Subsequently, the technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier production
technology (MTE) is determined as:
MTEj = TGR× TEjk (5.6)
It is also necessary to identify whether all the group-level data were generated from a
single production frontier. As noted by Battese et al. (2004), there would be no good
reason for estimation of technical eciency of farmers relative to the meta-frontier
if all the data were generated from a single production frontier. Hence following the
aforementioned authors, the likelihood-ratio test of the null hypothesis that there is
no dierence between two group-specic sample selection stochastic frontiers for all
farm households was performed. By pooling data from PET with insurance and PET
without insurance adopters the likelihood-ratio test of the null hypothesis, that the
group-specic stochastic frontiers are the same for all farm households was tested.
The likelihood-ratio test is dened by λ = -2[L(Hp) - (L(H0) + L(H1))] , where
L(Hp) is the value of the log-likelihood function for stochastic frontiers estimated by
pooling data for all farm households, L(H0) and L(H1) is the value of the sum for all
the log-likelihood functions for the PET without insurance adopters and PET with
insurance adopters respectively.
In estimating equation 5.1, some of the employed explanatory variables such as
membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access, credit access, and non-
farm work participation are potentially endogenous. As shown in several empirical
studies, farmer-based organizations normally help their members to obtain inputs
and credit, thus making membership of farmer-based organizations a potentially
endogenous variable. Agricultural extension agents also normally disseminate new
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technologies to farmers, leading to the adoption of the technologies. Furthermore,
farm households adopting these productivity-enhancing technologies may potentially
attract more visits by extension sta than non-adopters and may also be encour-
aged to subscribe to agricultural insurance. Farm households that have access to
credit can also aord to purchase fertilizer, improved seeds, and subscribe to agri-
culture insurance compared to households that are credit constrained, hence making
credit access potentially endogenous. Furthermore, nonfarm work participation may
also be potentially endogenous because income earned from nonfarm work can be
invested in productivity-enhancing technologies and the purchase of insurance.
At the same time, engaging in o-farm work may reduce labour allocation to farming
activities thus limiting the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies. There-
fore, addressing issues related to endogeneity is particularly important because the
presence of reverse causality and endogeneity in models can make the identica-
tion of causal eects dicult due to biased estimates. To address the potential
endogeneity of membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access, credit
access, and nonfarm work participation, the control function approach proposed
by Wooldridge (2015) was employed. The approach involves the specication of
the potential endogenous variable as a function of explanatory variables inuencing
adoption, together with a set of instruments in a rst-stage probit regression. The
employed instruments here should strongly inuence the given potential endogenous
variables (i.e. membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access, credit
access, and nonfarm work participation) but not the choice of the two productivity-
enhancing technologies with insurance. For the study, the use of coping strategies
is used as instruments for membership farmer-based organization. Coping strate-
gies are important informal risk-sharing arrangements within social networks such
as micronance, rotating savings, and credit. Hence farm households that use cop-
ing strategies are likely to be members of farmer-based organizations. In case of
extension access, support needs of a farm household was considered as identifying
instrument.
Farm households that require support needs, might actively seek to gain extension
access. Location was used as an instrument for controlling credit access. Loca-
tion in a populous region is normally associated with high urbanization rates and
easy access to informal credit sources. Households located in populous regions are
more likely going to have access to credit compared to households in a less populous
location. Distance to a major city was considered as an instrument to control for
nonfarm work participation. Shorter distances to a major city increase the likelihood
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of households obtaining nonfarm work compared to longer distances. Furthermore,
these instruments are also excluded in the estimation of equation 5.1. Finally, both
the observed factors and the generalized residuals predicted from a rst-stage re-
gression are included as covariates in the sample selection model. Including the
residuals serves as a control function, enabling the consistent estimation of the four
potential endogenous variables in the sample selection model.
5.2.3 Propensity score matching (PSM)
To mitigate biases coming from observables, the study followed previous studies
(Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012; Villano et al., 2015) and use the PSM to create a suitable
counterfactual dataset. As suggested by Monteiro (2010), the approach permits
the generation of a control group with observed characteristics that are as similar
as possible as those for the treated group, a condition that is necessary to get an
accurate measure of impact. The use of PSM makes it possible to match farmers
who adopt PET with insurance with those that did not adopt with insurance based
on observed characteristics so that both groups are as similar as possible except
for adoption. In the matching process, a binary choice model is used to generate
a score which is equal to the probability of receiving treatment, considering both
treated and non-treated groups based on a given set of predetermined covariates
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
The generated scores are then used to match PET with insurance adopters with PET
without insurance adopters for those farm households falling within a `common sup-
port' area. In the process, observations from PET with insurance adopters with a
score smaller than the minimum or larger than the maximum for the PET without in-
surance adopter group are removed from the sample (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
To ensure that the samples within the common support area have the same distri-
bution of observable characteristics, regardless of whether the farmer has adopted
or not, it is necessary to test for the `balancing property' (Becker and Ichino, 2002).
This is achieved by conducting a t-test before and after matching to evaluate the
null hypotheses that the means of observed characteristics of PET with insurance
adopters and PET without insurance adopters are equal. If the mean of most of the
observed characteristics is not statistically dierent, this suggests that the balancing
property of the covariates is satised (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). The study em-
ployed the kernel matching algorithm with six optimal number of blocks2 identied.
2In the algorithm blocks for which the average propensity scores of treated and controls does
172
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
The matching procedure yielded a sample of 735 matched observations, made up of
145 PET with insurance adopters and 590 PET without insurance adopters.
5.2.4 Endogenous Switching Regression Model
For policy reasons, the study also evaluated the impact of productivity-enhancing
technologies with insurance adoption on technical eciency at the meta-frontier.
Ideally, it would have been sucient to use the estimated technical eciency with
respect to the meta-frontier production technology (MTE) in equation 5.6, however,
doing this might introduce unknown biases in our results. This is because the en-
dogenous switching regression model allows one to account for selectivity bias due to
observed and unobserved factors. The estimation of the meta-technical eciencies
in equation 5.6 already accounted for likely selectivity bias due to observed and un-
observed factors through equation 5.2. Using these meta-technical eciency scores
in the endogenous switching model will mean accounting for selectivity biases twice
and this might result in estimation biases. Bearing this in mind, we employed the
stochastic meta-frontier approach by Huang et al. (2014). This approach does not
account for selectivity biases in the group level frontier estimation but permits the
control for selectivity biases arising from observed and unobserved factors in the
endogenous switching regression model.
Following the approach outlined by Huang et al. (2014), a stochastic meta-frontier
production function of farm households adopting productivity-enhancing technolo-
gies with and without insurance was estimated as a two-step procedure. The rst
step involves estimating group-specic frontiers. In the second step, stochastic fron-
tier techniques are used to determine the meta-frontier production function. At the
same time, because farm households normally consider outcomes such as potential
net utility when making decisions on the adoption of new technologies, they may self-
select into adopting PET with and without insurance, depending on their inherent
characteristics. The non-randomness of adoption decisions, therefore, raises issues
of sample selection bias as previously mentioned. Hence to account for selectivity
bias due to observed and unobserved factors, an endogenous switching regression
approach was employed, where the adoption decision (Yj = 1 or 0) is considered as
a switch or adoption status indicator, with two outcome regimes. This approach
not dier is created. Subsequently, the covariates are balanced within each block between treated
and controls groups. A detailed explanation of the approach can be found in paper of Becker and
Ichino (2002). We estimated the PSM using the pscore package by Becker and Ichino (2002) in
Stata.
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employs the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method to estimate one
selection and two outcome equations simultaneously. The endogenous switching re-
gression model was estimated using the full sample. A detailed description of the
stochastic meta-frontier approach and the endogenous switching regression model is
provided in the appendix.
5.3 Study area and data
Senegal is a country located within the Sahel region of West Africa. It has six main
agro-ecological zones (Niayes, Senegal River Valley, Sylvo-pastoral Zone, Groundnut
Basin, Eastern Senegal, and Casamance), based on biophysical and socioeconomic
criteria (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). Rainfall in these agroecological zones are uni-
modal and are characterized by varying levels of rainfall and temperature. With
more than 95% of the total cropped area depending on rain-fed and less than 1% of
agricultural land under irrigation, the growing season in Senegal is strongly corre-
lated to the rainy season. The main crops cultivated in Senegal by smallholders are
groundnuts and millet, which together account for almost 75% of the planted area.
Maize, rice sorghum, cowpeas, and cotton make up about 25% and less than 1% is
sown to other crops, including vegetables (D'Alessandro et al., 2015).
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the larger
Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricultural Pol-
icy Support Project funded by USAID under "Feed the Future". The implemented
project focused on several value chains such as dry cereals, irrigated rice, horticul-
ture, and inputs value chains such as seeds and fertilizers. The Senegalese National
Agricultural Research Institute (ISRA) conducted the survey, with the support of
the International Food Research Institute (IFPRI) between April and May 2017
across all the 14 administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments except
for the departments of Dakar, Pikine, and Guédiawaye. A total of 42 agricultural
departments were included in the survey. The survey design was a two-stage, na-
tionally based random survey that included rural census districts as the primary
units and farm households as the secondary units. The method consisted of rst
dividing the statistical population (i.e. agricultural households) into the primary
units so that each of them is unambiguously related to a well-dened primary unit.
Then samples were drawn in two stages. In the rst stage, a sample of rural census
districts was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricultural households was
selected at the level of each primary unit. In rural census districts where rain-fed
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agriculture was practice and localized crops were grown such as Senegal River Valley
and Niayes Market Gardening Zone, stratication of the rural census districts was
done before agricultural households were selected.
The collected data covered the main agricultural season of 2016/2017 and include
information on household demographic characteristics, plot and land holdings, agri-
cultural equipment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017 growing season,
credit, inputs use and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes, and food pro-
cessing activities. Others included household consumption, access to amenities,
non-farm and livestock revenue, remittance, agricultural insurance, risks and adap-
tation strategies, perception of subsidized inputs, and membership of farmer-based
organizations.
As indicated earlier, our study considered two farm households, one adopting fer-
tilizer and improved seeds without insurance and the other adopting fertilizer and
improved seeds with insurance. After the data cleaning and preparation, a total of
1169 farm households (145 adopting fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance
and 1024 adopting fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance) were retrieved
from a total sample of 5,312 households.
5.3.1 The empirical specication
Because estimation results may be sensitive to dierent model specications (Wang,
2003; Liu and Myers, 2009), the selection among alternative competing models was
based on careful examination both on a theoretical and an empirical level, and
consideration also for the type of data available and the context of the study. Hence
for this study, the technology for crop production by farm households is represented
by a CobbDouglas production frontier3 that can be specied as:






δkDkj + vj − ui (5.7)
where ln is the natural logarithm, yj denotes the total value of crop output of farm
household j, β0 denotes farm household-specic xed eects measuring heterogeneity,
βj and δk denote unknown parameters to be estimated, Wj is the quantity of the
kth input of the j th household, D represents dummy variable for irrigation use and
3The sample selection stochastic frontier was estimated using Limdep version 11.
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farming system. vj denotes random error and ui the ineciency term. The inputs
vectors include labour in man-days/ha, landholding in hectares, and fertilizer and
seed quantities used in kg per hectare.
The specication of the empirical probit (selection) model is based on economic
theory, empirical studies on technology adoption and production eciency. From
the empirical literature, we summarized variables that are hypothesized to aect
productivity-enhancing technologies with or without insurance adoption decisions.
These include farm household characteristics, farm characteristics, risk variables,
and institutional variables. Table 5.1 presents the denition of the variables used
in the analysis. The summary statistics of variables for farm households in each
adoption group and across unmatched and matched samples is presented in Table
5.8 in the appendix. A signicant dierence exists between households adopting
PET with insurance and PET without insurance. Households adopting PET with
insurance appear to have relatively older male heads with formal education com-
pared to households adopting PET without insurance. At the same time, PET with
insurance adopting households are wealthier, have better access to extension and
credit, have higher membership in farmer-based organizations, and are more market
integrated than households adopting PET without insurance. Related to the risk
variables, households adopting PET with insurance are less risk-averse, experience
fewer risks but encounter the most losses related to risk.
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Table 5.1: Variables denition
Name Variable description
Dependent variable of the selection equation
Adoption =1 if household adopted PET with insurance
Outcome variable for ESR model
MTE Technical eciency with respect to meta-frontier
Household characteristics
Age Age of household head in years
Gender =1 if household head is male
Education =1 if the household head has formal education
HH size Total number of people in the household
Light =1 if source of lighting fuel is electricity
HWI1 Household welfare index
Remittance =1 if the household receives remittances
Nonfarm =1 if household participates in nonfarm work
HH part =1 if household head participates in farm work
Institutional variables
Extension =1 if accessed extension service
Membership =1 if a member of a farmer-based organization
Credit =1 if access to credit
Fert subsidy =1 if access to subsidized fertilizer
Seed subsidy =1 if access to subsidized seeds
Subsidy =1 if access to both subsidized fertilizer and seeds
Market =1 if the household is integrated into markets
Insurance =1 if the household has insurance needs
Farm-related characteristics
Cash crop Share of land under cash crops (%)
Irrigation =1 if a household uses irrigation
Diversication2 Crop diversication index
Farming system =1 if household practices rainfed subsistence agriculture
Mixed farming =1 if household rears livestock and grow crops
Soil degradation =1 if the soil is perceived to be degraded
Soil quality3 Soil quality index
AII4 Agriculture implement index
Risk variables
Rainfall Log of mean annual rainfall in mm (2010  2017)
Std rainfall Standard deviation of rainfall in mm (2010  2017)
Risk attitude =1 if highly risk-averse
Risk count Number of risks experienced by household
Loss count Number of risk-related losses experienced by household
1 This is an index computed using principal component analysis (PCA) based on farm household
access to basic amenities such as water, electricity, toilet, the type of roof, wall and oor
material, and the number of sleeping rooms in the household.
2 The diversication index estimated here is simply the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which
is calculated by squaring the land area share of each crop grown by a household and then
summing the resulting numbers. It can range from close to zero to 1. A value of 1 means
that the household produces only one crop, while a value close to zero suggests a high crop
diversication.
3 For soil quality, we computed a soil quality index using publicly available data from International
Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC  World Soil Information). We describe the
computation of this index in the appendix.
4 We computed an agricultural implement index using a for the number of agricultural equipment
owned by households.
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Table 5.1: Variables denition(continued)
Name Variable description
Instrumental variables
Coping strategy =1 if the household employs coping strategies
Support needs =1 if farmer has support needs
Location =1 if the household is located in a highly populous region
Distance Log of distance to a major city in km
Suciency =1 if subsidized seed is perceived sucient
Stochastic production frontier
Input variables
Labour Log of total quantity of labour used in man-days/ha
Land Log of total land holding of household in hectares
Fertilizer Log of fertilizer quantity used in kg/ha
Seeds Log of seed quantity used in kg/ha
Output variable
Crop income Log of crop production value in CFA
Mundlak xed eect variables
Mean labour Mean labour use across all crops grown
Mean land Mean land (ha) allocation across all crops grown
Mean fertilizer Mean fertilizer (kg) use across all crops grown
Mean seed Mean seed (kg) use across all crops grown
Industry-level environmental variables
AEZ BasinAra =1 if agro-ecological zone is Bassin Arachide
AEZ RiverVall =1 if agro-ecological zone is River Valley
AEZ Niayes =1 if agro-ecological zone is Niayes
AEZ Casamance =1 if agro-ecological zone is Casamance
AEZ CentEast =1 if agro-ecological zone is Center East
AEZ VallAnambe =1 if agro-ecological zone is Valley Anambe
5.4 Empirical results
In this section, the results from the empirical approaches used in the study are
presented. Firstly, investments in fertilizer, seeds, and labour across farm households
adopting PET with and without insurance were compared. Secondly, the rst stage
probit results and the sample selection stochastic frontiers for the unmatched and
matched samples are presented. In each of these models, we provide estimates of the
technical eciency (TE) scores, technology gap ratios (TGR), and the group-specic
technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier (MTE). Lastly, the results of
the endogenous switching regression model and the technical eciency implications
of PET with insurance adoption are presented.
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5.4.1 Input use and investment
With the empirical results providing mixed results related to the impact of insur-
ance use on investments in production inputs, the quantities of production input use
(labour, land, fertilizer, and seeds) per hectare and investments (CFA) across the
various farm households adopting PET with and without insurance was compared.
Referring to Table 5.8 in the appendix, signicant dierences in fertilizer and im-
proved seeds use exists between PET with insurance and PET without insurance
adopting households for the unmatched sample. In general, farm households adopt-
ing PET with insurance tend to use more production inputs than farm households
adopting PET without insurance. Table 5.2 shows investments in fertilizer, seeds,
and hired labour across the various farm households adopting PET with and with-
out insurance. For the unmatched sample, we nd statistically signicant dierences
between PET with insurance and PET without insurance adopting households in
terms of investment in fertilizer, general and improved seed. Generally, PET with
insurance adopting households tends to have higher investments in fertilizer, seeds,
and labour compared to PET without insurance adopting households. Households
adopting PET with insurance make the highest investment, about 11.203 CFA/ha
in fertilizers followed by labour (10.244 CFA/ha) and seeds (9.287 CFA/ha). The
ndings are congruent to previous studies (see Goodwin et al., 2004; Mobarak and
Rosenzweig, 2012; Berhane et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015; Elabed
and Carter, 2015; Delavallade et al., 2015; Cole et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2019) that
have found insurance to increase investments in inputs.
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Table 5.2: PET investment levels and use
PET only PET with insurance
Unmatched sample Meana SD Meana SD
Fertilizer expenditure (CFA/ha) 9.916 1.806 11.203∗∗∗ 0.984
Seed expenditure (CFA/ha)b 8.995 1.469 9.287∗ 1.559
Improved seeds expenditure (CFA/ha) 2.951 1.718 3.559∗∗∗ 1.496
Labour expenditure (CFA/ha) 9.939 1.663 10.224 1.123
N 1024 145
Matched sample
Fertilizer expenditure (CFA/ha) 10.729 1.576 11.203∗∗∗ 0.984
Seed expenditure (CFA/ha) 9.182 1.563 9.287 1.559
Improved seeds expenditure (CFA/ha) 3.328 1.705 3.559 1.496
Labour expenditure (CFA/ha) 10.106 1.645 10.224 1.123
N 590 145
a Reported mean values are logged values.
b This is general seed use, hence it includes non-improved seeds as well. During the data
collection period 1 US$= 615.81 CFA. ∗∗∗, ∗ represent 1% and 10% signicance level,
respectively.
5.5 Sample-Selection Stochastic Frontier Estimates
5.5.1 First-stage: Farm household adoption decision
Results of the rst stage of the sample-selection stochastic frontier model, using both
the original unmatched dataset and the matched dataset, are presented in Table 5.11
in the appendix. At the same time, the results of the control function approach to
control for the eect of potentially endogenous variables in both unmatched and
matched analysis are presented in Table 5.9 and 5.10 in the appendix. The results
show that the instruments used to control for the potentially endogenous variables
were appropriate. From Table 5.11, the chi-squared test statistic is signicant, indi-
cating a joint signicance of the parameters for the adoption of PET with insurance
for both matched and unmatched samples. For the unmatched sample, we nd the
estimate of the residual term for extension access to be signicant suggesting the
presence of simultaneity bias. The insignicance of the estimates of the residual for
membership of farmer-based organizations, credit access, and nonfarm work partici-
pation indicates the absence of simultaneity bias, and hence a consistent estimation
of these variables (Wooldridge, 2015). In both the unmatched and matched sam-
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ples, we nd that the education level of the household head, source of lighting fuel
(a proxy for household wealth), access to extension, and insurance needs to be posi-
tively and signicantly associated with farm household's decision to adopt PET with
insurance. The share of land area devoted towards cash crops is however negative
and signicantly associated with PET with insurance adoption. Receipt of remit-
tance was observed to be negative and signicantly related to the adoption for PET
with insurance for the unmatched sample. For the matched sample, the participa-
tion of household heads in farm work and risk attitude is negative and signicantly
associated with the adoption of PET with insurance. The number of losses related
to production risks was however observed to be positive and signicantly associated
with the adoption of PET with insurance.
5.5.2 Second stage: Frontier estimates
The results of the group-specic stochastic frontiers and meta-frontier for both the
unmatched sample and matched sample are presented in Table 5.3 and 5.4, re-
spectively. A test of the null hypothesis that there is no dierence between the
pooled frontier model and the two group-specic stochastic frontiers was rejected4
suggesting signicant dierences in technology between the frontiers for PET with
and without insurance adopters. Thus, the estimation of separate frontiers for each
group is justied. In both unmatched and matched samples, the input vectors for
PET without insurance adopters are positive and signicant for land, fertilizer, and
seeds, implying that these inputs contribute to moving farm productivity to the
frontier. For PET with insurance adopters, labour, land, and fertilizer are positive,
with land and fertilizer being signicant. Seed is however negative and insignicant,
implying that it moves farm productivity away from the frontier.
4The generalized likelihood ratio test statistic χ2(11) = 19.675 (p < 0.01) for both unmatched
and matched sample
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Table 5.3: Estimates of sample-selection stochastic and meta-frontier model: Unmatched
sample
PET without insurance PET with insurance Meta-Frontier
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant 10.641∗∗∗ 0.275 10.599∗∗∗ 0.783 10.668∗∗∗ 0.595
Labour 0.048 0.042 0.123 0.163 0.130 0.120
Land 0.805∗∗∗ 0.046 0.978∗∗∗ 0.157 0.974∗∗∗ 0.149
Fertilizer 0.291∗∗∗ 0.025 0.501∗∗∗ 0.070 0.505∗∗∗ 0.095
Seed 0.111∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.044 0.071 0.018 0.032
Irrigate 0.189∗ 0.097 0.513∗ 0.308 0.591∗∗ 0.309
Farming system -0.003 0.104 0.519 0.454 0.506∗ 0.369
Sigma(u) 0.697∗∗∗ 0.092 1.277∗∗∗ 0.193
Sigma(v) 0.791∗∗∗ 0.027 0.537∗∗∗ 0.135
Rho (w v) 0.062 0.155 -0.713∗∗ 0.278
RTS 1.25 1.56 1.63
Log likelihood -1460.504 -389.448
N 1024 145 1169
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
Because the Cobb-Douglas coecients have an elasticity interpretation, the value
of the parameters can be taken as a measure of the percentage contribution of each
input vector to a percentage change in total crop income. In both unmatched and
matched samples, land has the highest contribution to moving farm productivity to
the frontier of PET without insurance adopters, followed by fertilizer, seeds, and
labour. In the case of PET with insurance adopters, land has the highest contribu-
tion to moving farm productivity followed by fertilizer and labour. Seeds, however,
reduces total crop income, perhaps because not all seeds used by farm households
are improved seeds. In both unmatched and matched samples, the irrigation use
dummy variable has a positive and signicant eect in moving farm productivity to
the frontier for both PET without insurance and PET with insurance adopters. Ex-
cept for PET with insurance adopters in the unmatched sample, the farming system
dummy variable has a positive eect in moving farm productivity to the frontier
although the observed eect is not statistically signicant. The estimated returns to
scale (RTS) for the unmatched sample, shows a return to scale of 1.25 for PET with-
out insurance adopters and 1.56 for PET with insurance adopters. This implies that
both PET without insurance and PET with insurance adopting farm households are
operating under increasing returns to scale. Implying that, holding all else constant,
a 1% joint increase in all inputs will bring about more than a unit increase in crop
income, however, the returns for PET with insurance adopters are higher. For the
matched sample, we observe similar results. We observed returns to scale of 1.49
and 1.39 for PET without insurance and PET with insurance adopters, respectively.
PET without insurance adopters, however, obtains slighter higher returns compared
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to PET with insurance adopters.
Table 5.4: Estimates of sample-selection stochastic and meta-frontier model: Matched
sample
PET without insurance PET with insurance Meta-Frontier
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant 9.567∗∗∗ 0.414 10.911∗∗∗ 0.814 10.542∗∗∗ 0.830
Labour 0.079 0.063 0.048 0.158 0.083 0.096
Land 0.879∗∗∗ 0.067 0.899∗∗∗ 0.153 0.939∗∗∗ 0.140
Fertilizer 0.462∗∗∗ 0.034 0.500∗∗∗ 0.056 0.551∗∗∗ 0.070
Seed 0.068∗ 0.034 -0.055 0.076 0.017 0.031
Irrigate 0.323∗∗ 0.138 0.530∗ 0.311 0.594∗∗ 0.298
Farming system 0.235 0.145 0.610 0.394 0.630∗∗ 0.366
Sigma(u) 0.633∗∗∗ 0.124 1.341∗∗∗ 0.162
Sigma(v) 0.844∗∗∗ 0.035 0.485∗∗∗ 0.110
Rho (w v) -0.083 0.201 -0.601∗ 0.364
RTS 1.49 1.39
Log likelihood -905.581 -379.541
N 590 145
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
For both unmatched and matched samples, we nd that the ineciency dispersion
parameters Sigma (u) are signicant for both PET without insurance and PET with
insurance adopters, suggesting that ineciency is an important contributor to total
crop income variability. However, Sigma (u) is much larger for farmers adopting PET
with insurance, suggesting that PET with insurance adopting farm households are
more aected by ineciency than those adopting PET without insurance. Results
from the sample selection production frontiers models show that the estimated sam-
ple selectivity term, Rho is negative and statistically signicant in both unmatched
and matched samples for PET with insurance adopters. This suggests the presence
of selectivity bias, thus unobserved factors that aect the adoption of PET with
insurance are correlated with the idiosyncratic error term of the stochastic frontier
model. The results, therefore, support the use of the sample selectivity framework.
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5.5.3 Technical eciency scores and technology gap ratios
The main goal of this study is to investigate the nexus between insurance use and
technical eciency. Hence, the mean technical eciencies scores and technology
gap ratios of PET without insurance adopters and PET with insurance adopters
were compared to draw inferences. Table 5.5, presents the estimated group-specic
technical eciency (TE) scores, technology gap ratios (TGR), and the group-specic
technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier (MTE) for both unmatched and
matched samples. Since farm households operate under heterogeneous technologies,
the group-specic technical eciency (TE) estimates cannot be directly compared
across PET without insurance and PET with insurance adopters. This is because
technical eciency estimates are measured against dierent production frontiers,
thus comparing farm households' technical eciencies from their own frontier could
bias results.
The results suggest that after controlling for biases arising from both observable
and unobserved dierences between PET without insurance adopters and PET with
insurance adopters, the former performs better within their own frontier than the
latter in both unmatched and matched sample. Nonetheless, technical eciency is
generally low for both PET without insurance and PET with insurance adopters.
For the unmatched sample, PET without insurance adopters have a mean technical
eciency score of 58.6% while those of PET with insurance adopters is 43.9%. Simi-
larly, for the matched sample, a mean technical eciency score of 61.2% was observed
for PET without insurance adopters while that of PET with insurance adopters is
43.1%. Therefore, it can be concluded that considering the group-specic frontiers,
PET with insurance adoption is correlated to lower technical eciencies.
The results from the meta-frontier estimates show that the technology gap ratios of
farm households adopting PET without insurance and PET with insurance are both
operating closer to the meta-frontier. However, the technology gap ratios of PET
with insurance adopters are signicantly higher than those of PET without insurance
adopters, suggesting that PET with insurance adopters appear to be slightly more
ecient in adopting the best available technology.
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Table 5.5: Estimated technical eciency and technology gap ratios
Unmatched sample Matched sample
Mean SD Mean SD
PET without insurance
TE 0.586 0.104 0.612 0.089
TGR 0.893 0.015 0.893 0.009
MTE 0.523 0.093 0.547 0.079
PET with insurance
TE 0.439 0.217 0.431 0.218
TGR 0.977 0.011 0.973 0.008
MTE 0.428 0.211 0.419 0.213
Pooled
TE 0.568 0.133 0.576 0.144
TGR 0.904 0.031 0.909 0.033




1 T-test of mean TGR and MTE dierence between PET without insurance
adopters and PET with insurance adopters. Values reported in brackets are
standard errors. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
With the unmatched sample, the mean technical eciency with respect to the meta-
frontier for farm households adopting PET without insurance is about 52% and this
is signicantly higher than that of farm households adopting PET with insurance,
who have a mean technical eciency of about 43%. Similar results were also ob-
served for the matched sample. On average PET without insurance adopting farm
households are about 55% technically ecient compared to PET with insurance
adopting farm households who have a mean technical eciency of about 42%. This
implies that the adoption of PET without insurance on average tends to increase
technical eciency by about 21% among adopters compared with PET with insur-
ance adopters. Our results appear to be congruent to the study of Atozou et al.
(2017) who found Senegalese groundnut farmers who had subscribed to insurance
to be less technically ecient compared to those who had not subscribed to insur-
ance. Furthermore, as suggested by Larochelle and Alwang (2013), the cost of risk
management could simply be reected by an increase in technical ineciency due
to resource reallocation eects. Previous studies (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993;
Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2004), also suggest that
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insurance use introduces some form of moral hazard problems. In the context of a
developing country like Senegal, this might come from behavioural biases in the form
of eort expended in production. This might likely be the case since no reduction in
input use or investment in inputs is observed for PET with insurance adopters when
compared with PET without insurance adopters. Hence farmers adopting PET with
insurance might be devoting less eort to their farming activities. Earlier studies by
Chassang et al. (2012) and Bulte et al. (2014) provide important insights into the ef-
fect of eort. Chassang et al. (2012) suggest that the unobserved eort of agents is a
source of heterogeneity in treatment eects. They also suggest that eort expended
by agents responds to beliefs, and beliefs respond to information. Congruent to
the argument of Chassang et al. (2012), data from the investigation of behavioural
responses of new agricultural technologies in Tanzania using a double-blind eld
experiment by Bulte et al. (2014) shows that if farmers do not have information
about an intervention (improved technology), they do not expand greater eort in
the use and management and hence resource allocations are inecient compared to
a situation where they are aware or have information about the intervention.
5.5.4 Endogenous Switching Regression Results
The results of the endogenous switching regression model are presented in Table 5.6.
In the interest of brevity, we do not discuss the results of the stochastic meta-fronter
model and rst-stage regression results5. The results of the stochastic meta-frontier
model are presented in Table 5.12 in the appendix. The generalized likelihood ratio
test statistic χ2(20) = 62.41 (p < 0.001) of the null hypothesis that there is no
dierence between the pooled frontier model and the two group-specic stochastic
frontiers was rejected suggesting signicant technology dierences between the fron-
tiers for PET with and without insurance adopters. Thus, the estimation of separate
frontiers for each group prior to estimating the stochastic meta-frontier is justied.
The results of the test of the validity of instruments (insurance needs and percep-
tion of subsidized seed sucient) used for model identication reported in Table
5.14 suggests that the instruments were appropriate. The parameter estimates of
the residual term for extension access and nonfarm work participation are signi-
cant, suggesting the presence of simultaneity bias, and thus a consistent estimation
of these variables (Wooldridge, 2015).
5The rst-stage results of the endogenous switching regression model are also similar to that in
the sample selection stochastic frontier reported in Table 5.11 in the appendix. Additionally, the
results of the control function approach are reported in Table 5.13.
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In the context of policy, it is useful to determine the drivers of technical eciency
or ineciency to guide the design of performance-improvement programs that can
help farmers better optimize the returns of productivity-enhancing technologies and
insurance. Furthermore, understanding the impact of policy measures aimed at
pushing farm households towards the meta-frontier is important in identifying likely
inadvertent impacts. Thus, in Table 5.6 we identify some important socio-economic
and institutional variables that drive technical eciency. The estimates reveal that
technical eciency is signicantly inuenced by age, gender, education, household
size, land size, extension access, membership of farmer-based organizations, credit
access, the share of land area under cash crops, crop diversication, subsidy access,
mixed farming, rainfall, and equipment ownership.
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Table 5.6: ESR results for adoption and impact on technical eciency
Selection equation
MTE of PET adopters
without insurance
MTE of PET adopters
with insurance
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -2.596∗∗ 1.319 0.671∗∗∗ 0.043 1.374∗∗∗ 0.266
Age 0.003 0.005 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Gender 0.155 0.230 0.022∗ 0.012 -0.020 0.091
Education 0.369∗∗∗ 0.132 0.019∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.081∗∗ 0.039
HH size 0.006 0.014 -0.001∗ 0.001 -0.003 0.004
Land -0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.018∗∗ 0.007
Extension 1.019∗∗ 0.508 0.028∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.025 0.048
Membership 1.334∗ 0.783 0.008 0.007 -0.160∗∗∗ 0.038
Credit 1.382 0.926 -0.001 0.011 -0.154∗∗∗ 0.051
Market 0.129 0.118 0.006 0.006 -0.022 0.039
Cash crop -0.015∗∗ 0.007 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002 0.002
Diversication -0.003 0.003 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001




Risk count -0.028 0.043
Loss count 0.181∗∗ 0.074
Soil degradation 0.306 0.227
Remittance -0.272∗ 0.154
Soil quality 0.052 0.036 0.008 0.177
Std rainfall -0.114 0.254
Rainfall -0.019∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.066∗∗ 0.032
Insurance 0.534∗∗∗ 0.111
Suciency -0.367∗ 0.205
Mixed farming 0.048∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.081∗∗∗ 0.030
AII 0.001 0.003 0.045∗∗ 0.021
Mean labour 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.011
Mean land -0.066∗∗ 0.027 0.378∗ 0.227
Mean fertilizer 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Mean seed 0.000 0.000 0.006∗∗ 0.002
Resid mem -0.688 0.461
Resid ext -0.633∗∗ 0.278
Resid credit -0.460 0.499
Resid nonfarm 0.791∗ 0.435
Sigma (σ) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.002 0.269∗∗∗ 0.031
Rho (ρ) -0.167∗∗ 0.077 -0.927∗∗∗ 0.049
Wald chi2 523.360∗∗∗
Log-likelihood 792.007
LR test of indep. eqns. Chi2 23.720∗∗∗
Joint sig. of crop varying
covariates χ2(4)
19.230∗∗∗ 17.230∗∗∗
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
For PET without insurance adopting households, the age of the household head,
household size, the share of land area under cash crops, input subsidy access, and
rainfall is negatively related to technical eciency. On the contrary, the gender and
education level of the household head, extension access, crop diversication, and
mixed farming is positively related to technical eciency. For PET with insurance
adopting households, the education level of the household head, land size, member-
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ship in farmer-based organizations, credit access, subsidy access, mixed farming, and
rainfall is negatively related to technical eciency. We nd that crop diversication
and equipment ownership are positively related to the technical eciency of PET
with insurance adopting households.
The obtained results are largely congruent to previous studies that have investigated
drivers of technical eciency. For example studies by Solís et al. (2007), and Azumah
et al. (2019) found gender to signicantly inuence technical eciency. The eect of
membership of farmer-based organizations on technical eciency in the literature is
mixed. Some studies (Khanal et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2018) have found a positive
impact on technical eciency while others (Wollni and Brümmer, 2012; Azumah
et al., 2019) have found a negative eect. The nding on the eect of subsidies is
also consistent with that of Latrue et al. (2017) who nd that the eect of subsidies
on technical eciency was negative for some European Dairy Farms. Similarly, Alem
et al. (2018) found subsidies to increase the level of ineciency among Norwegian
dairy farms. Bojnec and Ferto (2013) also found government subsidies negatively
inuenced the technical eciency of Slovenian family farms.
5.5.5 Technical eciency implications of PET with insurance
adoption
An important part of this study is to understand the impact of insurance on tech-
nical eciency at the meta-frontier if farmers decide to adopt PET with or without
insurance. Table 5.7 presents the estimates of the treatment eects of adoption on
technical eciency under actual and counterfactual conditions. The results conrm
the presence of likely behavioural biases or moral hazard problems with insurance
use. The adoption of PET with insurance has a negative and statistically signicant
eect on the technical eciency of households. The treatment eect indicates that
the adoption of PET with insurance decreases technical eciency by about 50%. On
the contrary, for PET without insurance adopting households, the mean technical
eciency would be increased by about 37% had they adopted PET with insurance.
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0.836(0.006) 0.608(0.002) 0.228∗∗∗(0.006) 37.44
PET with insurance
adopters
0.424(0.015) 0.637(0.009) 0.213∗∗∗(0.018) 50.17
Heterogeneity eects -0.412∗∗∗(0.016) 0.028∗∗∗(0.007) -0.440∗∗∗(0.016)
∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
Following Di Falco et al. (2011) we also adjusted for potential heterogeneity in
outcomes by estimating the associated base heterogeneity eects and transitional
heterogeneity related to the adoption of PET with insurance. The base heterogene-
ity eect is the dierence in outcomes for farm households that adopted PET with
insurance, and those that adopted PET without insurance across the two-adoption
decision stage. Transitional heterogeneity on the other hand is the dierence between
the treatment eect for PET with insurance adopters and PET without insurance
adopters. Results from Table 5.7 shows that PET without insurance adopters obtain
better technical eciency scores relative to PET with insurance adopters when they
decide to adopt PET with insurance. The results also suggest that PET with insur-
ance adopters have slightly higher technical eciencies than PET without insurance
adopters if the decision is not to adopt PET with insurance. Additionally, the tran-
sitional heterogeneity eect was observed to be negative, implying that overall, the
adoption eect is larger for PET without insurance adopters relative to PET with
insurance adopters. The results suggest that PET with insurance adoption per se
do not lead to lower technical eciencies, but lower observed technical eciencies
may be driven by unobserved eort or behavioural biases of farmers which can be
an important source of heterogeneity in treatment eects.
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5.6 Conclusion
This study examined the nexus between insurance use and technical eciency by
comparing two distinct groups of farm households in Senegal; PET with insurance
adopters and PET without insurance adopters. We also evaluated the impact of com-
plementing the adoption of PET with insurance on levels of investment in labour,
fertilizer, and seeds. To address the nexus between insurance use and technical
eciency, the study employed a sample selection stochastic production frontier,
meta-frontier together with propensity score matching, and an endogenous switch-
ing regression model to correct for potential selectivity biases. The results showed
that complementing the adoption of PET with insurance increases investment in
fertilizer, improved seeds, and labour.
Furthermore, PET with insurance adopting farm households appears to be less
technically ecient compared to PET without insurance adopting farm households.
Households that adopted PET with insurance decrease their technical eciency by
about 50%. At the same time, the mean technical eciency of PET without in-
surance adopters would have been increased by about 37% had they adopted PET
with insurance. The results suggest that lower observed technical eciencies for
PET with insurance adopters may be driven by unobserved eort or behavioural
biases of farmers which can be an important source of heterogeneity in the observed
treatment eects. The above ndings have a number of policy implications. First,
insurance products like index-based insurance will continue to play an important role
in helping small-holders, particularly in developing countries better adapt to the ef-
fects and impacts of climate change. However, policymakers must recognize some
unintended or pervasive eects and develop the necessary remedies. Since member-
ship of farmer-based organizations, crop diversication, and mixed farming appears
to reduce technical ineciency, these should be promoted among farm households.
Furthermore, the adoption of PET with insurance should be complemented with
soil testing services and fertilizer recommendations to help farmers to use appropri-
ate amounts of fertilizer, which can go a long way to minimize input costs, achieve
higher yield thereby attaining environmental and economic sustainability.
191
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
References
Abdoulaye, T., Wossen, T. and Awotide, B. (2018) Impacts of improved maize varieties
in Nigeria: ex-post assessment of productivity and welfare outcomes, Food Security, 10,
369379.
Abdulai, A. and Human, W. (2014) The adoption and impact of soil and water conserva-
tion technology: An endogenous switching regression application, Land Economics, 90,
2643.
Abedullah, Kouser, S. and Qaim, M. (2015) Bt Cotton, Pesticide Use and Environmental
Eciency in Pakistan, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66, 6686.
Aholder, F., Poeydebat, C., Corbeels, M., Scopel, E. and Tittonell, P. (2013) The yield
gap of major food crops in family agriculture in the tropics: Assessment and analysis
through eld surveys and modelling, Field Crops Research, 143, 106118.
Aigner, D., Lovell, C. A. K. and Schmidt, P. (1977) Formulation and estimation of stochas-
tic frontier production function models, Journal of Econometrics, 6, 2137.
Alem, H., Lien, G., Hardaker, J. B. and Guttormsen, A. (2018) Regional dierences in
technical eciency and technological gap of Norwegian dairy farms: a stochastic meta-
frontier model, Applied Economics, 51, 409421.
Ali, M. and Byerlee, D. (1991) Economic eciency of small farmers in a changing world:
A survey of recent evidence, Journal of International Development, 3, 127.
Ali, M. and Chaudhry, M. A. (1990) Inter-Regional Farm Eciency in Pakistan's Punjab:
A Frontier Production Function Study, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 41, 6274.
Amacher, M. C., O'neill, K. P. and Perry, C. H. (2007) Soil Vital Signs: A New Soil
Quality Index (SQI) for Assessing Forest Soil Health Michael, Tech. rep., Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Fort Collins, CO: U.S.
Amare, M., Jensen, N. D., Shiferaw, B. and Cissé, J. D. (2018) Rainfall shocks and agricul-
tural productivity: Implication for rural household consumption, Agricultural Systems,
166, 7989.
Andersson, J. A. and D'Souza, S. (2014) From adoption claims to understanding farmers
and contexts: A literature review of Conservation Agriculture (CA) adoption among
smallholder farmers in southern Africa, Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 187,
116132.
Asfaw, S. (2010) Estimating Welfare Eect of Modern Agricultural Technologies: A Micro-
Perspective from Tanzania and Ethiopia.
Assunção, J. J. and Braido, L. H. (2007) Testing household-specic explanations for the
inverse productivity relationship, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89, 980
990.
Atozou, B., Lawin, K. G. and Niang, D. (2017) Impact of Weather Index Insurance on
Groundnut Farmers' Technical Ecient in Senegal: A Propensity Score Matching Ap-
proach, Journal of Sustainable Development, 10, 131142.
Azumah, S. B., Donkoh, S. A. and Awuni, J. A. (2019) Correcting for sample selection in
stochastic frontier analysis: insights from rice farmers in Northern Ghana, Agricultural
and Food Economics, 7.
Babcock, B. A. and Hennessy, D. A. (1996) Input Demand under Yield and Revenue
Insurance, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 416427.
Badunenko, O. and Kumbhakar, S. C. (2017) Economies of scale, technical change and
persistent and time-varying cost eciency in Indian banking: Do ownership, regulation
and heterogeneity matter?, European Journal of Operational Research, 260, 789803.
Barnett, B. J., Barrett, C. B. and Skees, J. R. (2008) Poverty Traps and Index-Based Risk
192
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Transfer Products, World Development, 36, 17661785.
Battese, G. E. and Coelli, T. J. (1992) Frontier production functions, technical eciency
and panel data: With application to paddy farmers in India, Journal of Productivity
Analysis, 3, 153169.
Battese, G. E., Prasada Rao, D. S. and O'Donnell, C. J. (2004) A metafrontier production
function for estimation of technical eciencies and technology gaps for rms operating
under dierent technologies, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 21, 91103.
Becker, S. O. and Ichino, A. (2002) Estimation of Average Treatment Eects Based on
Propensity Scores, The Stata Journal, 2, 358377.
Berhane, G., Clarke, D., Dercon, S., Hill, R. V. and Taesse, A. S. (2013) Insuring against
the Weather.
Binswanger, H. P. and Sillers, D. A. (1983) Risk Aversion and Credit Constraints in Farm-
ers' Decision-Making: A Reinterpretation, The Journal of Development Studies, 20,
521.
Bojnec, . and Ferto, I. (2013) Farm income sources, farm size and farm technical eciency
in Slovenia, Post-Communist Economies, 25, 343356.
Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Greene, W. and Solís, D. (2012) Technical eciency analysis correcting
for biases from observed and unobserved variables: An application to a natural resource
management project, Empirical Economics, 43, 5572.
Bulte, E., Beekman, G., Di Falco, S., Hella, J. and Lei, P. (2014) Behavioral responses
and the impact of new agricultural technologies: Evidence from a double-blind eld
experiment in Tanzania, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96, 813830.
Cai, H., Chen, Y., Fang, H. and Zhou, L.-A. (2015) The Eect of Microinsurance on Eco-
nomic Activities: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 97, 287300.
Caliendo, M. and Kopeinig, S. (2008) Some practical guidance for the implementation of
propensity score matching, Journal of Economic Surveys, 22, 3172.
Chang, B. G., Huang, T. H. and Kuo, C. Y. (2015) A comparison of the technical ef-
ciency of accounting rms among the US, China, and Taiwan under the framework
of a stochastic metafrontier production function, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 44,
337349.
Chassang, S., Padró i Miquel, G. and Snowberg, E. (2012) Selective Trials: A Principal-
Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments, American Economic Review,
102, 12791309.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C. (2011) $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal
Investment in 401(k) Plans, Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 748763.
Cole, S., Giné, X. and Vickery, J. (2017) How Does Risk Management Inuence Production
Decisions? Evidence from a Field Experiment, The Review of Financial Studies, 30,
19351970.
Cunguara, B. and Darnhofer, I. (2011) Assessing the impact of improved agricultural tech-
nologies on household income in rural Mozambique, Food Policy, 36, 378390.
D'Alessandro, S., Fall, A. A., Grey, G., Simpkin, S. and Wane, A. (2015) Senegal Agricul-
tural sector risk assessment, Tech. rep., World Bank, Washington DC.
De Groote, H., Owuor, G., Doss, C., Ouma, J., Muhammad, L. and Danda, K. (2005)
The Maize Green Revolution in Kenya Revisited, electronic Journal of Agricultural and
Development Economics, 2, 3249.
de Nicola, F. (2015) The impact of weather insurance on consumption, investment, and
welfare, Quantitative Economics, 6, 637661.
Delavallade, C., Dizon, F., Hill, R. V. and Petraud, J. P. (2015) Managing Risk with
193
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Insurance and Savings: Experimental Evidence for Male and Female Farm Managers in
West Africa.
Demeke, M., Kiermeier, M., Sow, M. and Antonaci, L. (2016) Agriculture and Food Insecu-
rity Risk Management in Africa - Concepts, lessons learned and review guidelines, Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rome, Italy.
Dercon, S. and Christiaensen, L. (2011) Consumption risk, technology adoption and
poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia, Journal of Development Economics, 96, 159
173.
Di Falco, S. (2014) Adaptation to climate change in Sub-Saharan agriculture: Assessing
the evidence and rethinking the drivers, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 41,
405430.
Di Falco, S. and Chavas, J. P. (2009) On crop biodiversity, risk exposure, and food security
in the highlands of Ethiopia, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91, 599611.
Di Falco, S., Veronesi, M. and Yesuf, M. (2011) Does adaptation to climate change provide
food security? A micro-perspective from Ethiopia, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 93, 825842.
Duo, E., Kremer, M. and Robinson, J. (2008) How High Are Rates of Return to Fertilizer?
Evidence from Field Experiments in Kenya, American Economic Review, 98, 482488.
Duo, E., Kremer, M. and Robinson, J. (2011) Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory
and Experimental Evidence from Kenya, American Economic Review, 101, 23502390.
Ekbom, A., Alem, Y. and Sterner, T. (2013) Integrating soil science into agricultural
production frontiers, Environment and Development Economics, 18, 291308.
Elabed, G. and Carter, M. (2014) Ex-ante Impacts of Agricultural Insurance: Evidence
from a Field Experiment in Mali.
Elabed, G. and Carter, M. R. (2015) Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the will-
ingness to pay for microinsurance, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 118,
150166.
Fafchamps, M. (1993) Sequential Labor Decisions Under Uncertainty: An Estimable House-
hold Model of West- African Farmers, Econometrica, 61, 11731197.
Farrin, K. and Miranda, M. J. (2015) A heterogeneous agent model of credit-linked index
insurance and farm technology adoption, Journal of Development Economics, 116, 199
211.
Foster, A. D. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2010) Microeconomics of Technology Adoption,
Annual Review of Economics, 2, 395424.
Gillespie, J. M., Davis, C. G. and Rahelizatovo, N. C. (2004) Factors Inuencing the
Adoption of Breeding Technologies in U.S. Hog Production.
Giné, X. and Yang, D. (2009) Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: Field experi-
mental evidence from Malawi, Journal of Development Economics, 89, 111.
González-ores, M., Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Solís, D. and Winters, P. (2014) The impact of
high value markets on smallholder productivity in the Ecuadorean Sierra: A Stochastic
Production Frontier approach correcting for selectivity bias, Food Policy, 44, 237247.
Goodwin, B. K. (2001) Problems with market insurance in agriculture, American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 83, 643649.
Goodwin, B. K., Vandeveer, M. L. and Deal, J. L. (2004) An Empirical Analysis of Acreage
Eects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 86, 10581077.
Grabowski, P. P., Kerr, J. M., Haggblade, S. and Kabwe, S. (2016) Determinants of adop-
tion and disadoption of minimum tillage by cotton farmers in eastern Zambia, Agricul-
ture, Ecosystems & Environment, 231, 5467.
194
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Graf, J., Kayser, O., Klarseld, L., Bonsey, R. and Brossard, S. (2015) Smallholder Farmers
and Business, 15 pioneering collaborations for improved productivity and sustainability.
Greene, W. (2010) A stochastic frontier model with correction for sample selection, Journal
of Productivity Analysis, 34, 1524.
Heisey, P. W. and Mwangi, W. (1996) Fertilizer use and maize production in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Hengl, T., Leenaars, J. G., Shepherd, K. D., Walsh, M. G., Heuvelink, G. B., Mamo, T.,
Tilahun, H., Berkhout, E., Cooper, M., Fegraus, E., Wheeler, I. and Kwabena, N. A.
(2017) Soil nutrient maps of Sub-Saharan Africa: assessment of soil nutrient content at
250 m spatial resolution using machine learning, Nutrient Cycling in Agroecosystems,
109, 77102.
Hill, R. V., Kumar, N., Magnan, N., Makhija, S., de Nicola, F., Spielman, D. J. and Ward,
P. S. (2019) Ex ante and ex post eects of hybrid index insurance in Bangladesh, Journal
of Development Economics, 136, 117.
Hill, R. V. and Viceisza, A. (2012) A eld experiment on the impact of weather shocks and
insurance on risky investment, Experimental Economics, 15, 341371.
Horowitz, J. K. and Lichtenberg, E. (1993) Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use
in Agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75, 926935.
Huang, C. J., Huang, T. H. and Liu, N. H. (2014) A new approach to estimating the
metafrontier production function based on a stochastic frontier framework, Journal of
Productivity Analysis, 42, 241254.
Imbens, G. W. and Wooldridge, J. M. (2009) Recent developments in the econometrics of
program evaluation, Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 586.
Imran, M. A., Ali, A., Ashfaq, M., Hassan, S., Culas, R. and Ma, C. (2019) Impact of
climate smart agriculture (CSA) through sustainable irrigation management on Resource
use eciency: A sustainable production alternative for cotton, Land Use Policy, 88,
104113.
Issahaku, G. and Abdulai, A. (2019) Sustainable Land Management Practices and Tech-
nical and Environmental Eciency among Smallholder Farmers in Ghana, Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, pp. 121.
Kabunga, N. S., Dubois, T. and Qaim, M. (2012) Yield Eects of Tissue Culture Bananas
in Kenya: Accounting for Selection Bias and the Role of Complementary Inputs, Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 63, 444464.
Karlan, D., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I. and Udry, C. (2014) Agricultural Decisions after
Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129, 597
652.
Kassie, M., Jaleta, M. and Mattei, A. (2014) Evaluating the impact of improved maize
varieties on food security in Rural Tanzania: Evidence from a continuous treatment
approach, Food Security, 6, 217230.
Kassie, M., Teklewold, H., Marenya, P., Jaleta, M. and Erenstein, O. (2015) Production
Risks and Food Security under Alternative Technology Choices in Malawi: Application
of a Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression, Journal of Agricultural Economics,
66, 640659.
Khanal, U., Wilson, C., Lee, B. and Hoang, V. N. (2018) Do climate change adaptation
practices improve technical eciency of smallholder farmers? Evidence from Nepal,
Climatic Change, 147, 507521.
Khonje, M., Manda, J., Alene, A. D. and Kassie, M. (2015) Analysis of Adoption and
Impacts of Improved Maize Varieties in Eastern Zambia, World Development, 66, 695
706.
195
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Khouma, M., Jalloh, A., Thomas, T. S. and Nelson, G. C. (2013) Senegal, in West African
agriculture and climate change: A comprehensive analysis (Eds.) A. Jalloh, G. C. Nelson,
T. S. Thomas, R. Zougmore and H. Roy-Macauley, International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), chap. chapter 11, pp. 291322.
Knight, J., Weir, S. and Woldehanna, T. (2003) The role of education in facilitating risk-
taking and innovation in agriculture, Journal of Development Studies, 39, 122.
Kouamé, E. B.-h. E. (2010) Risk, risk aversion and choice of risk management strategies
by cocoa farmers in western Cote d'Ivoire.
Koussoubé, E. and Nauges, C. (2017) Returns to fertiliser use: Does it pay enough? Some
new evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 44,
183210.
Kremer, M., Lee, J., Robinson, J. and Rostapshova, O. (2013) Behavioral Biases and Firm
Behavior: Evidence from Kenyan Retail Shops, American Economic Review: Papers and
Proceedings, 103, 362368.
Lamb, R. L. (2003) Fertilizer Use, Risk, and O-Farm Labor Markets in the Semi-Arid
Tropics of India, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85, 359371.
Lambrecht, I., Vanlauwe, B., Merckx, R. and Maertens, M. (2014) Understanding the
Process of Agricultural Technology Adoption: Mineral Fertilizer in Eastern DR Congo,
World Development, 59, 132146.
Larochelle, C. and Alwang, J. (2013) The role of risk mitigation in production eciency:
A case study of potato cultivation in the Bolivian Andes, Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 64, 363381.
Latrue, L., Bravo-Ureta, B. E., Carpentier, A., Desjeux, Y. and Moreira, V. H. (2017)
Subsidies and Technical Eciency in Agriculture: Evidence from European Dairy Farms,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 99, 783799.
Lee, L.-F. (1982) Some Approaches to the Correction of Selectivity Bias, The Review of
Economic Studies, 49, 355.
Leuven, E. and Sianesi, B. (2003) PSMATCH2: Stata Module to Perform Full Mahalanobis
and Propensity Score Matching, Common Support Graphing, and Covariate Imbalance
Testing.
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003) Estimating production functions using inputs to control
for unobservables, Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317341.
Liu, E. M. (2013) Time to ChangeWhat to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption
Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China, Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 1386
1403.
Liu, Y. and Myers, R. (2009) Model selection in stochastic frontier analysis with an appli-
cation to maize production in Kenya, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 31, 3346.
Lokshin, M. and Sajaia, Z. (2004) Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Endogenous Switch-
ing Regression Models, The Stata Journal, 4, 282289.
Ma, W. and Abdulai, A. (2016) Does cooperative membership improve household welfare?
Evidence from apple farmers in China, Food Policy, 58, 94102.
Madajewicz, M., Tsegay, A. H. and Norton, M. (2013) Managing Risks To Agricultural
Livelihoods: Impact Evaluation of the Harita Program in Tigray, Ethiopia, 2009 - 2012,
Tech. Rep. December, Boston, Massachusetts.
Mal, P., Manjunatha, A. V., Bauer, S. and Ahmed, M. N. (2011) Technical eciency and
environmental impact of Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton in North India, AgBioForum, 14,
164170.
Marenya, P. P. and Barrett, C. B. (2007) Household-level determinants of adoption of
improved natural resources management practices among smallholder farmers in western
196
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Kenya, Food Policy, 32, 515536.
Matuschke, I. and Qaim, M. (2008) Seed Market Privatisation and Farmers' Access to Crop
Technologies: The Case of Hybrid Pearl Millet Adoption in India, Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 59, 498515.
Mekonnen, T. (2017) Productivity and household welfare impact of technology adoption:
Micro-level evidence from rural Ethiopia.
Miller, C. (2008) Risk Mitigation and Management for Agricultural Investment: Investment
and Resource Mitigation, Tech. rep., Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy.
Mobarak, A. M. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2012) Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally
Insured.
Monteiro, N. P. (2010) Using propensity matching estimators to evaluate the impact of
privatization on wages, Applied Economics, 42, 12931313.
Mukherjee, A. and Lal, R. (2014) Comparison of soil quality index using three methods,
PLoS ONE, 9, e105981.
Mundlak, Y. (1978) On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, Econometrica,
46, 6985.
O'Donnell, C. J., Rao, D. S. P. and Battese, G. E. (2008) Metafrontier frameworks for the
study of rm-level eciencies and technology ratios, Empirical Economics, 34, 231255.
Park, T. A. (2014) Assessing performance impacts in food retail distribution systems:
A stochastic frontier model correcting for sample selection, Agricultural and Resource
Economics Review, 43, 373389.
Poole, N. (2017) Risk management for agricultural smallholders, in Smallholder Agriculture
and Market Participation, Practical Action Publishing, chap. Chapter 4, pp. 81114.
Rahman, S., Matin, M. A. and Hasan, M. K. (2018) Joint determination of improved variety
adoption, productivity and eciency of pulse production in Bangladesh: A sample-
selection stochastic frontier approach, Agriculture (Switzerland), 8.
Sibiko, K. W. and Qaim, M. (2020) Weather index insurance, agricultural input use, and
crop productivity in Kenya, Food Security, 12, 151167.
Smith, V. H. and Goodwin, B. K. (1996) Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural
Chemical Use, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 428438.
Solís, D., Bravo-Ureta, B. E. and Quiroga, R. E. (2007) Soil conservation and technical
eciency among hillside farmers in Central America: A switching regression model,
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 51, 491510.
Teklewold, H., Kassie, M. and Shiferaw, B. (2013) Adoption of multiple sustainable agri-
cultural practices in rural Ethiopia, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64, 597623.
Torres, M. A. O., Kallas, Z., Herrera, S. I. O. and Guesmi, B. (2019) Is technical eciency
aected by farmers' preference for mitigation and adaptation actions against climate
change? A case study in Northwest Mexico, Sustainability (Switzerland), 11.
USAID (2017) Climate Change Risk Prole - Senegal.
Vidoli, F., Cardillo, C., Fusco, E. and Canello, J. (2016) Spatial nonstationarity in the
stochastic frontier model: An application to the Italian wine industry, Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 61, 153164.
Vigani, M. and Kathage, J. (2019) To Risk or Not to Risk? Risk Management and Farm
Productivity, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 101, 14321454.
Villano, R., Bravo-Ureta, B., Solís, D. and Fleming, E. (2015) Modern Rice Technologies
and Productivity in the Philippines: Disentangling Technology from Managerial Gaps,
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66, 129154.
Wang, H. J. (2003) A stochastic frontier analysis of nancing constraints on investment:
The case of nancial liberalization in Taiwan, Journal of Business and Economic Statis-
197
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
tics, 21, 406419.
Wollni, M. and Brümmer, B. (2012) Productive eciency of specialty and conventional cof-
fee farmers in Costa Rica: Accounting for technological heterogeneity and self-selection,
Food Policy, 37, 6776.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2018) Correlated random eects models with unbalanced panels, Jour-
nal of Econometrics.
Wooldridge, J. M. W. (2015) Control Function Methods in Applied Econometrics, Journal
of Human Resources, 50, 420445.
Wopereis-Pura, M., Watanabe, H., Moreira, J. and Wopereis, M. (2002) Eect of late
nitrogen application on rice yield, grain quality and protability in the Senegal River
valley, European Journal of Agronomy, 17, 191198.
World Bank (2009) Index-based Crop Insurance in Senegal: Promoting Access to Agricul-
tural Insurance for Small Farmers, Tech. Rep. April, World Bank, Sustainable Develop-
ment, Africa Region Finance and Private Sector Development, Washington, D.C.
Yang, P., Iles, M., Yan, S. and Jollie, F. (2005) Farmers' knowledge, perceptions and
practices in transgenic Bt cotton in small producer systems in Northern China, Crop
Protection, 24, 229239.
Yang, Z., Mugera, A. W., Yin, N. and Wang, Y. (2018) Soil conservation practices and
production eciency of smallholder farms in Central China, Environment, Development
and Sustainability, 20, 15171533.
You, J. (2014) Risk, under-investment in agricultural assets and dynamic asset poverty in
rural China, China Economic Review, 29, 2745.
Zhang, K., Zheng, H., Chen, F. L., Ouyang, Z. Y., Wang, Y., Wu, Y. F., Lan, J., Fu, M.
and Xiang, X. W. (2015) Changes in soil quality after converting Pinus to Eucalyptus
plantations in southern China, Solid Earth, 6, 115123.
Zheng, H., Ouyang, Z. Y., Wang, X. K., Miao, H., Zhao, T. Q. and Peng, T. B. (2005)
How dierent reforestation approaches aect red soil properties in southern China, Land
Degradation and Development, 16, 387396.
198
Chapter 5. Does Complementing the Adoption of Productivity Enhancing Technologies with
Insurance Improve Technical Eciency?
Appendix
Appendix A1: Supplementary empirical approach
Stochastic meta-frontier approach
Following the approach outlined by Huang et al. (2014), a stochastic meta-frontier
production function of farm households adopting heterogeneous technologies is es-
timated as a two-step procedure. The rst step involves estimating group-specic
frontiers. In the second step, stochastic frontier techniques are used to determine the




Vji−Uji , j = 1, 2, ..., Nj; i = 1, 2, . . . . M (5.8)
where yji denotes the logarithmic crop income of farm household j in the ith group
and Wji refers to the vector of inputs of the j th farm household in the ith group, Vji
is the conventional error term that captures stochastic noise, Uji represents technical
ineciency, and γi are parameters to be estimated. It is assumed that Vji and Uji are
uncorrelated and Vji is independently and identically distributed as N(0, σ
2V ) while
Uji follows a truncated-normal distribution (Huang et al., 2014). Accordingly, tech-
nical eciency derived from the model-specic to each farm household and adoption
status (PET with or without insurance) can be stated as:
TEij =
yji
f i(W ji, γi)ϵ
Vji
= ϵ−Uji (5.9)
The technical eciency expressed in equation 5.8 is also assumed to be associated
with a set of within-group rm-specic exogenous (environmental) variables Zji in
addition to input vectors. For this study, the education level of household head,
crop diversication, agriculture implement ownership, mixed farming, and market
integration was employed as group-level environmental variables. Following Huang
et al. (2014), the common underlying meta-frontier production function for all groups
is dened as fM(W ji,γi) where the function is the same for all groups i = 1 . . ., M.
Their relationship is expressed as:
f i(W ji, γi) = f
M(W ji, γi)ϵ
−UMji , ∀ i, j, (5.10)
where UMji ≥ 0. Thus, fM(W ji,γi)≥ f i(W ji, γi), and therefore, the ratio of the group
frontier to the meta-frontier, referred to as the meta-technology gap ratio (TGR),
can be expressed as:
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TGR =




ji ≤ 1 (5.11)
According to Huang et al. (2014), the existence of the technology gap can be due to
the choice of a particular technology that depends on the production environments
and specic barriers. The meta-technology gap ratio is an index lying between zero
and unity. A value equal to unity implies that farm households adopted the most
advanced technology while a value of less than one means that farm households
have failed to adopt the most advanced technology. The technology gap component
UMji in equation 5.11 is thus group and farm household-specic. Furthermore, at
any given input level Wji, a household's observed crop income yji relative to the
meta-frontier fM(W ji,γi) can be decomposed into three components as:
yji
fM(W ji, γi)
= TGRij × TEij × ϵVji (5.12)
The three components in equation 5.12 are the j th farmer's meta-technology gap
ratio (TGR), technical eciency (TE), and random noise (ϵV ). Huang et al. (2014)
emphasize that though both TGR and TE lie between 0 and 1, the meta-frontier
does not necessarily envelope all farmers' observed outputs due to random noise.
The unrestricted ratio in equation 5.12 distinguishes meta-frontier modelling by
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) from the data envelopment analysis (DEA). Hence,





= TGRji × TEji (5.13)
where MTEji represents a farm household's technical eciency with respect to the
meta-frontier production technology, fM(W ji,γi). As proposed by Battese et al.
(2004) and O'Donnell et al. (2008), the empirical measurement of the meta-frontier
model comprises two steps: rst, a maximum likelihood estimation is required to
estimate each group-specic frontier regression in equation 5.8. Secondly, mathe-
matical programming techniques are used to estimate the meta-frontier in equation
5.10 by minimizing the sum of squares of the deviations of the meta-frontier func-
tion from the estimated group-specic frontiers. However, as argued by Huang et al.
(2014), the second step of this method presents potential diculties because no
statistical properties can be drawn of the meta-frontier estimators due to their de-
terministic nature. At the same time, Huang et al. (2014) and Chang et al. (2015)
argue that the programming techniques do not isolate idiosyncratic shocks and thus
results are susceptible to random shocks. In light of these shortcomings, Huang
et al. (2014) proposed a stochastic meta-frontier model that uses stochastic fron-
tier analysis to estimate meta-frontier parameters in the second stage rather than
mathematical programming techniques. In the proposed approach by Huang et al.
(2014), the conventional maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate param-
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eters of the meta-frontier model, hence allowing for the usual statistical inferences
to be performed without depending on simulations or bootstrapping as in the case of
mathematical programming techniques. The model of Huang et al. (2014) therefore
builds on the equations 5.8 to 5.13. It considers the relation between the group-
specic frontier and the meta-frontier functions in equation 5.10 to be reformulated
as:
Inf i(W ji, γi) = Inf
M(Wji, γi)− UMji . (5.14)
Because the group-specic frontier f i(Wji,γi) is unobservable but its estimate is
available from the rst step and for the reason that the tted value (f̂ iWji,γi) of
f i (Wji,γi) and the true frontier value f
i(Wji,γi) are dierent, equation 5.14 can be
reformulated as:
Inf̂ i(W ji, γi) = Inf
M(Wji, γi)− UMji + V Mji ,∀i, j = 1, 2. . . . . . J (5.15)
where UMji is the statistical noise to represent the deviation between f̂
i(Wji,γi) and
f i(Wji,γi) expressed as:
Inf̂ i(W ji, γi) = Inf
M(Wji, γi) + V
M
ji (5.16)
The specication in equation 5.15 is like the conventional stochastic frontier regres-
sion model and is therefore referred to as the stochastic meta-frontier (SMF) model.
Because Inf̂ i(Wji,γi) is obtained by maximum likelihood-based methods, its param-
eter estimates are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. The error
V Mji is normally distributed as N(0, σ
M2V ) while UMji ≥ 0 and Uji ∼ N+(µM(Zji),
σM2(Zji)), where Zji represents the industry-specic environmental variables which
include deviations of rainfall, soil quality, and agro-ecological zones. The proposed
two-step stochastic frontier approach of Huang et al. (2014) allows for the estimated
group-specic frontier (f̂ iWji,γi) to be greater than or equal to the meta-frontier
(fMWji,γi) due to the error of estimating f
i(Wji,γi) in equation 5.15. According to
Huang et al. (2014), the meta-frontier should be larger or equal to the true group-
specic frontier, i.e., fM(Wji, γi) ≥ f i(Wji, γi). As previously stated, the estimated
TGR must always be less than or equal to unity. The TGR is computed using the
following formula:
T̂GRji = E(ϵ
−UMji |ε̂Mji ) ≤ 1 (5.17)
where ε̂Mji =Inf̂
i(W ji,γi)  Inf̂
M(Wji,γi) which represents the estimated composite
residual of equation 5.15. At the same time, the estimated technology gap in equa-
tion 5.16 is a function of the production environments Zji via the mode µ
M (Zji)
and the heteroscedastic variance σM2(Zji).
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Endogenous Switching Regression Model
Following previous studies (see Di Falco et al., 2011; Abdulai and Human, 2014; Ma
and Abdulai, 2016) the empirical approach employed to evaluate the impact of PET
with and without insurance adoption on technical eciency was performed in two
stages. In the rst stage, the selection of a particular technology is specied using a
binary model. The equations for the outcome of interest, in this case, the technical
eciency with respect to the meta-frontier are modelled for both PET with insurance
adopters and PET without insurance adopters conditional on selection. Assuming
risk neutrality, farmers will evaluate the net returns (utility) associated with the
adoption of PET with and without insurance, let the latent net utility for adopters
and non-adopters be denoted as Y ∗, such that a utility-maximizing household j will
choose to adopt PET with insurance if the utility gained from adopting is greater
than the utility of not adopting with insurance (Y ∗ = U∗iA  U
∗
iN > 0). Given that a
farm household utility level is a latent variable and cannot be observed, we observe
only indicators of utility, namely choices. We specify the latent variable as:
Y ∗ = βXj + εj, Yj = 1
[
Y ∗j > 0
]
, (5.18)
where Yj is a binary variable that equals 1 for farm households who adopt PET
with insurance and zero otherwise (i.e. PET without insurance), with β denoting a
vector of parameters to be estimated. Thus, the farm household adopts PET with
insurance only if the perceived net benets are positive. The error term ε is assumed
to be normally distributed with zero mean. X is a vector of explanatory variables
that inuence the adoption decision such as risk attitude, knowledge, household,
and farm-level characteristics, etc. The probability that a farm household adopts
PET with insurance can be expressed as follows:
Pr (Yj = 1) = Pr
(
Y ∗j > 0
)
= Pr (εj > −βXj) = 1− F (−βXj) (5.19)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the error term.
In the second stage, separate outcome equations6 are specied for PET with insur-
ance adopters and PET without insurance adopters.
MTEj1 = α1Zj1 + µ1 if Yj = 1 (5.20a)
MTEj0 = α0Zj0 + µ0 if Yj = 0 (5.20b)
where MTEj1 and MTEj0 are the technical eciencies with respect to the meta-
frontier for PET with insurance adopters and PET without insurance adopters,
6The Endogenous Switching Regression Model was estimated using the Movestay package in
Stata.
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respectively. Zj is a vector of explanatory variables that include farm and household-
level characteristics, such as the age, gender, education level of household head,
household size, access to extension services, farm size, crop portfolio, land share
under cash crops, etc. The vectors α1 and α0 are the parameters to be estimated
and µ is the error term.
To overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unobserved heterogeneity with
observed covariates, the approach of Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge (2018) which
has also been used by Di Falco (2014), Kassie et al. (2015), Teklewold et al. (2013)
and Vigani and Kathage (2019)7 was employed. This was achieved by exploiting
crop-level information and including the mean of crop varying explanatory variables,
which include labour, landholding, fertilizer, and seed quantity to deal with the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome equations 5.20a and 5.20b. Controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important to help address farm or plot-
specic unobservables as they may contain useful missing information regarding
land quality (Kassie et al., 2015) for instance. Concurrently, if farm households
obtain private information about unobservable eects such as how good the soil is
on the plot or some shocks, they will adjust their factor input decisions accordingly
(Fafchamps, 1993; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Assunção and Braido, 2007). Hence,
this approach permits the exploitation of crop-level information to deal with the
issue of farm household's unobservable characteristics and farm-specic eects. As
suggested by Teklewold et al. (2013), a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the
vectors of the crop varying explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is required
to indicate the relevance of crop-specic heterogeneity.
Model identication requires at least one variable in the selection equation 5.18 that
does not appear in the outcome equations 5.20a and 5.20b. The valid instrument (s)
is required to inuence a farm household's adoption decision but do not aect tech-
nical eciency. The variables representing insurance needs and perception about
the suciency of subsidized seeds are used as the instrument variables. While these
variables are expected to aect adoption decisions, it is assumed that these do not
aect technical eciency directly. We conducted a validity check of these instru-
ments, by estimating a simple probit model for the selection equation and an OLS
model for the outcome equation separately to checked that both variables are in
eect, signicant when included in the selection equation but not signicant when
included in the outcome equation. The three error terms εj in equation 5.18, and
µ1 and µ0 in equation 5.20a and 5.20b are assumed to have a trivariate normal
distribution, with zero mean and the following covariance matrix:
Cov (εj, µ1, µ0) = Σ =





7In most of these studies, plot-variant variables were used to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity but due to the lack of plot-level data we use an alternative approach by using crop-variant
variables since household produce multiple crops and we have crop-level data.
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where Var(ε) = σ2ε, Var (µ1) = σ
2µ1, Var(µ0) = σ
2µ0, Cov(ε, µ1) = σε1, and
Cov(ε, µ0) = σε0. Since we do not observe MTEj1 and MTEj0 simultaneously,
the covariance between µ1 and µ0 is not dened. The error term, εj of the sample
selection equation 5.18 is correlated with the error terms of the outcome equation
5.20a and 5.20b. For this reason, the error terms in equation 5.20a and 5.20b,
conditional on the sample selection criterion, have nonzero expected values, and
hence using an ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coecients α1 and
α0 will result in sample selection bias (Lee, 1982). The expected values of the
truncated error terms (µ1 | Y =1) and (µ0 | Y = 0) are then given as:









where Φ(.) and ϕ(.) are the probability density and the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The terms λ1 and λ0
refer to the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at βXj and are incorporated into outcome
equations to account for sample selection bias. A drawback of the two-step approach
for the endogenous switching regression model is that it generates residuals that are
heteroskedastic and as a result cannot be used to obtain consistent standard errors
without cumbersome adjustments (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The full information
maximum likelihood method suggested by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) overcomes the
problem through a simultaneous estimation of the two equations, that is, equation
5.18 and equations 5.20a and 5.20b.
The signs and signicance levels of the correlation coecients (ρ) from the estimates
which are the correlation coecients between the error term εj of the selection
equation and error terms µ1 and µ0 of the outcome equations 5.20a and 5.20b are
of particular interest. Specically, there is endogenous switching, if either ρ1 or ρ0
is signicantly dierent from zero, which would result in selection bias.
Estimating treatment eects
In this study, our main interest is to estimate the treatment eect (switching im-
pacts) of PET with and without insurance adoption on technical eciency. The
endogenous switching regression method can be used to compare expected technical
eciency with the counterfactual hypothetical technical eciency that farm house-
holds did not adopt PET with insurance and vice versa. This can be represented as
follows:
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Farm households that adopted PET with insurance (observed):
E[MTEj1|Yj = 1] = α1Zj1 + σε1λ1 (5.24a)
Counterfactual case if PET with insurance adopting farm households did not adopt:
E[MTEj1|Yj = 0] = α1Zj0 + σε1λ0 (5.24b)
Farm households that adopted PET without insurance (observed):
E[MTEj0|Yj = 0] = α0Zj0 + σε0λ0 (5.24c)
Counterfactual case if PET without insurance adopting farm households adopted
PET with insurance:
E[MTEj0|Yj = 1] = α0Zj1 + σε0λ1 (5.24d)
The change in outcome due to adoption can then be specied as the dierence be-
tween adoption and non-adoption. The use of these conditional expectations from
equations 5.24a to 5.24d permits the calculation of average treatment eects (ATT)
 i.e., the treatment eect for treated farm households (i.e., PET with insurance
adopters), which is the dierence between equations 5.24a and 5.24b. Furthermore,
the average treatment eect on the untreated (ATU) households (i.e., PET without
insurance adopters) is of interest and this is simply the dierence between equations
5.24c and 5.24d. Just as previously mentioned in the paper, the control function
approach was employed to account for the potential reverse causality and endogene-
ity problems that may arise with some explanatory variables in equation 5.18 such
as membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access, credit access, and
nonfarm work participation.
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Table 5.8: Summary statistics for the matched and unmatched sample











Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Crop income 12.867 1.189 13.474∗∗∗ 1.341 12.943 1.225 12.773 1.272 13.474∗∗∗ 1.341 12.911 1.315
Labour 4.017 1.403 4.082 1.071 4.025 1.366 4.426 1.389 4.082∗∗ 1.071 4.358 1.339
Land 1.011 1.324 0.806 1.155 0.986 1.306 0.563 1.373 0.806∗ 1.155 0.611 1.335
Fertilizer 4.440 1.469 5.449∗∗∗ 0.919 4.565 1.451 5.094 1.265 5.449∗∗∗ 0.919 5.164 1.212
Seed 3.606 1.154 3.736 1.447 3.622 1.195 3.727 1.291 3.736 1.447 3.728 1.322
Improved seeds 2.951 1.718 3.559∗∗∗ 1.496 3.027 1.704 3.328 1.705 3.559 1.496 3.374 1.668
Age 53.324 12.893 53.545 12.996 53.352 12.901 52.919 12.368 53.545 12.996 53.042 12.488
Gender 0.934 0.249 0.945 0.229 0.935 0.247 0.936 0.246 0.945 0.229 0.937 0.242
Education 0.430 0.495 0.510 0.502 0.440 0.497 0.464 0.499 0.510 0.502 0.473 0.500
HH size 10.473 5.653 9.586∗ 4.614 10.363 5.540 9.851 5.283 9.586 4.614 9.799 5.156
Light 0.348 0.476 0.579∗∗∗ 0.495 0.376 0.485 0.392 0.489 0.579∗∗∗ 0.495 0.429 0.495
Extension 0.322 0.468 0.621∗∗∗ 0.487 0.359 0.480 0.459 0.499 0.621∗∗∗ 0.487 0.491 0.500
Membership 0.311 0.463 0.593∗∗∗ 0.493 0.346 0.476 0.471 0.500 0.593∗∗ 0.493 0.495 0.500
Credit 0.095 0.293 0.283∗∗∗ 0.452 0.118 0.323 0.137 0.344 0.283∗∗∗ 0.452 0.166 0.372
Market 0.576 0.494 0.676∗ 0.470 0.589 0.492 0.620 0.486 0.676 0.470 0.631 0.483
HH part 0.732 0.443 0.745 0.437 0.734 0.442 0.761 0.427 0.745 0.437 0.758 0.429
Nonfarm 0.263 0.440 0.152∗∗∗ 0.360 0.249 0.433 0.198 0.399 0.152 0.360 0.189 0.392
Risk attitude 0.439 0.497 0.283∗∗∗ 0.452 0.420 0.494 0.353 0.478 0.283 0.452 0.339 0.474
Risk count 1.448 1.669 0.869∗∗∗ 1.560 1.376 1.666 0.939 1.489 0.869 1.560 0.925 1.502
Loss count 1.697 1.056 1.800 1.084 1.710 1.059 1.741 1.128 1.800 1.084 1.752 1.119
Cash crop 0.207 0.254 0.030∗∗∗ 0.115 0.185 0.248 0.075 0.165 0.030∗∗∗ 0.115 0.066 0.158
Diversication 33.681 32.875 23.701∗∗ 40.298 32.443 34.024 27.040 37.151 23.701 40.298 26.381 37.787
Soil degradation 0.060 0.237 0.117∗ 0.323 0.067 0.250 0.088 0.284 0.117 0.323 0.094 0.292
Notes: A t-test is used to determine if PET with insurance adopting farm household's means are statistically dierent
from that of PET only adopting farm households. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
aAs previously noted, the balancing property is carried out on covariates of treated and control observations within each
block of which the average propensity scores of treated and control observations do not dier. In this table, however, the







































































Table 5.8: Summary statistics for the matched and unmatched sample (continued)











Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Rainfall 6.325 0.488 6.149∗∗∗ 0.513 6.303 0.495 6.239 0.503 6.149 0.513 6.221 0.506
Insurance 0.487 0.500 0.752∗∗∗ 0.434 0.520 0.500 0.603 0.490 0.752∗∗∗ 0.434 0.633 0.482
Fert subsidy 0.683 0.466 0.814∗∗∗ 0.391 0.699 0.459 0.720 0.449 0.814∗ 0.391 0.739 0.440
Seed Subsidy 0.551 0.498 0.359∗∗∗ 0.481 0.527 0.499 0.410 0.492 0.359 0.481 0.400 0.490
Remittance 0.104 0.305 0.097 0.296 0.103 0.304 0.110 0.313 0.097 0.296 0.107 0.310
Coping 0.287 0.453 0.262 0.441 0.284 0.451 0.253 0.435 0.262 0.441 0.254 0.436
Support 0.835 0.371 0.966∗∗∗ 0.183 0.851 0.356 0.888 0.315 0.966∗∗∗ 0.183 0.903 0.296
Location 0.147 0.355 0.014∗∗∗ 0.117 0.131 0.337 0.085 0.279 0.014∗∗∗ 0.117 0.071 0.257
Distance 71.870 48.918 93.040∗∗∗ 40.068 74.495 48.400 89.408 50.129 93.040 40.068 90.124 48.307
Irrigation 0.398 0.490 0.731∗∗∗ 0.445 0.440 0.497 0.586 0.493 0.731∗∗∗ 0.445 0.615 0.487
Farming system 0.594 0.491 0.214∗∗∗ 0.411 0.547 0.498 0.368 0.483 0.214∗∗∗ 0.411 0.337 0.473
Subsidy 0.464 0.499 0.324∗∗ 0.470 0.447 0.497 0.371 0.484 0.324 0.470 0.362 0.481
HWI 0.165 1.742 0.835∗∗∗ 1.797 0.249 1.762 0.354 1.826 0.835∗∗ 1.797 0.449 1.829
Mixed farming 0.341 0.474 0.297 0.458 0.335 0.472 0.336 0.473 0.297 0.458 0.328 0.470
Std rainfall 4.653 0.222 4.577∗∗∗ 0.218 4.644 0.222 4.623 0.213 4.577∗ 0.218 4.614 0.215
Suciency 0.241 0.428 0.193 0.396 0.235 0.424 0.242 0.429 0.193 0.396 0.233 0.423
AEZ BasinAra 0.299 0.458 0.028∗∗∗ 0.164 0.265 0.442 0.112 0.315 0.028∗∗∗ 0.164 0.095 0.294
AEZ RiverVall 0.293 0.455 0.628∗∗∗ 0.485 0.334 0.472 0.469 0.499 0.628∗∗∗ 0.485 0.501 0.500
AEZ Niayes 0.017 0.128 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.015 0.120 0.019 0.135 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.015 0.121
AEZ Casamance 0.122 0.328 0.028∗∗∗ 0.164 0.110 0.313 0.075 0.263 0.028∗∗ 0.164 0.065 0.247
AEZ CentEast 0.075 0.264 0.021∗∗∗ 0.143 0.068 0.253 0.053 0.223 0.021∗ 0.143 0.046 0.210
AEZ VallAnambe 0.161 0.368 0.290∗∗ 0.455 0.177 0.382 0.241 0.428 0.290 0.455 0.250 0.434
Soil quality 0.355 0.095 0.351 0.097 0.355 0.095 0.344 0.103 0.351 0.097 0.346 0.102
AII 0.104 1.290 0.957∗∗∗ 0.833 0.209 1.274 0.603 1.042 0.957∗∗∗ 0.833 0.673 1.013
Mean labour 2.241 1.659 1.983 1.554 2.209 1.648 2.118 1.551 1.983 1.554 2.091 1.552
Mean land 0.111 0.163 0.028∗∗∗ 0.078 0.100 0.158 0.056 0.133 0.028∗∗∗ 0.078 0.051 0.124
Mean fertilizer 18.046 35.697 61.392∗ 243.540 23.423 92.913 22.567 44.216 61.392 243.540 30.226 115.948
Mean seed 6.646 7.394 6.951 7.836 6.684 7.447 5.587 7.326 6.951 7.836 5.856 7.444
N 1024 145 1169 590 145 735
Notes: A t-test is used to determine if PET with insurance adopting farm household's means are statistically
dierent from that of PET only adopting farm households. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level,
respectively. aAs previously noted, the balancing property is carried out on covariates of treated and control
observations within each block of which the average propensity scores of treated and control observations do not dier.
In this table, however, the average of all blocks treated and controlled observations are used.
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Table 5.9: Control function approach estimates: Unmatched sample
Membership Extension Credit Nonfarm work
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant -1.372∗∗ 0.602 -1.869∗∗∗ 0.640 -0.333 0.755 -0.365 0.631
Age -0.006∗ 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.004
Gender -0.018 0.163 0.125 0.168 -0.147 0.196 -0.145 0.174
Education 0.058 0.087 0.052 0.090 0.207∗ 0.108 0.251∗∗∗ 0.090
HH size 0.023∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.008
Land 0.007 0.006 -0.002 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.007
Light -0.185∗∗ 0.088 0.189∗∗ 0.090 -0.280∗∗ 0.114 -0.013 0.092
Extension 0.587∗∗∗ 0.090 0.018 0.115 -0.069 0.099
Membership 0.648∗∗∗ 0.093 0.365∗∗∗ 0.109 -0.047 0.101
Credit 0.467∗∗∗ 0.122 -0.010 0.130 -0.092 0.139
Market 0.120 0.084 -0.002 0.087 0.083 0.105 -0.026 0.088
Nonfarm -0.067 0.102 -0.097 0.104 -0.119 0.130
HH part -0.069 0.106 -0.068 0.112 0.343∗∗ 0.139 0.157 0.110
Risk attitude -0.127 0.090 0.193∗∗ 0.090 0.112 0.107 0.558∗∗∗ 0.088
Risk count -0.071∗∗ 0.034 0.071∗∗ 0.035 -0.044 0.044 0.004 0.033
Loss count 0.199∗∗∗ 0.044 -0.116∗∗ 0.045 -0.041 0.058 0.173∗∗∗ 0.045
Cash crop -0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.010∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.006∗∗∗ 0.002
Diversication 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001
Soil degradation 0.175 0.169 0.132 0.166 -0.481∗∗ 0.221 0.845∗∗∗ 0.169
Rainfall 0.081 0.086 0.061 0.088 -0.224∗∗ 0.110 -0.120 0.091
Insurance needs 0.126 0.084 -0.135 0.087 0.217∗∗ 0.104 0.110 0.088
Fert subsidy 0.017 0.099 0.404∗∗∗ 0.102 0.068 0.123 -0.325∗∗∗ 0.105
Seed Subsidy -0.029 0.101 -0.693∗∗∗ 0.102 -0.156 0.126 0.316∗∗∗ 0.107
Remittance 0.035 0.135 0.333∗∗ 0.134 0.007 0.167 -0.096 0.143
Coping -0.370∗∗∗ 0.102
Support needs 1.401∗∗∗ 0.176
Location -0.702∗∗∗ 0.237
Distance -0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
Wald Chi2(23) 229.934∗∗∗ 338.434∗∗∗ 74.451∗∗∗ 169.750∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -638.66 -594.144 -387.146 -571.118
N 1169
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 5.10: Control function approach estimates: Matched sample
Membership Extension Credit Nonfarm work
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant -1.139 0.739 -2.127∗∗∗ 0.777 0.135 0.875 -0.487 0.875
Age -0.008∗ 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005
Gender -0.219 0.201 0.076 0.211 -0.068 0.235 -0.302 0.238
Education -0.172 0.111 0.137 0.112 0.083 0.129 0.393∗∗∗ 0.129
HH size 0.013 0.011 -0.022∗ 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.021∗ 0.013
Land 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.011 -0.008 0.011
Light -0.317∗∗∗ 0.105 0.186∗ 0.107 -0.394∗∗∗ 0.129 -0.033 0.128
Extension 0.363∗∗∗ 0.108 0.018 0.129 0.119 0.129
Membership 0.410∗∗∗ 0.111 0.186 0.127 0.216∗ 0.130
Credit 0.285∗∗ 0.138 0.013 0.139 0.048 0.162
Market -0.025 0.104 -0.128 0.106 0.147 0.126 0.124 0.127
Nonfarm 0.230∗ 0.139 0.105 0.140 0.140 0.161
HH part -0.112 0.141 -0.285∗∗ 0.143 0.211 0.174 0.323∗ 0.178
Risk attitude 0.064 0.115 0.309∗∗∗ 0.110 0.207 0.127 0.388∗∗∗ 0.125
Risk count -0.026 0.047 0.110∗∗ 0.047 -0.054 0.060 -0.039 0.054
Loss count 0.145∗∗∗ 0.054 -0.201∗∗∗ 0.053 -0.098 0.066 0.261∗∗∗ 0.059
Cash crop -0.001 0.004 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.004 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.013∗∗ 0.005
Diversication 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002
Soil degradation 0.140 0.184 0.154 0.180 -0.522∗∗ 0.231 0.772∗∗∗ 0.188
Rainfall 0.212∗∗ 0.104 0.135 0.104 -0.254∗∗ 0.125 -0.198 0.122
Insurance needs -0.241∗∗ 0.108 -0.236∗∗ 0.110 0.134 0.127 0.236∗ 0.130
Fert subsidy -0.151 0.125 0.488∗∗∗ 0.124 -0.076 0.142 -0.102 0.150
Seed Subsidy 0.236∗ 0.124 -0.628∗∗∗ 0.123 -0.039 0.146 0.086 0.146
Remittance 0.134 0.163 0.300∗ 0.165 0.079 0.188 -0.005 0.187
Coping -0.419∗∗∗ 0.128
Support needs 1.442∗∗∗ 0.211
Location -0.965∗∗∗ 0.368
Distance -0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Wald Chi2(23) 147.253∗∗∗ 186.557∗∗∗ 62.762∗∗∗ 140.633∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -435.803 -416.07 -298.976 -286.113
N 735
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 5.11: Estimates of the sample-selection equation: unmatched and matched sample
Unmatched sample Matched sample
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant -2.056∗ 1.095 -2.540∗∗ 1.171
Age 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006
Gender 0.161 0.278 0.203 0.284
Education 0.327∗∗ 0.154 0.331∗∗ 0.159
HH size 0.011 0.018 0.008 0.017
Land -0.005 0.010 -0.004 0.011
Light 0.504∗∗ 0.182 0.653∗∗∗ 0.232
Extension 1.184∗ 0.617 1.006∗ 0.517
Membership 0.909 1.134 1.021 1.064
Credit 0.993 1.403 2.084 1.461
Market 0.187 0.126 0.212 0.148
Nonfarm 0.137 0.217 0.167 0.229
Participation -1.471 1.114 -1.409∗ 0.839
Risk attitude -0.286 0.228 -0.457∗∗ 0.207
Risk count -0.006 0.065 -0.024 0.064
Loss count 0.178 0.110 0.225∗∗ 0.108
Cash crop -0.015∗ 0.008 -0.019∗∗ 0.008
Diversication -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005
Soil degradation 0.270 0.381 0.338 0.340
Rainfall -0.212 0.161 -0.185 0.178
Insurance 0.589∗∗∗ 0.149 0.624∗∗∗ 0.176
Fert subsidy 0.120 0.226 0.242 0.202
Seed Subsidy 0.171 0.246 0.015 0.214
Remittance -0.453∗ 0.236 -0.367 0.246
Resid mem -0.362 0.682 -0.391 0.642
Resid ext -0.620∗ 0.347 -0.480 0.309
Resid cred -0.185 0.782 -0.785 0.839
Resid nonfarm 0.627 0.640 0.522 0.457
Log likelihood -308.4513 -304.014
LR chi2(27) 259.598∗∗∗ 121.984∗∗∗
N 1169 735
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively. Stan-
dard errors reported are the bootstrapped errors. In the probit model 1
= adoption of PET with insurance and 0=adoption of PET only
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Labour 0.039 0.040 0.019 0.101 -0.006 0.015
Land 0.780∗∗∗ 0.044 0.935∗∗∗ 0.097 0.861∗∗∗ 0.017
Fertilizer 0.285∗∗∗ 0.029 0.509∗∗∗ 0.070 0.362∗∗∗ 0.011
Seed 0.117∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.022 0.040 0.078∗∗∗ 0.010
Irrigate 0.187∗ 0.101 0.481∗ 0.282 0.264∗∗∗ 0.037
Farm system -0.335 0.290 0.382 0.296 -0.057 0.060
Constant 10.512∗∗∗ 0.354 10.526∗∗∗ 0.638 10.669∗∗∗ 0.102
Group-specic environmental variables
Education -0.521 0.694 0.626 0.685
Diversication -0.219∗ 0.130 -0.024 0.016
AII 0.065 0.469 -0.327 0.338
Mixed farming -1.036 2.564 0.755 0.630
Market -0.148 0.663 0.448 0.597
Constant 0.116 1.235 -0.692 1.833
Industry-specic environmental variables
Std rainfall 0.028 0.042
Soil quality -0.456∗∗∗ 0.145
AEZ BasinAra 0.085 0.066
AEZ RiverVall -0.493∗∗∗ 0.077
AEZ Niayes 0.087 0.113
AEZ Casamance -0.027 0.069
AEZ CentEast 0.012 0.073
AEZ VallAnambe -0.311∗∗∗ 0.083
Subsidy -0.012 0.030
Constant 0.543∗∗ 0.213
Sigma u 0.628∗ 0.334 1.467∗∗∗ 0.441 0.002 0.007
Sigma v 0.868∗∗∗ 0.024 0.397∗∗∗ 0.077 0.353∗∗∗ 0.007
Lambda 0.723∗∗ 0.330 3.697∗∗∗ 0.425 0.007 0.010
Technical eciency and technology gap ratios
TE 0.857m 0.153s 0.457m 0.238s
TGR 0.731m 0.171s 0.898m 0.115s
MTE 0.608m 0.116s 0.424m 0.244s
Log likelihood -1333.023 -177.69 -440.916
N 1024 145 1169
m denotes mean values
s denotes standard deviations.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 5.13: Control function approach for endogenous switching regression model
Membership Extension Credit Nonfarm
Variable Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err. Coe. Std. Err.
Constant 0.400 0.913 -2.223∗∗ 0.985 1.339 1.153 0.043 0.963
Age -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.004
Gender -0.011 0.162 0.175 0.169 -0.131 0.194 -0.149 0.174
Education 0.058 0.087 -0.028 0.091 0.175 0.107 0.311∗∗∗ 0.090
HH size 0.021∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.023∗∗ 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.015∗ 0.008
Land 0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.007
HWI -0.068∗∗∗ 0.025 0.155∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.050 0.032 -0.110∗∗∗ 0.027
Extension 0.622∗∗∗ 0.090 0.028 0.115 -0.080 0.100
Membership 0.683∗∗∗ 0.094 0.343∗∗∗ 0.109 -0.073 0.102
Credit 0.440∗∗∗ 0.122 0.031 0.130 -0.129 0.139
Market 0.120 0.084 0.034 0.087 0.078 0.105 -0.030 0.088
Nonfarm -0.108 0.102 -0.131 0.104 -0.111 0.128
Risk -0.118 0.090 0.213∗∗ 0.090 0.135 0.106 0.554∗∗∗ 0.088
Risk count -0.066∗ 0.034 0.089∗∗ 0.035 -0.053 0.043 0.004 0.033
Loss count 0.175∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.083∗ 0.045 -0.038 0.057 0.150∗∗∗ 0.045
Cash crop -0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.004∗ 0.002
Diversication 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Soil degradation 0.165 0.168 0.146 0.167 -0.476∗∗ 0.222 0.860∗∗∗ 0.170
Std rainfall -0.294 0.189 0.138 0.199 -0.576∗∗ 0.239 -0.231 0.197
Subsidy -0.008 0.107 -0.647∗∗∗ 0.112 -0.063 0.134 -0.151 0.108
Remittance 0.024 0.135 0.321∗∗ 0.135 -0.047 0.168 -0.073 0.145
Insurance 0.108 0.084 -0.140 0.088 0.190∗ 0.103 0.089 0.088





Log-likelihood -636.619 -586.084 -391.945 -565.331
LR chi2(22) 234.02∗∗∗ 354.56∗∗∗ 64.85∗∗∗ 181.32∗∗∗
N 1,169
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 5.14: Test of validity of instruments used in the rst stage ESR model
Selection equation
MTE of PET without
insurance adopters
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -2.596** 1.319 0.797*** 0.064
Age 0.003 0.005 -0.000* 0.000
Gender 0.155 0.230 0.026** 0.012
Education 0.369*** 0.132 0.017*** 0.006
HH size 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.001
Land -0.008 0.008 -0.001** 0.000
HWI 0.137*** 0.043 0.002 0.002
Extension 1.019** 0.508 0.027*** 0.007
Membership 1.334* 0.783 0.008 0.007
Credit 1.382 0.926 0.011 0.010
Market 0.129 0.118 0.008 0.006
Nonfarm -1.570** 0.731 0.004 0.007
Risk -0.146 0.188 -0.006 0.006
Risk count -0.028 0.043 -0.008*** 0.002
Loss count 0.181** 0.074 0.004 0.003
Cash crop -0.015** 0.007 -0.002*** 0.000
Diversication -0.003 0.003 0.002*** 0.000
Soil degradation 0.306 0.227 0.033*** 0.013
Std rainfall -0.114 0.254 -0.047*** 0.013
Subsidy 0.509*** 0.196 -0.030*** 0.007
Remittance -0.272* 0.154 0.011 0.010
Insurance 0.534*** 0.111 0.008 0.006
Suciency -0.367* 0.205 -0.002 0.008
Resid mem -0.688 0.461
Resid ext -0.633** 0.278
Resid credit -0.460 0.499
Resid nonfarm 0.791* 0.435
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Appendix A3: Computation of Soil Quality Index
(SQI)
In computing the soil quality index for the study, the Soil nutrient maps of Sub-
Saharan Africa8 raster le at 250 m resolution provided by the International Soil
Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC) was used. Nutrients covered in this data
include; total nitrogen (N), total phosphorus (P), extractable phosphorus (P), potas-
sium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg), sodium (Na), aluminium (Al), boron (B),
copper (Cu), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn) and zinc (Zn) in (ppm). The estimation
approaches for these nutrients data have been well discussed in Hengl et al. (2017).
Additionally, soil physical and biochemical properties data9 provided by ISRIC were
used for the computation of the index. Free spatial data in the form of shapeles for
the administrative regions of Senegal were obtained from DIVA-GIS10 provided by
ISRIC were used for the computation of the index. Free spatial data in the form of
shapeles for the administrative regions of Senegal were obtained from DIVA-GIS
. Using the free and open-source geographic information system software and the
geographic coordinate data of farm households, the soil parameters for each farm
household were calculated. The Soil Quality Index (SQI) was calculated following
the approaches described in Zheng et al. (2005), Mukherjee and Lal (2014), and
Zhang et al. (2015). First, the principal component analysis (PCA) was used to
identify a minimum data set (MDS) to reduce the indicator load in the estima-
tion of the index and to avoid data redundancy. During the principal component
analysis, only the `highly weighted' variables were retained in the MDS. After the se-
lection of parameters for the MDS, all selected observations were transformed using
linear scoring functions (less is better, more is better, and optimum) based on the
recommendations in the empirical literature (Amacher et al., 2007; Mukherjee and
Lal, 2014). Thereafter, the weighted additive SQI was computed using the formula
below: SQI =
∑
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Abstract
In this paper, we used a nationally representative survey data from Senegal to in-
vestigated the joint welfare impact of risk-reducing technologies and insurance by
comparing three distinct farm households: non-adopters of mineral fertilizer, im-
proved seeds and insurance, mineral fertilizer, and improved seeds adopters without
insurance, and mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adopters with insurance. Us-
ing a multinomial endogenous switching regression model to control for selection
bias stemming from both unobserved and observed factors, we nd that adopt-
ing mineral fertilizer and improved seeds generally lead to increases in food calorie
availability and crop income per capita. However, complementing the adoption
of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance leads to higher household
welfare outcomes compared to adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds in iso-
lation. These ndings underscore the need to scale up and encourage the adoption
of productivity-enhancing technologies and insurance products to help smallholders
not only improve their welfare but also better adapt to climate change impacts.
Keywords: Technology, Mineral fertilizer, Improved seeds, insurance, Food calorie,
Crop income.
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6.1 Introduction
Climate variability is a major source of risk to smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Increasing erratic weather and climate shifts will further erode smallholder
farmers' long-term livelihood potential through the loss of productive assets, stiing
investments, and imposing ex-ante barriers to the use of technologies (D'Alessandro
et al., 2015; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Demeke et al., 2016; Amare et al.,
2018). In the coming decades, climate variability is projected to increase in terms of
frequency and severity and this will pose elevating threats to food production and
access, especially for vulnerable and resource-poor communities (Bates et al., 2010;
Thornton and Gerber, 2010). Concurrently, a growing body of evidence has linked
climate-related risk to the extent and the persistence of rural poverty in developing
regions of the world (World Bank, 2016; Hansen et al., 2019). At the same time,
growth in agricultural productivity which requires the use of modern inputs and
technologies remains a key instrument for poverty reduction and food security.
Facing climate and production risks, the empirical literature documents a range of
alternative strategies employed by farm households to avoid or minimize losses re-
lated to climatic risk. Some of these include adopting agronomic practices such as
conservation farming practices, mulching, sustainable land management (Di Falco
and Veronesi, 2013; World Bank, 2016; Obiri and Driver, 2017), diversication which
could be crop or income-based (Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Obiri and Driver, 2017;
Birthal and Hazrana, 2019). Another strand of literature also suggests the adop-
tion of the so-called risk-reducing inputs or technologies such as improved and
high yielding seeds, inorganic fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation (Holzmann and
Jørgensen, 2001; World Bank, 2005; Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 2008; Schanit-
Chatterjee, 2010; Chetaille et al., 2011; Breen et al., 2013; Obiri and Driver, 2017;
Hansen et al., 2019). Beyond risk-reducing eects, risk-reducing inputs or tech-
nologies which are also referred to as productivity-enhancing technologies play an
important role in increasing agricultural productivity and closing yield gaps in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Simultaneously, several studies (see Lamb, 2003; Barnett et al.,
2008; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Hill and Viceisza, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014;
You, 2014; Farrin and Miranda, 2015; Cole et al., 2017) suggests that uninsured
risk or lack of protection from downside risk accounts for deciencies in technology
uptake and inecient production choices among low-income households.
Skees and Collier (2008) argued that risk-driven averseness to invest in inputs such
as mineral fertilizer and improved seeds may be partially responsible for the reason
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why Africa has not undergone a green revolution. With an increasing call for a
Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa, Hansen et al. (2019) argue that a central
challenge to achieving this is to go beyond increased agricultural production and
mitigate risks posed by increasing variable climate and marginal production con-
ditions. Complementing risk-reducing production technologies with insurance has
therefore been suggested as the way forward (Skees and Collier, 2008; Lybbert and
Carter, 2015; Carter et al., 2017). However, the extent to which the joint adoption
of risk-reducing technologies and insurance aects household welfare is still not fully
understood. In this paper, we investigate whether managing climate risks through
the joint adoption of mineral fertilizers, improved seeds, and insurance improves
household welfare compared to adopting only mineral fertilizers and improved seeds.
Studies addressing this issue are still scarce.
So far, the literature has focused separately on the impact of risk-reducing inputs
or technologies (Wopereis-Pura et al., 2002; Duo et al., 2008; Marenya and Bar-
rett, 2009a,b; Asfaw, 2010; Birthal et al., 2012; Kassie et al., 2014; Emerick et al.,
2016; Savini et al., 2016; Koussoubé and Nauges, 2017; Abdoulaye et al., 2018) and
insurance (Goodwin et al., 2004; Madajewicz et al., 2013; Ragoubi et al., 2013; Kar-
lan et al., 2014; de Nicola, 2015; Elabed and Carter, 2015; Fuchs and Wol, 2016;
Isaboke et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2017; Mebada, 2018; Hill et al., 2019; Janzen and
Carter, 2019; Vigani and Kathage, 2019; Sibiko and Qaim, 2020) on several house-
hold welfare outcomes. At the same time, the results from these studies have been
contentious. For example, studies by Duo et al. (2008), Suri (2011), Foltz et al.
(2012), Matsumoto (2014), Magnan et al. (2015) and Wossen et al. (2019) nd re-
turns or protability heterogeneities in the use of these risk-reducing inputs or tech-
nologies which might be an important precipitant for non-adoption. Similarly, some
studies have found that insurance lowers investments in productivity-enhancing tech-
nologies (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Giné and Yang,
2009; de Nicola, 2015), decrease farm prot and productivity (Spörri et al., 2012;
Vigani and Kathage, 2019), and reduces the use of complementary risk management
strategies (Schanit-Chatterjee, 2010; Nigus et al., 2018; Matsuda et al., 2019).
There are important reasons for studying the joint welfare impact of risk-reducing
technologies and insurance as opposed to evaluating their separate impacts. Al-
though risk-reducing technologies are known to reduce production or income losses
when weather-related stresses occur, they can also potentially increase risk when
used in isolation (Just and Pope, 1979; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Garde-
broek et al., 2010; Moser and Muÿho, 2017). Under moderate climate uctuations,
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risk-reducing technologies can stabilize production, but may not be able to buer
the impacts of extreme events (Lybbert and Bell, 2010). However, complementing
adoption with insurance provides a risk cushioning attribute that incentivizes not
only higher investments in inputs as already shown in the literature but also im-
prove access to credit (Boucher et al., 2008; Farrin and Miranda, 2015), and reduce
opportunity costs associated with risk-averse farmers' precautionary ex-ante strate-
gies (Hansen et al., 2019). At the same time, insurance use can also increase farm
household resilience by indemnifying farm households in bad years, hence helping
them to protect assets and improve production in better years (Hellmuth et al., 2009;
Greatrex et al., 2015). Such changes in investments and input use have far-reaching
eects on household welfare which is still not fully understood.
We build on past work that have separately evaluated the impact of risk-reducing
technologies and insurance to quantify both the individual and composite1 impact
of two risk-reducing inputs  mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption with or
without insurance on farm households' food calorie availability and crops income per
capita using a nationally representative farm household survey data from Senegal.
Three distinct farm households are compared in the study; 1) those who do not
adopt mineral fertilizers and improved seeds, and insurance, 2) those who adopt
mineral fertilizers and improved seeds without insurance and 3) those who adopt
mineral fertilizers and improved seeds with insurance. We address our objective
by employing a multinomial endogenous switching regression which accounts for
selectivity biases and unobserved heterogeneity.
Evaluating the impact of productivity-enhancing technologies and insurance on
household welfare in Senegal important for several reasons. First, with agricul-
ture being predominantly rain-fed, Senegal's agricultural sector faces highly vari-
able rainfall and is highly vulnerable to the eects of climate change. These cli-
matic shocks have been observed to be a major limiting factor to the adoption
of productivity-enhancing technologies (D'Alessandro et al., 2015). Between the
period, 2002  2016, for instance, consumption of fertilizer in Senegal was lower
than the Sub-Saharan African average. The low adoption of productivity-enhancing
technologies has resulted in low agricultural productivity which is reected by large
yield gaps observed for principal crop commodities. Complementing the adoption
of productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance, therefore, presents an oppor-
1What is meant by individual and composite impact here is that mineral fertilizer and improved
seed adoption are considered together as one technology. With this, farm household can either
decide to adopt this technology in isolation or with insurance. When adopted in combination with
insurance, this becomes a composite technology, otherwise it is considered as a single technology.
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tunity for smallholders to increase productivity while at the same time eectively
improving the adaptive capacity of Senegalese farm households in the midst of cli-
mate change. At the same time, evaluating the impact of the joint adoption of
mineral fertilizers, improved seeds, and insurance can help guide policymakers to
better design, target and scale-up intervention programs.
The study is organized as follows; 6.2 introduces the conceptual framework and
econometric approach. Section 6.3 presents the data and variables measurement
and the empirical specication. The ndings of the study are presented in Section
6.4, and nally, Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Conceptual framework and econometric speci-
cation
Farm household adoption decisions could result in positive outcomes, however, esti-
mation of such outcomes in observational studies such as this one is dicult because
one does not directly observe the counterfactual outcomes of interest. This diculty
is easily addressed in cases where experimental data is available through random-
ized control trials, for instance, information on the counterfactual situation would
normally be provided, and as such, the problem of causal inference can easily be re-
solved (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). Furthermore, farm households' decisions to adopt
the two risk-reducing inputs  mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or with-
out insurance may not also be random and they may endogenously self-select into
adoption or non-adoption. Therefore, decisions are likely to be inuenced systemati-
cally by both observed and unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with
the two outcomes of interest (food calorie availability and crop income per capita).
Such unobservable characteristics may include for example the innate managerial
and technical abilities of the farmers or the types of social networks formed by farm-
ers that are not captured, such as the kind of neighbours the farmer communicates
with and whether such neighbours have adopted mineral fertilizer, improved seeds,
or insurance. The inability to capture these unobservable characteristics may lead
to selection bias.
Hence, to disentangle the pure eects of adoption, farm households' choice of adop-
tion and its impacts were modelled in a multinomial endogenous switching regression
framework. This approach is a selection-bias correction methodology based on the
220
Chapter 6. Welfare impacts of managing climate risk through the adoption of risk-reducing
technologies and insurance
multinomial logit selection model developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). This
approach allows consistent and ecient estimates of the selection process and a rea-
sonable correction for the outcome equations to be obtained, even with violations
of the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Estimation of the
multinomial endogenous switching regression occurs simultaneously in two steps. In
the rst stage, farm households' choices of adoption packages are modelled using a
multinomial logit selection model. In the second stage, the individual and composite
impact of the two risk-reducing inputs with or without insurance on food calorie
availability and crop income per capita are evaluated using OLS with selectivity
correction terms from the rst stage. Following the studies of Di Falco and Veronesi
(2013), Kassie et al. (2015), Teklewold et al. (2017) and Vigani and Kathage (2019)
we describe the empirical econometric approach used in the study below.
6.2.1 Stage I: Multinomial Adoption Selection Model
Farm households are assumed to maximize their expected utility by adopting mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance. The ith farm household's expected
utility, U∗ij, from adopting a package j, where j (j = 1,..., M ; in our case M = 3), is a
latent variable determined by observed household, land, and climatic characteristics,
Xi and unobserved characteristics εij, such that:
U∗ij = Xiϖ + εij (6.1)
Let I be an index that denotes the farmers' choice of package, such that:
I = j iff U∗ij > Max
k ̸=j
(U∗ik) or ηij < 0 ∀ k ̸= j, (6.2)




ij) < 0 (Bourguignon et al., 2007). The formulation in
equation 6.2 implies that the ith farm household will adopt a package j to maximize
their expected benet if it provides greater expected utility than any other package




ij) < 0. The probability that farm household i with
characteristics X will choose a package j can be specied by a multinomial logit
model (McFadden, 1974) as:
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The parameter estimates of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation. In our specication, the base category, non-adoption of min-
eral fertilizer, improved seeds, and insurance, is denoted as j = 1. In the remaining
portfolios (j = 2, 3), at least one package is used by a farm household.
6.2.2 Stage II: Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regres-
sion Model
In the second stage, a multinomial endogenous switching regression model is esti-
mated to investigate the impact of each package on food calorie availability and crop
income per capita by applying the Bourguignon et al. (2007) selection bias correc-
tion model. The model implies that farm households face a total of 3 regimes (one
regime per package, where j = 1 is the reference category or non-adopting category).
It is assumed that the vector of outcome variables is a linear function of explanatory
variables. Hence, the stochastic function to evaluate food calorie availability and
crop income per capita implications of each package j is given as:
Outcome j : Qij = Zijβij + Zijαij + µij if I = j; j = 1, 2, 3 (6.4)
where Qij is the outcome variable of farm household i in regime j, and Zi represents
a vector of inputs, and farm household head and household's characteristics, asset
ownership, soil fertility, and climatic characteristics included in Xi. β and α rep-
resent the corresponding vector of coecients to be estimated. µij represents the
unobserved stochastic component distributed with E(µij | Zi, Xi) = 0 and V(µij |
Zi, Xi) = σ
2
j . To overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity with observed covariates, the study employed the approach of Mund-
lak (1978) and Wooldridge (2018) which has also been used by Di Falco (2014),
Kassie et al. (2015), Teklewold et al. (2017) and Vigani and Kathage (2019)2. We
exploit crop-level information and include the mean of crop varying Z explanatory
variables, which include landholding, labour, fertilizer, and seed quantity to deal
2In most of these studies, plot-variant variables were used to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity but due to the lack of plot-level data on inputs, we use an alternative approach by using
crop-variant variables since household produce multiple crops and we have crop-level data on in-
puts.
222
Chapter 6. Welfare impacts of managing climate risk through the adoption of risk-reducing
technologies and insurance
with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. According to Teklewold et al. (2013),
a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the vectors αj are jointly equal to zero is
required to indicate the relevance of crop-specic heterogeneity.
For each sample observation, Qij is observed if and only if one among the M depen-
dent regimes is observed. When estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) model,
the outcomes of interest, food calorie availability, and crop income per capita equa-
tions 6.4 are estimated separately. However, if the error terms of equation 6.1, εij are
correlated with the error terms µij of the outcome model in equation 6.4, then the
expected values of µij conditional on the sample selection are nonzero i.e., corr(εij,
µij) ̸= 0, and the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To correct for the
potential inconsistency, we employ the multinomial endogenous switching regression
model by Bourguignon et al. (2007), which takes into account the correlation be-
tween the error terms εij from the multinomial logit model estimated in the rst
stage and the error terms from each outcome equation µij. Bourguignon et al. (2007)
show that consistent estimates of β and α in the outcome equation 6.4 can be ob-
tained by estimating the following selection bias-corrected food calorie availability
and crop income per capita equations:
Outcome j : Qij = Zijβij + Zijαij + σjελij + ωij if I = j; j = 1, 2, 3 (6.5)
where σjε is the covariance between εij in equation 6.1 and µij from equation 6.4,















where P̂ represents the probability that farm household i chooses package j as
dened in equation 6.3, ρj is the correlation between εij and µij. The specication
in equation 6.5 implies that the number of selection correction (bias) terms in each
equation are equal to the number of multinomial logit choices M.
While the variables Xi in equation 6.1 and Zi in equation 6.4 are allowed to overlap,
proper identication requires at least one variable in Xi that does not appear in
Zi. Therefore, the selection equation 6.1 is estimated based on all explanatory
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variables specied in the outcome equation 6.4 plus at least one or more instruments.
Following Di Falco and Veronesi (2013), we establish the admissibility of the selected
instruments by performing a simple falsication test: the selected or valid instrument
(s) is required to signicantly inuence a farm household's choice of mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds adoption with or without insurance but have no signicant eect
on outcomes (i.e. food calorie availability and crop income per capita). In this
study, the perceptions about subsidized fertilizer suciency and perception about
subsidized seed quality were employed as identifying instrument. These are expected
to inuence the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or without
insurance but not food calorie availability and crop income per capita.
Estimation of the treatment and counterfactual eects
The Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression framework by allowing us to
control for potential selectivity biases can be used to examine average treatment
eects (ATT) by comparing expected outcomes of adopters with and without adop-
tion. Following Bourguignon et al. (2007), the following conditional expectations
for each outcome variable of interest (food calorie availability and crop income per
capita) from equation 6.5 can be computed as:




∣∣I = j, Zij, Zij, λij) = Zijβj + Zijαj + σjλij (6.7)




∣∣I = 1, Zi1, Zij, λi1) = Zi1β1 + Zi1α1 + σ1λi1 (6.8)




∣∣I = j, Zij, Zij, λij) = Zijβ1 + Zijα1 + σ1λij (6.9)




∣∣I = 1, Zi1, Zi1, λi1) = Zi1βj + Zi1αj + σjλi1 (6.10)
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Equations 6.7 and 6.8 represent the actual expected outcomes of interest observed
in the sample for adopting and non-adopting farm households respectively, while
equations 6.9 and 6.10 are their respective counterfactual expected outcomes of
interest. The use of these conditional expectations allows us to calculate the average
treatment eects (ATT)  i.e. the treatment eect for treated farm households,
which is the dierence between equations 6.7 and 6.9:
ATT = E [Qij|I = j]− E [Qi1|I = j]
= Zij (βj − β1) + Zij (αj − α1) + λij(σj − σ1)
(6.11)
Additionally, the average adoption eect for non-adopters, also known as the average
treatment eect on the untreated (ATU) can be computed as the dierence between
equations 6.8 and 6.10.
ATU = E [Qi1|I = 1]− E [Qij|I = 1]
= Zi1 (β1 − βj) + Zi1 (α1 − αj) + λi1(σ1 − σj)
(6.12)
Method for addressing potential endogeneity
To study the impact of mineral fertilizer and improved seed adoption with or with-
out insurance on the welfare outcomes of interest, it is important to account for the
potential reverse causality and endogeneity problems that may arise with some vari-
ables. This is important because the presence of reverse causality and endogeneity
in models can make the identication of causal eects dicult due to biased esti-
mates. In estimating equation 6.1, some of the employed explanatory variables such
as membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access, credit access, and
nonfarm work participation are potentially endogenous (see Abdulai and Human,
2014; Ma and Abdulai, 2016). As shown in several empirical studies, farmer-based
organizations normally help their members to obtain inputs and credit, thus making
membership of farmer-based organizations a potentially endogenous variable. Fur-
thermore, agricultural extension agents also normally disseminate new technologies
to farmers, leading to the adoption of the technologies. Farm households adopt-
ing mineral fertilizer and improved seeds may potentially attract more visits by
extension sta than non-adopters and may also be encouraged to subscribe to agri-
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cultural insurance. Farm households that have access to credit can also aord to
purchase mineral fertilizer, improved seeds, and subscribed to agriculture insurance
compared to households that are credit constrained, hence making credit access
potentially endogenous. Furthermore, nonfarm work participation may also be po-
tentially endogenous because income earned from nonfarm work can be invested in
productivity-enhancing technologies and the purchase of insurance. At the same
time, nonfarm work participation may impose labour constraints on households,
limiting their ability to adopt mineral fertilizer and improved seeds.
To address the potential endogeneity of membership of farmer-based organizations,
extension access, credit access, and nonfarm work participation we used the control
function approach proposed by Wooldridge (2015). The approach involves the speci-
cation of the potential endogenous variable as a function of all explanatory variables
inuencing adoption decision in equation 6.1, together with a set of instruments in
a rst stage probit regression. The employed instruments here should strongly inu-
ence the given potential endogenous variables (i.e., membership of farmer-based or-
ganizations, extension access, credit access, and nonfarm work participation) but not
the choice of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption with or without insur-
ance. For our study, the use of coping strategies is used as identifying instruments for
membership of farmer-based organizations. Coping strategies are important infor-
mal risk-sharing arrangements within social networks such as micronance, rotating
savings, and credit associations. Hence farm households that use coping strategies
are likely to be members of farmer-based organizations. The use of coping strate-
gies is expected to signicantly inuence membership in farmer organizations but
not the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption with or without
insurance.
In the case of extension access, support need was considered as identifying instru-
ments. Farm households that require support needs, might actively seek to gain ex-
tension access. Support needs of a household are expected to signicantly inuence
extension access but not the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adop-
tion with or without insurance. The number of regional micronance subscribers
was used as an instrument for controlling credit access. Farm households residing
in regions with high micronance subscribers are likely going to have much easier
access to credit. Location in a populous region was considered as an instrument to
control for nonfarm work participation. Populous regions are associated with high
urbanization rates and easy access to nonfarm occupations. An important consid-
eration in selecting instruments is that the instrumental variables used here (coping
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strategy, support needs, micronance subscribers, and location in a populous region)
are required not to be correlated with the instruments (i.e., perceptions about sub-
sidized fertilizer suciency and perception about subsidized seed quality) used for
the multinomial endogenous switching regression model identication. Furthermore,
these instruments are also excluded in the estimation of equation 6.1. Finally, both
the observed factors and the generalized residuals predicted from a rst-stage pro-
bit regression are included as covariates in the multinomial adoption selection model.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2015), the approach leads to a robust, regression-based
Hausman test for the endogeneity of the suspected variables. If the coecient of
the residual term is statistically signicant, it shows that endogeneity was indeed
present and also well controlled for in the model (Gibson et al., 2010; Ricker-Gilbert
et al., 2011; Amankwah et al., 2016; Harris and Kessler, 2019; Katengeza et al., 2019;
Ogutu et al., 2019). Furthermore, Wooldridge (2015) observed that if the coecient
on the estimated generalized residual is statistically signicant, there is a need to
adjust the standard errors for the two-step estimation by bootstrapping.
6.3 Data and variable measurement
6.3.1 Farm household survey
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the
larger Senegalese Projet d'appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA) or the Agricul-
tural Policy Support Project conducted between April and May 2017 across 14
administrative regions of Senegal. The survey which was targeted towards cereals,
horticultural crops, and fruit and vegetable producers was a two-stage, nationally
based random survey design that included rural census districts as the primary units
and farm households as the secondary units. In the rst stage, a sample of rural cen-
sus districts was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricultural households
was selected at the level of each primary unit. Data collected include information on
household demographic characteristics, plot and land holdings, agricultural equip-
ment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017 growing season, credit, inputs
use and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes and prices, and food processing
activities. Others included household consumption, access to amenities, extension,
non-farm and livestock incomes, remittance, agricultural insurance, risks and adap-
tation strategies, perception on subsidized inputs (fertilizer, seeds, and agricultural
equipment), and membership of farmer-based organizations.
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6.3.2 Measuring food calorie availability and crop income per
capita
In measuring household food calorie availability, the study focused only on the supply
of foodstus in a household from own production. We used the daily per adult-
equivalent food availability because it helps determine the capacity of each household
to provide proper food energy to its members during a whole calendar year. The total
quantity of food calories produced per equivalent adult per day or a household daily
food calories availability was estimated using staple food crops grown by households.
A total of 9 staple crops were used in estimating household food calorie availability.
This includes 5 cereal staples (maize, rice, millet, sorghum, and fonio), 2 legumes
(groundnut3 and cowpeas), 1 oilseed crop (sesame), and 1 root tuber crop (cassava).
According to Hathie (2019), Senegal has food traditions, both in urban and rural,
based on the consumption of cereals (rice, millet, maize, and sorghum) as staple
foods, and these constitute about 40% of households' food budget. Furthermore, rice,
millet/sorghum, wheat, and maize are the foundations of the Senegalese diet with
Senegalese deriving about 60% of their calories from grain consumption. Household
food calorie availability was computed using the gross household production of these
9 crops. We rst, estimated the available food crop by multiplying the farm-gate
production of each crop by the appropriate post-harvest losses ratios4.
Subsequently, the derived available food crops were converted into calories (kcal)
available using the crop-specic energy ratios and edible portions conversion fac-
tors from the West African Food Composition5 table by Stadlmayr et al. (2012).
For each household, we estimated the total adult equivalent following Claro et al.
(2010)6 by considering the gender and age composition of family members. House-
hold adult equivalents (AE) for each household member are obtained by dividing the
Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) for the energy of each household member,
according to the specic age and gender, by the average energy RDA reference value
of 2,550 kcal (Claro et al., 2010). The sum of all of the individual adult equivalents
within a household was further computed to obtain the household adult equivalent
3As reported in D'Alessandro et al. (2015) despite considered as an important cash crop, ground-
nut is also grown for household consumption
4The postharvest losses ratios used were obtained from the African Postharvest Losses Infor-
mation System (APHLIS), Aognon et al. (2015) and Tomlins et al. (2016) are provided in Table
6.15 of the Appendix.
5Conversion ratios for edible fractions and energy equivalence (kilo calories) are presented in
Table 6.16 in the Appendix.
6The Adult-equivalent conversion factors for estimated calorie requirements according to age
and gender are presented in Table 6.17.
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(AE) value. This approach is particularly important because some family members
such as children might have distinct energy needs which dier from adults. We sub-
sequently divided the calories available at the household level by the households'
total adult equivalents (AE) to make the values comparable. Finally, the obtained
values were divided by 365 to obtain the daily food available per adult equivalent.
Our second outcome variable crop income per capita was measured as the value of all
household crop production in CFA. In our data, farm households produced about 33
dierent crops but on average, households produce 2 crops. Using the reported farm
gate price, we estimated the monetary value of each crop commodity produced by
farm households. A sum of all the monetary value of all crops grown by households
represented a household crop income. This was then divided by the total number of
household members to obtain crop income per capita.
6.3.3 Empirical specication
A wide range of factors has been found in the empirical literature to aect household
food availability (security or insecurity) and incomes. These variables fall largely
into sociodemographic factors, farm characteristics, agro-climatic variables, access
to market and credit, access to government intervention programs, etc. Variables
considered for our analysis is based on the review of the empirical literature on
technology adoption and impact evaluation studies (see Feder, 1980; Feder et al.,
1981; Adesina and Zinnah, 1993; Baidu-Forson, 1999; Doss, 2003; Duo et al., 2008,
2011; Adhikari et al., 2009; Admassie and Ayele, 2010; Asfaw and Shiferaw, 2010;
Simtowe et al., 2010, 2011, 2012; Sharma et al., 2011; Suri, 2011; Dandedjrohoun
et al., 2012; Awotide et al., 2013; Bonou et al., 2013; Arslan et al., 2014; Donkor
et al., 2016). Table 6.1 describes all the variables used in the analysis. A comparison
of variables across the three household types is also provided in Table 6.2. House-
holds adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance appear to have
the largest food calorie availability and crop income per capita. This is followed
by households adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance.
Non-adopting households have the least food calorie availability and crop income
per capita. Apart from landholding, households adopting mineral fertilizer and im-
proved seeds with insurance use large volumes of improved seeds, fertilizers, and
hired labour. They also appear to be relatively wealthier as measured by the proxy
variable lighting fuel. On average, households are headed by males with an average
age of 53 years. Formal education is also low among household heads. Households
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have an average of 9 members and have low land areas under cash crops, low access
to credit, extension, and a lower membership in farmer-based organizations.
Table 6.1: Variables and their description
Name Variable description
Outcome variables
Food calorie availability Log of food calorie availability per adult equivalent per day
Crop income per capita Log of total crop income in CFA/capita
Farm household characteristics
Age Age of household head in years
Gender =1 if the household is male-headed
Education =1 if the household head has formal education
HH size Number of people residing in the household
Hired labour Total hired labour used by the household
Roof materiala =1 if the roof material of household is concrete or slate
Risk attitude =1 if highly risk-averse
Nonfarm work =1 if household participates in nonfarm work
Plough =1 if the household owns a plough
Access to services and institutions
Extension =1 if access to extension service
Credit =1 if access to credit
Membership =1 if a member of a farmer-based organization
Market integration =1 if integrated into markets
Subsidy =1 if access to input subsidies
Insurance needs =1 if farmer has specic insurance needs
Farm and biophysical characteristics
Land Total land area owned by household (ha)
Improved seeds Total quantity of improved seeds used in kg
Cash crop Share of land under cash crops (%)
Soil degradation =1 if the soil is perceived to be degraded
Rainfall Mean annual rainfall in mm (2010  2017)
Std. Rainfall Standard deviation of rainfall in mm (2010  2017)
AEZ BasinAra =1 if agro-ecological zone is Bassin Arachide
AEZ RiverVall =1 if agro-ecological zone is River Valley
AEZ Casamance =1 if agro-ecological zone is Casamance
AEZ CentEast =1 if agro-ecological zone is Center East
AEZ VallAnambe =1 if agro-ecological zone is Center East
Location variables =1 if agro-ecological zone is Valley Anambe
Road Log of distance to the nearest road (km)
Market Log of distance to the nearest market (km)
Mundlak xed eects variables
Mean labourb Mean labour allocation across all crops grown
Mean land Mean land (ha) allocation across all crops grown
Mean fertilizer Mean fertilizer (kg) use across all crops grown
Mean seed Mean seed (kg) use across all crops grown
Instrumental variables
Fertilizer suciency =1 if subsidized fertilizer is perceived to be sucient
Seed quality =1 if subsidized seed is perceived to be of a good quality
Coping strategy =1 if the household employs coping strategies
Support needs =1 if farmer has farming support needs
Subscribers Log of regional distribution of micronance subscribers
Location =1 if the household is located in a populous region
a The type of household roof material is used as a proxy variable for household wealth.
b This is the mean of total labour used by farm household (i.e., household labour and hired labour)
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6.4 Empirical results
In this section, we rst examine factors driving the adoption of mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds with and without insurance. Secondly, we present the economic
implications associated with each adoption decision on household food calorie avail-
ability and crop income per capita. We present the results of the econometric es-
timation of the two outcomes of interest in Table 6.11 and 6.12 in the appendix,
but for the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the results. The selectivity correction
terms (m0 to m2) in Table 6.11 and 6.12 are signicant in some of the technology
package equations. This indicates the presence of sample selectivity eects and using
OLS would have produced biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, accounting for
selectivity eects using the multinomial endogenous switching regression model as
we did in this study was appropriate. At the same time, the Wald test of the joint
signicance of mean of crop-variant variables in our model (see Table 6.11 and 6.12)
was signicant, hence giving a justication for their inclusion in our model.
6.4.1 Determinants of adoption
Table 6.3 shows the results of the multinomial logit model for the dierent adoption
decisions. We nd that the multinomial logit model ts the data well, the Wald
test is highly signicant, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that all the regression
coecients are jointly equal to zero. Furthermore, the test for the joint signicance of
instruments across the dierent technology packages is highly signicant. The results
from the control-function specication indicate that the correction for endogeneity in
the model was necessary. We nd the coecient of the membership of a farmer-based
organization residual terms to be statistically signicant, implying the presence of
endogeneity of membership in farmer-based organizations. The control function
approach was therefore appropriate in controlling for the endogeneity of membership
of a farmer-based organization. The results from the control-function approach are
presented in Table 6.10. Our results also suggest that selected instruments used
in the control function approach satised the necessary conditions. Not only do
the instruments (use of coping strategies, support needs, regional distribution of
micronance subscribers, and location in a populous region) have a signicant eect
on the potentially endogenous variables but they are also not correlated to the two
instrumental variables (perception of subsidized fertilizer suciency and perception
of subsidized seed quality) used in the multinomial endogenous switching regression
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model identication as shown in Table 6.14.
The results of the multinomial logit model in Table 6.3 suggest that the adoption
of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance is mostly inuenced by
farm household characteristics, access to services and institutions, and farm and
biophysical characteristics. Male-headed households, education level of household
head, household size, and land holdings are positively associated with the likelihood
of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption without insurance. At the same
time, market integration, the land area devoted to cash crops, location in the River
Valley and Valley Anambe agro-ecological zones, insurance needs, input subsidy ac-
cess, and perception about fertilizer suciency are positively associated with the
adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance. On the con-
trary, plough ownership, membership of farmer-based organizations, distance to a
major market, risk attitude, and perception about subsidized seed quality is asso-








































































Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Crop income per capita 3.996 1.122 4.609 0.585 4.933 0.613 4.209 1.029
Food availability per capita 1.969 0.532 2.441 0.505 2.837 0.598 2.146 0.587
Age 53.113 13.345 53.273 12.877 53.592 12.926 53.178 13.193
Gender 0.907 0.290 0.929 0.257 0.946 0.228 0.915 0.279
Education 0.347 0.476 0.430 0.495 0.517 0.501 0.378 0.485
HH size 9.118 4.812 10.367 5.619 9.599 4.646 9.496 5.081
Land 4.341 4.641 5.544 7.924 4.204 6.310 4.681 5.863
Improved seeds 0.000 0.000 129.317 176.400 186.361 221.331 44.541 122.743
Hired labour 0.122 1.012 0.255 0.996 0.510 1.201 0.176 1.019
Roof material 0.140 0.348 0.230 0.421 0.245 0.431 0.170 0.376
Plough 0.310 0.463 0.179 0.384 0.068 0.253 0.263 0.440
Extension 0.075 0.264 0.316 0.465 0.619 0.487 0.166 0.372
Credit 0.010 0.102 0.095 0.293 0.293 0.456 0.046 0.209
Membership 0.042 0.200 0.316 0.465 0.592 0.493 0.142 0.349
Market integration 0.557 0.497 0.577 0.494 0.680 0.468 0.568 0.495
Nonfarm work 0.272 0.445 0.262 0.440 0.150 0.358 0.265 0.441
Road 3.556 0.884 3.711 0.880 4.012 0.698 3.619 0.882
Market 3.977 0.466 3.930 0.429 4.043 0.630 3.967 0.464
Risk attitude 0.484 0.500 0.435 0.496 0.279 0.450 0.462 0.499
Cash crop 0.270 0.282 0.204 0.255 0.030 0.114 0.241 0.275
Soil degradation 0.004 0.063 0.062 0.240 0.122 0.329 0.025 0.157
Std. Rainfall 110.739 24.480 107.408 24.612 100.413 23.678 109.371 24.594
Rainfall 679.828 299.976 625.573 314.916 548.416 315.916 659.016 306.694
AEZ BasinAra 0.453 0.498 0.290 0.454 0.027 0.163 0.389 0.488
AEZ RiverVall 0.072 0.258 0.307 0.461 0.633 0.484 0.162 0.368
AEZ Casamance 0.232 0.422 0.118 0.323 0.027 0.163 0.192 0.394
AEZ CentEast 0.101 0.301 0.073 0.260 0.020 0.142 0.090 0.286
AEZ VallAnambe 0.004 0.060 0.160 0.367 0.286 0.453 0.060 0.237
Insurance needs 0.308 0.462 0.484 0.500 0.748 0.435 0.376 0.484
Mean labour 1.780 1.331 2.224 1.646 1.976 1.544 1.915 1.450
Mean land 0.096 0.107 0.108 0.162 0.028 0.078 0.097 0.125
Mean fertilizer 0.000 0.000 17.880 35.311 60.786 241.926 7.557 53.495
Mean seed 2.973 3.601 6.514 7.353 6.908 7.803 4.146 5.430
Subsidy 0.284 0.451 0.765 0.424 0.857 0.351 0.445 0.497
Fertilizer suciency 0.036 0.185 0.375 0.484 0.537 0.500 0.153 0.360
Seed quality 0.162 0.368 0.223 0.417 0.054 0.228 0.175 0.380
Coping strategy 0.341 0.474 0.280 0.449 0.265 0.443 0.320 0.467
Support needs 0.703 0.457 0.832 0.374 0.959 0.199 0.751 0.433
Subscribers 11.319 0.937 11.205 0.802 11.363 0.392 11.288 0.886
Location 0.201 0.401 0.061 0.239 0.007 0.082 0.153 0.360
N 2,478 1,056 147 3,681
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Just like the adoption of mineral fertilizers and improved seeds without insurance,
we nd that the adoption of mineral fertilizers and improved seeds with insurance is
mostly inuenced by farm household characteristics. We nd that the education level
of the household head, household size, land holdings, extension access, market inte-
gration, insurance needs, and access to input subsidies are positively associated with
the adoption of mineral fertilizers and improved seeds with insurance. Conversely,
risk attitude and perception of subsidized seed quality are negatively associated with
the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance. The results
suggest that the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with and with-
out insurance is largely driven by the education level of household head, household
size, landholding, market integration, risk attitude, insurance needs, access to input
subsidies, and perception about subsidized seed quality.
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -3.708∗∗∗ 0.711 -11.214 7.093
Age 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.011
Gender 0.429∗ 0.250 0.524 0.877
Education 0.254∗∗ 0.127 1.079∗∗∗ 0.302
HH size 0.047∗∗∗ 0.013 0.090∗∗ 0.035
Land 0.075∗∗∗ 0.014 0.099∗∗∗ 0.024
Roof material 0.189 0.162 -0.493 0.339
Plough -0.547∗∗∗ 0.164 -0.257 0.534
Extension 0.957 0.590 2.644∗ 1.427
Credit 1.674 2.027 -1.084 2.995
Membership -2.323∗ 1.216 -2.001 2.254
Market integration 0.212∗ 0.111 0.558∗∗ 0.260
Nonfarm work 2.128 1.326 -1.374 2.930
Road 0.085 0.078 -0.074 0.171
Market -0.416∗∗∗ 0.132 0.028 0.392
Risk attitude -0.717∗∗∗ 0.216 -1.026∗∗ 0.458
Cash crop 0.617∗∗ 0.242 -0.665 0.982
Soil degradation 0.355 0.596 0.768 0.899
Std. Rainfall 0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.006
AEZ BasinAra 0.033 0.245 -0.025 6.848
AEZ RiverVall 3.047∗∗∗ 0.347 6.323 6.794
AEZ Casamance -0.144 0.355 1.359 6.966
AEZ CentEast -0.093 0.354 1.749 7.303
AEZ VallAnambe 4.838∗∗∗ 0.554 8.876 6.816
Insurance needs 0.578∗∗∗ 0.135 1.637∗∗∗ 0.294
Subsidy 2.197∗∗∗ 0.156 3.627∗∗∗ 0.494
Fertilizer suciency 1.265∗∗∗ 0.216 0.463 0.466
Seed quality -0.451∗∗∗ 0.145 -1.027∗ 0.548
Resid mem 2.019∗∗∗ 0.613 2.396∗ 1.241
Resid ext 0.265 0.286 -0.179 0.778
Resid credit 0.074 0.897 2.271 1.434
Resid nonfarm -1.258 0.781 0.311 1.698
Joint sig of instruments (χ2) 42.910∗∗∗ 4.780∗
Wald test, χ2 (62) 1009.910∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -1555.512
N 3681
Notes: The base category is farm households that did not adopt either fertilizer and
improved seeds adopters with or without insurance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent
1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the
bootstrapped standard errors.
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6.4.2 Impacts of adoption on food calorie availability and
crop income per capita
The impact of mineral fertilizer and improved seed adoption with or without insur-
ance on household food calorie availability and crop income per capita is shown in
Table 6.4 and 6.5, respectively. We compare expected food calorie availability and
crop income per capita under the actual case that the farm household adopted a
particular package and the counterfactual case that they did not. Controlling for
the eects of several covariates and the selection bias stemming from both unob-
served and observed factors on household food calorie availability and crop income
per capita, the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or without in-
surance is associated with signicant increases in household food calorie availability
and crop income per capita compared with the counterfactual case of non-adoption.
By adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance, households
increase their food calorie availability per adult equivalent per day by about 16%
compared to the counterfactual case of not adopting (Table 6.4). The observed ef-
fect is highly signicant at 1%. On the other hand, households that adopt mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance increase their food calorie availability
per adult equivalent per day by about 33% compared to the counterfactual case of













































































8.606(0.095) 5.791(0.068) 2.815∗∗∗(0.116) 32.71
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
Table 6.5: Adoption impact on crop income per capita
Package
Actual crop income per
capita
Counterfactual outcome









4.933(0.041) 3.998(0.029) 0.935∗∗∗(0.050) 18.95
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
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Similar to the observed results for food calorie availability per adult equivalent per
day, we nd that the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without in-
surance signicantly increases crop income per capita by about 8% compared to
the counterfactual case of not adopting (Table 6.5). At the same time, by adopt-
ing mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance, households signicantly
increase their crop income per capita by about 19% compared to the counterfactual
case. The results obtained are congruent to similar studies in the empirical litera-
ture that have evaluated the impact of single productivity-enhancing technologies
on household outcomes.
For example, the study by Kassie et al. (2014) nds that on average, the adoption
of improved maize varieties in Tanzania reduced the probabilities of chronic and
transitory food insecurity from between 0.7 and 1.2% and between 1.1 and 1.7%, re-
spectively. In rural Ethiopia, Zeng et al. (2017) nd positive and signicant impacts
of improved maize varieties adoption on child nutrition outcomes. In Uganda, Kassie
et al. (2011) found that the adoption of improved groundnut varieties signicantly
increases crop income of farm households and reduces poverty. Similarly, in Zam-
bia, Khonje et al. (2015) nd that the adoption of improved maize had signicant
poverty-reducing impacts through signicant gains in crop incomes, consumption ex-
penditure, and food security. Studies on the combined impact of these risk-reducing
inputs or productivity-enhancing technologies are scanty. However, a limited num-
ber of studies such as those by Ariga et al. (2008) and Nyangena and Juma (2014)
show that adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies as a package signicantly
increases yields, rather than as individual elements.
We also examined whether the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with
insurance actually improves farm household welfare, by evaluating welfare impacts
if farm households switch to or from using insurance in addition to mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds. We nd that farm household by switching from the adoption
of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance to adopting with insur-
ance increase their food calorie availability per adult equivalent per day by about
5% and crop income per capita by 6% with the observed eects being signicant at
1% (Table 6.6). In the same fashion, we evaluated the resulting welfare impact in a
situation where farm households that adopted mineral fertilizer and improved seeds
with insurance decide to adopt without insurance. We nd that farm households
by switching from adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance to
adopting without insurance reduce their food calorie availability and crop income
per capita by about 2.13% and 1.88% respectively, however, the observed eect is
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not signicant (Table 6.7). As pointed out earlier, several empirical studies show
that insurance use has positive welfare impacts on adopting farm households mainly
through unlocking additional demand or increase investments in inputs, assets, and
higher-return farm enterprises, stabilizing farm production and incomes, and im-































































Table 6.6: Switching impact for adopters without insurance
Actual outcome
Counterfactual outcome
- If households adopted
with insurance
ATT Change (%)
Food calorie availability per
AE/day
7.364(0.027) 7.760(0.044) 0.396***(0.051) 5.38
Crop income per capita 4.627(0.010) 4.915(0.018) 0.288***(0.020) 6.23
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
Table 6.7: Switching impact for adopters with insurance
Actual outcome Counterfactual outcome
- If households adopted
without insurance
ATT Change (%)
Food calorie availability per
AE/day
8.606(0.095) 8.423(0.228) -0.183(0.247) -2.13
Crop income per capita 4.933(0.041) 4.840(0.095) -0.093(0.104) -1.88
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Additionally, we evaluated the counterfactual adoption impacts of non-adopting
households by estimating the average treatment eects on the untreated (ATU)
for food calorie availability per adult equivalent per day and crop income per capita.
Controlling for the eects of several covariates and the selection bias stemming from
both unobserved and observed factors on household food calorie availability and crop
income per capita, the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or with-
out insurance by non-adopting households is associated with signicant increases in
household food calorie availability and crop income per capita. Had non-adopting
farm households adopted mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance,
they would have increased their food calorie availability per adult equivalent per
day by about 7% (Table 6.8). At the same time, the counterfactual case of mineral
fertilizer and improved seed adoption with insurance would have increased their food
calorie availability by about 6%. The observed eects in both cases are signicant
at 1%.
Regarding crop income per capita, we nd that in the counterfactual case of non-
adopting households adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds without insur-
ance, crop income per capita would have increased by about 7% and the observed
eect is signicant at 1% (Table 6.9). On the contrary, adopting mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds with insurance would have increased crop income per capita by





































































ity per capita - If households
adopted
ATU Change (%)
Fertilizer and improved seeds
without insurance
6.232(0.013) 6.651(0.012) 0.419***(0.018) 6.72
Fertilizer and improved seeds
with insurance
6.232(0.013) 6.606(0.024) 0.374***(0.027) 6.00
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.





per capita - If households
adopted
ATU Change (%)
Fertilizer and improved seeds
without insurance
4.241(0.007) 4.523(0.005) 0.282***(0.009) 6.65
Fertilizer and improved seeds
with insurance
4.241(0.007) 4.682(0.010) 0.440***(0.012) 10.39
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ represent 1% signicance level.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this study we examined both individual and composite impact of two risk-
reducing inputs  mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption with or without
insurance on farm households' food calorie availability and crop income per capita
using a nationally representative farm household survey data from Senegal. We
nd that adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with or without insur-
ance to be largely driven by the education level of household head, household size,
landholding, market integration, risk attitude, insurance needs, access to input sub-
sidies, and perception about subsidized seed quality. We nd that adopting mineral
fertilizer and improved seeds generally lead to an increase in welfare outcomes for
farm households. However, complementing the adoption of mineral fertilizer and im-
proved seeds with insurance leads to higher household welfare outcomes compared
to adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds in isolation.
We nd that by switching from mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adoption with-
out insurance to adopting with insurance, farm households can signicantly increase
their food calorie availability and crop income per capita by about 5% and 6% re-
spectively. On the contrary, if farm households that adopted mineral fertilizer and
improved seeds with insurance were to adopt without insurance, their food calorie
availability and crop income per capita reduce by about 2.13% and 1.88% respec-
tively. For non-adopting or untreated households, the adoption of mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds without insurance can increase both their food calorie availabil-
ity and crop income per capita by about 7%. However, adopting mineral fertilizer
and improved seeds with insurance would have increased their food calorie avail-
ability and crop income per capita by about 6% and 10% respectively. The above
ndings have several policy implications. First, since extension access, market inte-
gration and input subsidies access are important drivers for adoption, development
interventions around these institutions are important channels to encourage the
adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies such as fertilizers, improved seeds,
and insurance uptake. Lastly, mineral fertilizer and improved seed adoption with
insurance appear to be an important instrument in increasing the adaptive capacity
and resilience of smallholders, and hence policy directives should focus on scaling it
up.
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Appendix
Table 6.10: Control function results for potentially endogenous variables
Membership Extension Credit Nonfarm work
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -1.645*** 0.394 -3.171*** 0.406 -1.351 0.942 -0.904*** 0.306
Age -0.004 0.002 0.004* 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002
Gender -0.080 0.108 0.094 0.108 -0.158 0.144 -0.195** 0.085
Education 0.102 0.063 0.149** 0.062 0.124 0.085 0.174*** 0.050
HH size 0.027*** 0.006 -0.008 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.013*** 0.005
Land 0.015*** 0.005 0.011** 0.005 0.016*** 0.006 -0.008 0.005
Roof material -0.081 0.082 0.136* 0.080 0.141 0.108 -0.155** 0.073
Plough -0.100 0.086 -0.003 0.082 -0.111 0.121 0.256*** 0.061
Extension 0.773*** 0.073 0.034 0.103 0.046 0.073
Credit 0.486*** 0.109 -0.014 0.117 -0.015 0.118
Membership 0.809*** 0.077 0.453*** 0.096 0.001 0.078
Market integration 0.112* 0.061 0.009 0.060 -0.020 0.083 -0.015 0.048
Nonfarm work 0.053 0.072 0.049 0.070 -0.061 0.101
Road -0.002 0.038 -0.096*** 0.036 -0.023 0.052 -0.105*** 0.029
Market 0.014 0.072 0.053 0.071 0.194* 0.105 0.140** 0.054
Risk attitude -0.134** 0.065 0.181*** 0.061 0.082 0.086 0.463*** 0.048
Cash crop -0.216 0.144 -0.158 0.135 0.226 0.206 -0.228** 0.099
Soil degradation 0.008 0.151 0.094 0.152 -0.467** 0.211 0.727*** 0.151
Std. Rainfall -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001
AEZ BasinAra -0.322** 0.131 0.163 0.145 0.556* 0.297 -0.377*** 0.093
AEZ RiverVall 0.450*** 0.133 1.177*** 0.148 1.225*** 0.296 -0.434*** 0.113
AEZ Casamance 0.126 0.130 0.230 0.150 0.681** 0.301 0.566*** 0.093
AEZ CentEast -0.027 0.154 0.538*** 0.162 0.616* 0.319 0.405*** 0.109
AEZ VallAnambe 0.987*** 0.153 0.021 0.176 1.535*** 0.308 0.279** 0.135
Insurance needs 0.147** 0.063 -0.117* 0.062 0.190** 0.084 -0.135*** 0.051
Subsidy 0.254*** 0.088 0.349*** 0.082 0.228** 0.116 0.198*** 0.070
Fertilizer suciency 0.266*** 0.093 0.514*** 0.091 0.081 0.121 -0.089 0.087
Seed quality 0.035 0.100 -0.240** 0.095 -0.124 0.135 0.069 0.078
Coping strategy -0.247*** 0.073
Support needs 1.194*** 0.114
Subscribers -0.189*** 0.062
Location 0.191** 0.082
Log-likelihood -1101.443 -1155.876 -563.764 -1867.881
LR chi2(27) 809.730*** 997.220*** 243.980*** 518.120***
N 3681
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 5.543*** 0.276 6.537*** 0.466 10.259*** 3.563
Age 0.000 0.002 -0.004* 0.003 -0.009 0.009
Gender 0.243*** 0.083 0.444*** 0.150 -0.210 0.531
Education -0.052 0.052 0.104 0.066 -0.168 0.330
HH size -0.088*** 0.007 -0.076*** 0.007 -0.082*** 0.031
Land -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.006 0.123** 0.057
Improved seeds 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.001
Hired Labour 0.028 0.051 0.076** 0.039 0.052 0.171
Roof material -0.074 0.091 -0.068 0.095 0.475 0.368
Plough 0.068 0.052 0.063 0.080 -0.613 0.618
Extension 0.365*** 0.121 -0.124 0.083 -0.159 0.357
Credit -0.078 0.262 -0.018 0.124 -0.818 0.500
Membership 0.183 0.151 -0.220** 0.093 -0.562* 0.34
Market integration -0.001 0.046 -0.033 0.063 -0.190 0.286
Nonfarm work -0.010 0.063 0.113 0.081 0.291 0.522
Road -0.034 0.029 -0.069* 0.039 0.288 0.320
Market 0.133** 0.055 0.443*** 0.080 0.265 0.362
Risk attitude -0.112** 0.054 0.161** 0.073 0.130 0.335
Cash crop -0.714*** 0.131 -0.897*** 0.269 -2.138 9.272
Soil degradation -0.027 0.295 0.161 0.121 0.175 0.383
Rainfall 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AEZ BasinAra 0.314* 0.177 -0.543** 0.228 0.929 3.740
AEZ RiverVall 0.259 0.246 -0.022 0.276 -0.872 1.763
AEZ Casamance 0.497*** 0.130 -0.865*** 0.228 0.041 4.959
AEZ CentEast 0.900*** 0.169 -0.380 0.257 -1.237 4.101
AEZ VallAnambe 1.929*** 0.462 -0.096 0.294 -1.341 1.793
Insurance needs 0.038 0.057 0.094 0.074 -0.226 0.402
Subsidy -0.035 0.149 -0.153 0.118 -0.050 0.701
Mean labour 0.028 0.022 -0.011 0.023 -0.044 0.081
Mean land 4.524*** 0.673 1.389*** 0.405 0.644 2.675
Mean fertilizer 0.011*** 0.001 -0.001 0.003
Mean seed 0.033** 0.014 0.011 0.009 -0.001 0.043
m0 -0.941*** 0.355 -0.018 0.304 -0.092 2.739
m1 -0.953 0.729 -0.285** 0.138 0.024 1.914
m2 -1.182 2.217 -0.963* 0.539 -1.222 0.779
Joint signicance of crop
varying covariates
131.690*** 83.930*** 0.490
N 2478 1056 147
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are
the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 3.668*** 0.118 4.152*** 0.204 5.510*** 1.557
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.003** 0.001 -0.004 0.004
Gender 0.128*** 0.035 0.216*** 0.053 -0.038 0.209
Education 0.003 0.024 0.079*** 0.030 -0.039 0.137
HH size -0.040*** 0.003 -0.032*** 0.003 -0.021 0.013
Land -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.053** 0.026
Improved seeds 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Hired Labour 0.005 0.025 0.039** 0.016 0.105 0.071
Roof material -0.107*** 0.040 -0.092** 0.042 0.183 0.156
Plough 0.035 0.022 0.046 0.038 -0.119 0.238
Extension 0.143*** 0.046 -0.059 0.038 -0.088 0.151
Credit -0.004 0.104 -0.001 0.067 -0.316 0.209
Membership 0.053 0.066 -0.012 0.043 -0.253* 0.148
Market integration -0.001 0.019 -0.014 0.028 -0.027 0.118
Nonfarm work -0.016 0.028 0.014 0.035 0.317 0.232
Road -0.019* 0.011 -0.048*** 0.018 0.110 0.145
Market 0.058*** 0.022 0.178*** 0.037 0.131 0.155
Risk attitude -0.059*** 0.022 0.055* 0.031 0.094 0.150
Cash crop 0.285*** 0.042 0.033 0.113 -0.019 3.536
Soil degradation -0.050 0.136 0.036 0.054 0.004 0.163
Rainfall 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AEZ BasinAra 0.177** 0.084 -0.049 0.121 -0.029 1.361
AEZ RiverVall 0.278*** 0.105 0.029 0.120 -0.347 0.810
AEZ Casamance 0.237*** 0.056 -0.185* 0.097 -0.268 1.840
AEZ CentEast 0.455*** 0.073 -0.067 0.112 -0.631 0.966
AEZ VallAnambe 0.741*** 0.207 -0.058 0.135 -0.695 0.799
Insurance needs 0.017 0.022 0.032 0.032 -0.216 0.178
Subsidy 0.016 0.060 -0.075 0.053 0.060 0.253
Mean labour 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.011 -0.039 0.035
Mean land 2.190*** 0.297 0.658*** 0.161 0.470 1.098
Mean fertilizer 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Mean seed 0.021*** 0.006 0.017*** 0.004 0.014 0.020
m0 -0.242** 0.111 -0.020 0.137 -0.417 1.094
m1 -0.297 0.244 -0.034 0.063 0.413 0.693
m2 -0.170 0.874 -0.141 0.253 -0.443 0.310
Joint signicance of crop
varying covariates
182.820*** 109.220*** 2.340
N 2335 1052 147
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 6.13: Correlation test of instruments
Variable Fertilizer suciency Seed quality Coping strategy Support needs Subscribers Location
Fertilizer suciency 1.000
Seed quality -0.011 1.000
Coping strategy -0.047 0.021 1.000
Support needs 0.090 0.008 0.003 1.000
Subscribers -0.002 -0.022 -0.147 0.035 1.000
Location -0.116 0.124 -0.014 -0.031 0.551 1.000
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Crop income per capita
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 3.708*** 0.684 5.791*** 0.289 3.742*** 0.121
Age -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
Gender -0.429* 0.247 0.291*** 0.083 0.159*** 0.034
Education -0.254** 0.127 -0.060 0.049 -0.002 0.021
HH size -0.047*** 0.013 -0.078*** 0.005 -0.034*** 0.002
Land -0.075*** 0.013 0.082*** 0.005 0.042*** 0.002
Roof material -0.189 0.169 -0.097 0.076 -0.141*** 0.030
Plough 0.547*** 0.172 0.038 0.054 0.025 0.022
Extension -0.957 0.596 0.377*** 0.091 0.158*** 0.038
Credit -1.674 1.928 -0.405* 0.239 -0.154 0.100
Membership 2.323** 1.126 0.117 0.128 0.045 0.055
Market integration -0.212* 0.112 -0.018 0.045 -0.014 0.019
Nonfarm work -2.128* 1.287 -0.075 0.054 -0.042* 0.023
Road -0.085 0.074 -0.020 0.027 -0.010 0.011
Market 0.416*** 0.129 0.118** 0.050 0.049** 0.021
Risk attitude 0.717*** 0.214 -0.171*** 0.047 -0.088*** 0.020
Cash crop -0.617*** 0.230 -0.183* 0.100 0.469*** 0.036
Soil degradation -0.355 0.753 -0.130 0.640 -0.093 0.237
Std. Rainfall -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
AEZ BasinAra -0.033 0.254 0.319*** 0.079 0.203*** 0.032
AEZ RiverVall -3.047*** 0.346 0.142 0.130 0.236*** 0.053
AEZ Casamance 0.144 0.341 0.392*** 0.087 0.197*** 0.036
AEZ CentEast 0.093 0.351 0.745*** 0.102 0.397*** 0.042
AEZ VallAnambe -4.838*** 0.539 1.540*** 0.559 0.565** 0.238
Insurance needs -0.578*** 0.130 0.032 0.050 0.014 0.021
Subsidy -2.197*** 0.170 -0.119 0.075 0.026 0.032
Fertilizer suciency -1.265*** 0.212 0.030 0.137 0.008 0.058
Seed quality 0.451*** 0.155 0.077 0.086 -0.019 0.036
Resid mem -2.019*** 0.563
Resid ext -0.265 0.290
Resid credit -0.074 0.875
Resid nonfarm 1.258* 0.758
N 3681
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively. Reported standard errors































































Table 6.15: Post-harvest loss ratios per crop and region (%)
Region MaizeaRiceaSorghumaMilletaFonioaGroundnutbSesamecCowpeabCassavab
Dakar 17.19 0.00 11.09 8.02 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Diourbel 20.52 0.00 12.29 20.80 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Fatick 20.45 11.09 12.29 8.69 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Karine 28.85 10.85 22.19 20.67 18.76 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kaolack 20.34 10.85 11.31 8.54 11.48 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kédougou 26.57 11.79 11.40 10.63 23.70 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Kolda 26.57 22.69 12.49 22.60 23.55 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Louga 17.19 10.85 11.31 8.34 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Matam 17.19 11.25 11.20 8.12 18.76 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Saint-Louis 17.19 11.37 11.31 8.46 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Sédhiou 26.54 22.76 22.39 10.76 23.58 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Tambacounda 17.19 11.05 22.23 8.34 11.48 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Thiès 25.94 10.85 22.13 20.67 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
Ziguinchor 17.91 23.07 11.40 10.63 0.00 10.10 25.00 23.50 42.3
a Source: African Postharvest Losses Information System (APHLIS). https://www.aphlis.net/en
b Source: Aognon et al. (2015)
c Source: Tomlins et al. (2016)
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Table 6.16: Conversion ratios for edible fractions and food energy equivalence










Source: Stadlmayr et al. (2012)
Table 6.17: Adult-equivalent conversion factors according to age and gender
























In the context of climate change, farm households are increasingly exposed to weather
changes such as prolonged drought, late start of rains, shifting rainfall patterns, etc.
These changes present an enormous risk to food production particularly in devel-
oping countries that are disproportionally aected by climate change. With limited
access to credit or insurance markets and resources, farm households most often
have challenges managing the myriad of risks they face. Hence farm households
heavily rely on a range of traditional risk management strategies to avoid or mini-
mize losses, but these are mostly incomplete, suboptimal, and mitigate only a small
part of overall risk. Furthermore, risk management by farm households is multifar-
ious with each having a dierent cost and resource use or allocation implications.
These risk management strategies usually include agronomic adaptation practices,
diversifying income sources, coping strategies, share tenancy contracts, traditional
moneylending, and risk-sharing within the extended family and other community
networks.
Furthermore, formal risk management instruments such as index-based insurance,
production, and market or sales contracts are increasingly playing an important role
in farm households risk management. The use of any of these strategies can po-
tentially shift scarce production resources and this can aect production eciency
and household welfare. For example, insurance can unlock additional demand for
fertilizer, seeds, and labour thus having implications for input use, levels of invest-
ments and allocation of scarce resources which can have long-term implications on
production eciency. The use of coping strategies such as the sale of product assets
might plunge households into poverty due to their inability to recover the loss of as-
sets ex-post the shock for instance. This PhD research, therefore, sought to explore
the impact of climate change and various risk management strategies employed by
Senegalese farm households across multiple outcomes including, agriculture incomes
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and dispersions around income, technical eciency and food security. To achieve
this, the study employed dierent econometric analyses using nationally represen-
tative farm household survey data collected in 2017. This chapter summarizes the
main ndings, oers relevant policy implications of the study, discusses some caveats
related to the study, and oers recommendations for future research.
7.2 Main ndings
The rst introductory paper to the PhD research in chapter 2 examined the im-
pact of climate change in the form of rainfall variability on inter-household income
inequality, daily food calorie availability, and agricultural labour productivity in
Senegal, and the role of adaptation (risk management) strategies. To address model
uncertainty, the study employed the recently developed model-averaging techniques
and the Gini decomposition approach. The ndings of the study suggest that rain-
fall variability negatively aects income equality by increasing the Gini elasticity of
income. Particularly for agriculture incomes, the study found that the Gini elasticity
of agriculture income increases for every deviation in rainfall. In the case of non-
farm income, the Gini elasticity decreases for every deviation in rainfall. Because
agriculture income sources constitute the largest share and contributor to house-
hold income inequality, any shocks to the sector will largely be responsible for any
observed increases in income inequality.
The study also nds that rainfall variability decreases household daily food calorie
availability and agricultural labour productivity. Especially for agricultural labour
productivity, the study provides empirical proof of how rainfall variability will im-
pact labour productivity beyond heat stress which has been widely studied in the
literature. The study nds that rainfall variability will aect agricultural labour pro-
ductivity through a reduction in household food calorie availability. The study also
nds varying impacts of adaptation strategies on household outcomes. Insurance
(risk transfer) use despite being positively correlated to income equality, increases
both household food security and agricultural labour productivity. Risk mitiga-
tion strategies were also observed to be positively correlated with income inequality
and appear to decrease household food security and agricultural labour productiv-
ity. Risk coping measures correlates negatively with income inequality, decrease
household food security and increase agricultural labour productivity. The use of
insurance, irrigation, subsidies access, and the adoption of productivity-enhancing
technologies (fertilizer and improved seeds) are the most important instruments to
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help households deal with rainfall variability related shocks.
The paper presented in Chapter 3, evaluated the adoption eect of dierent risk
management strategies employed by farm households on agriculture income and dis-
persions around incomes. Because the adoption of these risk management strategies
is non-random, failure to account for this might introduce biases in the estimates.
The study thus employed a Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression model
to control for potential selectivity bias problems. To evaluate dispersions around in-
comes, the study also employed a Moment-Based Approach. Findings in this chapter
rst showed that the use of ex-ante risk management strategies signicantly reduces
agriculture incomes. Intuitively, there is an opportunity cost eect, mostly in the
form of income losses related to the use of ex-ante risk management strategies. The
use of ex-post strategies either in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk man-
agement strategies signicantly increases agriculture incomes. Risk coping strategies
rely largely on the sale of assets and thus appears an eective strategy to smoothen
household income shortfalls in the short run. All the risk management strategies
employed by households signicantly reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes,
however, ex-post strategies produce the largest dispersion reduction eect.
The study reported in Chapter 4 analysed the technical eciency implications of the
risk management strategies employed by farm households. To achieve this the study
employed a sample selection stochastic production frontier to control for potential
self-selectivity biases in adoption together with a meta-frontier model to evaluate
the impact of risk management strategies on technical eciency. The empirical re-
sults showed that risk management has implications on farm household's technical
eciency. Farm households adopting ex-post risk management strategies appear
to have a relatively higher technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier
compared to the other risk management strategies. Households employing ex-ante
risk management strategies were observed to be the least technically ecient com-
pared to households not managing risks or those employing ex-post risk management
strategies in isolation or in combination with ex-ante risk management strategies.
Households not managing risks appear to slightly have a higher meta technology
gap, suggesting that they are adopting the best production technology. The results
also suggest that managing production risks using multiple strategies does not nec-
essarily result in the highest technical eciency gain compared to the use of single
or isolated strategies.
In Chapter 5, the study assessed the complementary impact of productivity-enhancing
technologies (mineral fertilizer and improved seeds) adoption with insurance on tech-
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nical eciency. The analysis compared two distinct farm households  one adopting
fertilizer and improved seeds without insurance and the other fertilizer and improved
seeds with insurance. The study employed a sample selection stochastic production
frontier with a meta-frontier model, propensity score matching (PSM) approach,
and an endogenous switching regression model to control for potential biases. The
empirical results show that households that adopted productivity-enhancing tech-
nologies with insurance tend to have higher levels of investment in production inputs.
However, households that adopted productivity-enhancing technologies without in-
surance tend to be more technically ecient on average. Households that adopted
productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance seem to be slightly more e-
cient in adopting the best available technology set as measured by the technology
gap ratio. At the meta-frontier, the results of the endogenous switching regression
model suggest that adopting productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance de-
creases the technical eciency of productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance
adopters by about 50%. Conversely, for households adopting productivity-enhancing
technologies without insurance, adopting with insurance could potentially increase
the mean technical eciency by about 37%. The results suggest that lower ob-
served technical eciencies for productivity-enhancing technologies with insurance
adopters may be driven by unobserved eort or behavioural biases of farmers which
can be an important source of heterogeneity in the observed treatment eects.
The study in Chapter 6, assessed the joint welfare impacts of managing climate risks
through the adoption of risk-reducing technologies and insurance by comparing three
distinct farm households: 1) non-adopters of mineral fertilizer, improved seeds and
insurance, 2) mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adopters without insurance and
3) mineral fertilizer and improved seeds adopters with insurance. Because the adop-
tion of these technology packages or portfolios is non-random, failure to account for
this might introduce biases in the estimates. The study thus employed a Multi-
nomial Endogenous Switching Regression model to control for potential selectivity
bias problems. The empirical results show that the adoption of mineral fertilizer and
improved seeds with or without insurance is associated with signicant increases in
household food calorie availability and crop income per capita. However, comple-
menting the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved seeds with insurance leads
to higher household welfare outcomes compared to adopting mineral fertilizer and
improved seeds without insurance. Furthermore, the empirical result suggests that
farm households by switching from the adoption of mineral fertilizer and improved
seeds without insurance to adopting with insurance signicantly increase their food
calorie availability and crop income per capita. At the time, the study nds that
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farm households by switching from adopting mineral fertilizer and improved seeds
with insurance to adopting without insurance reduce their food calorie availability
and crop income per capita although the observed eect is not signicant.
7.3 Policy implications
Important policy implications can be drawn from the ndings of this study. First,
the ndings underscore the need for context-specic studies to guide policies that
seeks to help farmers better manage production-related risks. Most importantly
it highlights that some trade-os have to be made in managing risks, thus poli-
cymakers must recognize the presence of some unintended eects and develop the
necessary remedies. For instance, insurance increases food security and labour pro-
ductivity but at the same time increases income inequality and potentially reduces
technical eciency because of moral hazard problems. At the same time, ex-post
risk management strategies appear to be eective in terms of increasing household
agriculture incomes and reducing dispersions around incomes and providing better
technical eciencies compared to other strategies. Ex-post risk management strate-
gies may be eective in managing risk in the short term, however, in the long term,
it might not be an eective strategy. Particularly for very poor households, the use
of ex-post strategies will not be a feasible risk management option since the sale of
productive assets may plunge them deeper into poverty. There is therefore a need
for a more targeted and systematic approach to agricultural risk management. Most
importantly, investments in services such as the provision of timely relevant weather
information can help farm households better harness the use of risk management
strategies. For instance, it will help farmers to select the right crop commodities
to produce for a particular season and at what time within the season to sow for
instance.
Index-based insurance products should be widely promoted to farm households since
they appear to help households better manage production-related risks. However,
achieving this requires overcoming some socioeconomic and institutional hurdles.
Improving better access to credit is particularly important for index-based insurance
access as well as the provision of hands-on practical information on how insurance
works. Beyond credit, there is a need to provide and expand functioning markets
for inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, irrigation, and post-harvest facilities.
There is also the need to not only scale up index-based insurance products to more
farm households but also oer subsidies to encourage widespread uptake. Promoting
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index-based insurance products should be done through farmer-based organizations
for instance since they are important drivers of the adoption of risk management
strategies and at the same time can potentially lower related administrative costs of
running index-based insurance schemes.
Empowering farmer's management of climate risks will also require the adoption of
context-suitable agricultural practices such as conservation agriculture, sustainable
land management practices, etc., and technologies that are important low-cost risk
mitigation strategies such as improved and drought-resistant varieties of crops, and
irrigation facilities. This will also require the provision of information and technical
assistance to farmers in the use and implementation of these practices. Providing
such technical assistance programs can help in amplifying the benets of some of
the risk management strategies employed by households. Furthermore, provision of
technical assistance should go beyond information but also soil testing services and
recommendations on fertilizer application rates to help farmers to use appropriate
amounts of fertilizer, which can go a long way to minimize input costs, achieve higher
yield thereby attaining environmental and economic sustainability.
7.4 Caveats and future research
There are some important caveats to be considered for this PhD study. Climate
change and for that matter adaptation or risk management usually occurs over long
periods. Due to the data used in this PhD research being limited to cross-sectional
data, the analysis is rather static. For instance, some of the risk management strate-
gies evaluated in this research can be eective in the short run, while others might
deliver payos in the long run. Similarly, technical eciency evaluated across the
various risk management strategies might also have both temporal and spatial eects
which the study fails to capture. The analysis used in this study therefore obscures or
fails to capture important spatial and temporal shifts in outcomes, that can provide
critical thresholds to identify the impact of risk management. Furthermore, since
we clustered the various risk management strategies into three broad typologies, the
study only evaluated or captured aggregate impacts of risk management strategies
as supposed to individual impacts. At the same time, because production condi-
tions and the scope of risk management strategies are heterogeneous across various
farm enterprises, focusing on aggregate eects as done in this study may obscure
enterprise-specic eects for instance. Future research can therefore focus on using
long term data such as panel or longitudinal data on various production systems,
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agriculture incomes, and risk management strategies employed by farm households
to investigate all these dimensions and provide a better comparison between the
various risk management strategies. Such data would be needed to provide more ro-
bust evidence on the implication of risk management on important household welfare
outcomes.
Additionally, the nexus between risk management and allocative and economic ef-
ciency will be an interesting research theme to pursue for future research. This
will provide important insights into how households allocate resources pre and post-
climate shocks. This is particularly interesting for government intervention programs
like cash transfers and input subsidies that are sometimes provided to farm house-
holds post major climate shocks. Such a study will provide important cues as to
how best households can build new assets post-climate shocks. In an experimental
setting, future studies can also explore the role of farmers' eort in the use of
insurance products to better understand how behavioural biases might oset the




A.1 Weighted Average Least Squares
Chapter 2 of the PhD study employed a model averaging technique to investigate
the impact of climate change in the form of rainfall variability on inter-household
inequality, food security and labour productivity. A major problem in empirical
models' estimation is the so-called problems of model uncertainty. In most cases,
economic theory provides some information about empirical model specications
but oers little guidance about how to specify the exact data-generating process
for the outcome of interest (De Luca and Magnus, 2011). At the same time, the
lack of a one-to-one link between theory and empirical model specication generates
uncertainty regarding, for example, which explanatory variables must be included
in the model, which functional forms are appropriate, or which lag length captures
dynamic responses. A key feature behind model uncertainty is therefore the exis-
tence of a wide range of functional forms and explanatory variables without much
consensus concerning which canonical model is appropriate. The implication of this
is that empirical researchers need to choose among a set of possible model specica-
tions. In such cases, empirical results will typically be inuenced by the inclusion or
omission of specic variables. Depending on the model selection procedure, dierent
researchers may arrive at dierent conclusions even when using the same data (De
Luca and Magnus, 2011). Hence addressing model uncertainty is clearly important.
Model averaging techniques alleviate such inconsistencies by comparing the robust-
ness of regression coecients over the entire model space. Two main model averaging
techniques exist in the empirical literature: Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and
Weighted-average least squares (WALS). For this study, the latter technique which
was developed by Magnus et al. (2010) was employed because of two main following
reasons:
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1. Weighted-average least squares (WALS) is theoretically and practically supe-
rior to the standard Bayesian model averaging (BMA) because the prior is
`neutral' and the risk properties of the estimator are close to those of the
minimax regret estimator (Magnus et al., 2010).
2. It is also practically superior because of the space over which model selection
is performed increases linearly rather than exponentially with size. WALS
unlike BMA relies on preliminary orthogonal transformations of the auxiliary
regressors and the parameters. Thus the computational burden required to
obtain an exact WALS estimate is lower compared to BMA (De Luca and
Magnus, 2011). Also, the choice of the prior distribution on parameters is
independent of prior information availability as in the case of BMA.
Considering the linear regression model of the form:
y = X1β1 +X2β2 + µ (A.1)
where y is an n × 1 vector of observations on the outcome of interest; the Xj, j = 1,
2, are n × kj matrices of observations on two subsets of deterministic regressors; the
βj are kj × 1 vectors of unknown regression parameters; and u ∼ N(0, σ2), an n ×
1 random vector of unobservable disturbances whose elements are independent and
identically matrix X = (X1, X2) has full column-rank k. The reason for partitioning
the design distributed. We assume that k1 ≥ 1, k2 ≥ 0, k = k1 + k2 ≤ n - 1, and
the design matrix X in two subsets of regressors is that X1 contains explanatory
variables that we want in the model because of theoretical reasons or other consid-
erations about the phenomenon under investigation, whereas X2 contains additional
explanatory variables of which we are less certain. Using the terminology of Danilov
and Magnus (2004), the k1 columns of X1 are called focus regressors and the k2
columns of X2 are called auxiliary regressors.
where y is an n × 1 vector of observations on the outcome of interest, Xj, j = 1,
2, are n × kj matrices of observations on two subsets of deterministic regressors, µ
is a random vector of unobservable disturbances, and β1 and β2 are unknown pa-
rameter vectors. We assume that k1 ≥ 1, k2 ≥ 0, k = k1 + k2 ≤ n - 1, that X =
(X1, X2) has full column-rank, and that the disturbances (µ1, ..., µn) are indepen-
dent and identically distributed N(0, σ2). The design matrix X is assumed to be
in two subsets of regressors; X1 contains explanatory variables that are called focus
regressors (i.e., variables wanted in the model because of theoretical reasons or other
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considerations about the phenomenon under investigation), X2 contains additional
explanatory variables of which we are less certain which are referred to as auxiliary
regressors. The primary interest is the estimation of the vector of focus parameters
β1 in equation A.1, whereas β2 is treated as a vector of nuisance parameters. By
the properties of partitioned inverses, the unrestricted ordinary least-squares (OLS)
estimators of β1 and β2 are given by:





where β̂rµ = (X
⊤
1 X1)
−1 X⊤1 y is the restricted OLS estimator from a regression
of y on X1 (with β2 restricted to zero), Q = (X
⊤
1 X1)
−1 X⊤1 X2 is the multivariate




is a symmetric and idempotent matrix. Within this framework, model uncertainty
arises because dierent subsets of auxiliary regressors could be excluded from X2 to
improve, in the mean squared error (MSE) sense, the unrestricted OLS estimator
β̂1µ of β1. It is a basic result from the least-squares theory that by restricting some
elements of β2 to zero we can indeed obtain an estimator of β1 which is subject to
omitted variable bias but is also more precise than the unrestricted OLS estimator
β̂1µ . The choice of excluding dierent subsets of auxiliary regressors is therefore
motivated by a trade-o between bias and precision in the estimators of the focus
regression parameters. Because model uncertainty is conned to the k2 variables
of X2, the number of possible models to be considered is I = 2
k2 . Subsequently,
assume Mi is the ith model in the model space which is obtained by including only
a subset of k2i (with 0 ≤ k2i ≤ k2) auxiliary regressors. Model Mi is represented as
follows:
y = X1β1 +X2iβ21 + εi, i = 1 = . . . , I (A.4)
where X2i is an n × k2i matrix of observations on the included subset of k2i auxiliary
regressors, β2i is the corresponding subvector of auxiliary parameters, and ϵi is the
new vector of disturbances after excluding k2 - k2i auxiliary regressors. Estimation
of model averaging proceeds in two steps. In the rst step one rst estimates the
parameters of interest conditional on each model in the model space. In the second
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step, the unconditional estimate as a weighted average of these conditional estimates





where the λi are non-negative random weights that add up to one, and β̂1i is the es-
timate of β1 obtained by conditioning on model Mi. Weighted-average least-squares
(WALS) estimation starts with the orthogonal transformations of the auxiliary re-
gressors and their parameters, which greatly reduce the computational burden of the
model-averaging estimator and allow for exploiting prior distributions corresponding
to a more transparent concept of ignorance about the role of the auxiliary regressors.
The rst step of WALS consists of computing an orthogonal k2 × k2 matrix P and
a diagonal k2 × k2 matrix ∧ such that P⊤X⊤2 M1X2 = ∧. These matrices are then
used to dene Z2 = X2P∧−1/2 and γ2 = ∧1/2P⊤β2 such that Z⊤2 M1Z2 = Ik2 and Z2γ2
= X2β2. The original vector of auxiliary parameters β2 can always be recovered
from β2 = P∧−1/2γ2. After applying these orthogonal transformations to equation
A.1, the unrestricted OLS estimators of β1 and γ2 from a regression of y on X1 and
Z2 are given by:
β̂1µ = β̂1r − Rγ̂2µ (A.6)
γ̂2i = Wiγ̂2µ (A.7)
where R = (X⊤1 X1)
−1X⊤1 Z2 is the multivariate OLS estimator from a regression of
Z2 on X1. If we also dene the k2 × (k2 - k2i) selection matrix Si by S⊤i = (Ik2−k2i,0),
or a column permutation thereof, such that Si captures the restrictions placed on γ2
under model Mi, then the restricted OLS estimators of β1 and γ2i are given by:
β̂1i = β̂1r −RWiγ̂2µ (A.8)
γ̂2i = Wiγ̂2µ (A.9)
where Wi = Ik2 - Si S
⊤
i is a k2 × k2 matrix whose j th diagonal element is zero if γ2j
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is restricted to zero; otherwise, the j th diagonal element is one. A key advantage
of these transformations lies in the fact that γ̂2µ ∼ Nk2(γ2,σ2Ik2). This result has
several implications on the computational aspects and the statistical properties of
the WALS estimator. First, under some minimal regularity conditions on the model




λiβ̂1i = β̂1r −RWγ̂2 (A.10)
where W=
∑I
i=1 λiWi is a k2 Ö k2 diagonal random matrix (because the λi are
random). Therefore, even if the model space contains 2k2 models, the computational
burden of the WALS estimator β̃1 is of the order k2 due to the need to only consider
the diagonal elements of W, that is k2 linear combinations of the model weights λi.
Also, the equivalence theorem proved in Danilov and Magnus (2004) implies that
the MSE of the WALS estimator β̃1 of β1 is crucially related to the MSE of the less





Thus, if we can nd the diagonal elements of W such that the shrinkage estimator
Wγ̂2 is an optimal estimator of γ2, then the same estimator will also provide the
optimal WALS estimator β̃1 of β1. Additionally, because the k2 components of γ2 are
independent, they can be estimated separately by exploiting the information that
γ̂2j ∼ N(γ2j, σ2). According to Magnus et al. (2010), this problem is addressed
using a Laplace estimator η̂j for the theoretical t-ratio ηj = γ2j/σ.
A.2 Decomposing the Gini index by sources of in-
come
Assume that farm households obtain income yk from dierent income components
or source k. Total farm household income is then given by the sum of income from
all income sources k. This can be formalized as y0 =
∑k
k=1 yk. Following Stark et al.
(1986), the Gini index for total farm household income y0 is then given by:
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G0 =
2Cov[ y0, F (y0)]
µ0
(A.12)
where G0 is the Gini index of all household incomes, µ0 is the mean of farm household
incomes, Fy0 is the cumulative distribution function of overall household income y0.
Given the property that y0 =
∑k




k=1 Cov[ y0, F (y0)]
µ0
(A.13)
where Cov[ yk, F (y0)] is the covariance between income source k and the cumulative
distribution of income,F (y0). Utilising the properties of the covariance, the overall
















Assume that Sk =
yk
y0
denote the share of income from source k in total household
income y0 and Gk is the corresponding Gini index measuring the level of inequality









Cov[ yk, F (y0)]
Cov[yk, F (yk)]





Rk which is equal to the term
Cov[ yk,F (y0)]
Cov[ yk,F (yk)]
in equation A.15 represents the so-called
Gini correlation of component k with total household income. According to Stark
et al. (1986), the properties of the Gini correlation are a mixture of the properties
of Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coecients. Similarly, Rk is bounded by -1
≤ Rk ≤ 1 and will be equal to zero when yk and y0 are uncorrelated, equal to 1(-1)
if yk is an increasing (decreasing) function of total income.
Taking the derivative for a small percentage change in income from a particular
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income source, permits the analysis of the eect of a marginal change in an income
source on the overall Gini index at that point in time, holding all other income
sources constant. Following Stark et al. (1986), let G0 be the Gini index before
multiplying each household's income from source j by (I + e), and let G(e) be the
Gini after the multiplication. As already shown in equation A.15, the Gini index




Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk
The multiplication of income source j by (I + e) does not aect Gk (k = I, ..., K ).
However, Rk is a function of the ranks of total income. The rank function is not well
dened for incomes that are equal. To avoid the problem created in this case, we
assume that incomes vary slightly across households (aside from households whose








k ̸=j µk + (1 + e)µj
=
µk∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
for k ̸= j (A.17)
while for source j,
Sk(e) =
(1 + e)µj∑K
k=1 µk + eµj
. (A.18)
Let us now evaluate:
G = G(e)−G0 =
K∑
k=1
Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk(e) − G0 =
K∑
k=1
Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk
K∑
k=1
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Rk ∗Gk ∗ Sk +Rj ∗Gj ∗ Sj
∂G0
∂ej
= Sj(Rj ∗Gj − G0)
(A.23)
A.3 Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression
Chapter 3 and 6 of the PhD study employed a multinomial endogenous switching
regression model to address issues of selection bias arising from self-selection and
unobservable characteristics. To disentangle the pure eects of risk management
strategies adoption, and its impacts were modelled in a multinomial endogenous
switching regression framework. This approach is a selection-bias correction method-
ology based on the multinomial logit selection model developed by Bourguignon et al.
(2007). This approach allows consistent and ecient estimates of the selection pro-
cess and a reasonable correction for the outcome equations to be obtained, even with
violations of the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Estima-
tion of the multinomial endogenous switching regression occurs simultaneously in
two steps. In the rst stage, farm households' choices of risk management strategies
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(here in strategy) are modelled using a multinomial logit selection model. In the
second stage, the outcomes associated with each risk management strategy choices
are evaluated using OLS with selectivity correction terms from the rst stage. The
empirical econometric approach used is described below.
Stage I: Multinomial Adoption Selection Model
Farm households are assumed to maximize their expected utility by adopting a par-
ticular risk management strategy. The ith farm household's expected utility, U*ij,
from adopting a strategy j, where j (j = 1,..., M ), is a latent variable determined
by observed household, land, and climatic characteristics, Xi and unobserved char-
acteristics εij, such that:
U∗ij = Xiϖ + εij (A.24)
Let I be an index that denotes the farmers' choice of strategy, such that:
I = j iff U∗ij > Max
k ̸=j
(U∗ik) or ηij < 0 ∀ k ̸= j, (A.25)




ij) < 0 (Bourguignon et al., 2007). The formulation in
equation A.25 implies that the ith farm household will adopt a strategy j to maximize
their expected benet if it provides greater expected utility than any other strategy




ij) < 0. The probability that farm household i with
characteristics X will choose a strategy j can be specied by a multinomial logit
model McFadden (1974) as:




The parameter estimates of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation. In our specication, the base category, no strategy, is denoted
as j = 1. In the remaining portfolios (j = 2, 3. . . . M ), at least one strategy is used
by a farm household.
273
Appendix A. Empirical methods
Stage II: Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression Model
In the second stage, a multinomial endogenous switching regression model is esti-
mated to investigate the impact of each strategy on the outcomes of interest by
applying the Bourguignon et al. (2007) selection bias correction model. The model
implies that farm households face a total of M regimes (one regime per strategy,
where j = 1 is the reference strategy). It is assumed that the vector of outcome
variables is a linear function of explanatory variables. Hence, the stochastic function
to evaluate the outcomes of interest of each strategy j is given as:
Outcome j : Qij = Zijβij + Zijαij + µij if I = j; j = 1, 2, 3 (A.27)
where Qij is the outcome variable of farm household i in regime j, and Zi represents
a vector of inputs, and farm household head and household's characteristics, asset
ownership, soil fertility and climatic characteristics included inXi. β and α represent
the corresponding vector of coecients to be estimated. µij represents the unob-
served stochastic component distributed with E(µij | Zi, Xi) = 0 and V(µij | Zi, Xi)
= σ2j . To overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ity with observed covariates, the study employed the approach of Mundlak (1978)
and Wooldridge (2018). We exploit crop-level information and include the mean of
crop varying Z explanatory variables, which include landholding, labour, fertilizer
and seed quantity to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. According to
Teklewold et al. (2013), a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the vectors αj are
jointly equal to zero is required to indicate the relevance of crop-specic heterogene-
ity. For each sample observation, Qij is observed if and only if one among the M
dependent regimes is observed. When estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS)
model, the outcomes of interest, in equations A.27 are estimated separately. How-
ever, if the error terms of equation A.24, εij are correlated with the error terms µij of
the outcome model in equation A.27, then the expected values of µij conditional on
the sample selection are nonzero i.e., corr(εij, µij) ̸= 0, and the OLS estimates will be
biased and inconsistent. To correct for the potential inconsistency, the multinomial
endogenous switching regression model by Bourguignon et al. (2007), is employed.
It takes into account the correlation between the error terms εij from the multino-
mial logit model estimated in the rst stage and the error terms from each outcome
equation µij. Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that consistent estimates of β and α
in the outcome equation A.27 can be obtained by estimating the following selection
bias-corrected outcomes of interest equations:
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Outcome j : Qij = Zijβij + Zijαij + σjελij + ωij if I = j; j = 1, 2, 3 (A.28)
where σjε is the covariance between εij in equation A.24 and µij from equation A.27,















where P̂ represents the probability that farm household i chooses strategy j as de-
ned in equation A.26, ρj is the correlation between εij and µij. The specication in
equation A.28 implies that the number of selection correction (bias) terms in each
equation are equal to the number of multinomial logit choicesM. While the variables
Xi in equation A.24 and Zi in equation A.27 are allowed to overlap, proper identi-
cation requires at least one variable in Xi that does not appear in Zi. Therefore,
the selection equation A.24 is estimated based on all explanatory variables specied
in the outcome equation A.27 plus at least one or more instruments. Following Di
Falco and Veronesi (2013), we establish the admissibility of the selected instruments
by performing a simple falsication test: the selected or valid instrument (s) is re-
quired to signicantly inuence a farm household's choice of strategy adoption but
have no signicant eect on the outcomes of interest.
Estimation of the treatment and counterfactual eects
The Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression framework by allowing us to
control for potential selectivity biases can be used to examine average treatment
eects (ATT) by comparing expected outcomes of adopters with and without adop-
tion. Following Bourguignon et al. (2007), the following conditional expectations for
each outcome variable of interest from equation A.28 can be computed as:




∣∣I = j, Zij, Zij, λij) = Zijβj + Zijαj + σjλij (A.30)
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∣∣I = 1, Zi1, Zij, λi1) = Zi1β1 + Zi1α1 + σ1λi1 (A.31)




∣∣I = j, Zij, Zij, λij) = Zijβ1 + Zijα1 + σ1λij (A.32)




∣∣I = 1, Zi1, Zi1, λi1) = Zi1βj + Zi1αj + σjλi1 (A.33)
Equations A.30 and A.31 represent the actual expected outcomes of interest observed
in the sample for adopting and non-adopting farm households respectively, while
equations A.32 and A.33 are their respective counterfactual expected outcomes of
interest. The use of these conditional expectations allows us to calculate the average
treatment eects (ATT)  i.e., the treatment eect for treated farm households,
which is the dierence between equations A.30 and A.32:
ATT = E [Qij|I = j]− E [Qi1|I = j]
= Zij (βj − β1) + Zij (αj − α1) + λij(σj − σ1)
(A.34)
Additionally, the average adoption eect for non-adopters, also known as the average
treatment eect on the untreated (ATU) can be computed as the dierence between
equations A.31 and A.33.
ATU = E [Qi1|I = 1]− E [Qij|I = 1]
= Zi1 (β1 − βj) + Zi1 (α1 − αj) + λi1(σ1 − σj)
(A.35)
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A.4 Sample Selection Stochastic Frontier and Meta-
frontier Approach
Chapter 4 and 5 of the PhD study evaluated the technical eciency outcomes asso-
ciated with various risk management strategies. As already established in chapter
3 of the thesis, farm households' decisions to adopt risk management strategies is
not random, hence giving rise to selectivity eects in adoption. Farm households
may therefore endogenously self-select adoption or non-adoption, making such de-
cisions to be likely inuenced systematically by both observed and unobservable
characteristics that may be correlated with the outcomes of interest, herein techni-
cal eciency. The inability to capture these unobservable characteristics may lead
to selection bias. In acknowledging the presence of selectivity biases, earlier studies
attempted to address this issue by relying on the Heckman approach (see Bradford
et al., 2001; Sipiläinen and Lansink, 2005; Solís et al., 2007), copula function (Lai
et al., 2009) and a system approach (Kumbhakar et al., 2009). However, as argued
by Greene (2010) the Heckman approach is unsuitable for nonlinear models such as
the stochastic production frontier. Furthermore, the log-likelihood is substantially
more computationally demanding in the copula function and a system approach.
To control for selection bias, and disentangle the pure eects of risk management,
we model farm households' choice of risk management strategies and their impacts
on technical eciency by adopting the framework developed by Greene (2010) that
extends Heckman's approach to consider sample selection in a stochastic frontier
framework assuming that the unobserved characteristics in the selection equation
are correlated with the noise in the stochastic frontier. The sample selection SPF
model by Greene (2010) is specied as follows:
Sample selection : tj = 1 [β
′Xj + εj > 0] , εj ∼ N(0, 1)
Stochastic frontier model : yj = γ




, ϵj = vj − uj,
(A.36)
where yj and Wj are observed only when tj =1, vj = σvvj with vj ∼ N(0, 1), uj
= |σuuj| = σu|uj| with uj ∼ N(0, 1), and (ϵj, vj) ∼ N2 [0, 1, (1, ρσv, σ2v)]. Also,
yj denotes the logarithmic crop income of farm household j, Wj is a vector of log-
arithmic input quantities, tj is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 for adopters
of particular risk management strategy and 0 otherwise, Xj is a vector of covari-
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ates in the sample selection equation. The coecients β and γ are parameters to
be estimated, ϵj is the composed error term of the stochastic frontier model that
includes the conventional error (vj) and ineciency term (uj), and ϵj is the error
term. The ineciency term uj is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution with
the dispersion parameter σu, whereas ϵj and vj follow a bivariate normal distri-
bution with variances of 1 and σ2v, respectively. The correlation coecient, ρσv if
statistically signicant, indicates evidence of selectivity bias implying that estimates
of the standard stochastic frontier model would be inconsistent Greene (2010). The
log-likelihood for the model in A.36 is formed by integrating out the unobserved |uj|
and then maximizing with respect to the unknown parameters. Thus,






f(yj|Wj, Xj, tj, |Uj|) p(|Uj|)t|Uj|. (A.37)
Because the integral in equation A.37 is not known it is approximated. To simplify
the estimation, Greene (2010) uses a two-step approach. The single equation MLE of
β in the Probit equation in equation A.36 is consistent but inecient. However, for
the estimation of the parameters of the sample selection stochastic frontier model,
it is not necessary to re-estimate β and the estimates of β are taken as given in
the simulated log-likelihood. The standard errors of the parameters are adjusted
using the approach by Murphy and Topel (2002) and estimated using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) approach, and asymptotic standard errors are
obtained by employing the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithm estimator.
Furthermore, Greene (2010) argues that the non-selected observations (i.e., when
tj =0) do not contribute information about the parameters to the simulated log-
likelihood and thus the function to be maximized becomes:





















Where ai = β̂′Xj. The parameters of the model are estimated using a conventional
gradient-based approach, the BFGS method, and use the BHHH estimator to obtain
the asymptotic standard errors. The maximand reduces to that of the maximum
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simulated likelihood estimator of the basic frontier model when ρ equals zero. This
provides a method of testing the specication of the selectivity model against the
simpler model using a (simulated) likelihood ratio (LR) test. The specication
described earlier in equation A.36 allow us to estimate, separate selectivity corrected
stochastic frontier models for each risk management strategy. From these estimated
stochastic frontier models, we derive the group-specic technical eciency estimates,
TEji = E[ e
−uji , i = 1, 2 . . . .4]
.
Meta-frontier Analysis
A direct comparison of technical eciencies between adopters of the various risk
management strategies outlined above is not possible because these scores are rel-
ative to each group's own frontier. To address this issue, a meta-frontier that en-
velopes the risk management specic frontiers is estimated to allow for the compar-
ison among the risk management strategies. The meta-frontier production function
is based on the idea that all producers in the various production groups have dif-
ferential access to an array of production technologies. The choice of a particular
technology may be driven by several factors such as regulation, production environ-
ments and resources, relative input prices etc. The presence of these factors inhibits
producers in some groups from choosing the best technology from the array of the
potential technology set. Estimation of the meta production frontier which envelopes
the group-specic frontiers is assumed to be the most optimal, hence allowing for
the estimation of technology gap ratios which is the dierence between the optimal
or best technology and the chosen sub-technology. Employing this approach oers
us the opportunity to compare the impact of the various risk management strategies
employed by farm households on productivity and technical eciency by providing
a common technology of reference for both adopters and non-adopters of the various
risk management strategies. Following the approach outlined by O'Donnell et al.
(2008), we estimate a meta-frontier that envelops the production frontiers of the
risk management specic group frontiers. The deterministic meta-frontier model for
farm households adopting the various risk management strategies can be expressed
as follows:
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Y ∗i = f (Xj, β
∗) = eXjβ
∗




where β∗ denotes the vector of parameters of the meta-frontier function such that
Xjβ
∗ ≥ Xiβk for all j observations. We estimate the parameters of the meta-frontier
function (β∗) in equation A.39 by minimizing the sum of the absolute dierences
between the meta-frontier and the respective group-specic frontier at all observa-






|(In f(Xj, β∗)− In f(Xj, β̂k)|
s.t. In f (Xj, β






Based on the parameters of the meta-frontier function (β∗), we can calculate the
gaps between the meta-frontier and the individual risk management specic group
frontiers, termed the meta-technology gap ratio (TGR). A comparatively high av-
erage meta-technology gap ratio for a particular technology group indicates a lower
technology gap between farm households in that group compared with all available
set of production technologies represented in the all-encompassing production fron-
tier. For given levels of inputs, the meta-technology ratio is calculated as the ratio
of the highest attainable group output to the highest possible meta-frontier output





Subsequently, the technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier production
technology (MTE) is determined as:
MTEj = TGR× TEjk (A.42)
It is also necessary to identify whether all the group-level data were generated from
a single production frontier. As noted by Battese et al. (2004), there would be no
good reason for estimation of technical eciency of farmers relative to the meta-
frontier if all the data were generated from a single production frontier. Hence
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following the aforementioned authors, we applied the likelihood-ratio test of the
null hypothesis that there is no dierence between the risk management group-
specic sample selection stochastic frontiers for all farm households. By pooling data
from adopters of the various risk management strategies the likelihood-ratio test of
the null hypothesis, that the group-specic stochastic frontiers are the same for all
farm households was tested. The likelihood-ratio test is dened by λ = -2[ L(Hp)
- L(H0 . . . ,k)] where L(Hp) is the value of the log-likelihood function for stochastic
frontiers estimated by pooling data for all farm households, L(H0 . . . ,k) is the value of
the sum for all the log-likelihood functions for the various risk management strategy
adopters.
A.5 Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR)
A variant of the multinomial endogenous switching regression model used in chapter
3 and 6 of the PhD study was also employed in chapter 5. The endogenous switching
regression model is suitable when two treatments or regimes are involved. Similar to
the multinomial endogenous switching regression model, the ESR model is estimated
in two stages. In the rst stage, the selection of a particular technology is specied
using a binary model. The equations for the outcome of interest, in this case, the
technical eciency with respect to the meta-frontier are modelled for both PET with
insurance adopters and PET without insurance adopter's conditional on selection.
Assuming risk neutrality, farmers will evaluate the net returns (utility) associated
with the adoption of PET with and without insurance, let the latent net utility
for adopters and non-adopters be denoted as Y ∗, such that a utility-maximizing
household j will choose to adopt PET with insurance if the utility gained from
adopting is greater than the utility of not adopting with insurance (Y ∗ = U∗iA  U
∗
iN
> 0). Given that a farm household utility level is a latent variable and cannot be
observed, we observe only indicators of utility, namely choices. We specify the latent
variable as:
Y ∗ = βXj + εj, Yj = 1
[
Y ∗j > 0
]
, (A.43)
where Yj is a binary variable that equals 1 for farm household who adopt PET
with insurance and zero otherwise (i.e., PET without insurance), with β denoting a
vector of parameters to be estimated. Thus, the farm household adopts PET with
insurance only if the perceived net benets are positive. The error term ε is assumed
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to be normally distributed with zero mean. X is a vector of explanatory variables
that inuence the adoption decision such as risk attitude, knowledge, household, and
farm-level characteristics etc. The probability that a farm household adopts PET
with insurance can be expressed as follows:
Pr (Yj = 1) = Pr
(
Y ∗j > 0
)
= Pr (εj > −βXj) = 1− F (−βXj) (A.44)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the error term. In the second
stage, separate outcome equations are specied for PET with insurance adopters
and PET without insurance adopters.
MTEj1 = α1Zj1 + µ1 if Yj = 1 (A.45)
MTEj0 = α0Zj0 + µ0 if Yj = 0 (A.46)
where MTEj1 and MTEj0 are the technical eciencies with respect to the meta-
frontier for PET with insurance adopters and PET without insurance adopters,
respectively. Zj is a vector of explanatory variables that include farm and household-
level characteristics, such as the age, gender, education level of household head,
household size, access to extension services, farm size, crop portfolio, land share
under cash crops etc. The vectors α1 and α0 are the parameters to be estimated
and µ is the error term.
To overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
with observed covariates, the approach of Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge (2018)
was employed. This was achieved by exploiting crop-level information and including
the mean of crop varying explanatory variables, which include labour, landholding,
fertilizer and seed quantity to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in
the outcome equations A.45 and A.46. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is
particularly important to help address farm or plot-specic unobservables as they
may contain useful missing information regarding land quality (Kassie et al., 2015)
for instance. Concurrently, if farm households obtain private information about
unobservable eects such as how good the soil is on the plot or some shocks, they
will adjust their factor input decisions accordingly (Fafchamps, 1993; Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003; Assunção and Braido, 2007). Hence, this approach permits the
exploitation of crop-level information to deal with the issue of farm household's
282
Appendix A. Empirical methods
unobservable characteristics and farm-specic eects. As suggested by Teklewold
et al. (2013), a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the vectors of the crop varying
explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is required to indicate the relevance
of crop-specic heterogeneity.
Model identication requires at least one variable in the selection equation A.43
that does not appear in the outcome equations A.45 and A.46. The valid instru-
ment (s) is required to inuence a farm household's adoption decision but do not
aect technical eciency. The variables representing insurance needs and perception
about the suciency of subsidized seeds are used as the instrument variables. While
these variables are expected to aect adoption decisions, it is assumed that these
do not aect technical eciency directly. We conducted a validity check of these
instruments, by estimating a simple probit model for the selection equation and
an OLS model for the outcome equation separately to checked that both variables
are in eect, signicant when included in the selection equation but not signicant
when included in the outcome equation. The three error terms εj in equation A.43,
and µ1 and µ0 in equation A.45 and A.46 are assumed to have a trivariate normal
distribution, with zero mean and the following covariance matrix:












where Var (ε) = σ2ε, Var (µ1) = σ
2µ1, Var (µ0) = σ
2µ0, Cov(ε, µ1) = σε1, and
Cov(ε, µ0) = σε0. Since we do not observe MTEj1 and MTEj0 simultaneously, the
covariance between µ1 and µ0 is not dened. The error term, εj of the sample selec-
tion equation A.43 is correlated with the error terms of the outcome equation A.45
and A.46. For this reason, the error terms in equation A.45 and A.46, conditional
on the sample selection criterion, have nonzero expected values, and hence using an
ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coecients α1 and α0 will result in
sample selection bias (Lee, 1982). The expected values of the truncated error terms
(µ1 | Y =1) and (µ0 | Y = 0) are then given as:
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where Φ(.) and ϕ(.) are the probability density and the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The terms λ1 and λ0
refer to the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at βXj and are incorporated into outcome
equations to account for sample selection bias. A drawback of the two-step approach
for the endogenous switching regression model is that it generates residuals that are
heteroskedastic and as a result cannot be used to obtain consistent standard errors
without cumbersome adjustments (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The full information
maximum likelihood method suggested by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) overcomes the
problem through a simultaneous estimation of the two equations, that is, equation
A.43 and, equations A.45 and A.46.
The signs and signicance levels of the correlation coecients (ρ) from the estimates
which are the correlation coecients between the error term εj of the selection
equation and error terms µ1 and µ0 of the outcome equations A.45 and A.46 are of
particular interest. Specically, there is endogenous switching, if either ρ1 or ρ0 is
signicantly dierent from zero, which would result in selection bias.
Estimating treatment eects
In this study, our main interest is to estimate the treatment eect (switching im-
pacts) of PET with and without insurance adoption on technical eciency. The
endogenous switching regression method can be used to compare expected technical
eciency with the counterfactual hypothetical technical eciency that farm house-
holds did not adopt PET with insurance and vice versa. This can be represented as
follows:
Farm households that adopted PET with insurance (observed):
E[MTEj1|Yj = 1] = α1Zj1 + σε1λ1 (A.50a)
Counterfactual case if PET with insurance adopting farm households did not adopt:
E[MTEj1|Yj = 0] = α1Zj0 + σε1λ0 (A.50b)
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Farm households that adopted PET without insurance (observed):
E[MTEj0|Yj = 0] = α0Zj0 + σε0λ0 (A.50c)
Counterfactual case if PET without insurance adopting farm households adopted
PET with insurance:
E[MTEj0|Yj = 1] = α0Zj1 + σε0λ1 (A.50d)
The change in outcome due to adoption can then be specied as the dierence
between adoption and non-adoption. The use of these conditional expectations from
equations A.50a to A.50d permits the calculation of average treatment eects (ATT)
 i.e., the treatment eect for treated farm households (i.e., PET with insurance
adopters), which is the dierence between equations A.50a and A.50b. Furthermore,
the average treatment eect on the untreated (ATU) households (i.e., PET without
insurance adopters) is of interest and this is simply the dierence between equations
A.50c and A.50d.
A.6 Control Function Approach
Throughout chapter 2 to 6, we employ the control function approach to deal with
potential reverse causality and endogeneity problems that may arise with some vari-
ables used in the models. This is particularly important because the presence of
reverse causality and endogeneity in models can make the identication of causal
eects dicult due to biased estimates. To address the potential endogeneity of
these variables (e.g. membership of farmer-based organizations, extension access,
credit access and nonfarm work participation) we used the control function ap-
proach proposed by Wooldridge (2015). The approach involves the specication of
the potential endogenous variable as a function of all explanatory variables used
in the main/selection equation, together with a set of instruments in a rst stage
probit regression for dichotomous variables or linear regression for continuous vari-
ables. Employed instruments should strongly inuence the given potential endoge-
nous variable (s) but not the selection into the treatment of interest for instance
or the dependent variable in the main equation. For dichotomous variables (e.g.,
membership of farmer-based organizations or extension access) we employed a probit
regression specication of the potential endogenous variable in addition to instru-
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mental variables in the rst-stage estimation, such as:
Si = Xijτ +Gijγ + ϵij (A.51)
where Si is a vector of the observed potential endogenous variables, X are the vari-
ables used in the main/selection equation, Gij is a vector of instrumental variables.
The vectors τ and γ are the parameters to be estimated and ϵij is the random error
term. To ensure identication, the instrumental variable, Gij included in equation
A.51 are excluded from the estimation of the main/selection equation. In the case
of the multinomial endogenous switching regression model and the standard endoge-
nous switching regression (ESR) model, it is also worth noting that the instrumental
variable(s) used for the control function approach is expected to not correlate with
the other instrumental variables used for model identication. Wooldridge (2015)
then proposes estimating a generalized residuals which uses the inverse Mills ratio
(the ratio of the standard normal density, ϕ, divided by the standard normal cumu-
lative distribution function, Φ) to compute the generalized residuals as follows.
Rij = Siλ(Xij τ̂)− (1 − Si)λ(−X ij τ̂), i = 1, ......, N (A.52)
where λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.) is the well- known inverse Mills ratio. Both potential
endogenous variable (s) and the estimated residuals predicted from equation A.52
are then incorporated into the main/selection equation to account for endogeneity
as follows:
U∗ij = Xijβ + Siϑ+Rijα + ωij (A.53)
whereXij is as dened previously, Si is a vector of the observed potential endogenous
variable(s), andRij is a vector of the generalized residuals terms from the rst-stage
regressions of the endogenous variables in equation A.52. The vectors β, ϑ and α are
the parameters to be estimated and ωij is the random error term. The endogenous
variables become appropriately exogenous in a second-stage estimation equation by
adding appropriate generalized residuals since they serve as the control function.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2015), the approach leads to a robust, regression-
based Hausman test for endogeneity of the suspected variables. If the coecient of
the residual term is statistically signicant, it shows that endogeneity was indeed
present and also well controlled for in the model. Furthermore, Wooldridge (2015)
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observed that if the coecient on the estimated generalized residual is statistically
signicant, there is a need to adjust the standard errors for the two-step estimation
by bootstrapping.
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